

Harris, James, 1709-1780


The works of James Harris with an account of his life and character ; in
two volumes


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
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THE
WORKS
OF
JAMES HARRIS, ESQ.
WITH
AN ACCOUNT OF HIS LIFE AND CHARACTER,
BY HIS SON
THE EARL OF MALMESBURY.

IN TWO VOLUMES. oo

VOL. I.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY LUKE HANSARD,
FOR F. WINGRAVE, SUCCESSOR TO
MR. NOURSE, IN THE STRAND.

1801. oo

Wb/69/311

THE

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THE EARL OF MARESBURY.

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VOL. I.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY LEEH HARRIS,

FOR F. WINGRAVE, SUCCESSOR TO

MR. NOBLE, IN THE STRAND.

1801.

TO
T H E K I N G.

SIR,
WHEN I ventured to solicit **YOUR**
MAJESTY'S permission to lay this Book at
YOUR feet, I considered that the end of my
Father's literary labours was to promote the
cause of truth and the moral interests of man-
kind;

DEDICATION.

kind; I therefore presumed to think that his Works might be offered, without impropriety, to the protection of a MONARCH, whose life and reign have been an uniform practice of Religion and Virtue.

TO YOUR MAJESTY Europe is indebted for whatever is still preserved to it of social order and legitimate Government: and we, SIR, who having the happiness to be YOUR MAJESTY's subjects, remain in the unimpaired enjoyment of our Religion, Liberties, and Laws, must feel that these inestimable blessings have, under Providence, been hitherto secured to us by YOUR MAJESTY's great and good example, and by the wisdom, steadiness,
and

DEDICATION.

and dignity with which You have exercised
YOUR Royal Authority. May YOUR MA-
JESTY long continue to reign over a free, grate-
ful, and united People.

I am,

SIR,

YOUR MAJESTY'S

Most dutiful Subject

and devoted Servant,

Park Place,
Sept. 10th, 1801. }

MALMESBURY.

DEDICATION.

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I am,

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Most dutiful Subject

and devoted Servant

MALMESBURY.

Printed by
Sept. 10th, 1801.

MEMOIRS

OF THE

LIFE AND CHARACTER

OF THE

AUTHOR.

A NEW Edition of my Father's Works having been for some time expected by the Public, I have been induced to prefix to it the following short Memoirs of his Life and Character.

There are few readers, I believe, who do not desire to know something more of an author than is commonly to be learned merely from his own writings. What he has been in private life, and in his domestic retirement; what appear to have been his habits of study, and of relaxation; how he has conducted himself as a member of society, so as to have deserved either praise or blame;—all these are natural topics of enquiry concerning every writer who has attained considerable literary eminence. To gratify a curiosity so reasonable, is one motive which

has engaged me in the present undertaking; but, I will confess, it is not the only one.

The pride which I feel in being the son of such a Father, and the gratitude and affection with which I must ever recollect him, have also powerfully induced me to pay this public tribute of respect to his memory. To his early care of my education, to his judicious introduction of me to respectable friends and patrons, to his constant good advice and excellent example, I am fond of attributing whatever credit I may have acquired in the various active employments that have fallen to my share.

I reflect with the highest pleasure on his having seen me, during many years, engaged in the service of my country; and I can with truth say, that such advantages of rank or distinction as I have been fortunate enough to acquire, which he did not live to witness, have, from that very circumstance, lost much of their value in my estimation.

JAMES HARRIS, Esq. the writer of these Volumes, was the eldest son of JAMES HARRIS, Esq. of the Clofe of Salisbury, by his second wife the Lady Elizabeth Ashley, who was third daughter of Anthony Earl of Shaftesbury, and sister to the celebrated author of the Characteristics,
as

as well as to the Hon. Maurice Ashley Cooper, the elegant translator of Xenophon's *Cyropædia*. He was born upon the 20th of July, 1709. The early part of his education was received at Salisbury, under the Rev. Mr. Hele, master of the grammar-school, in the Clofe, who was long known and respected in the West of England as an instructor of youth.

From Mr. Hele's school, at the age of sixteen, he was removed to Oxford, where he passed the usual number of years as a gentleman commoner of Wadham college. His father, as soon as he had finished his academical studies, entered him at Lincoln's Inn, not intending him for the bar, but, as was then a common practice, meaning to make the study of the law a part of his education.

When he had attained his twenty-fourth year, his father died. This event, by rendering him independent in fortune, and freeing him from all controul, enabled him to exchange the study of the law for other pursuits that accorded better with his inclination.

The strong and decided bent of his mind had always been towards the Greek and Latin classics. These he pre-

ferred to every other sort of reading; and to his favourite authors he now applied himself with avidity, retiring from London to the house in which his family had very long resided in the Clofe of Salisbury, for the sake of enjoying, without interruption, his own mode of living.

His application during fourteen or fifteen years to the best writers of antiquity continued to be almost unremitting, and his industry was such as is not often exceeded. He rose always very early, frequently at four or five o'clock in the morning, especially during the winter, because he could then most effectually insure a command of time to himself. By these means he was enabled to mix occasionally in the society of Salisbury and its neighbourhood, without too great a sacrifice of his main object, the acquisition of ancient literature.

I have heard my Father say, that it was not until many years after his retirement from London that he began to read Aristotle and his commentators, or to enquire, so deeply as he afterwards did, into the Greek philosophy. He had imbibed a prejudice, very common at that time even among scholars, that Aristotle was an obscure and unprofitable author, whose philosophy had been deservedly superseded

superfeded by that of Mr. Locke; a notion which my Father's own writings have since contributed to correct, with no small evidence and authority.

In the midst, however, of his literary labours he was not inattentive to the public good, but acted regularly and assiduously as a magistrate for the county of Wilts; giving, in that capacity, occasional proofs of a manly spirit and firmness, without which the mere formal discharge of magisterial duty is often useless and inefficient.

The first fruit which appeared to the world of so many years spent in the pursuit of knowledge, and in habits of deep speculation, was a volume published in 1744, containing three Treatises. The first concerning Art—The second concerning Music, Painting, and Poetry—The third concerning Happiness—These treatises, in addition to their merit as original compositions, are illustrated by a variety of learned notes and observations, elucidating many difficult passages of ancient writers, the study and examination of whom it was my Father's earnest wish to promote and to facilitate. Lord Monboddo, speaking of the Dialogue upon Art, praises it, as containing “ the
“ best specimen of the dividing, or diæretic manner, as
“ the

“ the ancients called it, that is to be found in any modern
“ book with which he is acquainted.”

In the month of July 1745, my Father was married to Miss Elizabeth Clarke, daughter, and eventually heiress, of John Clarke, Esq. of Sandford, near Bridgewater, in the county of Somerset. Five children were the issue of this marriage; two of whom died young; myself and two daughters only having survived my Father.

This change in his state of life by no means withdrew his attention from those studies in which he had been used to take so great delight, and which he had cultivated with such advantage and reputation; for in 1751 he published another work, called “Hermes,” or a philosophical enquiry concerning universal grammar.—An eulogium so honourable to this publication has been made on it by the learned Dr. Lowth, late Bishop of London, that I cannot deny myself the pleasure of here inserting it, as of indisputable weight and authority. —“ Those,” says the Bishop in the preface to his English Grammar, “ who would
“ enter deeply into the subject (of universal grammar) will
“ find it fully and accurately handled, with the greatest
“ acuteness of investigation, perspicuity of explication, and
“ elegance

“ elegance of method, in a treatise entitled *Hermes*, by
“ James Harris, Esq. the most beautiful example of ana-
“ lysis that has been exhibited since the days of Aris-
“ totle.”

What first led my Father to a deep and accurate consideration of the principles of universal grammar, was a book which he held in high estimation, and has frequently quoted in his *Hermes*, the *Minerva* of Sanctius. To that writer he confessed himself indebted for abundance of valuable information, of which it appears that he knew well how to profit, and to push his researches on the subject of grammar to a much greater length, by the help of his various and extensive erudition.

From the period of his marriage until the year 1761, my Father continued to live entirely at Salisbury, except in the summer, when he sometimes retired to his house at Durnford, near that city. It was there that he found himself most free from the interruption of business and of company, and at leisure to compose the chief part of those works which were the result of his study at other seasons. His time was divided between the care of his family, in which he placed his chief happiness, his literary pursuits, and the society of his friends and neighbours, with whom
he

he kept up a constant and cheerful intercourse. The superior taste and skill which he possessed in music, and his extreme fondness for hearing it, led him to attend to its cultivation in his native place with uncommon pains and success; inasmuch that, under his auspices, not only the Annual Musical Festival in Salisbury flourished beyond most institutions of the kind, but even the ordinary subscription-concerts were carried on, by his assistance and directions, with a spirit and effect seldom equalled out of the metropolis. Many of the beautiful selections made from the best Italian and German composers for these festivals and concerts, and adapted by my Father, sometimes to words selected from scripture, or from Milton's Paradise Lost, sometimes to compositions of his own, have survived the occasions on which they were first produced, and are still in great estimation. Two volumes of these selections have been lately published by Mr. Corfe, organist of Salisbury cathedral; the rest remain in manuscript in possession of my family. His own house, in the mean time, was the frequent scene of social and musical meetings; and I think I do not hazard too much in saying, that he contributed, both by his own conversation, and by the company which he often assembled at his house from various parts, to refine and improve the taste and manners of the place in which he resided.

In

In 1761, by the interest of his near relation and very respectable friend, the late Edward Hooper, Esq. of Hurn Court in Hampshire, my Father was chosen one of the Representatives in Parliament for the Borough of Christ Church, which seat he retained to the day of his death. The year following he accepted the office of one of the Lords of the Admiralty, from whence he was promoted in 1763 to be a Lord of the Treasury. He remained in that situation until the ministry with which he was connected went out of office in 1765; and after that time he did not hold any employment until 1774, when he became Secretary and Comptroller to the Queen. This appointment was always valued by him exceedingly; not only by reason of the handsome and flattering manner in which it was conferred upon him by Her Majesty, but also on account of the frequent occasions it afforded him of experiencing Her Majesty's gracious kindness and condescension, of which he had a very high sense, and which were continued to him, without interruption, to the end of his life; for in Her service he died.

Although assiduous in the discharge of his parliamentary duty, and occasionally taking a share in debates, my Father never contracted any violent spirit of party. He abhorred faction of every kind; nor did he ever relin-

Vol. I. c quish,

quish, for public business, those still more interesting pursuits which had made the delight and occupation of his earlier years. If they were somewhat intermitted during the sitting of Parliament, he renewed them with increased relish and satisfaction on his return into the country. Those who saw him in London, partaking with cheerfulness and enjoyment of a varied and extensive society, and frequenting dramatic and musical entertainments, while, during his stay in Salisbury, he always exercised a respectable, but well regulated hospitality, were surprized that he could have found time to compose and publish, in 1775, another learned work. It contains, under the title of *Philosophical Arrangements*, a part only of a larger work that he had meditated, but did not finish, upon the *Peripatetic Logic*. So far as relates to the *Arrangement* of Ideas, it is complete; but it has other objects also in view. It combats with great force and ability, the atheistical doctrines of Chance and Materialism—doctrines which have been lately revived in France, under the specious garb of modern philosophy, and, issuing from thence, have overspread a great part of Europe; destroying the happiness of mankind, by subverting, in every part of their progress, the foundations of morality and religion.

The

The last of my Father's literary productions was printed in 1780, by the name of *Philological Inquiries*, but not published sooner than 1781. It is a more popular work than any of his former ones; and contains rather a summary of the conclusions to which the philosophy of the ancients had conducted them in their critical inquiries, than a regular and perfect system. The principles on which those conclusions depend are therefore omitted, as being of a more abstruse nature than was agreeable to his design, which was to teach by illustration and example, not by strict demonstration. Indeed this publication appears to have been meant, not only as a retrospective view of those studies which exercised his mind in the full vigour of his life, but likewise as a monument of his affection towards many of his intimate friends. I cannot therefore but consider it as a pleasing proof of a mind retaining, at an advanced age, a considerable degree of its former energy and activity, together with, what is still more rarely to be found, an undiminished portion of its candour and benevolence.

Before this last volume was entirely concluded, my Father's health had evidently begun to be very much impaired. He never enjoyed a robust constitution; but for some time, towards the end of his life, the infirmities

under which he laboured had gradually increased. His family at length became apprehensive of a decline, symptoms of which were very apparent, and by none more clearly perceived than by himself. This was evident from a variety of little circumstances, but by no means from any impatience or fretfulness, nor yet from any dejection of spirits, such as are frequently incident to extreme weakness of body, especially when it proves to be the forerunner of approaching dissolution. On the contrary, the same equable and placid temper which had distinguished him throughout his whole life, the same tender and affectionate attention to his surrounding family, which he had unceasingly manifested while in health, continued, without the smallest change or abatement, to the very last; displaying a mind thoroughly at peace with itself, and able without disturbance or dismay to contemplate the awful prospect of futurity.

After his strength had been quite exhausted by illness, he expired calmly on the 22d of December, 1780, in the 72d year of his age.

His remains were deposited in the north aisle of the cathedral church of Salisbury, near those of his ancestors; and I cannot forbear to record tokens of unsolici-
cited

cited respect, honourable to my Father's memory, and soothing to the recollection of his family, which were shewn from various quarters upon that melancholy occasion. Six gentlemen, his friends and neighbours, supported the pall. At the western door of the cathedral the corpse was met by the whole choir, and a funeral anthem was performed while the procession moved towards the grave. On the ensuing Sunday, the Rev. Mr. Chaffy, who preached at the cathedral, adverted in his sermon to the recent event of my Father's death with such apposite and judicious commendation, as at once to mark his own sincere respect for a deceased neighbour, and strongly to excite the sympathy of his audience by the truths delivered concerning him.

A monument was soon after erected to the memory of my Father, near the spot where he was interred, on which is the following inscription:

M. S.

M. S.

Jacobi Harris Sarisburiensis

Viri boni, et docti,

Græcarum Literarum præcipuè periti,

Cujus Opera accuratissima

De Artibus elegantioribus

De Grammaticâ, de Logicâ, de Ethicâ,

Stylo brevi, limato, simplici,

Sui More Aristotelis

Conscripta,

Posterì laudabunt ultimi.

Studiis feuerioribus addictus,

Communis tamen vitæ officia,

Et omnia Patris, Mariti,

Civis, Senatoris munia,

Et implevit et ornavit.

Obiit XXII. Die Decembris, M,DCC,LXXX.

Anno Ætatis LXXII.

Above this Infcription, a female Figure of Philosophy is represented, holding over a Medallion of my Father a Scroll, with the following infcription:

Το Φρονειν

Μονον αγαθον

Το δ'αφρονειν

Κακον.

It

It remains for me to add some farther particulars concerning my Father, which, I think, are requisite to make his character completely understood.

The distinction by which he was most generally known, while living, and by which he is likely to survive to posterity, is that of a Man of Learning. His profound knowledge of Greek, which he applied more successfully, perhaps, than any modern writer has done, to the study and explanation of ancient philosophy, arose from an early and intimate acquaintance with the excellent poets and historians in that language. They, and the best writers of the Augustan age, were his constant and never-failing recreation. By his familiarity with them, he was enabled to enliven and to illustrate his deeper and more abstruse speculations, as every page almost of these volumes will abundantly testify. But his attainments were not confined to ancient philosophy, and classical learning. He possessed likewise a general knowledge of modern history, with a very distinguishing taste in the fine arts, in one of which, as before observed, he was an eminent proficient. His singular industry empowered him to make these various acquisitions, without neglecting any of the duties which he owed to his family, his friends, or his

his country. I am in possession of such proofs, besides those already given to the public, of my Father's laborious study and reflection, as, I apprehend, are very rarely to be met with. Not only was he accustomed, through a long series of years, to make copious extracts from the different books which he read, and to write critical remarks and conjectures on many of the passages extracted, but he was also in the habit of regularly committing to writing such reflections as arose out of his study, which evince a mind carefully disciplined, and anxiously bent on the attainment of self-knowledge, and self-government. And yet, though habituated to deep thinking and laborious reading, he was generally cheerful, even to playfulness. There was no pedantry in his manners or conversation, nor was he ever seen either to display his learning with ostentation, or to treat with slight or superciliousness those less informed than himself. He rather sought to make them appear partakers of what he knew, than to mortify them by a parade of his own superiority. Nor had he any of that miserable fastidiousness about him which too often disgraces men of learning, and prevents their being amused or interested, at least their choosing to appear so, by common performances and common events.

It

It was with him a maxim, that the most difficult, and infinitely the preferable, sort of criticism, both in literature and in the arts, was that which consists in finding out beauties, rather than defects; and although he certainly wanted not judgment to distinguish and to prefer superior excellence of any kind, he was too reasonable to expect it should very often occur, and too wise to allow himself to be disgusted at common weakness or imperfection. He thought, indeed, that the very attempt to please, however it might fall short of its aim, deserved some return of thanks, some degree of approbation; and that to endeavour at being pleased by such efforts, was due to justice, to good-nature, and to good sense.

Far at the same time from that presumptuous conceit which is solicitous about mending others, and that moroseness which feeds its own pride by dealing in general censure, he cultivated to the utmost that great moral wisdom, by which we are made humane, gentle, and forgiving; thankful for the blessings of life, acquiescent in the afflictions we endure, and submissive to all the dispensations of Providence. He detested the gloom of superstition, and the persecuting spirit by which it is so often accompanied; but he abhorred still more the baneful and destructive system of modern philosophy; and from his

early solicitude to inspire me with a hatred of it, it would almost seem that he foresaw its alarming approach and fatal progress. There is no obligation which I acknowledge with more thankfulness; none that I shall more anxiously endeavour to confer upon my own children, from a thorough conviction of its value and importance.

My Father's affection to every part of his family was exemplary and uniform. As a husband, a parent, a master, he was ever kind and indulgent; and it deserves to be mentioned to his honour, that he thought it no interruption of his graver occupations, himself to instruct his daughters, by exercising them daily both in reading and composition, and writing essays for their improvement, during many of their younger years. No man was a better judge of what belonged to female education, and the elegant accomplishments of the sex, or more disposed to set a high value upon them. But he had infinitely more at heart, that his children should be early habituated to the practice of religion and morality, and deeply impressed with their true principles. To promote this desirable end, he was assiduous both by instruction and example; being himself a constant attendant upon public worship, and enforcing that great duty upon every part of his family. The deep sense of moral and religious obligation

obligation which was habitual to him, and those benevolent feelings which were so great a happiness to his family and friends, had the same powerful influence over his public, as his private life. He had an ardent zeal for the prosperity of his country, whose real interests he well understood; and in his parliamentary conduct he proved himself a warm friend to the genuine principles of religious and civil liberty, as well as a firm supporter of every branch of our admirable Constitution.

MALMESBURY.

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MALMESBURY.

GENERAL CONTENTS;

OR, AN

ANALYSIS OF THE WHOLE.

VOLUME THE FIRST.

MEMOIRS of the LIFE and CHARACTER of the AUTHOR.

CONTENTS of the THREE TREATISES.

TREATISE the FIRST.—A DIALOGUE concerning ART. To the
Right Honourable the Earl of SHAFTESBURY - - - - page 1
Advertifement to the Reader - - - - - 2

TREATISE the SECOND.—A DISCOURSE on MUSIC, PAINTING, and
 POETRY - - - - - 31

CHAP.

I. INTRODUCTION — *Design and Distribution of the Whole—*
Preparation for the following Chapters - - - - 33
 II. ON the Subjects which Painting imitates—On the Subjects
which Music imitates—Comparison of Music with Painting 37
 III. ON the Subjects which Poetry imitates, but imitates only thro'
natural Media, or mere Sounds—Comparison of Poetry in
this Capacity, first with Painting, then with Music - - 42

IV. ON

CHAP.

IV. ON the Subjects which Poetry imitates, not by mere Sounds or natural Media, but by Words significant; the Subjects being such to which the Genius of each of the other two Arts is most perfectly adapted. — Its Comparison in these Subjects, first with Painting, then with Music - - - - -	page 45
V. ON the Subjects which Poetry imitates by Words significant, being at the same time Subjects not adapted to the Genius of either of the other Arts — The Nature of these Subjects. — The Abilities of Poetry to imitate them. — Comparison of Poetry in respect of these Subjects, first with Painting, then with Music - -	49
VI. ON Music considered not as an Imitation, but as deriving its Efficacy from another Source. — On its joint Operation by this means with Poetry. — An Objection to Music solved. — The Advantage arising to it, as well as to Poetry, from their being united. — Conclusion - - - - -	56
TREATISE the THIRD. — Concerning HAPPINESS, A Dialogue	61
Part the First - - - - -	63
Part the Second - - - - -	105
NOTES on TREATISE the FIRST: Concerning ART - - - - -	143
NOTES on TREATISE the THIRD: Concerning HAPPINESS -	159
Additional NOTE on TREATISE the SECOND - - - - -	195
Additional NOTES on TREATISE the THIRD - - - - -	199
POSTSCRIPT - - - - -	203

CONTENTS of HERMES.

HERMES: or A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY, concerning Universal Grammar. Addressed to the Right Honourable PHILIP Lord HARDWICKE, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain - -	page 205
Dedication - - - - -	207
Preface - - - - -	209

BOOK I.

CHAP.

I. INTRODUCTION. Design of the Whole - - - - -	215
II. Concerning the Analyzing of Speech into its smallest Parts -	220
III. Concerning the several Species of those smallest Parts - -	228
IV. Concerning Substantives, properly so called - - - - -	236
V. Concerning Substantives of the Secondary Order - - - -	251
VI. Concerning Attributives, and first concerning Verbs - - -	263
VII. Concerning Time and Tenses - - - - -	270
VIII. Concerning Modes - - - - -	293
IX. Concerning Verbs, as to their Species and other remaining Properties - - - - -	311
X. Concerning those other Attributives, Participles and Adjectives	317
XI. Concerning Attributives of the Secondary Order - - -	321

BOOK II.

I. Concerning Definitives - - - - -	332
II. Concerning Connectives, and first those called Conjunctions -	345
III. Concerning those other Connectives, called Prepositions - -	357
IV. Concerning Cases - - - - -	364
V. Concerning Interjections — Recapitulation — Conclusion -	372

B O O K III.

CHAP.

I. <i>Introduction—Division of the Subject into its principal Parts,</i>	p. 380
II. <i>Upon the Matter or common Subject of Language</i>	- - - 386
III. <i>Upon the Form, or peculiar Character of Language</i>	- - - 393
IV. <i>Concerning general or universal Ideas</i>	- - - 405
V. <i>Subordination of Intelligence—Difference of Ideas, both in particular Men, and in whole Nations—Different Genius of different Languages—Character of the English, the Oriental, the Latin, and the Greek Languages—Superlative Excellence of the Last—Conclusion</i>	- - - 431
<i>Additional NOTES</i>	- - - 445
INDEX to the THREE TREATISES.	
INDEX to HERMES.	

VOLUME THE SECOND.

CONTENTS of the PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS. <i>Address to the Right Honourable THOMAS Lord HYDE, Chancellor of the Dutchy of Lancaster, &c.</i>	- - - page 1
<i>Advertisement</i>	- - - 3

CHAP.

I. INTRODUCTION—Scope or End of the Inquiry—begins from the ARRANGEMENT of simple, or single Terms—Character of these Terms—Nature and Multitude of the Objects, which they represent	- - - 5
II. <i>A Method</i>	

CHAP.

- II. *A Method of ARRANGEMENT proposed—rejected, and why—another Method proposed—adopted, and why—General Remarks—Plan of the Whole* - - - - - page 18
- III. Concerning SUBSTANCE natural—how continued, or carried on—Principles of this Continuation, two—increased to three—reduced again to two—these last two, Form and a Subject, or rather, Form and Matter - - - - - 25
- IV. Concerning MATTER—an imperfect Description of it—it's Nature and the Necessity of it's existence, traced out and proved—first by Abstraction—then by Analogy—Illustrations from Mythology - - - - - 38
- V. Concerning FORM—An imperfect Description of it—Primary Forms, united with Matter, make Body—Body Mathematical—Body Physical—how they differ—Essential Forms—Transition to Forms of a Character superior to the passive and elementary 49
- VI. Concerning FORM, considered as an EFFICIENT ANIMATING PRINCIPLE—Harmony in Nature between the living and the lifeless—Ovid, a philosophical Poet—Farther Description of the Animating Principle from it's Operations, Energies, and Effects—Virgil—The Active and the Passive Principle run thro' the Universe—Mind, Region of Forms—Corporeal Connections, where necessary, where obstructive—Means and Ends—their different Precedence according to different Systems—Empedocles, Lucretius, Prior, Galen, Cicero, Aristotle, &c. Providence - 55
- VII. Concerning the Properties of Substance, attributed to it in the Peripatetic Logic - - - - - 75
- VIII. Concerning QUALITIES—corporeal and incorporeal—natural and acquired—of Capacity, and Completion—Transitions immediate, and thro' a medium—Dispositions—Habits—Genius—Primary and imperfect Capacity—Secondary and perfect—where it is, that no Capacities exist—Qualities, penetrating and superficial—

CHAP.

- Essential Form—Figure, an important Quality—Figures intellectual, natural, artificial, phantastic—Colour, Roughness, Smoothness, &c.—Persons of Quality—PROPERTIES of Quality—Some rejected, one admitted, and why - - - - page 81*
- IX.** *Concerning QUANTITY—its two Species, their Characters—Time and Place, their Characters—PROPERTY of Quantity, what—Quantities relative—Figure and Number, their Effect upon Quantity—Importance of this Effect—Sciences Mathematical appertain to it—their Use, according to Plato—How other Beings partake of Quantity—Analogy, found in Mind—Common Sense and Genius, how distinguished—Amazing efficacy of this Genus in and thro' the World—Illustrations - - - 102*
- X.** *Concerning RELATIVES—their Source—Relatives apparent—real—their Properties, reciprocal—Inference, and Co-existence—Force of Relation in Ethics—in matters Dramatic—in Nature, and the Order of Being—Relations, amicable and hostile—Evil—Want—Friendship—Strife—Relation of all to the Supreme Cause—Extent and Use of this Predicament, or Arrangement - - - - - 120*
- XI.** *Concerning ACTION and PASSION—Action, its five Species—those of Passion reciprocate—Mind Divine—Human—the latter, how acted upon—Politics, Oeconomics, Ethics—Passivity in Bodies animate, and inanimate—Action, and Re-action, where they exist, where not—Self-motion, what, and where—Power, whence, and what—requisite both in Action and in Passion—Power, tho' like Non-Entity, yet widely different—Double in the reasoning Faculty—Power, not first in existence, but Energy, which never has ceased, or will cease, or can cease - - - - 141*
- XII.** *Concerning WHEN and WHERE—Concerning Time and Place, and their Definitions—When and Where, how distinguished from Time and Place, how connected with them—Descriptions of
When*

CHAP.

When and Where—their Utility and Importance in human Life—Various Terms, denoting these two Predicaments—others denoting them not, yet made to denote them—When and Where, their extensive influence—plausible Topics—concurring Causes—Opportunity, what—Chance, what it is not, what it is—Fate, Providence—co-operating Causes—Supreme Intelligence, p. 162

XIII. Concerning POSITION or SITUATION—*What it is, and how deduced—how it exists in Beings inanimate—in Vegetables—in Man—animal Progression—Works of Art—Attitudes—Illustrations of Attitude—from Poets—from Actors—from Orators—its Efficacy, whence—Position, among the Elements of Democritus—its influence and Importance in the natural World—in the intellectual - - - - - 176*

XIV. Concerning HABIT, or rather the BEING HABITED—*Its Description—its principal Species deduced and illustrated—its Privation—Conclusion of the second or middle part of the Treatise - - - - - 194*

XV. Concerning the APPENDAGES to the Universal Genera or Arrangements; that is to say concerning OPPOSITES, PRIOR, SUBSEQUENT, TOGETHER, or AT ONCE, and MOTION, usually called Post Predicaments—the Modes or Species of all these (Motion excepted) deduced and illustrated—Preparation for the Theory of MOTION - - - - - 201

XVI. Concerning MOTION PHYSICAL—*Its various Species deduced and illustrated—blend themselves with each other, and why—Contrariety, Opposition, Rest—Motion Physical—an Object of all the Senses—Common Objects of Sensation, how many—MOTION, a Thing not simple, but complicated with many other Things—its Definition or Description taken from the Peripatetics—the Accounts given of it by Pythagoras and Plato analogous to that of Aristotle, and why - - - - - 213*

CHAP.

XVII.	Concerning MOTION NOT-PHYSICAL— <i>This means METAPHYSICAL, and why so called—Spontaneity—Want—Perception, Consciousness, Anticipation, Preconception—Appetite, Resentment, Reason—Motion Physical and Metaphysical, how united—Discord and Harmony of the internal Principles—Powers vegetative, animal, rational—Immortality—REST, it's several Species—MOTION, to what perceptive Beings it appertains; to what not—and whence the Difference</i> - - - - -	page 227
XVIII.	Conclusion—Utilities deducible from the Theory of these Arrangements—Recapitulation - - - - -	252
	Additional NOTES - - - - -	259

 CONTENTS of the PHILOLOGICAL INQUIRIES.

PHILOLOGICAL INQUIRIES.	<i>Address to EDWARD HOOPER, Esq. of Hurn-Court, in the County of Hants</i> - - - - -	page 271
-------------------------	---	----------

PART THE FIRST.

CHAP.

I.	Concerning the Rise of CRITICISM in its FIRST SPECIES, the PHILOSOPHICAL— <i>eminent Persons, GREEKS and ROMANS, by whom this Species was cultivated</i> - - - - -	278
II.	Concerning the Progress of CRITICISM in its SECOND SPECIES, the HISTORICAL— <i>GREEK and ROMAN CRITICS, by whom this Species of Criticism was cultivated</i> - - - - -	283
III.	MODERNS, <i>eminent in the two species of Criticism before mentioned, the PHILOSOPHICAL and the HISTORICAL—the last Sort of Critics more numerous—those, mentioned in this Chapter, confined to the Greek and Latin Languages</i> - - - - -	285

IV. MODERN

CHAP.

- IV. MODERN Critics of the Explanatory kind, commenting MODERN Writers—Lexicographers—Grammarians—Translators, page 289
- V. Rise of the THIRD SPECIES of CRITICISM, the CORRECTIVE—practised by the Ancients, but much more by the Moderns, and WHY - - - - - 293
- VI. CRITICISM may have been ABUSED—Yet DEFENDED, as of the last Importance to the Cause of Literature - - - - - 296
- VII. Conclusion—Recapitulation—Preparation for the Second Part 299

PART THE SECOND.

- INTRODUCTION - - - - - 303
- I. THAT THE EPIC WRITERS CAME FIRST, and that NOTHING EXCELLENT IN LITERARY Performances happens merely from CHANCE—the CAUSES, or REASONS of such Excellence, illustrated by Examples - - - - - 305
- II. NUMEROUS COMPOSITION—derived from QUANTITY SYLLABIC—anciently essential both to Verse and Prose—Rhythm—Peans and Cretics, the Feet for Prose—QUANTITY ACCENTUAL—a Degeneracy from the SYLLABIC—Instances of it—first in Latin—then in Greek—Versus Politici—Traces of Accentual Quantity in Terence—essential to Modern Languages, and among others to English, from which last Examples are taken - 315
- III. QUANTITY VERBAL in English—a few Feet pure, and agreeable to SYLLABIC QUANTITY—instances—yet ACCENTUAL QUANTITY prevalent—instances—transition to PROSE—English Pæans, instances of—RHYTHM governs Quantity, where this last is Accentual - - - - - 327
- IV. Other Decorations of Prose besides Prosaic Feet—ALLITERATION—SENTENCES—PERIODS—Caution to avoid excess in consecutive Monosyllables—Objections, made and answered—Authorities alledged—Advice about READING - - - - 333
- V. Concerning

CHAP.

- V. Concerning *WHOLE and PARTS*, as essential to the constituting of a legitimate Work—the Theory illustrated from *THE GEORGICS OF VIRGIL*, and *THE MENEXENUS OF PLATO*—same Theory applied to smaller pieces—*TOTALITY*, essential to small Works, as well as great—*Examples to illustrate*—*ACCURACY*, another Essential—more so to smaller pieces, and *WHY*—Transition to *DRAMATIC SPECULATION* - - - - - page 346
- VI. *DRAMATIC SPECULATIONS*—the constitutive Parts of every Drama, Six in number—which of these belong to other Artists—which, to the Poet—transition to those, which appertain to the Poet - - - - - 358
- VII. In the constitutive Parts of a Drama, the *FABLE* considered first—its different Species—which fit for Comedy; which, for Tragedy—*Illustrations by Examples*—*REVOLUTIONS*—*DISCOVERIES*—*Tragic Passions*—*Lillo's Fatal Curiosity* compared with the *Oedipus Tyrannus* of Sophocles—Importance of Fables, both Tragic and Comic—how they differ—bad Fables, whence—other Dramatic Requisites, without the Fable, may be excellent—*Fifth Acts*, how characterised by some Dramatic Writers - - 362
- VIII. Concerning *DRAMATIC MANNERS*—what constitutes them—*Manners of Othello, Macbeth, Hamlet*,—these of the last questioned, and *WHY*—Consistency required—yet sometimes blameable, and *WHY*—*Genuine Manners in Shakspeare*—in *Lillo*—*Manners, morally bad, poetically good* - - - - - 373
- IX. Concerning *DRAMATIC SENTIMENT*—what constitutes it—Connected with *MANNERS*, and *HOW*—Concerning *SENTIMENT GNOMOLOGIC*, or *PRECEPTIVE*—its Description—Sometimes has a Reason annexed to it—Sometimes laudable, sometimes blameable—whom it most becomes to utter Sentences, and *WHY*—*Bosju*—Transition to *DICTION* - - - - - 377
- X. Concerning *DICTION*—the vulgar—the affected—the elegant—this last, much indebted to the *METAPHOR*—Praise of the *METAPHOR*—

CHAP.

- TAPHOR—*it's Description; and, when good, it's Character—the best and most excellent, WHAT—not turgid—nor enigmatic—nor base—nor ridiculous—instances—Metaphors by constant use sometimes become common Words—PUNS—Rupilius REX—OTTIE—ENIGMAS—Cupping—The God TERMINUS—Ovid's Fasti, 383*
- XI. RANK or PRECEDENCE of the constitutive Parts of the Drama—Remarks and Cautions both for Judging, and Composing 395
- XII. RULES defended—do not cramp GENIUS, but guide it—flattering Doctrine, that GENIUS will suffice—fallacious, and WHY—farther defence of RULES—No GENIUS ever acted without them; nor ever a Time, when RULES did not exist—Connection between RULES and GENIUS—their reciprocal aid—End of THE SECOND PART—Preparation for THE THIRD - page 401

PART THE THIRD.

- I. Design of the whole—Limits and Extent of THE MIDDLE AGE—THREE CLASSES of Men, during that interval, conspicuous; THE BYZANTINE GREEKS; THE SARACENS or ARABIANS; and THE LATINS or FRANKS, Inhabitants of Western Europe—Each Class in the following Chapters considered apart - 415
- II. Concerning the first Class, THE BYZANTINE GREEKS—SIMPLICIUS—AMMONIUS—PHILOPONUS—Fate of the fine Library at Alexandria - - - - - 421
- III. Digression to a short Historical Account of ATHENS, from the time of her Persian Triumphs, to that of her becoming subject to the Turks—Sketch, during this long interval, of her Political and Literary State; of her Philosophers; of her Gymnasia; of her good and bad Fortune, &c. &c.—Manners of the present Inhabitants—Olives and Honey - - - - - 426
- IV. Account of Byzantine Scholars continued—SUIDAS—JOHN STOBÆUS or of STOBA—PHOTIUS—MICHAEL PSELLUS—this last said

CHAP.

- said to have commented twenty-four Plays of MENANDER—Reasons, to make this probable—EUSTATHIUS, a Bishop, the Commentator of HOMER—EUSTRATIUS, a Bishop, the Commentator of ARISTOTLE—PLANUDES, a Monk, the admirer and translator of LATIN Classics, as well as the Compiler of one of the present GREEK ANTHOLOGIES—Conjectures concerning the duration of THE LATIN TONGUE at Constantinople, page 444*
- V. NICETAS, THE CHONIATE—*his curious Narrative of the Mischiefs done by BALDWIN'S CRUSADE, when they sackt CONSTANTINOPLE in the Year 1205—many of the Statues described, which they then destroyed—a fine Taste for Arts among the GREEKS, even in those Days, proved from this Narrative—not so, among the CRUSADERS—Authenticity of Nicetas's Narrative—State of CONSTANTINOPLE at the last Period of the Grecian Empire, as given by contemporary Writers, PHILELPHUS and ÆNEAS SYLVIUS—NATIONAL PRIDE among the Greeks not totally extinct even at this Day - - - - - 452*
- VI. Concerning THE SECOND CLASS of Geniuses during the middle Age, THE ARABIANS, or SARACENS—at first, barbarous—their Character before the time of Mahomet—Their greatest Caliphs were from among the ABASSIDE—ALMANZUR one of the first of that race—ALMAMUM of the same race, a great Patron of Learning, and learned Men—ARABIANS cultivated Letters, as their Empire grew settled and established—Translated the best Greek Authors into their own Language—Historians, ABULPHARAGIUS, ABULFEDA, BOHADIN—Extracts from the last concerning SALADIN - - - - - 463
- VII. ARABIAN POETRY, and Works of Invention—Facts relative to their Manners and Characters - - - - - 476
- VIII. ARABIANS favoured MEDICINE and ASTROLOGY—facts, relative to these two subjects—they valued KNOWLEDGE, but had no Ideas of CIVIL LIBERTY—the mean Exit of their last Caliph, MOSTASSEM—

CHAP.

- SEM—*End of their Empire in ASIA, and in SPAIN—their present wretched degeneracy in AFRICA—an Anecdote* - - page 492
- IX. Concerning the LATINS or FRANKS—BEDE, ALCUIN, JOANNES ERIGENA, &c. GERBERTUS or GIBERTUS, travelled to the Arabians in Spain for improvement—suspected of MAGIC—this the misfortune of many superior Geniuses in dark Ages; of BACON, PETRARCH, FAUST, and others—Erudition of THE CHURCH; Ignorance of THE LAITY—INGULPHUS, an Englishman, educated in the Court of Edward the Confessor—attached himself to the Duke of Normandy—accomplished Character of QUEEN EGITHA, Wife of the Confessor—Plan of Education in those Days—THE PLACES of Study, THE AUTHORS studied—Canon Law, Civil Law, Holy War, Inquisition—Troubadours—WILLIAM OF POICTOU—Debauchery, Corruption, and Avarice of the Times—WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR, his Character and Taste—his Sons, RUFUS and HENRY—little Incidents concerning them—HILDEBERT, a Poet of the times—fine Verses of his quoted - - - - - 501
- X. SCHOOLMEN—their Rise and Character—their Titles of Honour—Remarks on such Titles—ABELARD and HELOISA—JOHN of SALISBURY—admirable Quotations from his two celebrated Works—GIRALDUS CAMBRIENSIS—WALTER MAPPS—RICHARD COEUR DE LEON—his Transactions with Saladin—his Death, and the singular Interview, which immediately preceded it - 522
- XI. Concerning the POETRY of the LATTER LATINS or WESTERN EUROPEANS—Accentual Quantity—RHIME—Samples of RHIME in Latin—in Classical Poets, accidental; in those of a later age, designed—RHIME among the Arabians—ODILO, HUCBALDUS, HILDIGRIM, HALABALDUS, Poets or Heroes of the Western Europe—RHIMES in MODERN Languages—of Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Chaucer, &c.—Sannazarius, a pure

CHAP.

- Writer in Classic Latin, without Rhime—Anagrams, Chronograms, &c. finely and accurately described by the ingenious Author of the SCRIBLERIAD - - - - - page 537*
- XII. PAUL the Venetian, and SIR JOHN MANDEVILLE, great Travellers—SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, a great Lawyer—his valuable Book, addrest to his Pupil, the Prince of Wales—KING'S COLLEGE CHAPEL in Cambridge, FOUNDED BY HENRY THE SIXTH - - - - - 550
- XIII. Concerning NATURAL BEAUTY—its Idea the same in all Times—THESSALIAN TEMPE—Taste of VIRGIL, and HORACE—of MILTON, in describing Paradise—exhibited of late years first in Pictures—thence transferred to ENGLISH Gardens—not wanting to the enlightened Few of the middle Age—proved in LELAND, PETRARCH, and SANNAZARIUS—comparison between the Younger CYRUS, and PHILIP LE BEL of France, 557
- XIV. SUPERIOR LITERATURE and KNOWLEDGE both of the Greek and Latin CLERGY, whence—BARBARITY and IGNORANCE of the LAITY, whence—Samples of Lay-manners, in a Story from ANNA COMNENA'S History—CHURCH AUTHORITY ingeniously employed to check Barbarity—the same Authority employed for other good Purposes—to save the poor Jews—to stop Trials by Battle—more suggested concerning Lay-manners—Ferocity of the NORTHERN LAYMEN, whence—different Causes assigned—INVENTIONS during the dark Ages—great, tho' the Inventors often unknown—Inference arising from these Inventions - 565
- XV. Opinions on PAST Ages, and the PRESENT—Conclusion arising from the Discussion of these Opinions—CONCLUSION OF THE WHOLE - - - - - 574

APPENDIX OF DIFFERENT PIECES.

THE FIRST, containing an Account of the ARABIC MANUSCRIPTS,
belonging to the ESCURIAL LIBRARY *in Spain* - - - page 589

THE SECOND, containing an Account of THE MANUSCRIPTS OF LIVY,
in the same LIBRARY - - - - - 596

THE THIRD, containing an Account of THE MANUSCRIPTS OF
CEBES, in THE LIBRARY OF THE KING OF FRANCE, at *Paris*, 600

THE FOURTH, containing some Account of LITERATURE IN RUSSIA,
and of its *Progress towards being CIVILIZED* - - - - - 602

INDEX to the PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

INDEX to the PHILOLOGICAL INQUIRIES.

*Directions to the Binder for placing the Two PORTRAITS, and the
DECORATIVE ENGRAVINGS from Designs of the late JAMES STUART,
Esq; to Mr. HARRIS'S WORKS, 2 Vols. 4to.*

N. B. The Book to be beat before the Prints are inserted.

VOLUME THE FIRST:

PORTRAIT of the AUTHOR 1740, ÆT. SV. XXXI. - - to face the Title Page.

THREE TREATISES - - - - - to face signature B page 1.

For an Account of this elegant Frontispiece, see page 203.

HERMES - - - - - to face page 205.

For a Description of this Plate, see page 391.

VOLUME THE SECOND:

PORTRAIT of the AUTHOR 1776, ÆT. SV. LXVII. - - to face the Title Page.

PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS - - - to face signature B page 1.

For an Account of this Print, see page 256.

PHILOLOGICAL INQUIRIES - - - - - to face page 271.

This elegant Frontispiece was designed according to the idea of Mr. HARRIS, as mentioned in pages 431, 432. The back-ground, or scene of the Picture, is the Peribolus, or Wall, which encloses a GYMNASIUM, and the PORTAL thro' which you pass into it. On each side of the Portal is a Statue placed in a niche; one of them represents Mercury, the other Hercules. Two Youths approach the Gymnasium, and a Philosopher who attends them, is speaking to them before they enter. Over the wall are seen the tops of trees with which the Gymnasium is planted.

THE ENGRAVING, which is inserted at page 585 of this volume, of HERCULES RESTING FROM HIS LABOUR—was made from an impression in sulphur of a Gem, probably an antique Gem; which impression was given to Mr. HARRIS by Mr. HOARE of Bath. Its correspondence, in most particulars, with the figure of HERCULES described by NICETAS, and mentioned in pages 454, 455, induced Mr. HARRIS to imagine that it might possibly be some Copy, or Memorial, of that Figure; for which reason he thought an Engraving of it might properly find a place in This Work.



Ja: Stuart Esq: del:

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THREE TREATISES.

THREE TREATISES

THE FIRST
CONCERNING ART

THE SECOND
CONCERNING MUSIC
PAINTING AND POETRY

THE THIRD
CONCERNING HAPPINESS

First published in the Year 1744.

VOL. I.

B

Advertisement to the Reader.

IN the Treatises here published, there is the following Connection. The first treats of Art in its most comprehensive Idea, when considered as a Genus to many subordinate Species. The second considers three of these subordinate Species, whose Beauty and Elegance are well known to all. The last treats of that Art, which respects the Conduct of Human Life, and which may justly be valued, as of all Arts the most important, if it can truly lead us to the End proposed.

The Author has chosen to separate all Notes from his first and third Treatises, and subjoin them to the End, because those Treatises, being written in Dialogue, from their Nature and Genius admit not of Interruption. One of his Reasons for adding Notes was, to give Weight to his Assertions from the Authority of antient Writers. But his chief and principal Reason was, to excite (if possible) the Curiosity of Readers, to examine with stricter Attention those valuable Remains of antient Literature. Should he obtain this End, he shall think his Labours (such as they are) abundantly rewarded.

TREATISE THE FIRST

A DIALOGUE
CONCERNING ART

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE
EARL OF SHAFTESBURY

CONFESSION AND
A DIALOGUE

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE
LORDS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL

CONCERNING ART

A DIALOGUE

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE
EARL OF SHAFTESBURY

MY LORD,

THE following is a Conversation in its kind somewhat uncommon, and for this Reason I have remembered it more minutely than I could imagine. Should the same Peculiarity prove a Reason to amuse your Lordship, I shall think myself well rewarded in the Labour of reciting. If not, you are candid enough to accept of the Intention, and to think there is some Merit even in the Sincerity of my Endeavours. To make no longer Preface, the Fact was as follows.

A FRIEND from a distant Country having by chance made me a Visit, we were tempted by the Serenity of a chearful Morning in the Spring, to walk from *Salisbury* to see Lord *Pembroke's* at *Wilton*. The Beauties of Gardening, Architecture, Painting, and Sculpture belonging to that Seat, were the Subject of great Entertainment to my Friend: Nor was I, for my own part, less delighted than he was, to find that our Walk had so well answered his Expectations. We had given a large Scope to our Curiosity, when we left the Seat, and leisurely began our return towards home.

AND

AND here, my Lord, in passing over a few pleasant Fields, commenced the Conversation which I am to tell you, and which fell at first, as was natural, on the many curious Works, which had afforded us both so elegant an Amusement. This led us insensibly to discoursing upon ART, for we both agreed, that whatever we had been admiring of Fair and Beautiful, could all be referred to no other Cause. And here, I well remember, I called upon my Friend to give me his Opinion upon the meaning of the word ART: A word it was (I told him) in the Mouth of every one; but that nevertheless, as to its precise and definite Idea, this might still be a Secret; that so it was in fact with a thousand Words beside, all no less common, and equally familiar, and yet all of them equally vague and undetermined. To this he answered, That as to the precise and definite Idea of Art, it was a Question of some Difficulty, and not so soon to be resolved; that, however, he could not conceive a more likely Method of coming to know it, than by considering those several Particulars, to each of which we gave the Name. It is hardly probable, said he, that Music, Painting, Medicine, Poetry, Agriculture, and so many more, should be *all called by one common Name, if there was not something in each, which was common to all.* It should seem so, replied I. What then, said he, shall we pronounce this to be? At this, I remember, I was under some sort of Hesitation. Have Courage, cried my Friend, perhaps the Case is not so desperate. Let me ask you—Is Medicine the Cause of any thing? Yes surely, said I, of Health. And Agriculture, of what? Of the plentiful Growth of Grain. And Poetry, of what? Of Plays and Satires, and Odes, and the like. And is not the same true, said he, of Music, of Statuary, of Architecture, and, in short, of every Art whatever? I confess,

I confess, said I, it seems so. Suppose then, said he, we should say, *It was common to every Art to be a Cause*—Should we err? I replied, I thought not. Let this then, said he, be remembered, that *all Art is Cause*. I promised him it should.

BUT how then, continued he, if *all Art be Cause*, is it also true, that *all Cause is Art*? At this again I could not help hesitating.

You have heard, said he, without doubt, of that Painter famed in Story, who being to paint the Foam of a Horse, and not succeeding to his Mind, threw at the Picture in Resentment a Sponge bedaubed with Colours, and produced a Foam the most natural imaginable. Now, what say you to this Fact? Shall we pronounce Art to have been the Cause? By no means, said I. What, said he, if instead of *Chance*, his Hand had been guided by mere *Compulsion*, himself dissenting and averse to the Violence? Even here, replied I, nothing could have been referred to his Art. But what, continued he, if instead of a *casual Throw* or *involuntary Compulsion*, he had *willingly* and *designedly* directed his Pencil, and so produced that Foam, which Story says he failed in? Would not Art *here* have been the Cause? I replied, in this case, I thought it would. It should seem then, said he, that *Art* implies not only *Cause*, but the additional Requisite of *Intention, Reason, Volition, and Consciousness*; so that *not every Cause is Art*, but only *voluntary* or *intentional Cause*.

So, said I, it appears.

AND shall we then, added he, pronounce *every* intentional Cause to be Art? I see no reason, said I, why not. Consider, said he; Hunger this Morning prompted you to eat. You were then the *Cause*, and that too the *intentional Cause*, of consuming certain Food:

VOL. I.

C

And

And yet will you refer this Consumption to Art? Did you chew by Art? Did you swallow by Art? No certainly, said I. So by opening your Eyes, said he, you are the *intentional* Cause of Seeing, and by stretching your Hand, the *intentional* Cause of Feeling; and yet will you affirm, that *these Things proceed from Art*? I should be wrong, said I, if I did: For what *Art* can there be *in doing*, *what every one is able to do by mere Will, and a sort of uninstructed Instinct*? You say right, replied he, and the Reason is manifest: Were it otherwise, we should make all Mankind universal Artists in every single Action of their Lives. And what can be a greater Absurdity than this? I confessed that the Absurdity appeared to be evident. But if nothing then, continued he, which we do by *Compulsion*, or without intending it, be *Art*; and not even what we do *intentionally*, if it proceed from mere Will and *uninstructed Instinct*; what is it we have left remaining, where Art may be found conversant? Or can it indeed possibly be in any thing else, than in that which we do by *Use, Practice, Experience*, and the like, all which are born with no one, but are all acquired afterward by advances unperceived. I can think, said I, of nothing else. Let therefore the Words *Habit* and *Habitual*, said he, represent this Requisite, and let us say, that *Art* is not only a *Cause*, but an *intentional Cause*; and not only an *intentional Cause*, but an *intentional Cause founded in Habit*, or in other Words, an *habitual Cause*. You appear, said I, to argue rightly.

BUT if Art, said he, be what we have now asserted, something *learnt and acquired*, if it be also a thing *intentional* or *voluntary*, and not governed either by *Chance* or blind *Necessity*—If this, I say, be the Case, then mark the Consequences. And what, said I, are they?

they? The first, said he, is, that *no Events*, in what we call *the natural World*, must be referred to *Art*; such as Tides, Winds, Vegetation, Gravitation, Attraction, and the like. For these all happen by stated Laws; by a curious *Necessity*, which is not to be withstood, and where the *nearer and immediate Causes appear to be wholly unconscious*. I confess, said I, it seems so. In the next place, continued he, we must exclude all those admired *Works* of the *Animal World*, which, for their Beauty and Order, we *metaphorically* call *artificial*. The Spider's Web, the Bee's Comb, the Beaver's House, and the Swallow's Nest, must all be referred to another Source—For who can say, these ever *learnt* to be thus ingenious? or, that they were *ignorant by Nature*, and *knowing only by Education*? None, surely, replied I. But we have still, said he, a higher Consideration. And what, said I, is that? It is, answered he, this—Not even that *Divine Power*, which gave Form to all things, *then acted by Art*, when it gave that Form. For how, continued he, can that Intelligence, which has *all Perfection ever in Energy*, be supposed to have any Power, *not original to its Nature*? How can it ever have any thing to *learn*, when it *knows all from the Beginning*; or, being *perfect and complete*, admit of what is *additional and secondary*? I should think, said I, it were impossible. If so, said he, then Art can never be numbered among its Attributes: For *all Art* is something *learnt*, something *secondary and acquired*, and *never original* to any Being, which possesses it. So the fact, said I, has been established.

If this therefore, continued he, be true; if Art belong not either to the Divine Nature, the Brute Nature, or the Inanimate Nature, —to what Nature shall we say it does belong? I know not, said I, unless it be to the *Human*. You are right, said he; for *every*

Nature else you perceive is either *too excellent* to want it, or *too base* to be capable of it. Beside, except the Human, what other Nature is there left? Or where else can we find any of the Arts already instanced, or indeed whatever others we may now fancy to enumerate? Who are Statuaries, but Men? Who Pilots, who Musicians? This seems, replied I, to be the Fact.

LET us then, continued he, say, not only that *Art* is a *Cause*, but that it is *Man becoming a Cause*; and not only Man, but *Man intending to do what is going to be done*, and *doing it also by Habit*; so that its whole Idea, as far as we have hitherto conceived it, is—*Man becoming a Cause, Intentional and Habitual*. I confess, said I, it has appeared so.

AND thus, said he, have you had exhibited to you a Sketch of Art. You must remember however, it is but a Sketch: there is still something wanting to make it a finished Piece. I begged to know what this was. In order to that, replied he, I cannot do better, than remind you of a Passage in your admired *Horace*. It is concerning *Alfenus*; who (if you remember) he tells us, though his tools were laid aside, and his Shop shut up, was still an Artist as much as ever.—

—*Alfenus vafer omni*

Abiecto instrumento Artis clausâq. taberna, Sutor erat——

I remember, said I, the Passage, but to what purpose is it quoted? Only, replied he, to shew you, that I should not be without Precedent, were I to affirm it not absolutely necessary to the being of Art, that it should be Man *actually becoming* a Cause; but that it was enough if he had the *Power* or *Capacity* of so becoming. Why then, said I, did

did you not fettle it so at first? Because, replied he, *Faculties, Powers, Capacities*, (call them as you will) are in themselves, abstract from Action, but *obscure and hidden* things. On the contrary, *Energies and Operations lie open to the Senses*, and cannot but be observed, even whether we will or no. And hence therefore, when first we treated of Art, we chose to treat of it, as of a thing only in Energy. Now we better comprehend it, we have ventured somewhat farther. Repeat then, said I, if you please, the Alteration which you have made. At first, answered he, we reasoned upon Art, as if it was only Man *actually becoming* a Cause intentional and habitual. Now we say it is a *Power* in Man of becoming such Cause; and that, *though he be not actually in the Exercise of such a Power*. I told him, his Amendment appeared to be just.

THERE is too another Alteration, added he, which, for the sake of Accuracy, is equally wanting; and that is with respect to the Epithet, *Intentional or Voluntary*. And what, said I, is that? We have agreed it, replied he, to be necessary, that all *Art* should be under the Guidance of *Intention or Volition*, so that no Man acting by *Compulsion*, or by *Chance*, should be called an *Artist*. We have. Now, tho' this, said he, be true, yet it is not sufficient. We must *limit* this Intention or Volition to a *peculiar Kind*. For were every little Fancy, which we may work up into Habit, a sufficient Foundation to constitute an Art, we should make Art one of the lowest and most despicable of things. The meanest Trick of a common Juggler might, in such case, entitle a man to the character of an Artist. I confessed, that without some Limitation, this might be the Consequence. But how limit Intentions to a Kind or Species? What think you, replied he, if we were to do it by
the

the *Number* and *Dignity of the Precepts*, which go to the directing of our Intentions? You must explain, said I, for your Meaning is obscure. Are there not Precepts, replied he, in Agriculture, about Ploughing and Sowing? Are there not Precepts in Architecture, about Orders and Proportions? Are there not the same in Medicine, in Navigation, and the rest? There are. And what is your Opinion of these several Precepts? Are they *arbitrary and capricious*; or *rational and steady*? Are they the *Inventions of a Day*; or *well-approved by long Experience*? I told him I should consider them for the most Part as rational, steady, and well-approved by long Experience. And what, continued he, shall we say to their *Number*? Are they few? Or are they not rather so *numerous*, that in every particular Art, scarce any comprehend them all, but the several Artists themselves; and they only by length of time, with due Attendance and Application? I replied, it seemed so. Suppose then We were to pronounce, that *to every Art there was a System of such various and well-approved Precepts*: Should we err? No certainly. And suppose we should say, that the *Intention of every Artist*, in his several Art, *was directed by such a System*: Would you allow this? Surely. And will not *this limiting of Intentions* to such only, as are so directed, sufficiently distinguish Art from any thing else which may resemble it?—In other words, Is it likely, under this Distinction, to be confounded with other Habits of a trifling, capricious and inferior Kind? I replied, I thought not.

LET us then see, said he, and collect all that we have said, together. We have already agreed, that the *Power of acting* after a certain manner is sufficient to constitute Art, without the *actually operating*

operating agreeably to that Power. And We have now farther held the *Intentions* of every Artift to be directed by a *System of various and well-approved Precepts*. Besides all this, we fettled it before, that *all Art was founded in Habit*; and was *peculiar to Man*; and was seen by becoming *the Cause of some Effect*. It should seem then, that the whole Idea of ART was this—AN HABITUAL POWER IN MAN OF BECOMING THE CAUSE OF SOME EFFECT, ACCORDING TO A SYSTEM OF VARIOUS AND WELL-APPROVED PRECEPTS. I replied, That his Account appeared to be probable and just.

§ 2. AND now then, continued he, as we have gone thus far, and have fettled between us what we believe Art to be; shall we go a little farther, or is your Patience at an end? Oh! no, replied I, not if any thing be left. We have walked so leisurely, that much remains of our Way; and I can think of no Method, how we may better amuse ourselves.

MY Friend upon this proceeded with saying, that if *Art* were a *Cause*, (as we had agreed it was) it must be the *Cause of something*.

Allow it, said I. And if it be the *Cause of something*, it must have a *Subject to operate on*. For every Agent has need of some Patient; the Smith of his Iron, the Carpenter of his Wood, the Statuary of his Marble, and the Pilot of his Ship. I answered, it was true. If then, said he, the Subjects of particular Arts be thus evident: What Idea shall we form of that *universal Subject, which is common to all Art*? At this Question, it must be confessed, I was a little embarrassed.

THIS induced him to ask me, How many sorts of Subjects I allowed of? Here I could not help hesitating again. There is nothing,

nothing, continued he, so difficult in the Question. You must needs perceive, that *all Natures* whatever can be but either *contingent* or *necessary*. This may be, replied I; but even yet I do not comprehend you. Not comprehend me! said he; then answer me a Question: Can you conceive any *Medium* between *Motion* and *No-Motion*, between *Change* and *No-Change*? I replied, I could not.

If not, can you conceive any thing *in the whole Order of Being*, which must not be either *liable* to these, or *not liable*? Nothing.

Call those things, therefore, said he, which are *liable to Change and Motion*, *contingent Natures*; and those which are *not liable, necessary Natures*: And thus you have a *Division, in which all things are included*. We have so, said I.

IN which therefore, said he, of *these Natures* shall we seek for this *common Subject* of Art? To this, I told him, I was unable to answer. Reflect, said he, a little. We have found *Art* to be a *Cause*. We have. And is it not *essential to every Cause to operate*? or can it be a *Cause*, and be the *Cause* of nothing? Impossible. Wherever therefore there is *Cause*, there is necessarily implied some *Operation*. There is. And can there possibly be *Operation*, without *Motion* and *Change*? There cannot. But *Change* and *Motion* must needs be *incompatible* with what is *necessary* and *immutable*. They must. So therefore is *Cause*. It must.

And so therefore *Art*. It must. Truth therefore, said he, and *Knowledge*; *Principles* and *Demonstrations*; the general and intellectual *Essences* of Things; in short, *the whole immutable and necessary Nature* is no part of it reducible to a *Subject* of Art. It seems so, said I.

IF therefore Art, said he, have nothing to do with the *steady, abstract, and necessary Nature*, it can have only to do with the *transient, the particular, and contingent one*. It is true, said I; for there is no other left. And shall we then say, replied he, it has to do with *all contingent* Natures existing in the Universe? For aught, replied I, which to me appears contrary. What think you, said he, of those *Contingents of higher Order*? such as the grand Planetary System; the Succession of the Seasons; the regular and uniform Course of all superior Natures in the Universe? Has Art any Ability to intermeddle here? No certainly, said I. These superior Contingents then, *which move without Interruption*, are, it seems, above it. They are. And shall we say the same of *those of lower Sort*; those, *whose Course we see often interrupted*; those, *which the Strength and Cunning of Man are able to influence and controul*? Give Instances, said I, of what you mean. I mean, said he, Earth, Water, Air, Fire; Stones, Trees; Animals; Men themselves. Are these Contingents within the reach of Art, or has Art *here* no Influence? I should think, said I, a very great one.

IF this, continued he, be true, it should seem that the COMMON OR UNIVERSAL SUBJECT OF ART was—ALL THOSE CONTINGENT NATURES, WHICH LIE WITHIN THE REACH OF THE HUMAN POWERS TO INFLUENCE. I acknowledge, said I, it appears so.

THUS far then, said he, we have advanced with tolerable Success. We have gained some Idea of *Art*, and some Idea of its *Subject*. Our Inquiry, on the whole, has informed us, that ART is—an *habitual Power in Man of becoming a certain Cause*—and that its

SUBJECT is—*every such contingent Nature, which lies within the reach of the human Powers to influence.*

§ 3. It is true, said I, this appears to have been the result of our Inquiry, and a full and ample one it seems to have been. A long one, replied he, if you please, but not a full and ample one. Can any thing, said I, be wanting, after what you have said already?

Certainly, replied he, a great deal. We have talked much indeed of *Art*, considered as a Cause; and much of the *Subject*, on which it operates; but *what moves these Operations to commence, and where it is they end*, these are Topics, which we have as yet little thought of. I begged him then, that we might now consider them.

He was willing, he said, for his Part, and immediately went on by asking, What I thought was the *Beginning of Art*? I mean, said he, by *Beginning*, that *Cause for the Sake of which* it operates, and *which being supposed away, Men would be never moved to follow it*. To this, I told him, I was unable to answer. You will not think it, said he, so difficult, when you have a little more considered. Reflect with yourself—Was it not the *Absence of Health*, which *excited* Men to cultivate the Art of Medicine? I replied, it was.

What then, said he, if the *Human Body* had been so far *perfect and self-sufficient*, as never to have felt the *Vicissitudes of Well and Ill*: Would not then this Art have been wholly unknown? I replied, I thought it would. And what, said he, if we extend this Perfection a Degree farther, and suppose the Body not only thus *healthful*, but withal so *robust*, as to have felt no Uneasiness from *all Inclemencies of Weather*: Would not then the Arts of Building also and Cloathing have been as useless as that of Medicine? I replied, it seemed

seemed they would. But what, said he, if we bound not this Perfection of ours even here? What if we suppose, that not only Things *merely necessary*, but that those also *conducive to Elegance and Enjoyment* were of course all implied in the Constitution of Human Nature; that they were all *steady, constant, and independent from without*, and as inseparable from our Being, as Perspiring, or Circulation: In such case would not the Arts of Music, Painting, and Poetry, with every other Art passing under the Denomination of *Elegant*, have been as useless, as we have held those others of Medicine, Clothing, and Architecture? I replied, It seems they would. It was then the *Absence of Joys, Elegancies, and Amusements from our Constitution, as left by Nature*, which induced us to *seek them in these Arts of Elegance and Entertainment*. It was.

And what, said he, are Joys, Elegancies, Amusements, Health, Robustness, with those several other *Objects of Desire, whose Absence leads to Art*, but so many different Names of that *complex Being called Good*, under its *various, and multiform, and popular Appearances*? I replied, it seemed so.

If this then, said he, be granted, it should seem that the *Beginning or Principle of Art* was the *Absence of something thought Good*; because it has appeared that it is *for the Sake of some such absent Good that every Art operates*; and because, *if we suppose no such Absence to have been, we should never have known any Art*. I confess, said I, it seems so.

But how then, continued he? If it be true that *all Art* implies such *Principle*, it is reciprocally true, that every such *Principle* should imply *Art*? I see no Reason, said I, why not. Consider, said he. It might be thought a Good by some perhaps, to be as strong as

those Horses, which are ploughing yonder Field; to be as tall as those Elms, and of a Nature as durable.—Yet would the Absence of Goods *like these*, lead to Art? Or is it not *absurd* to suppose, there should be an Art of *Impossibilities*? Absurd, said I, certainly. If so, said he, when we define the *Beginning* or *Principle* of Art, it is not enough to call it the *Absence of Something thought Good*, unless we add, that the *Good* be a *Good Possible*; a *Thing attainable by Man*; a *Thing relative to Human Life, and consistent with Human Nature*: Or does not *this* also appear a Requisite? I replied, I thought it did.

BUT still, continued he—Is it a sufficient Motive to Art, that the *Good desired* should be *attainable*? In other Words, does *every Absence of Good attainable* lead to *Art*, or is our Account still *too loose*, and in need of stricter Determination? Of none, said I, which appears to me. Reflect, said he; there are some of the *possible Goods so obvious* and easy, that *every Man*, in an ordinary *State of common natural Perfection*, is able to acquire them, *without Labour* or Application. You will hardly deny but that a fair Apple, tempting to eat, may be gathered; or a clear Spring, tempting to drink, may be drank at, by the mere Suggestions of *Will and uninstructed Instinct*.

I granted, they might. It would be therefore impertinent, said he, to suppose that Goods, *like these*, should lead to Art, because *Art* would be *superfluous*, and in no respect necessary. Indeed, said I, it seems so.

IF therefore, said he, neither *Impossibles* lead to *Art*, because of *such there can be no Art*; nor Things *easily possible*, because *in such Nature can do without Art*: what is it we have left, to which we may refer it? Or can it indeed be to any other than to that *middle Class of Things*,
which,

which, however possible, are still not so easy, but to be beyond the Powers of Will, and Instinct uninstructed? I replied, it seemed so.

That there are many such Things, said he, is evident past Doubt. For what Man would pay Artists so largely for their Arts, were he enabled by Nature to obtain whatever he desired? Or who would study to be skilled in Arts, were Nature's original Powers to be of themselves alone sufficient? I told him, it was not likely.

It should seem then, said he, according to this Reasoning, that the BEGINNING, *Motive*, or *Principle* of *Art*; that *Cause*, which first moves it to *Action*, and, *for the Sake of which* its several Operations are exerted, is—THE WANT OR ABSENCE OF SOMETHING APPEARING GOOD; RELATIVE TO HUMAN LIFE, AND ATTAINABLE BY MAN, BUT SUPERIOR TO HIS NATURAL AND UNINSTRUCTED FACULTIES.

I replied, I could not deny, but that the Account appeared probable.

§ 4. LET this then, said he, suffice, as to the *Beginning* of Art. But how shall we describe its *End*? What is it we shall pronounce this?

My Answer, I replied, must be the same as often already; which was indeed, that I could not resolve the Question. It should seem, said

he, not so difficult, now we have discovered what Beginning is. For if *Beginning* and *End* are *Contraries* and opposed, it is but to *invert*, as it were, the Notion of Beginning, and we gain of course the Notion of End. I asked him in what Manner? Thus, said he, the *Begin-*

ning of Art has been held to be *Something, which, if supposed away, Men would be never moved to apply to Art.* By *Inversion* therefore the *End* of Art must be *Something, which, while supposed away, Men would never cease applying to Art*; because, were they to cease, while the End

was

was wanting, they would cease with Imperfection, and their Performance would be incomplete. To this I answered, That the Account, however true, was by far too general, to give me much Intelligence.

HE replied, If it was, he would endeavour to be more particular. And what, continued he, should we say, that every Art, according to its Genius, will of course be *accomplished* either in some *Energy*, or in some *Work*; that, besides these two, it can be accomplished in Nothing else; and consequently that *one of these must of necessity be its End*? I could not here but answer him with a Smile, That the Matter was now much obscurer than ever. I find then, said he, it is proper we should be more explicit in our Inquiries, and deduce our Reasonings from some clearer Point of View. I told him, It was quite necessary, if he intended to be intelligible.

THUS then, said he. You will grant, that every *Art, being a Cause, must be productive of some Effect*; for instance, Music, of a Tune; Dancing, of a Dance; Architecture, of a Palace; and Sculpture, of a Statue. It is allowed, said I. You will grant also, said he, that *in these Productions they are all accomplished and ended*: Or, in other Words, that as Music produces a Tune, so it is ended and accomplished in a Tune; and as Sculpture produces a Statue, so is it ended and accomplished in a Statue. It is admitted, said I. Now these Productions, continued he, if you will examine, are not like *Units or Mathematical Points*; but, on the contrary, *all consist of a certain Number of Parts*, from whose accurate *Order* is derived their *Beauty and Perfection*. For Example; Notes, ranged after such a Manner, make a Tune in Music; and Limbs, ranged after such a Manner, make a Statue

Statue or a Picture. I replied, They did. If then the *Productions*, continued he, of every *Art* thus consist of *certain Parts*, it will follow, that *these Parts* will be either *co-existent*, or not; and if *not co-existent*, then of course *successive*. Assist me, said I, by another Instance, for you are growing again obscure. *Co-existent*, replied he, as in a Statue, where Arms, Legs, Body, and Head *all subsist together at one individual Instant*: *Successive*, as in a Tune or Dance, where there is no such Co-existence, but where some *Parts* are *ever passing away*, and others are *ever succeeding* them.

CAN any Thing be said to *exist*, said I, whose Parts are *ever passing away*? Surely, replied he, or how else exist Years and Seasons, Months and Days, with their *common Parent*, *Time* itself?—Or indeed what is *Human Life*, but a *Compound of Parts thus fleeting*; a *Compound of various and multiform Actions*, which succeed each other in a certain Order? The Fact, said I, appears so.

THIS then, continued he, being the case, and there being this Difference in Productions, call every *Production*, the *Parts of which exist successively*, and *whose Nature hath its Being or Essence in a Transition*, call it, what it really is, a *Motion* or an *ENERGY*—Thus a Tune and a Dance are *Energies*; thus Riding and Sailing are *Energies*; and so is Elocution, and so is Life itself. On the contrary, call every *Production*, whose *Parts exist all at once*, and *whose Nature depends not on a Transition for its Essence*, call it a *WORK*, or *Thing done*, not an *Energy* or Operation. Thus a House is a *Work*, a Statue is a *Work*, and so is a Ship, and so a Picture. I seem, said I, to comprehend you.

IF then there *be no Productions*, said he, but must be of *Parts*, either *co-existent* or *successive*; and the *one* of these be, as you perceive, a *Work*, and the *other* be an *Energy*; it will follow, *there will be no Production, but will be either a Work or an Energy*. There will not, said I. But every *Art*, said he, you have granted, is *accomplished and ended in what it produces*? I replied, I had. And there are *no Productions*, but *Works or Energies*? None.

IT will follow then, said he, that EVERY ART WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AND ENDED IN A WORK OR ENERGY.

To this I answered, That his Reasoning I could not impeach; but that still the Distinction of Work and Energy was what I did not well comprehend. There are several Circumstances, said he, which will serve sufficiently to make it clear. I begged he would mention some.

THUS then, said he—When the Production of any Art is an *Energy*, then the *Perfection of the Art can be only perceived during that Energy*. For instance, the Perfection of a Musician is only known, while he continues playing. But when the Production of any Art is a *Work*, then *is not the Perfection visible during the Energy, but only after it*. Thus the Perfection of the Statuary is not seen during his Energies as a Statuary, but when his Energies are over, when no Stroke of the Chizzel is wanting, but the Statue is left as *the Result of all*. It is true, said I.

AGAIN, continued he,—in consequence of this, where the Production is an *Energy*, there *the Production is of Necessity co-eval with the Artist*.

Artist. For how should the Energy survive the Man? the Playing remain, when the Musician is dead? But where the Production is a *Work*, then *is there no such Necessity*. The Work may well remain, when the Artist is forgotten; there being no more reason, that the Statue and the Artist should be co-eval, than the Man and the rude Marble, before it received a regular Figure. You seem now, said I, to have explained yourself.

If then, said he, WORK and ENERGY be made *intelligible Terms*, you cannot but perceive the Truth of what we before asserted—that *every Art, according to its Genius, must needs be accomplished in one of these; that, except in these two, it can be accomplished in nothing else; and consequently that ONE OF THESE MUST OF NECESSITY BE ITS END.* I answered, That the Reasoning appeared justly deduced. So much then, replied he, for the *Ending or Accomplishment of Art*; and so much also for a long, and, I fear, an intricate Disquisition.

§ 5. HE had no sooner said this, than I was beginning to applaud him; especially on his having treated a Subject so copiously, started, as it were, by Chance, and without any apparent Preparation. But I had not gone far, before he interrupted me, by saying, That as to my Praises they were more than he deserved; that he could pretend to no great Merit for having been, as I called it, so copious, when he had so often before thought, on what at present we had been talking.

In short, says he, to tell you a Secret, I have been a long time amusing myself, in forming an Essay upon this Subject. I could not here forbear reproaching him, for having hitherto concealed his Intentions. My Reproaches produced a sort of amicable Contro-

verfy, which at length ended in his offering, That, to make me some amends, he would now recite me (if I pleased) a small fragment of the Piece; a Fragment which he had happened accidentally to have about him. The Propofal, on my part, was willingly accepted, and without farther Delay, the Papers were produced.

As to the Performance itself, it muft be confefsed, in point of Stile, it was fomewhat high and florid, perhaps even bordering upon an Excefs. At the time however of recital, this gave me lefs Offence, becaufe it feemed, as it were, to palliate the Drynefs of what had paffed before, and in fome fort to fupply the Place of an Epilogue to our Conference. Not however to anticipate, he began reading as follows :

“ O ART! Thou *diftinguifhing Attribute* and *Honour* of Human
 “ Kind! who art not only able to *imitate Nature* in her Graces, but
 “ (what is more) even to *adorn her* with Graces of *thy own*. Poſſeſſed
 “ of Thee, the meanest Genius grows deſerving, and has a juſt De-
 “ mand for a Portion of our Eſteem. Devoid of Thee, the Brightest
 “ of our Kind lie loſt and ufeleſs, and are but poorly diſtinguiſhed
 “ from the moſt Deſpicable and Baſe. When we inhabited Foreſts
 “ in common with Brutes, nor otherwiſe known from them than by
 “ the Figure of our Species; *Thou* taughteſt us to aſſert *the Sovereignty*
 “ *of our Nature*, and to aſſume that Empire, for which Providence intended us. Thouſands of Utilities owe their Birth to
 “ Thee; thouſands of Elegancies, Pleaſures, and Joys, without which
 “ Life itſelf would be but an infipid Poſſeſſion.

“ WIDE and extenſive is the Reach of thy Dominion. No ELEMENT
 “ is there either ſo *violent* or ſo *ſubtle*, ſo *yielding* or ſo *ſluggiſh*,
 “ as

“ as by the Powers of its Nature to be superior to thy Direction.
 “ Thou darest not the fierce Impetuosity of FIRE, but compellest
 “ its Violence to be both obedient and useful. By it Thou softenest
 “ the stubborn Tribe of Minerals, so as to be formed and moulded
 “ into Shapes innumerable. Hence Weapons, Armour, Coin; and
 “ previous to these, and other Thy *Works* and *Energies*, hence all
 “ those various Tools and Instruments which empower Thee to pro-
 “ ceed to farther Ends more excellent. Nor is the subtle AIR less
 “ obedient to Thy Power, whether Thou willest it to be a Minister to
 “ our Pleasure, or Utility. At Thy Command it giveth Birth to
 “ Sounds, which charm the Soul with all the Powers of Harmony.
 “ Under thy Instruction it moves the Ship o’er Seas, while that
 “ yielding Element, where otherwise we sink, even WATER itself is
 “ by Thee taught to bear us; the vast Ocean to promote that Inter-
 “ course of Nations, which Ignorance would imagine it was destined
 “ to intercept. To say how thy Influence is seen on EARTH, would
 “ be to teach the meanest what he knows already. Suffice it but to
 “ mention Fields of Arable and Pasture; Lawns and Groves, and
 “ Gardens, and Plantations; Cottages, Villages, Castles, Towns;
 “ Palaces, Temples, and spacious Cities.

“ NOR does thy Empire end in *Subjects* thus *in-animate*. Its
 “ Power also extends thro’ the various Race of ANIMALS, who either
 “ patiently submit to become thy Slaves, or are sure to find Thee an
 “ irresistible Foe. The faithful Dog, the patient Ox, the generous
 “ Horse, and the mighty Elephant, are content all to receive their
 “ Instructions from Thee, and readily to lend their natural *Instincts*
 “ or *Strength*, to perform those Offices, which thy Occasions call for.
 “ If there be found any Species, which are serviceable when dead,

“Thou fuggestest the Means to investigate and take them. If any
 “be so savage, as to refuse being tamed; or of Natures fierce enough
 “to venture an Attack; Thou teachest us to scorn their brutal
 “Rage; to meet, repel, pursue, and conquer.

“AND such, O ART! is thy amazing Influence, when Thou art
 “employed only on these *inferior Subjects*; on Natures *Inanimate*,
 “or at best *Irrational*. But whene’er Thou choosest a *Subject more*
 “*noble*, and settest to the cultivating of MIND itself, then it is Thou
 “becomest truly amiable and divine; the ever-flowing Source of
 “those sublimer Beauties, of which *no Subject but Mind alone* is
 “capable. Then it is Thou art enabled to exhibit to Mankind the
 “admired Tribe of Poets and of Orators; the sacred Train of
 “Patriots and of Heroes; the godlike List of Philosophers and
 “Legislators; the Forms of *virtuous and equal* Politics, where *private*
 “Welfare is made the same with *public*; where Crowds themselves
 “prove disinterested and brave, and Virtue is made a national and
 “popular Characteristic.

“HAIL! sacred Source of all these Wonders! *Thyself* instruct me
 “to praise Thee worthily, thro’ whom whate’er we do, is done with
 “Elegance and Beauty; without whom, what we do, is ever graceless
 “and deformed.—Venerable Power! By what Name shall I address
 “Thee? Shall I call Thee *Ornament* of Mind; or art Thou more
 “truly *Mind itself*?—IT IS MIND THOU ART, most perfect Mind;
 “not rude, untaught, but fair and polished; in such Thou dwellest,
 “of such Thou art the *Form*; nor is it a Thing more possible to
 “separate Thee from such, than it would be to separate Thee from
 “thy own Existence.”——

My

MY good Friend was now arrived to a very exalted Pitch, and was pursuing his Panegyric with great Warmth and Fluency; when we entered the Suburbs, our Walk being near finished. The People, as we went along, began to look at us with Surprise; which I, who was less engaged, having leisure to observe, thought it was proper to admonish my Friend, that he should give over. He immediately ceased reading; put his Papers up; and thanked me for stopping him at so seasonable a Time.

§ 6. WHAT remained of our Discourse passed off with less Rapture, and was indeed no more than a kind of short Recapitulation.

HE observed to me, that our Inquiries had furnished out an Answer to four different Questions. For thus, said he, if it be asked us, *What Art is?* We have to answer, *it is—an habitual Power in Man, of becoming the Cause of some Effect, according to a System of various and well-approved Precepts.* If it be asked us, *On what Subject Art operates?* We can answer, *On a contingent, which is within the reach of the Human Powers to influence.* If it be asked us, *For what Reason, for the sake of what, Art operates?* We may reply, *For the sake of some absent Good, relative to Human Life, and attainable by Man, but superior to his natural and uninstructed Faculties.* Lastly, if it be asked, *Where it is the Operations of Art end?* We may say, *Either in some Energy, or in some Work.*

HE added, That if he were not afraid of the Imputation of Pedantry, he could be almost tempted to say, That we had been considering Art, with respect to those *four Causes*, so celebrated *once* among Professors in the Schools. By these, upon Inquiry, I found
that

that he meant certain *Causes*, called the **Efficient*, the †*Material*, the ‡*Final*, and the ||*Formal*.

BUT here, without farther explaining, he begged for the present that we might conclude, being sufficiently, as he said, fatigued with the Length of what had passed already. The Request was reasonable I could not but own, and thus ended our Conversation, and soon after it our Walk.

* P. 15.

† P. 17.

‡ P. 21.

|| P. 24, 25.

The E N D.

TREATISE THE SECOND:

A DISCOURSE

ON

MUSIC, PAINTING, and POETRY.

1827

THE SECOND

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A DISCOURSE

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ON MUSIC, PAINTING, and POETRY.

CHAP. I.

Introduction.—Design and Distribution of the Whole.—Preparation for the following Chapters.

ALL Arts have this in common, that *they respect Human Life*.
Some contribute to its *Necessities*, as Medicine and Agriculture;
others to its *Elegance*, as Music, Painting, and Poetry.

Ch. I.

Now, with respect to these two different *Species*, the *necessary* Arts seem to have been *prior in time*; if it be probable, that Men consulted how *to live* and *to support themselves*, before they began to deliberate how *to render Life agreeable*. Nor is this indeed unconfirmed by Fact, there being no Nation known so barbarous and ignorant, as where the Rudiments of these *necessary* Arts are not in some degree cultivated. And hence possibly they may appear to be the *more excellent and worthy*, as having claim to a *Preference*, derived from their *Seniority*.

THE Arts however of *Elegance* cannot be said to want Pretensions, if it be true, that Nature framed us for *something more than mere Existence*. Nay, farther*, if *Well-being* be clearly preferable to *Mere-being*,

* 'Ου τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείους ποιητέον,
'Αλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν. Plat. in Critone.

Ch. I.

being, and this without it be but a thing contemptible, they may have reason perhaps to aspire even to a *Superiority*. But enough of this, to come to our Purpose.

§ 2. THE Design of this Discourse is to treat of MUSIC, PAINTING, and POETRY; to consider in what they *agree*, and in what they *differ*; and WHICH UPON THE WHOLE, IS MORE EXCELLENT THAN THE OTHER TWO.

IN entering upon this Inquiry, it is first to be observed, that the MIND is made conscious of the *natural World* and its Affections, and of other *Minds* and their Affections, by the several *Organs of the Senses* (a). By the *same Organs*, these Arts exhibit to the Mind *Imitations*, and imitate either Parts or Affections of this *natural World*, or else the Passions, Energies, and other Affections of *Minds*. There is this Difference however between these *Arts* and *Nature*; that Nature passes to the Percipient thro' *all* the Senses; whereas these Arts use *only two* of them, that of Seeing and that of Hearing. And hence it is that the *sensible Objects* or *Media*, thro' which (b) they imitate, can

(a) To explain some future Observations, it will be proper here to remark, that the MIND from these Materials thus brought together, and from its own Operations on them, and in consequence of them, becomes fraught with IDEAS—and that MANY MINDS so fraught, by a sort of COMPACT assigning to each IDEA some SOUND to be its MARK or SYMBOL, were the first INVENTORS and FOUNDERS of LANGUAGE. See Vol. II. or *Hermes*, Lib. iii. cap. 3. 4.

(b) To prevent Confusion it must be observed, that in all these Arts there is a Difference between the *sensible Media*, thro' which they imitate, and the *Subjects imitated*. The *sensible Media*, thro' which they imitate, must be always *relative to that Sense*, by which the particular Art applies to the Mind; but the Subject imitated may be *foreign to that Sense*, and beyond the Power of its Perception. Painting, for instance, (as is shewn in this Chapter) has no *sensible Media*, thro' which it operates, except Colour and Figure: But

can be *such only*, as these two Senses are framed capable of perceiving; and these Media are *Motion, Sound, Colour, and Figure*.

PAINTING, having the *Eye* for its *Organ*, cannot be conceived to imitate, but thro' the Media of *visible* Objects. And farther, its Mode of imitating being always *motionless*, there must be substracted from these the Medium of *Motion*. It remains then, that *Colour* and *Figure* are the only Media, thro' which Painting imitates.

MUSIC, passing to the Mind thro' the *Organ* of the *Ear*, can imitate only by *Sounds and Motions*.

POETRY, having the *Ear* also for its *Organ*, as far as *Words* are considered to be no more than *mere Sounds*, can go no farther in Imitating, than may be performed by *Sound and Motion*. But then, as *these its Sounds stand by *Compact for the various Ideas with which the Mind is fraught*, it is enabled by this means to imitate, as far as *Language can express*; and that it is evident will, in a manner, include all things.

Now from hence may be seen, how these ARTS agree, and how they differ.

THEY agree, by being all MIMETIC, or IMITATIVE.

THEY

as to *Subjects*, it may have *Motions, Sounds, moral Affections and Actions*; none of which are either *Colours* or *Figures*, but which however are *all capable of being imitated thro' them*. See Chapter the second, Notes (b), (c), (d).

* See Note (a) Page 34.

Ch. I.

THEY differ, as they imitate by *different Media*; Painting by *Figure* and *Colour*; MUSIC, by *Sound* and *Motion*; PAINTING and MUSIC, by *Media which are Natural*; POETRY, for the greatest Part, by a *Medium which is Artificial* (c).

§ 3. As to that ART, which upon the whole is *most excellent of the three*; it must be observed, that among these various *Media* of imitating, some will naturally be *more* accurate, some *less*; some will *best* imitate one Subject; some, another. Again, among the Number of *Subjects* there will be naturally also a Difference, as to *Merit* and *Demerit*. There will be some *sublime*, and some *low*; some *copious*, and some *short*; some *pathetic*, and others *void of Passion*; some formed to *instruct*, and others *not capable* of it.

Now, from these *two* Circumstances; that is to say, from the *Accuracy of the Imitation*, and the *Merit of the Subject imitated*, the Question concerning *which Art is most excellent*, must be tried and determined.

THIS however cannot be done, without a *Detail of Particulars*, that so there may be formed, on every part, just and accurate *Comparisons*.

To begin therefore with Painting.

(c) A Figure painted, or a Composition of Musical Sounds have always a *natural Relation to that, of which they are intended to be the Resemblance*. But a Description in Words has rarely any such *natural Relation to the several Ideas, of which those Words are the Symbols*. None therefore understand the *Description*, but those who speak the *Language*. On the contrary, Musical and Picture-Imitations are *intelligible to all Men*.

WHY it is said that Poetry is *not universally*, but *only for the greater part* artificial, see below, Chapter the Third, where what *Natural Force* it has, is examined and estimated.

C H A P. II.

On the Subjects which Painting imitates.—On the Subjects which Music imitates.—Comparison of Music with Painting.

THE FITTEST SUBJECTS FOR PAINTING, are all such Things, Ch. II.
and INCIDENTS, as are* peculiarly characterised by FIGURE and
COLOUR.

OF this kind are the whole Mass (a) of *Things inanimate and vegetable* ; such as Flowers, Fruits, Buildings, Landscips—The various Tribes of *Animal Figures* ; such as Birds, Beasts, Herds, Flocks—The *Motions and Sounds peculiar* to each Animal Species, when accompanied with *Configurations*, which are *obvious and remarkable* (b)—The *Human Body* in all its *Appearances* (as Male, Female ; Young, Old ; Handsome, Ugly ;) and in all its *Attitudes*, (as Laying, Sitting, Standing, &c.)—The *Natural Sounds peculiar* to the *Human Species*,
(such

* P. 35.

(a) THE Reason is, that *these* things are almost *wholly* known to us by their *Colour and Figure*. Besides, they are as *motionless*, for the most part, in *Nature*, as in the *Imitation*.

(b) INSTANCES of this kind are the Flying of Birds, the Galloping of Horses, the Roaring of Lions, the Crowing of Cocks. And the Reason is, that though to paint Motion or Sound be *impossible*, yet the Motions and Sounds here mentioned having an *immediate and natural Connection with a certain visible CONFIGURATION of the Parts*, the Mind, from a Prospect of this *Configuration*, conceives *insensibly* that which is *concomitant* ; and hence it is that, by a sort of *Fallacy*, the SOUNDS and MOTIONS appear to be *painted also*. On the contrary, not so in *such* Motions, as the Swimming of many kinds of Fish ; or in *such* Sounds, as the Purring of a Cat ; because *here* is no such *special Configuration* to be perceived.—Homer in his Shield describing the Picture of a Bull seized by two Lions, says of the Bull—ὃ δὲ μακρὰ μεμυκὼς ἔλκειο—He, bellowing loudly, was drag'd along. Where Eustathius, in commenting on this Bellowing, says, ὡς ἐδήλω τῷ χήματι as he (the Bull) made manifest (in the Picture) by his Figure or Attitude. Eust. in J. Σ. p. 1224.

Ch. II. (such as Crying, Laughing, Hollowing, &c.) (c)—All *Energies, Passions,* and *Affections*, of the *Soul*, being in any degree *more intense* or *violent* than ordinary (d)—All *Actions and Events*, whose *Integrity* or *Wholeness* depends upon a *short and self-evident* Succession of Incidents (e) —Or if the Succession be extended, then *such Actions* at least, whose *Incidents are all along, during that Succession, similar* (f)—All *Actions* which being qualified as *above*, open themselves into a *large Variety* of Circumstances, *concurring all in the same Point of Time* (g).—
All

(c) THE Reason is of the *same* kind, as that given in the Note immediately preceding; and by the *same* Rule, the Observation must be confined to *natural Sounds only*. In *Language*, few of the Speakers know the *Configurations*, which attend it.

(d) THE Reason is still of the *same* kind, *viz.* from their *Visible Effects* on the Body. They naturally produce either to the *Countenance* a particular *Redness* or *Paleness*; or a particular *Modification of its Muscles*; or else to the *Limbs*, a particular *Attitude*. Now all these Effects are *solely referable* to COLOUR and FIGURE, the two grand sensible Media, *peculiar* to Painting. See *Raphael's* Cartoons of *St. Paul* at *Athens*, and of his striking the Sorcerer *Elymas* blind: See also the Crucifixion of *Polycrates*, and the Sufferings of the Consul *Regulus*, both by *Salvator Rosa*.

(e) FOR of necessity every PICTURE is a *Punctum Temporis* or INSTANT.

(f) SUCH, for instance, as a Storm at Sea; whose *Incidents of Vision* may be nearly all included in foaming Waves, a dark Sky, Ships out of their erect Posture, and Men hanging upon the Ropes.—Or as a Battle; which from Beginning to End presents nothing else, than Blood, Fire, Smoak, and Disorder. Now *such Events* may be well imitated *all at once*; for how long soever they last, they are but *Repetitions of the same* —*Nicias*, the Painter, recommended much the same Subjects, *viz.* a Sea-fight or a Land-battle of Cavalry. His reasons too are much the same with those mentioned in Note (g). He concludes with a Maxim, (little regarded by his Successors, however important,) that the Subject itself is as much a Part of the Painter's Art, as the Poet's Fable is a Part of Poetry. See *Demetrius Phal.* p. 53. Edit. Ox.

(g) FOR PAINTING is not bounded in EXTENSION, as it is in DURATION. Besides, it seems true in every Species of Composition, that, as far as *Perplexity* and *Confusion* may be avoided, and the *Wholeness* of the Piece may be preserved *clear and intelligible*; the more ample the *Magnitude*, and the greater the *Variety*, the greater also, in proportion, the *Beauty* and *Perfection*. Noble instances of this are the Pictures above-mentioned in Note (d). See *Aristot. Poet.* cap. 7. 'Ο δὲ καὶ αὐτὴν φύσιν τῆς πράξεως ὅρῃ, ἀεὶ μὲν, &c. See also *Characteristicks*, V. I. p. 143. and *Bosſu*, B. I. cap. 16. *L'Achille de Homère est si grand, &c.*

All Actions which are *known*, and known *universally*, rather than Actions *newly invented* or *known but to few* (h).

Ch. II.

AND thus much as to the Subjects of Painting.

§ 2. IN MUSIC, THE FITTEST SUBJECTS of IMITATION are all such THINGS and INCIDENTS *as are most eminently* characterised by MOTION and SOUND.*

MOTION may be either *slow* or *swift*, *even* or *uneven*, *broken* or *continuous*.—SOUND may be either *soft* or *loud*, *high* or *low*. Wherever therefore any of these Species of *Motion* or *Sound* may be found in an *eminent* (not a *moderate* or *mean*) degree, there will be room for MUSICAL IMITATION.

THUS,

(h) THE Reason is, that a Picture being (as has been said) but a *Point* or *Instant*, in a Story *well known*, the Spectator's Memory will supply the *previous* and the *subsequent*. But this cannot be done, *where such Knowledge is wanting*. And therefore it may be justly questioned, whether the most celebrated Subjects, borrowed by Painting from History, would have been any of them intelligible *thro' the Medium of Painting only*, supposing History to have been silent, and to have given *no additional Information*.

It may be here added, that *Horace*, conformably to this Reasoning, recommends even to *Poetic Imitation* a *known* Story, before an *unknown*.

———*Tuque*

*Rectius Iliacum carmen deducis in actus,
Quam si proferres ignota, indictaque primus.*

Art. Poet. v. 128.

AND indeed as *the being understood to others*, either Hearers or Spectators, seems to be a *common Requisite* to all *Mimetic Arts* whatever; (for to those, who understand them not, they are in Fact no *Mimetic Arts*) it follows, that *Perspicuity* must be *Essential* to them *all*; and that no prudent Artist would neglect, if it were possible, any just Advantage to obtain this End. Now there can be no Advantage greater, than the *Notoriety of the Subject imitated*.

* P. 35.

Ch. II.

THUS, in the *Natural* or *Inanimate World*, MUSIC may imitate the Glidings, Murmurings, Toffings, Roarings, and other *Accidents of Water*, as perceived in Fountains, Cataracts, Rivers, Seas, &c.—The same of Thunder—the same of Winds, as well the stormy as the gentle. —In the *Animal World*, it may imitate the *Voice* of some Animals, but *chiefly* that of singing Birds——It may also *faintly copy* some of their *Motions*.—In the *Human Kind*, it can also imitate some *Motions* (i) and *Sounds* (k); and of Sounds those *most perfectly*, which are expressive of *Grief* and *Anguish* (l).

AND thus much as to the Subjects, which Music imitates.

§ 3. It remains then, that we *compare these two ARTS* together. And here indeed, as to *Musical Imitation in general*, it must be confessed that—as it can, from its Genius, imitate *only* Sounds and Motions—as there are not *many* Motions either in the *Animal* or in the *Inanimate World*, which are *exclusively peculiar* even to any *Species* and scarcely any to an *Individual*——as there are no *Natural Sounds*, which characterise at least *lower than a Species* (for the *Natural Sounds* of *Individuals* are in every *Species* the *same*)——farther, as Music does but *imperfectly* imitate even these Sounds and Motions (m)——

On

(i) As the *Walk* of the Giant *Polypheme*, in the Pastoral of *Acis* and *Galatea*.——See what ample *Strides* he takes, &c.

(k) As the *Shouts* of a Multitude, in the Coronation Anthem of, *God save the King*, &c.

(l) THE Reason is, that *this Species* of Musical Imitation *most nearly* approaches *Nature*. For *Grief*, in most Animals, declares itself by *Sounds*, which are not unlike to *long Notes in the Chromatic System*. Of this kind is the Chorus of *Baal's Priests* in the Oratorio of *Deborah*, *Doleful Tidings, how ye wound*, &c.

(m) THE Reason is from the *Dissimilitude* between the Sounds and Motions of *Nature*, and those of *Music*. *Musical Sounds* are all produced from *Even Vibration*, most
Natural

On the contrary, as Figures, Postures of Figures, and Colours characterise not only *every sensible Species*, but even *every Individual*; and for the most part also *the various* Energies and Passions* of every Individual——and farther, as Painting is able, *with the highest Accuracy and Exactness*, to imitate all these Colours and Figures; and while Musical Imitation pretends *at most* to no more, than the raising of Ideas *similar*, itself aspires to raise Ideas *the very same*——in a word, as Painting, in respect of *its Subjects*, is equal to the *noblest Part* of Imitation, *the Imitating regular Actions consisting of a Whole and Parts*; and of *such* Imitation, Music is *utterly incapable*——FROM ALL THIS it must be confessed, that MUSICAL IMITATION IS GREATLY BELOW THAT OF PAINTING, and that *at best* it is but an imperfect thing.

As to the *Efficacy* therefore of MUSIC, it must be derived from *another Source*, which must be left for the present, to be considered of hereafter†.

THERE remains to be mentioned Imitation by Poetry.

Natural from *Uneven*; *Musical Motions* are chiefly *Definite* in their Measure, most *Natural* are *Indefinite*.

* See Note (d) of this Chapter.

† Ch. VI.

C H A P. III.

On the Subjects which Poetry imitates, but imitates only thro' natural Media, or mere Sounds——Comparison of Poetry in this Capacity, first with Painting, then with Music.

Ch. III.

POETIC IMITATION includes every thing in it, which is performed either by PICTURE-IMITATION or MUSICAL; for its Materials are Words, and Words are * Symbols by Compact of all Ideas.

FARTHER as Words, beside their being Symbols by Compact, are also Sounds variously distinguished by their Aptness to be rapidly or slowly pronounced, and by the respective Prevalence of Mutes, Liquids, or Vowels in their Composition; it will follow that, beside their Compact-Relation, they will have likewise a Natural Relation to all such Things, between which and themselves there is any Natural Resemblance. Thus, for instance, there is Natural Resemblance between all sorts of harsh and grating Sounds. There is therefore (exclusive of its Signification) a Natural Relation between the Sound of a vile Hautboy, and of that Verse in † Virgil,

Stridenti miserum stipulâ disperdere Carmen.

or of that other in ‡ Milton,

Grate on their Scrannel Pipes of wretched Straw.

So

* See Note (a) Chap. I. † Ecl. 3. ver. 27. ‡ In his *Lycidas*.

So also between the *smooth swift* Gliding of a River, and of that Verse in * *Horace*, Ch. III.

————— at ille
Labitur, & labetur in omne volubilis ævum.

AND thus in part even *Poetic* Imitation has its Foundation in *Nature*. But then this Imitation goes not far: and taken without the *Meaning* derived to the Sounds from *Compact*, is but little intelligible, however perfect and elaborate.

§ 2. IF therefore POETRY be compared with PAINTING, in respect of this its *merely Natural and Inartificial* Resemblance, it may be justly said that—In as much as of *this sort* of Resemblance, Poetry (like Music) has no other Sources, than *those two* of *Sound* and *Motion*—in as much as it often wants these Sources *themselves* (for Numbers of Words neither *have*, nor *can have* any Resemblance to those *Ideas*, of which they are the *Symbols*)—in as much as *Natural* Sounds and Motions, which Poetry thus imitates, are themselves but † *loose* and *indefinite Accidents* of those *Subjects*, to which they belong, and consequently do but *loosely* and *indefinitely* characterise them—lastly, in as much as *Poetic* Sounds and Motions do but *faintly* resemble those of *Nature*, which are *themselves* confessed to be so *imperfect* and *vague*—FROM ALL THIS it will follow (as it has *already* followed of Music) that—POETIC IMITATION FOUNDED IN MERE NATURAL RESEMBLANCE IS MUCH INFERIOR TO THAT OF PAINTING, and *at best* but very *imperfect*.

§ 3. As

* Epist. 2. l. 1. ver. 42, 43. † P. 40, 41.

Ch. III.

§ 3. As to the Preference, which such POETIC IMITATION may claim before MUSICAL, or MUSICAL IMITATION before THAT; the Merits on each Side may appear perhaps *equal*. They both fetch their Imitations from **Sound* and *Motion*. Now MUSIC seems to imitate *Nature* better as to *Motion*, and POETRY as to *Sound*. The Reason is, that in *Motions* (a) *Music* has a *greater Variety*; and in *Sounds*, those of *Poetry* approach nearer to *Nature* (b).

IF therefore in *Sound* the one have the Preference, in *Motion* the other, and the *Merit* of *Sound* and *Motion* be supposed nearly *equal*; it will follow, that THE MERIT OF THE TWO IMITATIONS WILL BE NEARLY EQUAL ALSO.

* P. 35.

(a) MUSIC has no less than *five different Lengths of Notes* in ordinary use, reckoning from the Semi-brief to the Semi-quaver; all which may be *infinitely compounded*, even in any *one Time*, or *Measure*—POETRY, on the other hand, has but *two Lengths or Quantities*, a *long Syllable* and a *short*, (which is its *Half*) and *all the Variety of Verse* arises from such *Feet and Metres*, as these *two Species* of *Syllables*, by being compounded, can be made produce.

(b) MUSICAL Sounds are produced by *even Vibrations*, which *scarcely any Natural Sounds* are—on the contrary, *Words* are the Product of *uneven Vibration*, and so are *most natural Sounds*—Add to this, that *Words* are far more *numerous*, than *Musical Sounds*. So that *Poetry*, as to imitation by *Sound*, seems to exceed *Music*, not only in *nearness of Resemblance*, but even in *Variety* also.

C H A P. IV.

On the Subjects which Poetry imitates, not by mere Sounds or natural Media, but by Words significant; the Subjects at the same time being such, to which the Genius of each of the other two Arts is most perfectly adapted—Its Comparison in these Subjects, first with Painting, then with Music.

THE *Mimetic* Art of POETRY has been hitherto considered, as fetching its Imitation from mere *Natural* Resemblance. In this it has been shewn much *inferior* to PAINTING, and nearly equal to MUSIC.

Ch. IV.

It remains to be considered, what its Merits are, when it imitates not by mere *Natural* Sound, but by Sound *significant*; by Words, the *compact Symbols* of all kinds of Ideas. From hence depends its genuine Force. And here, as it is able to find Sounds expressive of every Idea, so is there *no Subject* either of Picture-Imitation, or Musical, to which it does not aspire; all Things and Incidents whatever being, in a manner, to be described by Words.

WHETHER therefore POETRY, in this its proper Sphere, be equal to the Imitation of the other two ARTS, is the Question at present, which comes in order to be discussed.

Now as Subjects are *infinite*, and the other two Arts are *not equally adapted* to imitate all; it is proposed, first to compare POETRY with them in such SUBJECTS, to which they are most perfectly adapted.

§ 2. To

Ch. IV.

§ 2. To begin therefore with PAINTING. A SUBJECT, in which the Power of this Art may be *most fully* exerted, (whether it be taken from the *Inanimate*, or the *Animal*, or the *Moral World*) must be a SUBJECT, *which is principally and eminently characterised by certain Colours, Figures, and Postures of Figures*—*whose Comprehension depends not on a Succession of Events; or at least, if on a Succession, on a short and self-evident one*—*which admits a large Variety of such Circumstances, as all concur in the same individual Point of Time, and relate all to one principal Action.*

As to such a Subject therefore——In as much as POETRY is forced to pass thro' the Medium of *Compact*, while PAINTING applies immediately thro' the Medium of *Nature*; the one being understood to all, the other to the Speakers of a certain Language* only——in as much as *Natural Operations* must needs be more *affecting*, than *Artificial*——in as much as Painting helps *our own rude Ideas* by *its own*, which are *consummate* and wrought up to the Perfection of Art; while Poetry can raise *no other (a)* than what every Mind is furnished with

* Note (c) p. 36.

(a) WHEN we read in MILTON of EVE, that

*Grace was in all her Steps, Heav'n in her Eye,
In ev'ry Gesture Dignity and Love;*

we have an Image *not* of that EVE, which MILTON conceived, but of *such an EVE only*, as every one, by his own proper Genius, is able to represent, from reflecting on those *Ideas*, which he has annexed to these several *Sounds*. The greater Part, in the mean time, have never perhaps bestowed one accurate Thought upon what *Grace, Heaven, Love, and Dignity* mean; or ever enriched the Mind with Ideas of Beauty, or asked *whence* they are to be acquired, and by what *Proportions* they are constituted. On the contrary, when we view EVE as painted by an *able Painter*, we labour under no such Difficulty; because we have exhibited before us the *better Conceptions of an ARTIST*, the *genuine Ideas* of perhaps a TITIAN or a RAPHAEL.

with *before*—in as much as Painting shews all the *minute and various concurrent Circumstances* of the Event in the *same* individual Point of Time, as they appear in *Nature*; while Poetry is forced to *want* this Circumstance of Intelligibility, by being ever obliged to enter into some degree of *Detail*—in as much as this Detail creates often the Dilemma of either becoming *tedious*, to be *clear*; or if *not tedious*, then *obscure*—lastly, in as much as all Imitations more *similar*, more *immediate*, and more *intelligible*, are preferable to those which are *less* so; and for the Reasons above, the Imitations of *Poetry* are *less similar*, *less immediate*, and *less intelligible* than those of *Painting*—FROM ALL THIS it will follow, that—IN ALL SUBJECTS WHERE PAINTING CAN FULLY EXERT ITSELF, THE IMITATIONS OF PAINTING ARE SUPERIOR TO THOSE OF POETRY, AND CONSEQUENTLY IN ALL SUCH SUBJECTS THAT PAINTING HAS THE PREFERENCE.

§ 3. AND now to compare POETRY with MUSIC, allowing to *Musical* the same Advantage of a *well-adapted* Subject, which has already been allowed to *Painting* in the Comparison just preceding.

WHAT such a SUBJECT is, has already been* described. And as to *Preference*, it must be confessed, that—in as much as MUSICAL IMITATIONS, tho' *Natural*, aspire not to raise the *same* Ideas, but only Ideas † *similar* and analogous; while POETIC IMITATION, tho' *Artificial*, raises Ideas the very *same*—in as much as the *Definite* and *Certain* is ever preferable to the *Indefinite* and *Uncertain*; and
that

* See Chap. II. § 2.

† P. 40, 41.

Ch. IV. that more especially in *Imitations*, where the principal (b) Delight is in recognizing the Thing imitated—it will follow from hence that—EVEN IN SUBJECTS THE BEST ADAPTED TO MUSICAL IMITATION, THE IMITATION OF POETRY WILL BE STILL MORE EXCELLENT.

(b) THAT there is an eminent Delight in this very RECOGNITION itself, abstract from any thing pleasing in the Subject recognized, is evident from hence—that, in all the Mimetic Arts, we can be highly charmed with *Imitations*, at whose *Originals* in Nature we are shocked and terrified. Such, for instance, as Dead Bodies, Wild Beasts, and the like.

THE Cause, assigned for this, seems to be of the following kind. We have a Joy, not only in the *Sanity* and *Perfection*, but also in the just and natural *Energies* of our several *Limbs* and *Faculties*. And hence, among others, the Joy in REASONING; as being the *Energy* of that principal Faculty, our INTELLECT or UNDERSTANDING. This Joy extends, not only to the Wise, but to the Multitude. For all Men have an *Aversion* to *Ignorance* and *Error*, and in some degree, however moderate, are glad to learn and to inform themselves.

HENCE therefore the *Delight*, arising from these *Imitations*; as we are enabled, in each of them, to exercise the REASONING FACULTY; and, by comparing the Copy with the Archetype in our Minds, to INFER that THIS is SUCH a THING; and, THAT, ANOTHER; a Fact remarkable among Children, even in their first and earliest Days.

Τὸ, τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι, σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ, καὶ τὴν διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι, καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας· καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. Σημεῖον δὲ τὸ τοῦ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων. Ἄ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν, τῶν τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριωμένους, χαίρομεν θεωρῶντες· οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀγριωτάτων, καὶ νεκρῶν. Ἄλιον δὲ καὶ τὸ, ὅτι μαθαίνειν ἢ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῷ. Διὰ γὰρ τὸ χαίρειν τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωρῶντας μαθαίνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι, τί ἕκαστον· οἷον, ὅτι ἔστι· ἐνέστι· Arist. Poet. c. 4.

C H A P. V.

On the Subjects which Poetry imitates by Words significant, being at the same time Subjects not adapted to the Genius of either of the other Arts—The Nature of those Subjects—The Abilities of Poetry to imitate them——Comparison of Poetry in these Subjects, first with Painting, then with Music.

THE MIMETIC ART of POETRY has now been considered in two Views—First, as imitating by *mere natural MEDIA*: and in this it has been placed *on a level* with MUSIC, but *much inferior* to PAINTING——It has been since considered as imitating thro' *Sounds significant by Compact*, and that in *such* Subjects respectively, where PAINTING and MUSIC have the *fullest Power* to exert themselves. Here to Painting it has been held *inferior*, but to Music it has been *preferred*.

Ch. V.

It remains to be considered——what *other Subjects* Poetry has left, to which the Genius of the other two Arts is less *perfectly adapted*——How far Poetry is *able* to imitate them——and whether from the *Perfection* of its Imitation, and the *Nature* of the Subjects themselves, it ought to be called no more than *equal* to its Sister Arts; or whether, on the whole, it should not rather be called *superior*.

§ 2. To begin, in the first place, by comparing it with Painting.

Ch. V.

THE *Subjects of Poetry*, to which the Genius of *Painting* is not adapted, are—all Actions, whose (a) *Whole* is of so lengthened a Duration, that no *Point of Time*, in any part of that Whole, can be given fit for *Painting*; neither in its *Beginning*, which will teach what is *Subsequent*; nor in its *End*, which will teach what is *Previous*; nor in its *Middle*, which will declare both the *Previous* and the *Subsequent*. —Also all Subjects so framed, as to lay open the *internal Constitution of Man*, and give us an Insight into (b) *Characters, Manners, Passions, and Sentiments*.

THE *Merit* of these Subjects is obvious. They must necessarily of all be the most *affecting*; the most *improving*; and such of which the Mind has the *strongest Comprehension*.

FOR as to the *affecting Part*—if it be true, that all *Events* more or less *affect* us, as the *Subjects*, which they respect, are more or less nearly *related* to us; then surely those *Events* must needs be most *affecting*,

(a) FOR a just and accurate Description of *Wholeness* and *Unity*, see *Arist. Poet.* Ch. 7 and 8, and *Bosju*, his best Interpreter, in his Treatise on the *Epic Poem.* B. II. Ch. 9, 10, 11.

(b) FOR a Description of CHARACTER, see below, Note (d) of this Chapter.

AS for MANNERS, it may be said in general, that a *certain System of them* makes a *Character*; and that as these Systems, by being *differently compounded*, make each a *different Character*, so is it that *one Man truly differs* from another.

PASSIONS are obvious; *Pity, Fear, Anger, &c.*

SENTIMENTS are discoverable in all those Things, which are the *proper Business and End of SPEECH or DISCOURSE*. The chief Branches of this *End* are to *Affert* and *Prove*; to *Solve* and *Refute*; to express or excite *Passions*; to *amplify* Incidents, and to *diminish* them. It is in these things therefore, that we must look for *Sentiment*. See *Arist. Poet.* c. 19.—ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὴν Διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τῆς λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι. Μέρη δὲ τούτων, τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι, καὶ τὸ λύειν, καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν, —καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος, καὶ σμικρότητα.

fecting, to whose *Subjects* we are of all the *most intimately related*.
Now such is the Relation, which we bear to *Mankind*; and Men and
Human Actions are the Subjects, here proposed for Imitation.

Ch. V.

As to *Improvement*—there can be none surely (to *Man* at least) so
great, as that which is derived from a just and decent Representation
of *Human Manners*, and *Sentiments*. For what can more contribute
to give us that *Master-Knowledge* (c) without which, *all other Know-*
ledge will prove of little or no *Utility*?

As

(c) Γ Ν Ω Θ Ι Σ Α Τ Τ Ο Ν. But farther, besides obtaining this *moral Science* from
the Contemplation of Human Life; an End *common* both to Epic, Tragic, and Comic
Poetry; there is a *peculiar* End to *Tragedy*, that of eradicating the Passions of *Pity* and
Fear. "Ἔστιν ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ μίμησις πράξεως σπυδαίας καὶ τελείας—δι' ἧς καὶ φόβος περαίνειται τὴν τῶν
ποιῶντων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. Arist. Poet. c. 6. TRAGEDY is the imitation of an Action im-
portant and perfect, thro' PITY and FEAR working the PURGATION OF SUCH-LIKE PAS-
SIONS.

THERE are none, it is evident, so devoid of these two *Passions*, as those *perpetually*
conversant, where the *Occasions* of them are most *frequent*; such, for instance, as the
Military Men, the Professors of *Medicine*, *Chirurgery*, and the like. Their Minds, by
this Intercourse, become as it were *callous*; gaining an *Apathy*, by *Experience*, which no
Theory can ever teach them.

Now that, which is wrought in *these Men* by the *real Disasters of Life*, may be sup-
posed wrought in others by the *Fictions of Tragedy*; yet with this happy Circumstance
in favour of Tragedy, that, without the Disasters being *real*, it can obtain the *same* End.

It must however, for all this, be confessed, that an Effect of this kind cannot reasonably
be expected, except among Nations, like the *Athenians* of old, who lived in a perpetual
Attendance upon these Theatrical Representations. For it is not a *single* or *occasional*
Application to these Passions, but a *constant* and *uninterrupted*, by which alone they may
be lessened or removed.

It would be improper to conclude this Note, without observing, that the Philosopher
in this place by *PITY* means not *PHILANTHROPY*, *Natural Affection*, a *Readiness to*
relieve others in their Calamities and Distress; but, by *Pity*, he means that *SENSELESS*
EFFEMINATE CONSTERNATION, which seizes weak Minds, on the sudden Prospect of
any thing disastrous; which, in its more violent Effects, is seen in *Shriekings*, *Swoonings*,
&c. a Passion, so far from laudable, or from operating to the Good of others, that it is
certain to deprive the Party, who labours under its Influence, of all Capacity to do the
least good Office.

Ch. V.

As to our *Comprehension*—there is nothing certainly, of which we have so *strong* Ideas, as of that which happens in the *Moral* or *Human* World. For as to the *Internal Part*, or *Active Principle* of the *Vegetable*, we know it but *obscurely*; because there we can discover neither *Passion*, nor *Sensation*. In the *Animal* World indeed this *Principle* is more seen, and that from the *Passions* and *Sensations* which *there* declare themselves. Yet all still rests upon the mere Evidence of *Sense*; upon the Force only of *external* and *unassisted Experience*. But in the *Moral* or *Human* World, as we have a Medium of *Knowledge* far more *accurate* than this; so from hence it is, that we can comprehend *accordingly*.

WITH regard therefore to the various *Events* which happen *here*, and the various *Causes*, by which they are produced—in other Words, of all Characters, Manners, Human Passions, and Sentiments; besides the Evidence of *Sense*, we have the *highest Evidence additional*, in having an express *Consciousness* of something *similar within*; of something *homogeneous* in the *Recesses* of our own *Minds*; in that, which constitutes to each of us *his true and real Self*.

THESE therefore being the Subjects, *not adapted to the Genius of Painting*, it comes next to be considered, *how far Poetry can imitate them*.

AND here, that it has *Abilities* clearly *equal*, cannot be doubted; as it has *that* for the *Medium* of its Imitation, through which *Nature* declares herself in the *same* Subjects. For the *Sentiments* in *real Life*

are only known by Men's* *Discourse*. And the *Characters, Manners, and Passions* of Men being the *Prompters* to what they *say*; it must needs follow, that their *Discourse* will be a *constant Specimen* of those *Characters, Manners, and Passions*.

† *Format enim Natura prius nos intus ad omnem*

Fortunarum habitum; juvat, aut impellit ad iram:

Post effert Animi Motus, INTERPRETE LINGUA.

Not only therefore *Language* is an *adequate* Medium of Imitation, but in *Sentiments* it is the *only* Medium; and in *Manners* and *Passions* there is no other, which can exhibit them to us after that *clear, precise, and definite Way*, as they in *Nature* stand allotted to the various sorts of Men, and are found to constitute the *several Characters* of each (d).

§ 3. To

* P. 50, Note (b).

† *Hor. de Arte Poet.* vers. 108.

(d) It is true indeed that (besides what is done by *Poetry*) there is some *Idea of Character*, which even *Painting* can communicate. Thus there is no doubt, but that such a *Countenance* may be found by *Painters* for *Aeneas*, as would convey upon view a *mild, humane*, and yet a *brave* Disposition. But then this *Idea* would be *vague* and *general*. It would be concluded, only in the gross, that the Hero was *Good*. As to that System of Qualities *peculiar* to *Aeneas* only, and which alone *properly constitutes his true and real Character*, this would still remain a *Secret*, and be no way discoverable. For how deduce it from the mere *Lineaments* of a Countenance? Or, if it were deducible, how few *Spectators* would there be found so sagacious? It is here, therefore, that *Recourse* must be had, not to *Painting*, but to *Poetry*. So *accurate* a Conception of *Character* can be gathered only from a *Succession of various, and yet consistent Actions*; a *Succession, enabling us to conjecture*, what the Person of the Drama will do in the *future*, from what already he has done in the *past*. Now to such an Imitation, *Poetry* only is *equal*; because it is not *bounded, like Painting, to short, and as it were, instant Events*, but may imitate Subjects of *any Duration whatever*. See *Arist. Poet.* cap. 6. Ἐστὶ δὲ ἥθος μὲν τὸ τοῖστον, ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὅποιά τις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἂν ἔσται δῆλον, εἰ προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων. See also the ingenious and learned *Bosju*, Book 4. ch. 4.

Ch. V.

§ 3. To compare therefore *Poetry*, in these *Subjects*, with *Painting*—
 In as much as no *Subjects* of *Painting* are **wholly superior* to *Poetry*;
 while the *Subjects*, here described, *far exceed the Power* of *Painting*
 —in as much as they are of *all Subjects* the most †*affecting*, and
improving, and such of which we have the *strongest Comprehension*—
 further, in as much as *Poetry* can most ‡ *accurately* imitate them—
 in as much as, besides all *Imitation*, there is a *Charm* in *Poetry*,
 arising from its very *Numbers* (e); whereas *Painting* has Pretence to
 no *Charm*, except that of *Imitation* only—lastly, (which will soon
 be ||shewn) in as much as *Poetry* is able to *associate Music* as a most
 powerful Ally; of which Assistance, *Painting* is utterly incapable—
 FROM ALL THIS it may be fairly concluded, that—POETRY is not
 only *Equal*, but that it is in *Fact* FAR SUPERIOR TO ITS SISTER ART
 OF PAINTING.

§ 4. BUT

* P. 35, 45.

† P. 50, &c.

‡ P. 52, &c.

|| Chap. VI.

(e) THAT there is a *Charm* in *Poetry*, arising from its *Numbers* only, may be made
 evident from the five or six first Lines of the *Paradise Lost*; where, without any Pomp
 of Phrase, Sublimity of Sentiment, or the *least Degree of Imitation*, every Reader must
 find himself to be sensibly delighted; and that, only from the graceful and simple *Cadence*
 of the *Numbers*, and that artful *Variation* of the *Cæsura* or *Pause*, so essential to the
 Harmony of every good Poem.

AN *English Heroic Verse* consists of ten *Semipeds*, or Half-feet. Now in the Lines
 above-mentioned the *Pauses* are varied upon *different Semipeds* in the Order, which
 follows; as may be seen by any, who will be at the Pains to examine.

PARADISE LOST, B. I.

Verse 1	} has its Pause fall upon	Semiped 7
--- 2		----- 6
--- 3		----- 6
--- 4		----- 5
--- 5		----- 3
--- 6		----- 4

§ 4. BUT if it exceed *Painting* in *Subjects*, to which *Painting* is *not adapted*; no doubt *will it exceed Music* in *Subjects* to *Music not adapted*. For *here* it has been * *preferred*, even in those *Subjects*, which have been held *adapted the best of all*.

§ 5. POETRY IS THEREFORE, ON THE WHOLE, MUCH SUPERIOR TO EITHER OF THE OTHER MIMETIC ARTS; *it having been shewn to be equally excellent* IN THE † ACCURACY OF ITS IMITATION; and to *imitate* SUBJECTS, WHICH FAR SURPASS, AS WELL IN ‡ UTILITY, AS IN || DIGNITY.

* Ch. IV. § 3. † P. 52. ‡ P. 51.

|| See p. 49, 50, and p. 38, Note (g). See also p. 36.

C H A P. VI.

On Music considered not as an Imitation, but as deriving its Efficacy from another Source.—On its joint Operation by this means with Poetry.—An Objection to Music solved.—The Advantage arising to it, as well as to Poetry, from their being united.—Conclusion.

Ch. VI. **I**N the above Discourse, MUSIC has been mentioned as an * *Ally* to Poetry. It has also been said to derive its † *Efficacy* from another Source, than *Imitation*. It remains, therefore, that these things be explained.

Now, in order to this, it is first to be observed, that there are various *Affections*, which may be raised by the Power of *Music*. There are Sounds to make us *cheerful*, or *sad*; *martial*, or *tender*; and so of almost every other Affection, which we feel.

It is also further observable, that there is a *reciprocal Operation* between our *Affections*, and our *Ideas*; so that, by a sort of *natural Sympathy*, certain *Ideas* necessarily tend to raise in us certain *Affections*; and those *Affections*, by a sort of Counter-Operation, to raise the *same Ideas*. Thus *Ideas* derived from Funerals, Tortures, Murders, and the like, naturally generate the Affection of *Melancholy*. And when, by any *Physical Causes*, that Affection happens to prevail, it as naturally generates the *same doleful Ideas*.

AND

* P. 54.

† P. 41.

AND hence it is, that *Ideas*, derived from *external* Causes, have at *different* times, upon the *same* Person, so *different* an Effect. If they happen to suit the Affections, which *prevail within*, then is their Impression *most sensible*, and their Effect *most lasting*. If the contrary be true, then is the Effect contrary. Thus, for instance, a Funeral will much more affect the same Man, if he see it when melancholy, than if he see it when chearful.

Now this being premised, it will follow, that whatever happens to be the *Affection* or *Disposition* of Mind, which ought naturally to result from the Genius of any *Poem*, the *same* probably it will be in the Power of some Species of *Music* to excite. But whenever the *proper Affection* prevails, it has been allowed that then *all kindred Ideas*, derived from external Causes, make the *most sensible Impression*. The Ideas therefore of Poetry must needs make the most sensible Impression, when the (a) Affections, peculiar to them, are already excited by the Music. For here a *double Force* is made co-operate to one End. A Poet, *thus assisted*, finds not an Audience in a Temper, averse to the Genius of his Poem, or perhaps at best under a cool *Indifference*; but by the Preludes, the Symphonies, and concurrent Operation of the Music in all its Parts, rouzed into *those very Affections*, which he would most desire.

AN

(a) QUINTILIAN elegantly, and exactly apposite to this Reasoning, says of *Music* — *Namque & voce & modulatione grandia elatè, jucunda dulciter, moderata leniter canit, totâque arte consentit cum eorum, quæ dicuntur, AFFECTIBUS.* *Inst. Orator. l. 1. cap. 10.*

Ch. VI.

AN Audience, so disposed, not only embrace with Pleasure the Ideas of the Poet, when exhibited; but, in a manner, even *anticipate* them in their several Imaginations. The Superstitious have not a more previous Tendency to be frightened at the sight of Spectres, or a Lover to fall into Raptures at the sight of his Mistress; than a Mind, thus tempered by the Power of Music, to enjoy all Ideas, which are suitable to that Temper.

AND hence the *genuine* Charm of Music, and the *Wonders* which it works, thro' its great Professors (b). A Power, which consists not in Imitations, and the raising *Ideas*; but in the raising *Affections*, to which Ideas may correspond. There are few to be found so insensible, I may even say so inhumane, as when GOOD POETRY IS JUSTLY SET TO MUSIC, not in some degree to feel the Force of so *amiable an Union*. But to the Muses Friends it is a Force *irresistible*, and penetrates into the deepest Recesses of the Soul.

——* *Pectus inaniter angit,*
Irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet.

§ 2. Now this is *that Source*, from whence Music was † said formerly to derive its greatest Efficacy. And here indeed, not in (c) Imitation,

(b) SUCH, above all, is *George Frederick Handel*; whose Genius, having been cultivated by continued Exercise, and being itself far the sublimest and most universal now known, has justly placed him without an Equal, or a Second. This transient Testimony could not be denied so excellent an Artist, from whom this Treatise has borrowed such eminent Examples, to justify its Assertions in what it has offered concerning Music.

* *Horat. Epist. I. l. 2. vers. 211.* † P. 41.

(c) FOR the narrow Extent and little Efficacy of MUSIC, considered as a MIMETIC or IMITATIVE Art, see Ch. II. § 3.

tation, ought it to be chiefly cultivated. On this account also it has been called a **powerful Ally* to Poetry. And farther, it is by the help of this Reasoning, that the *Objection* is solved, which is raised against the *Singing of Poetry* (as in Opera's, Oratorio's, &c.) from the want of *Probability* and *Resemblance to Nature*. To one indeed, who has no musical Ear, this *Objection* may have Weight. It may even perplex a Lover of Music, if it happen to surprise him in his Hours of *Indifference*. But when he is feeling the Charm of Poetry *so accompanied*, let him be angry (if he can) with that which serves only to interest him *more feelingly* in the Subject, and support him in a *stronger and more earnest* Attention; which enforces, by its Aid, the several Ideas of the Poem, and gives them to his Imagination with unusual Strength and Grandeur. He cannot surely but confess, that he is a *Gainer in the Exchange*, when he *barters* the want of a single Probability, that of *Pronunciation* (a thing merely arbitrary and every where different) for a *noble Heightening of Affections* which are suitable to the Occasion, and enable him to enter into the Subject with double *Energy* and *Enjoyment*.

§ 3. FROM what has been said it is evident, that these two Arts can never be so powerful *singly*, as when they are *properly united*. For *Poetry*, when alone, must be necessarily forced to *waste* many of its richest *Ideas*, in the mere raising of Affections, when, to have been properly relished, it should have *found* those Affections in their highest Energy. And *Music*, when alone, can only raise *Affections*, which

* P. 54.

Ch. VI. which soon *languish* and *decay*, if not maintained and fed by the nutritivé Images of Poetry. Yet must it be remembered, in this Union, that *Poetry* ever have the *Precedence*; its * *Utility*, as well as *Dignity*, being by far the more considerable.

§ 4. AND thus much, for the present, as to † *MUSIC*, *PAINTING*, and *POETRY*, the Circumstances, in which they *agree*, and in which they *differ*; and the *PREFERENCE*, DUE TO ONE OF THEM ABOVE THE OTHER TWO.

* Ch. V. § 2. p. 49. † P. 34.

The E N D.

TREATISE THE THIRD:

CONCERNING HAPPINESS,

A DIALOGUE.

Finished Dec. 15, A. D. 1741.

CONCERNING THE

A DIAMOND

CONCERNING HAPPINESS,

A DIALOGUE.

PART THE FIRST.

J. H. to F. S.

NATURE seems to treat Man, as a Painter would his disciple, Part I.
 to whom he commits the outlines of a Figure lightly sketched, which the Scholar for himself is to colour and complete. Thus from Nature we derive Senses, and Passions, and an Intellect, which each of us *for himself* has to model into a Character. And hence (the reverse of every Species beside) Human Characters alone are infinitely various ; as various indeed, as there are Individuals to form them. Hence too, the great Diversity of Systems, and of Doctrines, respecting the Laws and Rules, and Conduct of Human Life

It is in the History of these, my Friend, you have so successfully employed yourself. You have been studious to know, not so much what *Greeks, Romans, or Barbarians* have *done* ; as what they have *reasoned*, and what they have *taught*. Not an Epicure has more Joy in the Memory of a delicious Banquet, than I feel in recollecting, what we have discoursed on these Subjects.

AND

Part I.

AND here you cannot forget (for we were both unanimous) the Contempt, in which we held those superficial Censurers, who profess to refute, what they want even Capacities to comprehend. Upon the Faith of their own Boasting (could that be credited) Sentiments are exposed, Opinions demolished, and the whole Wisdom of Antiquity lies vanquished at their Feet. Like Opera Heroes, upon their own Stage, they can with ease dispatch a Lion, or discomfit a whole Legion. But alas! were they to encounter, not the Shadow, but the Substance, what think you would be the Event then?—Little better, I fear, than was the Fortune of poor *Priam*, when the feeble Old Man durst attack the Youthful *Pyrrhus*.

—* *Telum imbelle sine ictu*

Conjecit : rauco quod protenus ære repulsum.

Et summo Clypei nequicquam umbone pependit.

AMONG the many long exploded and obsolete Systems, there was one, you may remember, for which I professed a great Esteem. Not in the least degree convinced by all I had heard against it, I durst venture to affirm, that no System was more *plausible*; that grant but its *Principles*, and the rest followed of course; that none approached nearer to the *Perfection of our own RELIGION*, as I could prove, were there occasion, by *Authority not to be controverted*. As you, I knew, were the Favourer of an Hypothesis somewhat † *different*; so I attempted to support my own, by reciting you a certain Dialogue. Not succeeding however so happily in the Recollection, as I could wish,

* *Æneid*. l. 2. vers. 544.

† *Viz.* the PLATONIC.

wish, I have since endeavoured to transcribe, what at that time I would have rehearsed. The result of my Labour is the following Narrative, which I commit with Confidence to your Friendship and Candour.

§ 2. It was at a time, when a certain Friend, whom I highly value, was my Guest. We had been sitting together, entertaining ourselves with *Shakespear*. Among many of his Characters, we had looked into that of *Woolsey*. How soon, says my Friend, does the Cardinal in Disgrace abjure that Happiness, which he was lately so fond of? Scarcely out of Office, but he begins to exclaim

** Vain Pomp and Glory of the World! I hate ye.*

So true is it, that our Sentiments ever vary with the Season; and that in Adversity we are of one Mind, in Prosperity, of another.

As for his mean Opinion, said I, of Human Happiness, it is a Truth, which small Reflection might have taught him long before. There seems little need of Distress to inform us of this. I rather commend the seeming Wisdom of that † Eastern Monarch, who in the Affluence of Prosperity, when he was proving every Pleasure, was yet so sensible of their Emptiness, their Insufficiency to make him happy, that he proclaimed a Reward to the Man, who should invent a new Delight. The Reward indeed was proclaimed, but the Delight was not to be found. If by Delight, said he, you mean some Good; something conducive to real Happiness; it might have been found

* SHAKESPEAR'S *Henry the Eighth*.

† *Tusc. Disp.* v. 7.

Part I. found perhaps, and yet not hit the Monarch's Fancy. Is that, said I, possible? It is possible, replied he, tho' it had been *the Sovereign Good itself*——And indeed what wonder? Is it probable that such a Mortal, as an Eastern Monarch; such a pampered, flattered, idle Mortal; should have Attention, or Capacity to a Subject so delicate? A Subject, enough to exercise the Subtlest and most Acute?

WHAT then is it you esteem, said I, the *Sovereign Good* to be? It should seem, by your Representation, to be something very uncommon. Ask me not the Question, said he, you know not where it will carry us. Its *general Idea* indeed is easy and plain; but the *Detail of Particulars* is perplexed and long——Passions, and Opinions for ever thwart us——a Paradox appears in almost every Advance. Besides, did our Inquiries succeed ever so happily, the *very Subject itself* is always enough to give me Pain. That, replied I, seems a Paradox indeed. It is not, said he, from any Prejudice, which I have conceived against it; for to Man I esteem it the noblest in the World. Nor is it for being a Subject, to which my Genius does not lead me; for no Subject at all times has more employed my Attention. But the Truth is, I can scarce ever think on it but an unlucky Story still occurs to my Mind. “A certain Star-gazer, with his Telescope was once viewing the Moon; and describing her Seas, her Mountains, and her Territories. Says a Clown to his Companion, *Let him spy what he pleases; we are as near to the Moon, as he and all his Brethren.*” So fares it alas! with these, our moral Speculations. Practice too often *creeps*, where Theory can *soar*. The *Philosopher* proves as *weak*, as those, *whom he most contemns*. A mortifying

mortifying Thought to such as well attend it. Too mortifying, replied I, to be long dwelt on. Give us rather your *general* Idea of the *Sovereign Good*. This is easy from your own Account, however intricate the Detail.

THUS then, said he, since you are so urgent, it is thus that I conceive it. THE SOVEREIGN GOOD IS THAT, THE POSSESSION OF WHICH RENDERS US HAPPY. And how, said I, do we possess it? Is it *Sensual*, or *Intellectual*? There you are entering, said he, upon the *Detail*. This is beyond your Question. Not a small Advance, said I, to indulge poor Curiosity? Will you raise me a Thirst, and be so cruel not to allay it? It is not, replied he, of my raising, but your own. Besides I am not certain, should I attempt to proceed, whether you will admit such *Authorities*, as it is possible I may vouch. That, said I, must be determined by their Weight, and Character. Suppose, said he, it should be MANKIND; the *whole Human Race*. Would you not think it something strange, to seek of *those* concerning Good, who pursue it a *thousand Ways*, and many of them *contradictory*? I confess, said I, it seems so.

And yet, continued he, were there a Point, in which such *Dissentients* ever agreed, this *Agreement* would be no mean *Argument* in favour of its *Truth* and *Justness*. But where, replied I, is this Agreement to be found?

HE answered me by asking, What if it should appear, that there were certain ORIGINAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PRE-CONCEPTIONS OF GOOD, which were NATURAL, UNIFORM AND COMMON TO ALL MEN; which all recognized in their various Pursuits; and that the Differ-

Part I.

ence lay only IN THE APPLYING THEM TO PARTICULARS?

This requires, said I, to be illustrated. As if, continued he, a Company of Travellers, in some wide Forest, were all intending for one City, but each by a Route peculiar to himself. The Roads indeed would be *various*, and many perhaps *false*; but all who travelled, would have *one End in view*. It is evident, said I, they would.

So fares it then, added he, with Mankind in pursuit of *Good*. The Ways indeed are *Many*, but what they seek is *ONE*.

For instance; Did you ever hear of any, who in pursuit of their *Good*, were for living the Life of a Bird, an Insect, or a Fish? None. And why not? It would be inconsistent, answered I, with their Nature. You see then, said he, they *all agree* in this—that what they pursue, ought to be *consistent, and agreeable to their proper Nature*. So ought it, said I, undoubtedly. If so, continued he, one *Pre-conception* is discovered, which is *common to Good in general*—It is, that *all Good is supposed something agreeable to Nature*. This indeed, replied I, seems to be agreed on all hands.

BUT again, said he,—Is there a Man scarcely to be found of a Temper so truly mortified, as to acquiesce in the *lowest, and shortest Necessaries of Life*? Who aims not, if he be able, at something *farther, something better*? I replied, Scarcely one. Do not Multitudes pursue, said he, *infinite Objects of Desire*, acknowledged, every one of them, to be in no respect *Necessaries*?—Exquisite Viands, delicious Wines, splendid Apparel, curious Gardens; magnificent Apartments adorned with Pictures and Sculpture; Music and Poetry, and the whole Tribe of *Elegant Arts*? It is evident, said I.

If

If it be, continued he, it should seem that they *all* considered the *Chief* or *Sovereign Good*, not to be that, *which conduces to bare Existence or mere Being*; for to this the *Necessaries alone are adequate*.

I replied they were. But if not this, it must be somewhat *conducive to that, which is superior to mere Being*. It must. And what, continued he, can this be, but *Well-Being*? *Well-Being*, under the various Shapes, in which *differing* Opinions paint it? Or can you suggest any thing else? I replied, I could not. Mark here, then, continued he, another *Pre-conception*, in which they *all* agree——the *Sovereign Good* is somewhat *conducive, not to mere Being, but to Well-Being*. I replied, it had so appeared.

AGAIN, continued he. What labour, what expence, to procure those rarities, which our own poor country is unable to afford us? How is the world ransacked to its utmost Verges, and luxury and arts imported from every quarter?——Nay more——How do we baffle *Nature* herself; invert her Order; seek the Vegetables of Spring in the rigours of Winter, and Winter's Ice, during the heats of Summer? I replied, We did. And what disappointment, what remorse, when Endeavours fail? It is true. If this then be evident, said he, it should seem, that whatever we desire as our *Chief* and *Sovereign Good*, is something *which, as far as possible, we would accommodate to all Places and Times*. I answered, so it appeared.

See then, said he, another of its *Characteristics*, another *Pre-conception*.

BUT farther still——What contests for *Wealth*? What scrambling for *Property*? What perils in the pursuit; what solicitude in the maintenance?

Part I. maintenance?—And why all this? To what *Purpose*, what *End*?
 —Or is not the reason plain? Is it not that *Wealth* may continually procure us, whatever we fancy *Good*; and make that *perpetual*, which would otherwise be *transient*? I replied, it seemed so. Is it not farther desired, as *supplying us from ourselves*; when, without it, we must be beholden to the benevolence of *others*, and *depend on their caprice* for all that we enjoy? It is true, said I, this seems a reason.

AGAIN—Is not *Power* of every degree as much contested for, as *Wealth*? Are not magistracies, honours, principalities, and empire, the subjects of strife, and everlasting contention? I replied, They were. And why, said he, this? To obtain what *End*?—Is it not to *help* us, like wealth, to the *Possession of what we desire*? Is it not farther to *ascertain*, to *secure* our enjoyments; that when *others* would deprive us, we may be *strong enough to resist them*? I replied, it was.

OR to invert the whole—Why are there, who seek recesses the most distant and retired? fly courts and power, and submit to *Parcimony* and *Obscurity*? Why all this, but from the *same* intention? From an Opinion that *small* possessions, used moderately, are *permanent*—that *larger* possessions raise envy, and are more frequently *invaded*—that the *Safety of Power and Dignity* is more precarious, than that of *Retreat*; and that therefore they have chosen, what is *most eligible upon the whole*? It is not, said I, improbable, that they act by some such motive?

Do you not see then, continued he, two or three more *Pre-conceptions* of the *Sovereign Good*, which are fought for by all, as essential to constitute it? And what, said I, are these? That it should not be *transient*, nor *derived from the Will of others*, nor in *their Power to take away*; but be *durable, self-derived*, and (if I may use the Expression) *indeprivable*. I confess, said I, it appears so. But we have already found it to be considered, as *something agreeable to our Nature*; *conducive*, not to mere Being, but to *Well-Being*; and what we aim to have *accommodate to all Places and Times*. We have.

THERE may be *other* Characteristics, said he, but these I think sufficient. See then its Idea; behold it, as collected from the *Original, Natural, and Universal Pre-conceptions of all Mankind*. THE SOVEREIGN GOOD, they have taught us, ought to be something—
 AGREEABLE TO OUR NATURE; CONDUCTIVE TO WELL-BEING;
 ACCOMMODATE TO ALL PLACES AND TIMES; DURABLE, SELF-DERIVED, AND INDEPRIVABLE. Your account, said I, appears just.

IT matters, continued he, little, how they *err* in the *Application*—if they covet that as *agreeable to Nature*, which is in itself most *Contrary*—if they would have that as *Durable*, which is in itself most *Transient*—that as *Independent*, and their own, which is most *precarious* and *Servile*. It is enough for us, if we know their *Aim*—enough, if we can discover, what it is they propose—the *Means* and *Method* may be *absurd*, as it happens. I answered, their Aim was sufficient to prove what he had asserted.

It

Part I.

It is true, replied he, it is abundantly sufficient. And yet perhaps, even tho' this were ever so certain, it would not be altogether foreign, were we to examine, how they act; how they succeed in applying these *Universals* to *Particular Subjects*. Should they be found *just* in the Application, we need look no farther—The true *Sovereign Good* would of course be *Plain* and *Obvious*; and we should have no more to do, than to follow the beaten road. It is granted, replied I. But what if they *err*? Time enough for that, said he, when we are satisfied that they do. We ought first to inform ourselves, whether they may not possibly be in the right. I submitted, and begged him to proceed his own way.

§ 3. WILL you then, said he, in this disquisition into Human Conduct, allow me this—That such, as is the Species of Life, which every one *chooses*; such is his *Idea* of *Happiness*, such his *Conception* of the *Sovereign Good*? I seem, said I, to comprehend You, but should be glad You would illustrate. His Meaning, he answered, was no more than this—If a Man prefer a Life of *Industry*, it is because he has an *Idea* of Happiness in *Wealth*; if he prefers a Life of *Gaiety*, it is from a like *Idea* concerning *Pleasure*. And the *same*, we say, holds true in every other Instance. I told him, it must certainly.

AND can you recollect, said he, any Life, but what is a Life of *Business*, or of *Leisure*? I answered, None. And is not the great *End* of *Business* either *Power* or *Wealth*? It is. Must not every *Life* therefore of *Business* be either *Political* or *Lucrative*?

It must. Again—Are not *Intellect* and *Sense*, the *Soul's* leading *Powers*? They are. And in *Leisure* are we not ever seeking,

ing, to gratify one or the other? We are. Must not every Life therefore of *Leisure* be either *Pleasurable*, or *Contemplative*? If you confine Pleasure, said I, to *Sense*, I think it necessarily must. If it be not so confined, said he, we confound all Inquiry. Allow it. Part I.

MARK then, said he, the two grand *Genera*, the LIVES of BUSINESS and of LEISURE——mark also the *subordinate Species*; the POLITICAL and LUCRATIVE, the CONTEMPLATIVE and PLEASURABLE——Can you think of any other, which *these* will not include?

I replied, I knew of none. It is possible indeed, said he, that there may be *other* Lives framed, by the *blending* of these, two or more of them together. But if we separate with accuracy, we shall find that here they all terminate. I replied, so it seemed probable.

IF then, continued he, we would be exact in our Inquiry, we must examine *these four Lives*, and mark their *Consequences*. It is thus only we shall learn, how far those, who embrace them, find that *Good* and *Happiness*, which we know *they all pursue*. I made answer, it seemed necessary, and I should willingly attend him.

§ 4. To begin then, said he, with the POLITICAL LIFE. Let us see the *Good*, usually sought after here. To a *private Man*, it is the favour of some Prince, or Commonwealth; the honours and emoluments derived from this favour; the court and homage of mankind; the power of commanding others——To a *Prince*, it is the *same* thing nearly, only *greater in Degree*; a larger command; a stricter and more servile homage; glory, conquest, and extended empire——Am I right in my description? I replied, I thought he was.

VOL. I.

L

Whether

Part I.

Whether then, said he, *all this* deserves the Name of *Good* or not, I do not controvert. Be it one, or the other, it affects not our Inquiry. All that I would ask concerning it, is this—Do you not think it a *Good* (if it really be one) *derived from Foreign and External Causes*?

Undoubtedly, replied I. It cannot come then from *ourselves*, or be *self-derived*. It cannot. And what shall we say as to its *Duration* and *Stability*? Is it so *firm* and *lasting*, that we cannot be *deprived* of it? I should imagine, said I, quite otherwise. You insist not then, said he, on my appealing to *History*. You acknowledge the Fate of Favourites, of Empires, and their Owners. I replied, I did.

If so, said he, it should seem that this *Political Good*, which they seek, corresponds not to the *Pre-conceptions* of being *Durable*, and *Indeprivable*. Far from it. But it appeared just before, not to be *self-derived*. It did. You see then, said he, that *in three of our Pre-conceptions it intirely fails*. So indeed, said I, it appears.

BUT farther, said he—We are told of this *Good*, that in the *Possession* it is attended with *Anxiety*; and that when *lost*, it is usually *lost* with *Ignominy* and *Disgrace*; nay, often with prosecutions and the bitterest resentments; with mulcts, with exile, and death itself. It is frequently, said I, the case. How then, said he, can it answer that other *Pre-conception*, of *contributing to our Well-Being*? Can that contribute to *Well-Being*, whose *Consequences* lead to *Calamity*, and whose *Presence* implies *Anxiety*? This, it must be confessed, said I, appears not probable.

BUT once more, said he—There are certain *Habits* or *Dispositions* of *Mind*, called Sincerity, Generosity, Candour, Plain-dealing, Justice, Honour, Honesty, and the like. There are. And it has been generally believed, that these are *agreeable to Nature*. Assuredly,

But it has been as generally believed, that the *Political Good*, we speak of, is often not to be acquired but by *Habits*, *contrary to these*; and which, if *these* are *Natural*, must of necessity be *unnatural*.

What *Habits*, said I, do you mean? Flattery, answered he, Diffimulation, Intrigue: upon occasion, perhaps Iniquity, Falshood, and Fraud. It is possible, indeed, said I, that these may *sometimes* be thought necessary. How then, said he, can that *Good* be *agreeable to Nature*, which cannot be *acquired*, but by *Habits contrary to Nature*? Your Argument, said I, seems just.

IF then, said he, we have reasoned rightly, and our Conclusions may be depended on; it should seem that the SUPPOSED GOOD, *which the POLITICAL LIFE pursues, corresponds not, in any Instance, to our Pre-conceptions of the SOVEREIGN GOOD*. I answered, So it appeared.

§ 5. LET us quit then, said he, the *Political Life*, and pass to the LUCRATIVE. The Object of this is WEALTH. Admit it. And is it not too often, said he, the Case, that *to acquire this*, we are tempted to employ some of *those Habits*, which we have just condemned as *Unnatural*? Such, I mean, as Fraud, Falshood, Injustice, and the like? It must be owned, said I, too often.

BESIDES, continued he—What shall we say to the *Esteem*, the *Friendship*, and *Love of Mankind*? Are they worth having? Is it

Part I. *agreeable*, think you, *to Nature*, to endeavour to *deserve* them? Agreeable, said I, to Nature, beyond dispute. If so, then to merit *Hatred* and *Contempt*, said he, must needs be *contrary to Nature*. Undoubtedly. And is there any thing which so certainly merits *Hatred* and *Contempt*, as a mere *Lucrative Life*, spent in the uniform Pursuit of *Wealth*? I replied, I believed there was nothing. If so, said he, then as to *corresponding with our Pre-conceptions*, the *Lucrative Good*, in this respect, fares no better than the *Political*. It appears not.

AND what shall we say as to *Anxiety*? Is not both the *Possession* and *Pursuit* of *Wealth*, to those who really love it, ever *anxious*? It seems so. And why *anxious*, but from a Certainty of its *Instability*; from an Experience, how obnoxious it is to every cross Event; how easy to be lost and transferred to others, by the same Fraud and Rapine, which acquired it to ourselves?—This is indeed the tritest of all Topics. The Poets and Orators have long ago exhausted it.

It is true, said I, they have. May we not venture then, said he, upon the whole, to pass the *same* Sentence on the *LUCRATIVE LIFE*, as we have already on the *Political*—that it proposes not A GOOD, correspondent to those *Pre-conceptions*, by which we would all be governed in THE GOOD, which we are all seeking? I answered, we might justly.

§ 6. IF then neither the *Lucrative Life*, nor the *Political*, said he, procure that *Good* which we desire: shall we seek it from the *PLEASURABLE*? Shall we make *PLEASURE* our *Goddeſs*?

—————Pleasure,

————— *Pleasure,*
Whom Love attends, and soft Desire, and Words
Alluring, apt the steadiest Heart to bend.

So says the Poet, and plausible his Doctrine. Plausible, said I,
indeed.

LET it then, continued he, be a *pleasurable World*; a Race of *harmless, loving Animals*; an *Elysian Temperature* of Sunshine and Shade. Let the *Earth, in every Quarter*, resemble our own dear Country; where never was a Frost, never a Fog, never a Day, but was delicious and serene. I was a little embarrassed at this unexpected Flight, 'till recollecting myself, I told him, (but still with some Surprise) that, in no degree to disparage either my Country or my Countrymen, I had never found Either so exquisite, as he now supposed them.

There are then, it seems, said he, in the *Natural World*, and even in our own beloved Country, such Things as *Storms and Tempests*; as pinching *Colds*, and scorching *Heats*. I replied, there were.

And consequent to these, *Disease*, and *Famine*, and infinite *Calamities*.

There are. And in the *Civil or Human World*, we have *Discord* and *Contention*; or (as the Poet better * describes it)

Cruel Revenge, and rancorous Despite,
Disloyal Treason, and heart-burning Hate.

We have. Alas! then, poor *Pleasure*! Where is that Good,
accommodate to every Time; suited to every Place; self-derived, not de-

pendent

* SPENCER'S *Fairy Queen*, B. 2. Cant. 7. Stanz. 22.

Part I. *pendent on Foreign External Causes?* Can it be PLEASURE, on such a changeable, such a turbulent Spot, as this? I replied, I thought not.

AND what indeed, were the *World*, said he, modelled to a *Temperature the most exact?* Were the Rigours of the Seasons never more to be known; nor Wars, Devastations, Famines, or Diseases? Admitting all this, (which we know to be *impossible*) can we find still in *Pleasure* that *lengthened Duration*, which we consider as an *Essential*, to constitute the *Sovereign Good?*—Ask the Glutton, the Drinker, the Man of Gaiety and Intrigue, whether they know any *Enjoyment*, not to be cancelled by *Satiety?* Which does not hastily pass away into the tedious Intervals of *Indifference?*—Or yielding all this too, (which we know *cannot be yielded*) where are we to find our *Good*, how possess it in *Age?* In that Eve of Life, declining Age, when the *Power of Sense*, on which all depends, like the setting Sun, is gradually forsaking us?

I SHOULD imagine, said I, that *Pleasure* was no mean Adversary, since you employ, in attacking her, so much of your *Rhetoric*. Without heeding what I said, he pursued his Subject—Beside, if this be our *Good*, our *Happiness*, and our *End*; to what purpose *Powers*, which bear no *Relation* to it?—Why *Memory?* Why *Reason?* Mere *Sensation* might have been as *exquisite*, had we been *Flies* or *Earthworms*—Or can it be proved otherwise? I replied, I could not say. No *Animal*, continued he, *possesses its Faculties in vain*. And shall Man derive no Good from his *best*, his most *eminent?* From That, which of all is *peculiar* to himself? For as to *Growth* and *Nutrition*,

trition, they are not wanting to the meanest *Vegetable*; and for *Senses*, there are *Animals*, which perhaps *exceed us* in them all. Part I.

§ 7. THIS seems, said I, no mean Argument in favour of CONTEMPLATION. The CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE gives *Reason* all the Scope, which it can desire. And of all Lives, answered he, would it surely be the best, did we dwell, like *Milton's Uriel*, in the *Sun's bright Circle*. Then might we plan indeed the most *Romantic Kind of Happiness*. Stretched at Ease, without Trouble or Molestation, we might pass our Days, *contemplating* the Universe; tracing its Beauty; lost in Wonder; ravished with Ecstasy, and I know not what——But here alas! on this *sublunary*, this *turbulent Spot*, (as we called it not long since) how little is this, or any thing like it, *practicable*?——Fogs arise, which dim our Prospects—the *Cares of Life* perpetually molest us—Is *Contemplation suited to a Place, like this*? It must be owned, said I, not extremely. How then is it the *Sovereign Good*, which should be *Accommodate to every Place*? I replied, it seemed not probable.

BUT farther, said he——Can we enjoy the *Sovereign Good*, and be at the same time *vexed, and agitated by Passion*? Does not this seem a Paradox? I answered, it did. Suppose then an *Event* were to happen—not an *Inundation*, or *Massacre*—but an Acquaintance only drop a *disrespectful Word*; a Servant chance to break a *favourite Piece of Furniture*—What would instruct us to indure this?——*Contemplation*, Theory, Abstractions? Why not, said I? No, replied he with Warmth, (quoting the Poet) not

——— *Tho'*

—————* *Tho' all the Stars*
Thou know'st by Name; and all the Etherial Powers.

For does not *Experience* teach us, abundantly teach us, that our deepest Philosophers, as to *Temper and Behaviour*, are as very *Children* for the most part, as the meanest and most illiterate? A little more Arrogance perhaps, from Presumption of what they know, but not a grain more of *Magnanimity*, of *Candour* and *calm Indurance*.

You are somewhat too severe, said I, in censuring of all. There are better and worse among Them, as among Others. The *Difference* is no way *proportioned*, said he, to the *Quantity of their Knowledge*; so that whatever be its Cause, it can't be imputed to their *Speculations*.—Besides, can you really imagine, we came here only to *Think*? Is *Acting* a Circumstance, which is *foreign to our Character*? —Why then so many *Social Affections*, which all of us feel, even in *spite* of ourselves? Are we to suppress them All, as *useless* and *unnatural*? The Attempt, replied I, must needs be found impracticable. Were they once *suppressed*, said he, the Consequences would be somewhat strange. We should hear no more of Father, Brother, Husband, Son, Citizen, Magistrate, and *Society itself*. And were this ever the Case, ill (I fear) would it fare with even *Contemplation* itself. It would certainly be but bad *Speculating*, among lawless Barbarians —Unaffiliated Animals—where *Strength* alone of *Body* was to constitute *Dominion*, and the Contest came to be (as † *Horace* describes it)

—————*glandem*

* *Par. Lost. B. 12. ver. 576.*

† *Sat. 3. l. 1. ver. 99.*

—glandem atque cubilia propter,
Unguibus & pugnīs, dein fustibus—

Bad enough, replied I, of all conscience.

It should seem then, said he, that not even the BEST CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE, however noble its *Object*, was AGREEABLE TO OUR PRESENT NATURE, or *consistent with our present Situation*. I confess, said I, you appear to have proved so. But if this be allowed true of the *Best*, the most *Excellent*; what shall we say to the Mockery of *Monkery*; the Farce of *Friars*; the ridiculous Mummery of being sequestered in a *Cloyster*? This surely is too low a Thing, even to merit an Examination. I have no Scruples here, said I, you need not waste your Time.

§ 8. IF that, said he, be your Opinion, let us look a little backward. For our memory's sake it may be proper to recapitulate. I replied, it would be highly acceptable. Thus then, said he—We have examined the *four grand Lives*, which we find the Generality of Men embrace; the *Lucrative*, and the *Political*; the *Pleasurable*, and the *Contemplative*. And we have aimed at proving that—to *such a Being as MAN, with such a Body, such Affections, such Senses, and such an Intellect*—placed in *such a WORLD, subject to such Incidents*—not one of these LIVES is *productive of that GOOD, which we find all Men to recognize thro' the same uniform PRE-CONCEPTIONS; and which thro' one or other of these Lives they all of them pursue.*

§ 9. You have justly, said I, collected the Sum of your Inquiries.

And happy, said he, should I think it, were they to terminate

Part I. here. I asked him, Why? Because, replied he, to insinuate first, that *all Mankind* are in the wrong; and then to attempt afterwards, to shew *one's self* only to be right; is a Degree of Arrogance, which I would not willingly be guilty of. I ventured here to say, That I thought he need not be so diffident—that a Subject, where *one's own Interest* appeared concerned so *nearly*, would well justify every *Scruple*, and even the severest *Inquiry*. There, said he, you say something—there you encourage me indeed. For what;—Are we not cautioned against *Counterfeits*, even in Matters of meanest Value? If a Piece of Metal be tendered us, which seems doubtful, do we not hesitate? Do we not try it by the *Test*, before we take it for *Current*?—And is not this deemed *Prudence*? Are we not censured, if we act otherwise?—How much more then does it behove us not to be imposed on *here*? To be diffident and scrupulously exact, where *Imposture*, if once admitted, may tempt us to far worse Bargain, than ever *Glaucus* made with *Diomed*? What Bargain, said I, do you mean? The Exchange, replied he, not of *Gold* for *Brass*, but of *Good* for *Evil*, and of *Happiness* for *Misery*—But enough of this, since you have encouraged me to proceed—We are seeking that *Good*, which we think *others* have not found. Permit me thus to pursue my Subject.

§ 10. EVERY Being on this our *Terrestrial Dwelling*, exists *encompassed with infinite Objects*; exists among Animals *tame*, and Animals *wild*; among Plants and Vegetables of a thousand *different Qualities*, among Heats and Colds, Tempests and Calms, the Friendships and Discords of *heterogeneous Elements*—What say you? Are all these Things exactly the *same* to it; or do they *differ*, think you in their *Effects* and *Consequences*? They differ, said I, widely. Some

perhaps

perhaps then, said he, are *Apt, Congruous, and Agreeable to its Natural State.* I replied, they were. Others are *In-apt, Incongruous, and Disagreeable.* They are. And others again are *Indifferent.* They are.

It should seem then, said he, if this be allowed, that *to every individual Being, without the least Exception, the whole Mass of things External, from the greatest to the meanest, stood in the Relations of either Agreeable, Disagreeable, or Indifferent.* I replied, so it appeared.

BUT tho' this, continued he, be true *in the general*, it is yet as certain when we descend to Particulars, that what is *Agreeable to one Species* is *Disagreeable to another*; and not only so, but perhaps *Indifferent to a third.* Instances of this kind, he said, were too obvious to be mentioned.

I REPLIED, it was evident. Whence then, said he, this *Diversity?*—It cannot arise from the *Externals*—for Water is *equally Water*, whether to a *Man*, or to a *Fish*; whether, operating on the one, it *suffocate*, or on the other, it *give Life and Vigour.* I replied, it was. So is Fire, said he, the *same Fire*, however *various* in its Consequences; whether it *harden* or *soften*, give *Pleasure* or *Pain.* I replied, it was. But if this *Diversity*, continued he, be not derived from the *Externals*, whence can it be else?—Or can it possibly be derived otherwise than from the *peculiar Constitution*, from the *Natural State* of every Species itself? I replied, it appeared probable.

THUS then, said he, is it that *Every particular Species is, itself to itself, the Measure of all things in the Universe—that as Things vary*
M 2 their

Part I. *their Relations to it, they vary too in their Value——and that if their Value be ever doubtful, it can no way be adjusted, but by recurring with Accuracy to the Natural State of the Species, and to those several Relations, which such a State of course creates.* I answered, he argued justly.

§ 11. To proceed then, said he—Tho' it be true, that every Species has a *Natural State*, as we have asserted; is it not true, that every Species has a *Sense* or *Feeling* of it. This Feeling or Sense is a *Natural Eminence* or *Prerogative*, denied the *Vegetable* and *Inanimate*, and imparted only to the *Animal*. I answered, it was.

AND think you, continued he, that as many as have this *Sense* or *Feeling* of a *Natural State*, are *alienated* from it, or *indifferent* to it? Or is it not more probable, that they are *well-affected* to it? Experience, said I, teaches us, how well they are all affected. You are right, replied he. For what would be more absurd, than to be *indifferent* to their own *Welfare*; or to be *alienated* from it, as tho' it was *Foreign* and *Unnatural*? I replied, Nothing could be more.

But, continued he, if they are *well-affected* to this their proper *Natural State*, it should seem too they must be *well-affected* to all those *Externals*, which appear *apt*, *congruous*, and *agreeable* to it. I answered, They must. And if so, then *ill-affected* or *averse* to such, as appear the *contrary*. They must. And to such as appear *indifferent*, *indifferent*. They must. But if this, said he, be allowed, it will follow, that in consequence of these *Appearances*, they will think some *Externals* worthy of *Pursuit*; some worthy of *Avoidance*; and some worthy of *neither*. It was probable, said I, they should.

HENCE

HENCE then, said he, *another Division of Things external*; that is, into *Pursuable, Avoidable, and Indifferent*—a Division only belonging to Beings *Sensitive and Animate*, because all, *below these*, can neither avoid nor pursue. I replied, They could not.

IF, then, said he, *Man* be allowed in the Number of these *Sensitive* Beings, this Division will affect MAN—or to explain more fully, *the whole Mass of Things external will, according to this Division, exist to the Human Species in the Relations of Pursuable, Avoidable, and Indifferent.* I replied, They would.

SHOULD we therefore desire, said he, to know what these things truly are, we must first be informed, what is MAN's truly NATURAL CONSTITUTION. For thus, you may remember, it was settled not long since—that *every Species was its own Standard, and that when the Value of Things was doubtful, the Species was to be studied; the Relations to be deduced, which were consequent to it; and in this manner the Value of Things to be adjusted and ascertained.* I replied, We had so agreed it. I fear then, said he, we are engaged in a more arduous Undertaking, a Task of more difficulty, than we were at first aware of—But *Fortuna Fortes*—we must endeavour to acquit ourselves as well as we are able.

§ 12. THAT MAN therefore has a *Body, of a Figure and internal Structure* peculiar to itself; capable of certain Degrees of Strength, Agility, Beauty, and the like; this I believe is evident, and hardly wants a Proof. I answered, I was willing to own it. That he is capable too of *Pleasure and Pain*; is possessed of *Senses, Affections, Appetites,*

Part I. *Appetites, and Aversions*; this also seems evident, and can scarcely be denied. I replied, it was admitted. We may venture then to range HIM in the *Tribe of ANIMAL BEINGS*. I replied, We might.

AND think you, said he, without *Society*, you or any Man could have been *born*? Most certainly not. Without *Society*, when born, could you have been *brought to Maturity*? Most certainly not.

Vid. Jambl. Prot rept. 56. Had your Parents then had no *Social Affections* towards you in that *perilous* State, that *tedious* Infancy, (so much longer than the *longest* of other Animals) you must have inevitably perished thro' Want and Inability. I must. You perceive then that to *Society* you, and every Man are indebted, not only for the *Beginning* of *Being*, but for the *Continuance*. We are.

SUPPOSE then we pass from this *Birth* and *Infancy* of Man, to his *Maturity* and *Perfection*—Is there *any Age*, think you, so *self-sufficient*, as that in it he feels no *Wants*? What *Wants*, answered I, do you mean? In the first and principal place, said he, that of *Food*; then perhaps that of *Raiment*; and after this, a *Dwelling*, or Defence against the Weather. These *Wants*, replied I, are surely *Natural* at all *Ages*. And is it not *agreeable to Nature*, said he, that they should at *all Ages* be *supplied*? Affuredly. And is it not *more agreeable* to have them *well* supplied, than *ill*? It is. And *most agreeable*, to have them *best* supplied? Certainly. If there be then any *one State*, *better than all others*, for the supplying these *Wants*; *this State*, of *all others*, must needs be *most Natural*. It must.

AND

AND what *Supply*, said he, of these Wants, shall we esteem the *meanest*, which we can conceive?—Would it not be something like this? Had we nothing beyond Acorns for *Food*; beyond a rude Skin, for *Raiment*; or beyond a Cavern, or hollow Tree, to provide us with a *Dwelling*? Indeed, said I, this would be bad enough. And do you not imagine, *as far as this*, we might *each* supply *ourselves*, tho' we lived in Woods, mere solitary Savages? I replied, I thought we might.

SUPPOSE then, continued he, that our *Supplies* were to be *mended*—for instance, that we were to exchange Acorns for Bread—Would our *Savage* Character be sufficient *here*? Must we not be a little better disciplined; Would not some Art be requisite?—The *Baker's*, for example. It would. And *previously* to the Baker's that of the *Miller*? It would. And *previously* to the Miller's that of the *Husbandman*? It would. Three Arts then appear *necessary*, even upon the *lowest* Estimation. It is admitted.

BUT a Question farther, said he—Can the Husbandman work, think you, without his *Tools*? Must he not have his Plough, his Harrow, his Reap-hook, and the like? He must. And must not those other Artists too be furnished in the same manner? They must. And whence must they be furnished? From *their own* Arts?—Or are not the *making* Tools, and the *using* them, two different Occupations? I believe, said I, they are. You may be convinced, continued he, by small Recollection. Does *Agriculture* make *its own* Plough, *its own* Harrow? Or does it not apply to *other Arts*, for all *Necessaries* of this kind? It does. Again—Does

Part I. Does the Baker build *his own* Oven; or the Miller frame *his own* Mill? It appears, said I, no part of their Business.

WHAT a *Tribe* of Mechanics then, said he, are advancing upon us? —Smiths, Carpenters, Masons, Mill-wrights——and all these to provide the *single Necessary of Bread*. Not less than *seven* or *eight* Arts, we find, are wanting at the *fewest*. It appears so. And what if to the providing a *comfortable Cottage*, and *Raiment suitable to an industrious Hind*, we allow a *dozen* Arts more? It would be easy, by the same Reasoning, to prove the Number double. I admit the Number, said I, mentioned.

If so, continued he, it should seem, that *towards a tolerable Supply of the three Primary and Common Necessaries, Food, Raiment, and a Dwelling, not less than twenty Arts were, on the lowest Account, requisite*. It appears so.

AND is *one Man* equal, think you, to the *Exercise of these twenty Arts*? If he had even *Genius*, which we can scarce imagine, is it possible he should find *Leisure*? I replied, I thought not. If so, then a *solitary, unsocial State can never supply tolerably the common Necessaries of Life*. It cannot.

BUT what if we pass from the *Necessaries of Life*, to the *Elegancies*? To Music, Sculpture, Painting, and Poetry?—What if we pass from all *Arts* whether *Necessary* or *Elegant*, to the large and various *Tribe of Sciences*? To Logic, Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics?—Can *one Man*, imagine you, master all this? Absurd, said I, impossible.
And

And yet in this *Cycle of Sciences and Arts*, seem included all the *Comforts*, as well as *Ornaments* of Life; included all conducive, either to *Being*, or to *Well-Being*. It must be confessed, said I, it has the Appearance.

WHAT then, said he, must be done? In what manner must we be supplied? I answered, I knew not, unless we made a *Distribution*—Let one exercise *one Art*; and another a *different*—Let this Man study *such a Science*; and that Man, *another*—Thus the whole *Cycle* (as you call it) may be carried easily into Perfection.

It is true, said he, it may; and every Individual, *as far as his own Art or Science*, might be supplied *completely*, and as well as he could wish. But what avails a Supply in a *single Instance*? What in this case are to become of all his *numerous other Wants*? You conceive, replied I, what I would have said, but partially. My Meaning was, that *Artist trade with Artist*; each supply where he is *deficient*, by exchanging where he *abounds*; so that a *Portion of every thing may be dispersed throughout all*. You intend then a *State*, said he, of *Commutation and Traffic*. I replied, I did.

IF so, continued he, I see a new Face of things. The Savages, with their Skins and their Caverns, disappear. In their place I behold a fair *Community* rising. No longer Woods, no longer Solitude, but all is *Social, Civil, and Cultivated*—And can we doubt any farther, whether *Society* be *Natural*? Is not this evidently the *State, which can best supply the Primary Wants*? It has appeared so. And did we not agree some time since, that this *State*, whatever we found it, would be certainly of all others the most agreeable to our Nature?

Part I. We did. And have we not added, since this, to the Weight of our Argument, by passing from the *Necessary* Arts to the *Elegant*; from the *Elegant* to the *Sciences*? We have. The more, said he, we consider, the more shall we be convinced, that *All these*, the noblest Honours and Ornaments of the Human Mind, without that *Leisure*, that *Experience*, that *Emulation*, that *Reward*, which the *Social State* alone we know is able to provide them, could never have found *Existence*, or been in the least recognized. Indeed, said I, I believe not.

LET it not be forgot then, said he, in favour of *Society*, that to it we owe, not only the *Beginning* and *Continuation*, but the *Well-being*, and (if I may use the Expression) the very *Elegance* and *Rationality* of our *Existence*. I answered, It appeared evident.

AND what then? continued he.—If *Society* be thus agreeable to our *Nature*, is there nothing, think you, *within* us, to excite and lead us to it? No *Impulse*, no *Preparation of Faculties*? It would be strange, answered I, if there should not. It would be a singular *Exception*, said he, with respect to all other *herding* Species—Let us however examine—Pity, Benevolence, Friendship, Love; the general Dislike of Solitude, and Desire of Company; are they *Natural Affections*, which come of themselves; or are they taught us by *Art*, like Music and Arithmetic? I should think, replied I, they were *Natural*, because in every Degree of Men some Traces of them may be discovered. And are not the Powers and Capacities of *Speech*, said he, the same? Are not all Men *naturally* formed, to express their *Sentiments by some kind of Language*? I replied, They were.

IF then, said he, these several *Powers*, and *Dispositions* are *Natural*, so should seem too their *Exercise*. Admit it. And if their *Exercise*, then so too that *State*, where alone they can be exercised. Admit it. And what is this *State*, but the *Social*? Or where else is it possible to converse, or use our *Speech*; to exhibit Actions of Pity, Benevolence, Friendship or Love; to relieve our *Aversion to Solitude*, or gratify our *Desire of being with others*? I replied, It could be no where else.

You see then, continued he, a *Preparation of Faculties* is not wanting. We are fitted with Powers and Dispositions, which have only Relation to *Society*; and which, out of Society, can no where else be exercised. I replied, it was evident. You have seen too the *superior Advantages* of the *Social State*, above all others. I have.

LET this then be remembered, said he, throughout all our future Reasonings, remembered as a first Principle in our *Ideas of Humanity*, that MAN by Nature is truly a SOCIAL ANIMAL. I promised it should.

§ 13. LET us now, said he, examine, what farther we can learn concerning Him. As *Social* indeed, He is distinguished from the *Solitary* and *Savage Species*; but in no degree from the rest, of a milder and more friendly Nature. It is true, replied I, He is not.

Does He then differ no more from these several *Social Species*, than they, each of them, differ from one another? Must we range them all, and Man among the rest, under the same common and general Genus? I see no Foundation, said I, for making a Distinction.

Part I.

PERHAPS, said he, there may be none ; and it is possible too there may. Consider a little—Do you not observe in all *other* Species, a *Similarity among Individuals?* a surprizing *Likeness, which runs thro' each Particular?* In one Species they are all *Bold* ; in another, all *Timorous* ; in one all *Ravenous* ; in another, all *Gentle*. In the Bird-kind only, what a *Uniformity of Voice*, in each Species, as to their notes ; of *Architecture*, as to building their Nests ; of *Food*, both for themselves, and for supporting their Young? It is true, said I.

And do you observe, continued he, the *same Similarity among Men?* Are these all as *Uniform*, as to their *Sentiments* and *Actions?* I replied, by no means.

ONE Question more, said he, as to the Character of Brutes, if I may be allowed the Expression—Are *these*, think you, *what we behold them*, by *Nature* or *otherwise?* Explain, said I, your Question, for I do not well conceive you. I mean, replied he, is it by *Nature* that the Swallow builds her Nest, and performs all the Offices of her Kind : Or is she taught by *Art*, by *Discipline*, or *Custom?* She acts, replied I, by *pure Nature* undoubtedly. And is not the *same* true, said he, of *every other* Bird and Beast in the Universe? It is.

No wonder then, continued he, as they have so *wise* a Governess, that a *uniform Rule of Action* is provided for each Species. For what can be more worthy the Wisdom of *Nature*, than *ever to the same Substances to give the same Law?* It appears, said I, reasonable.

BUT what, continued he, shall we say as to *Man?* Is He too actuated by *Nature purely?* I answered, Why not? If He be, replied he, it is strange in *Nature* that with respect to *Man alone*, she should

should follow so *different* a Conduct. The Particulars in other Species, we agree, she renders *Uniform*; but in *Our's*, every *Particular* seems a sort of *Model by himself*. If Nature, said I, do not actuate us, what can we suppose else? Are *Local Customs*, said he, *Nature*? Are the *Polities* and *Religions* of particular Nations, *Nature*? Are the *Examples* which are set before us; the *Preceptors* who instruct us; the *Company and Friends*, with whom we converse, all *Nature*? No surely, said I. And yet, said he, it is evident that by these, and a thousand *incidental* Circumstances, equally *foreign* to Nature, our Actions, and Manners, and Characters are adjusted. Who then can imagine, we are actuated by *Nature only*? I confess, said I, it appears contrary.

You see then, said he, one remarkable *Distinction* between *Man* and *Brutes* in general—In the *Brute*, *Nature* does *all*; in *Man*, but *Part only*. It is evident, said I.

BUT farther, continued he—Let us consider the *Powers* or *Faculties*, possessed by each—Suppose I was willing to give a *Brute* the *same Instruction* which we give a *Man*. A Parrot perhaps, or Ape, might arrive to some small Degree of *Mimicry*; but do you think, upon the whole, they would be much *profited* or *altered*? I replied, I thought not. And do you perceive the *same*, said he, with respect to *Man*? Or does not Experience shew us the very reverse? Is not *Education* capable of moulding us into any thing—of making us greatly *Good*, or greatly *Bad*; greatly *Wise*, or greatly *Abfurd*? The Fact, said I, is indisputable.

Part I.

MARK then, said he, the Difference between *Human Powers* and *Brutal*—The Leading Principle of BRUTES appears to tend in each Species to *one single Purpose*—to this, in general, it *uniformly arrives*; and here, in general, it *as uniformly stops*—it needs no *Precepts* or *Discipline* to instruct it; nor will it easily be *changed*, or *admit a different Direction*. On the contrary, the Leading Principle of MAN is capable of *infinite Directions*—is convertible to *all sorts of Purposes*—equal to *all sorts of Subjects*—neglected, remains ignorant, and void of every Perfection——cultivated, becomes adorned with *Sciences*, and *Arts*—can raise us to excel, not only *Brutes*, but *our own Kind*—with respect to our *other Powers* and *Faculties*, can instruct us how to *use* them, as well as *those* of the *various Natures*, which we see existing around us. In a word, to oppose the two Principles to each other—The Leading Principle of *Man*, is *Multiform, Originally Uninstructed, Pliant and Docil*—the Leading Principle of *Brutes* is *Uniform, Originally Instructed*; but, in most Instances afterward, *Inflexible and Indocil*——Or does not Experience plainly shew, and confirm the Truth of what we assert? I made answer, it did.

You allow then, said he, the *Human Principle*, and the *Brutal*, to be things of different Idea. Undoubtedly. Do they not each then deserve a different Appellation? I should think so. Suppose therefore we call the *Human Principle* REASON; and the *Brutal*, INSTINCT: would you object to the Terms? I replied, I should not.

If not, continued he, then *Reason being peculiar to Man*, of all the Animals inhabiting this Earth, may we not affirm of Him, by way of Distinction, that He is a *Rational Animal*? I replied, We might justly.

LET

LET this too then be remembered, said he, in the Course of our Inquiry, that MAN is by Nature a RATIONAL ANIMAL. I promised it should. Part I.

§ 14. IN consequence of this, said he, as often as there is Occasion, I shall appeal as well to *Reason*, as to *Nature*, for a Standard.

What, said I, do you mean by *Nature*? Its Meanings, replied he, are many and various. As it stands at present opposed, it may be enough perhaps to say, that *Nature* is *that, which is the Cause of every thing, except those Things alone, which are the immediate Effects of Reason*. In other words, whatever is not *Reason*, or the *Effect* of *Reason*, we would consider as *Nature*, or the *Effect* of *Nature*. I answered, as he so distinguished them, I thought he might justly appeal to either.

AND yet, continued he, there is a remarkable *Difference* between the Standard of *Reason*, and that of *Nature*; a *Difference*, which at no time we ought to forget. What *Difference*, said I, do you mean? It is this, answered he—In *Nature*, the Standard is sought from among the *Many*; in *Reason*, the Standard is sought from among the *Few*. You must explain, said I, your Meaning, for I must confess you seem obscure.

THUS then, said he—Suppose, as an Anatomist, you were seeking the Structure of some internal Part—To discover this, would you not inspect a *Number* of Individuals? I should. And would you not inform yourself, what had been discovered by others?

I should. And suppose, after all, you should find a *Multitude* of

Part I.

of Instances for *one* Structure, and a *few singular* for a *different*: By which would you be governed? By the Multitude, said I, undoubtedly. Thus then, continued he, *in Nature the Standard*, you see, *exists among the many*. I replied, it had so appeared.

AND what, said he, were we to seek the Perfection of Sculpture, or of Painting?—Where should we inquire then?—Among the *numerous* common Artists, or among the *few* and celebrated? Among the Few, said I. What if we were to seek the Perfection of Poetry, or Oratory—Where then? Among the Few still. What if we were to seek the Perfection of true Argument, or a sound Logic—Where then? Still among the Few. And is not true Argument, or a sound Logic, one of *Reason's* greatest *Perfections*? It is. You see then, continued he, whence the Standard of *Reason* is to be sought—it is from among the *Few*, as we said before, in contradistinction to the Standard of Nature. I confess, said I, it appears so.

AND happy, said he, for us, that Providence has so ordered it—happy for us, that what is *Rational*, depends not on the *Multitude*; or is to be tried by so pitiful a Test, as the bare counting of Noses.

It is happy, said I, indeed—But whence pray the Difference? Why are the *Many* to determine in *Nature*, and the *Few* only, in *Reason*? To discuss this at large, said he, would require some time. It might insensibly perhaps draw us from our present Inquiry. I will endeavour to give you the Reason, in as few words as possible; which should they chance to be obscure, be not too solicitous for an Explanation. I begged him to proceed his own way.

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THE Cause, said he, appears to be this—In *Natural Works* and *Natural Operations*, we hold but *one Efficient Cause*, and that consummately *wise*. This Cause in *every Species* recognizing *what is best*, and working ever *uniformly* according to this *Idea of Perfection*, the *Productions* and *Energies*, in every Species where it acts, are for the most part *similar* and *exactly correspondent*. If an *Exception* ever happen, it is from some *hidden higher Motive*, which transcends our Comprehension, and which is seen *so rarely*, as not to injure the *general Rule*, or render it doubtful and precarious. On the contrary, in the *Productions* and *Energies* of *Reason*, there is not *one Cause* but *infinite*—as many indeed, as there are *Agents* of the Human Kind. Hence *Truth* being but *one*, and *Error* being *infinite*, and *Agents* infinite also: what wonder they should oftener miss, than hit the Mark?—that *Multitudes* should fail, where *one* alone succeeds, and *Truth* be only the Possession of the *chosen, fortunate Few*? You seem to have explained the Difficulty, said I, with sufficient Perspicuity.

LET us then go back, said he, and recollect ourselves; that we may not forget what it is we are seeking. I replied, Most willingly. We have been seeking, continued he, the *Sovereign Good*. In consequence of this Inquiry, we have discovered—that *all Things whatever exist to the Human Species in the Relations of either Pursuable, Avoidable, or Indifferent*. To determine these Relations with Accuracy we have been scrutinizing the Human Nature; and that, upon this known Maxim, that *every Species was its own proper Standard; and that where the Value of Things was dubious, there the Species was to be studied, and the Relations to be deduced, which naturally flow from it*. The Result

VOL. I.

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of

Part I. of this Scrutiny has been—that we have first agreed Man to be a *Social Animal*; and since, to be a *Rational*. So that if we can be content with a descriptive, concise Sketch of *Human Nature*, it will amount to this—that MAN IS A SOCIAL RATIONAL ANIMAL. I answered, it had appeared so.

§ 15. IF then, said he, we pursue our Disquisitions, agreeably to this Idea of Human Nature, it will follow that all Things will be *Pursuable, Avoidable, and Indifferent to Man*, as they respect the Being and Welfare of such a *Social, Rational Animal*. I replied, They must.

NOTHING therefore in the first place, said he, can be Pursuable, which is *destructive of Society*. It cannot. Acts therefore of Fraud and Rapine, and all acquired by them, whether Wealth, Power, Pleasure, or any thing, are evidently from their very Character not fit to be pursued. They are not. But it is impossible not to pursue many such things, unless we are furnished with some *Habit or Disposition* of Mind, by which we are induced to render to all Men *their own*, and to regard the Welfare, and Interest of Society. It is impossible. But the *Habit or Disposition of rendering to all their own*, and of regarding the Welfare and Interest of Society, is JUSTICE.

It is. We may therefore fairly conclude, that *Nothing is naturally Pursuable, but what is either correspondent to Justice, or at least not contrary*. I confess, said I, so it appears.

BUT farther, said he,—It is possible we may have the best Disposition to Society; the most upright Intentions; and yet thro' *Want of Ability*

Ability to discern, and know the Nature of Particulars, we may pursue many things inconsistent, as well with our Private Interest, as the Public. We may even pursue what is *Right*, and yet pursue it in such a manner, as to find our Endeavours *fruitless*, and our Purposes to fail. I answered, it was possible. But this would ill befit the Character of a *Rational Animal*. It would. It is necessary therefore, we should be furnished with some *Habit or Faculty*, instructing us how to discern the *real difference of all Particulars*, and suggesting the proper Means, by which we may either *avoid or obtain* them.

It is. And what is this, think you, but PRUDENCE? I believe, said I, it can be no other. If it be, said he, then it is evident from this Reasoning, that *Nothing can be pursuable which is not correspondent to Prudence*. I replied, He had shewn it could not.

BUT farther still, said he—It is possible we may neither want *Prudence*, nor *Justice* to direct us; and yet the *Impulses of Appetite*, the *Impetuosities of Resentment*, the *Charms and Allurements* of a thousand flattering Objects, may tempt us, in spite of ourselves, to pursue what is both *Imprudent*, and *Unjust*. They may. But if so, it is necessary, would we pursue as *becomes our Character*, that we should be furnished with some *Habit*, which may *moderate our Excesses*; which may temper our Actions to the Standard of a *Social State*, and to the Interest and Welfare, not of a *Part*, but of the *Whole Man*. Nothing, said I, more necessary. And what, said he, can we call this *Habit*, but the Habit of TEMPERANCE? You name it, said I, rightly. If you think so, replied he, then *Nothing can be Pursuable, which is not either correspondent to Temperance, or at least not contrary*. I replied, so it seemed.

Part I.

ONCE more, continued he, and we have done—It is possible that not only *Resentment* and *Appetite*, not only the *Charms* and *Allurements* of external Objects, but the *Terrors* too, and *Dread* of them may *marr the Rectitude of our Purposes*. It is possible. Tyranny and Superstition may assail us on one hand; the Apprehensions of Ridicule, and a *False Shame* on the other—It is expedient, to withstand these, we should be armed with some *Habit*, or our wisest, best Pursuits may else at all times be defeated. They may. And what is that generous, manlike and noble *Habit*, which sets us at all times above *Fear* and *Danger*; what is it but FORTITUDE? I replied, it was no other. If so then, continued he, besides our former Conclusions, *Nothing farther can be pursuable*, as our Inquiries now have shewn us, *which is not either correspondent to Fortitude, or at least not contrary*. I admit, said I, it can not.

OBSERVE then, said he, the Sum, the Amount of our whole Reasoning—*Nothing is truly Pursuable to such an Animal as Man, except what is correspondent, or at least not contrary, to JUSTICE, PRUDENCE, TEMPERANCE and FORTITUDE*. I allow, said I, it appears so. But if nothing *Pursuable*, then nothing *Avoidable* or *Indifferent*, but what is tried and estimated after the *same* manner. For *Contraries* are ever recognized thro' the *same Habit*, one with another. The *same* Logic judges of Truth and Falshood; the *same* Musical Art, of Concord and Discord. So the *same Mental Habitudes*, of Things *Avoidable* and *Pursuable*. I replied, it appeared probable.

To how unexpected a Conclusion then, said he, have our Inquiries insensibly led us?—In tracing the Source of Human Action, we have

have established it to be those FOUR GRAND VIRTUES, which are esteemed, for their Importance, the very HINGES OF ALL MORALITY. We have.

BUT if so, it should follow, that a *Life*, whose *Pursuings* and *Avoidings* are governed by these *Virtues*, is that *True and Rational Life*, which we have so long been seeking; that *Life*, where the *Value* of *all things* is justly measured by those *Relations*, which they bear to the *Natural Frame and real Constitution of Mankind*—in fewer Words, A LIFE OF VIRTUE appears to be THE LIFE ACCORDING TO NATURE. It appears so.

BUT in *such* a Life every *Pursuit*, every *Avoiding*, (to include all) every *Action* will of course admit of being *rationaly justified*. It will. But *That, which being Done, admits of a Rational Justification*, is the Essence or genuine Character of an *Office*, or MORAL DUTY. For thus long ago it has been defined by the best* Authorities.

Admit it. If so, then A LIFE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE, is A LIFE ACCORDING TO MORAL OFFICES OR DUTIES. It appears so.

But we have already agreed it, to be a *Life according to Nature*.

We have. Observe then: A LIFE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE, ACCORDING TO MORAL OFFICES, and ACCORDING TO NATURE, mean all THE SAME THING, tho' *varied* in the Expression. Your Remark, said I, seems just.

§ 16. WE need never therefore, replied he, be at a loss how to choose, tho' the Objects of Choice be ever so infinite and diversified.

As

* By *Tully* in his *Offices*, and by other Authors of Antiquity.

Part I.

As far as nothing is inconsistent with such a Life and such a Character, we may justly set Existence before Death; prefer Health to Sickness; Integrity of the Limbs, to being maimed and debilitated; Pleasure to Pain; Wealth to Poverty; Fame to Dishonour; Free Government to Slavery; Power and Magistracy, to Subjection and a private State—Universally, whatever tends either to *Being*, or to *Well-Being*, we may be justified, when we *prefer* to whatever appears the *contrary*. And when our several Energies, exerted according to the Virtues just mentioned, have put us in Possession of all that we require: when we enjoy, *subjoined to a right and honest Mind, both Health of Body, and Competence of Externals*: what can there be wanting to *complete our Happiness*; to render our State *perfectly consonant to Nature*; or to give us a more *Sovereign Good*, than that which we *now* enjoy? Nothing, replied I, that I can at present think of.

THERE would be nothing indeed, said he, *were our Energies never to fail*; were *all* our Endeavours to be ever crowned with due *Success*. But suppose the contrary—Suppose the *worst Success* to the *most upright Conduct*; to the wisest Rectitude of Energies and Actions. It is possible, nay Experience teaches us it is too often fact, that not only the Pursuers of what is *contrary to Nature*, but that those who pursue nothing but what is *strictly congruous to it*, may *miss of their Aims*, and be *frustrated in their Endeavours*. Inquisitors and Monks may detest them for their Virtue, and pursue them with all the Engines of Malice and Inhumanity. Without these, Pests may afflict their Bodies; Inundations o'erwhelm their Property; or what is worse than Inundations, either Tyrants, Pirates, Heroes, or Banditti. They may

fee their Country fall, and with it their bravest Countrymen; themselves pillaged, and reduced to Extremities, or perishing with the rest in the general Maffacre.

—* *cadit & Ripheus, justissimus unus*

Qui fuit in Teucris, & servantissimus æqui.

It must be owned, said I, this has too often been the Case.

OR grant, continued he, that these *greater* Events never happen—that the Part allotted us, be not in the *Tragedy* of Life, but in the *Comedy*. Even the *Comic Distresses* are abundantly irksome—Domestic Jars, the ill Offices of Neighbours—Suspensions, Jealousies, Schemes defeated—The Folly of Fools; the Knavery of Knaves; from which, as Members of Society, it is impossible to detach ourselves.

WHERE then shall we turn, or what have we to imagine? We have at length placed HAPPINESS, after much Inquiry, in *ATTAINING the primary and just Requisites of our Nature, by a Conduct suitable to Virtue and Moral Office*. But as to *corresponding with our Preconceptions* (which we have made the Test) does this System correspond better, than those *others*, which we have rejected? Has it not appeared from various Facts, too obvious to be disputed, that in many *Times* and *Places* it may be absolutely *unattainable*? That in many, where it exists, it may *in a moment be cancelled*, and put irretrievably *out of our Power*, by Events *not to be resisted*? If this be certain,

* ÆNEID. l. 2. ver. 426.

Part I. { certain, and I fear it cannot be questioned, our specious long Inquiry, however accurate we may believe it, has not been able to shew us a *Good*, of that Character which we require; a *Good Durable, Indivisible, and Accommodate to every Circumstance*——Far from it——Our Speculations (I think) rather lead us to that *low Opinion* of Happiness, which you may remember you * expressed, when we first began the subject. They rather help to prove to us, that instead of a *Sovereign Good*, it is the more probable sentiment, *there is no such Good at all*. I should indeed, said I, fear so. For where, continued he, lies the difference, whether we pursue what is *congruous* to Nature, or not *congruous*; if the *Acquisition* of one be as *difficult*, as of the *other*, and the *Possession* of both equally *doubtful and precarious*? If *Cæsar* fall, in attempting his Country's Ruin; and *Brutus* fare no better, who only fought in its Defence? It must be owned, said I, these are melancholy Truths, and the Instances, which you alledge, too well confirm them.

WE were in the midst of these serious Thoughts, descanting upon the Hardships and Miseries of Life, when by an Incident, not worth relating, our Speculations were interrupted. Nothing at the time, I thought, could have happened more unluckily——our Question perplexed——its Issue uncertain——and myself impatient to know the Event. Necessity however was not to be resisted, and thus for the present our Inquiries were postponed.

* See p. 65.

CONCERNING HAPPINESS,

A DIALOGUE.

PART THE SECOND.

BRUTUS *perished untimely, and Cæsar did no more*—These Words I was repeating the next Day to myself, when my Friend appeared, and chearfully bade me Good-Morrow. I could not return his Compliment with an equal Gaiety, being intent, somewhat more than usual, on what had passed the day before. Seeing this, he proposed a Walk into the Fields. The Face of Nature, said he, will perhaps dispel these Glooms. No Assistance, on my part, shall be wanting, you may be assured. I accepted his Proposal; the Walk began; and our former Conversation insensibly renewed.

Part II.

BRUTUS, said he, *perished untimely, and Cæsar did no more*.—It was thus, as I remember, not long since you were expressing yourself. And yet suppose their Fortunes to have been exactly *parallel*—Which would you have preferred? Would you have been *Cæsar* or *Brutus*? *Brutus*, replied I, beyond all Controversy. He asked me, Why? Where was the Difference, when their Fortunes, as we now

Part II. supposed them, were considered as the *same*? There seems, said I, abstract from their *Fortunes*, something, I know not what, *intrinsically preferable* in the Life and Character of *Brutus*. If that, said he, be true, then must we derive it, not from the *Succes*s of his Endeavours, but from their *Truth* and *Rectitude*. He had the Comfort to be conscious, that his Cause was a just one. It was impossible the other should have any such Feeling. I believe, said I, you have explained it.

SUPPOSE then, continued he, (it is but merely an Hypothesis) suppose, I say, we were to place the SOVEREIGN GOOD *in such a Rectitude of Conduct—in the CONDUCT merely, and not in the EVENT*. Suppose we were to fix our HAPPINESS; *not in the actual Attainment* of that Health, that Perfection of a Social State, that fortunate Concurrence of *Externals*, which is congruous to our Nature, and which we have a Right all to pursue; but solely fix it *in the mere DOING whatever is correspondent to such an End*, even tho' we never attain, or are near attaining it. In fewer words—What if we make our Natural State *the Standard only to determine our Conduct*; and place our Happiness *in the Rectitude of this Conduct alone*?—On such an Hypothesis (and we consider it as nothing farther) we should not want a *Good* perhaps, *to correspond to our Pre-conceptions*; for this, it is evident, would be correspondent to them *all*. Your Doctrine, replied I, is so new and strange, that tho' you have been copious in explaining, I can hardly yet comprehend you.

It amounts all, said he, but to this—Place your *Happiness*, where your *Praise* is. I asked, Where he supposed that? Not, replied

plied he, in the Pleasures which you feel, more than your Disgrace lies in the Pain——not in the casual Prosperity of Fortune, more than your Disgrace in the casual Adversity——but in *just complete Action throughout every Part of Life, what ever be the Face of Things, whether favourable or the contrary.*

BUT why then, said I, such *Accuracy* about *Externals*? So much Pains to be informed, what are *Pursuable*, what *Avoidable*? It behoves the Pilot, replied he, to know the Seas and the Winds; the Nature of Tempests, Calms, and Tides. They are the *Subjects*, about which his Art is conversant. Without a just Experience of them, he can never *prove* himself an *Artist*. Yet we look not for his *Reputation* either in *fair* Gales, or in *adverse*; but in the *Skilfulness of his Conduct*, be these Events as they happen. In like manner fares it with this the *Moral Artist*. He, for a *Subject* has the *Whole of Human Life*——Health and Sickness; Pleasure and Pain; with every other possible Incident, which can befall him during his Existence. If his *Knowledge* of all these be accurate and exact, so too must his *Conduct*, in which we place his *Happiness*. But if this *Knowledge* be defective, must not his *Conduct* be defective also? I replied, so it should seem. And if his *Conduct*, then his *Happiness*? It is true.

You see then, continued he, even tho' *Externals were as nothing*; tho' it was true, in their own Nature, they were neither *Good* nor *Evil*; yet an *accurate Knowledge of them* is, from our Hypothesis, absolutely *necessary*. Indeed, said I, you have proved it.

HE continued——Inferior Artists may be at a stand, because they want Materials. From their *Stubbornness* and *Intractability*, they may

Part II.

often be disappointed. But as long as *Life* is passing, and *Nature* continues to operate, the *Moral Artist of Life* has at all times, all he desires. He can never want a *Subject* fit to exercise him in his proper Calling; and that, with this happy Motive to the Constancy of his Endeavours, that, the crosser, the harsher, the more untoward the *Events*, the greater his *Praise*, the more illustrious his *Reputation*.

ALL this, said I, is true, and cannot be denied. But one Circumstance there appears, where your Similes seem to fail. The *Praise* indeed of the Pilot we allow to be in his *Conduct*; but it is in the *Success* of that *Conduct*, where we look for his *Happiness*. If a Storm arise, and the Ship be lost, we call him not *happy*, how well soever he may have conducted. It is then only we congratulate him, when he has reached the desired Haven. Your Distinction, said he, is just. And it is here lies the *noble Prerogative of Moral Artists*, above all others—But yet I know not how to explain myself, I fear my Doctrine will appear so strange. You may proceed, said I, safely, since you advance it but as an *Hypothesis*.

Thus then, continued he—The *End* in other Arts is ever *distant* and *removed*. It consists not in the *mere Conduct*, much less in a *single Energy*; but is the *just Result of many Energies*, each of which are essential to it. Hence, by Obstacles unavoidable, it may often be *retarded*: Nay more, may be so embarrassed, as *never possibly to be attained*. But in the *Moral Art of Life*, the very *CONDUCT* is the *END*; the very *Conduct*, I say, itself, throughout every its *minute* Energy; because *each* of these, however *minute*, partake as truly of *Rectitude*, as the *largest Combination of them*, when considered collectively.

tively. Hence of all Arts is this the only one *perpetually complete in every Instant*, because it needs not, like other Arts, *Time* to arrive at that Perfection, at which in *every Instant* it is arrived already. Hence by *Duration* it is not rendered either *more* or *less* perfect; *Completion*, like Truth, admitting of no Degrees, and being in no sense capable of either *Intension* or *Remission*. And hence too by necessary Connection (which is a greater Paradox than all) even that *Happiness* or *Sovereign Good*, the End of this Moral Art, is itself too, in *every Instant*, *Consummate and Complete*; is neither *heightened* or *diminished* by the Quantity of its *Duration*, but is the same to its Enjoyers, for a *Moment* or a *Century*.

UPON this I smiled. He asked me the Reason. It is only to observe, said I, the Course of our Inquiries—A new Hypothesis has been advanced—Appearing somewhat strange, it is desired to be explained—You comply with the Request, and in pursuit of the Explanation, make it ten times more *obscure* and *unintelligible*, than before. It is but too often the Fate, said he, of us Commentators. But you know in such cases what is usually done. When the Comment will not explain the Text, we try whether the Text will not explain itself. This Method, it is possible, may assist us here. The Hypothesis, which we would have illustrated, was no more than this—That the *Sovereign Good lay in Rectitude of Conduct*; and that *this Good corresponded to all our Pre-conceptions*. Let us examine then, whether, upon trial, this Correspondence will appear to hold; and, for all that we have advanced since, suffer it to pass, and not perplex us. Agreed, said I, willingly, for now I hope to comprehend you.

Part II.

§ 2. RECOLLECT then, said he. Do you not remember that *one Pre-conception* of the *Sovereign Good* was, to be *accommodate to all Times and Places*? I remember it. And is there any *Time*, or any *Place*, whence *Rectitude of Conduct* may be *excluded*? Is there not a right Action in Prosperity, a right Action in Adversity?—May there not be a decent, generous, and laudable *Behaviour*, not only in Peace, in Power, and in Health; but in War, in Oppression, in Sickneſs, and in Death? There may,

AND what ſhall we ſay to thoſe *other Pre-conceptions*—to being *Durable*, *Self-derived*, and *Indeprivable*? Can there be any *Good* ſo *Durable*, as the Power of always doing right? Is there any *Good* conceivable, ſo intirely *beyond the Power of others*? Or, if you heſitate, and are doubtful, I would willingly be informed, into what *Circumſtances* may Fortune throw a brave and honeſt Man, where it ſhall not be in his Power to *aſt bravely and honeſtly*? If there are no ſuch, then *Rectitude of Conduct*, if a *Good*, is a *Good Indeprivable*, I confeſs, ſaid I, it appears ſo,

BUT farther, ſaid he—Another *Pre-conception* of the *Sovereign Good* was, to be *Agreeable to Nature*. It was. And can any thing be more agreeable to a *Rational and Social Animal*, than *Rational and Social Conduct*? Nothing. But *Rectitude of Conduct* is with us *Rational and Social Conduct*. It is,

ONCE more, continued he—Another *Pre-conception* of this *Good* was, to be *Conducive*, not to *Mere-being*, but to *Well-being*.

Admit it. And can any thing, believe you, conduce ſo probably to

to the *Well-being* of a Rational Social Animal, as the right *Exercise* of that *Reason*, and of those *Social Affections*? Nothing. And what is this same *Exercise*, but the *highest Rectitude of Conduct*? Certainly.

Part II.

§ 3. You see then, said he, how well our Hypothesis, being once admitted, tallies with our *Original Pre-conceptions* of the *Sovereign Good*.

I replied, it indeed appeared so, and could not be denied. But who, think you, ever dreamt of a Happiness like this? A Happiness dependent, not on the *Success*, but on the *Aim*? Even common and ordinary Life, replied he, can furnish us with Examples. Ask of the Sportsman where lies his Enjoyment? Ask whether it be in the *Possession* of a slaughtered Hare, or Fox? He would reject with Contempt, the very Supposition—He would tell you, as well as he was able, that the Joy was in the *Pursuit*—in the Difficulties which are obviated; in the Faults, which are retrieved; in the *Conduct* and Direction of the Chace thro' all its Parts—that the *Completion* of their Endeavours was so far from giving them Joy, that instantly at that Period all their Joy was at an End. For Sportsmen, replied I, this may be no bad Reasoning. It is not the Sentiment, said he, of Sportsmen alone. The Man of Gallantry not unoften has been found to think after the same manner.

—*Meus est amor huic similis; nam*

Transvolat in medio posita, & fugientia captat *.

To these we may add the tribe of Builders and Projectors. Or has not

* HOR. Sat. II. L. I. v. 107.

Part II. not your own Experience informed you of Numbers, who, in the *Building* and *Laying-out*, have expressed the highest *Delight*; but shewn the utmost Indifference to the *Result* of their Labours, to the Mansion or Gardens, when once finished and complete?

THE Truth, said I, of these Examples is not to be disputed. But I could wish your Hypothesis had better than these to support it. In the *serious View of Happiness*, do you ever imagine there were any, who could fix it (as we said before) not on the *Success*, but on the *Aim*? More, even in this light, said he, than perhaps at first you may imagine. There are Instances innumerable of Men, *bad* as well as *good*, who having fixed, as their *Aim*, a *certain Conduct* of their own, have so far attached their Welfare and *Happiness* to it, as to deem *all Events* in its Prosecution, whether fortunate or unfortunate, to be mean, contemptible, and *not worthy their Regard*. I called on him for Examples.

WHAT think you, said he, of the Assassins, who slew the first *Prince of Orange*; and who, tho' brought by his Conduct to the most exquisite Tortures, yet *conscious of what he had done*, could bear them all unmoved? Or (if you will have a better Man) what think you of that sturdy *Roman*, who would have dispatched *Porfenna*; and who, full of his Design, and superior to all Events, could thrust a Hand into the Flames with the steadiest Intrepidity? I replied, That these indeed were very uncommon Instances.

ATTEND too, continued he, to *Epicurus* dying, the Founder of a Philosophy, little favouring of *Enthusiasm*—"This I write you (says he,

“ he, in one of his Epistles) *while the last Day of Life is passing,*
 “ *and that a HAPPY One. The Pains indeed of my Body are not*
 “ *capable of being heightened. Yet to these we oppose that Joy of the*
 “ *Soul, which arises from the Memory of our past Speculations.*”——
 Hear him, consonant to this, in another Place asserting, that a *Rational*
Adversity was better than an Irrational Prosperity.

AND what think you?——Had he not placed his *Good* and *Happiness* in the supposed *Rectitude of his Opinions*, would he not have preferred *Prosperity*, at all rates, to *Adversity*? Would not the Pains, of which he died, have made his *Happiness* perfect *Misery*?——And yet, you see, he disowns any such thing. The Memory of his past Life, and of his Philosophical Inventions were, even in the Hour of Death it seems, a Counterpoise to support him. It must be owned, said I, that you appear to reason justly.

PASS from *Epicurus*, continued he, to *Socrates*. What are the Sentiments of that divine Man, speaking of his own unjust Condemnation; “O Crito, says he, *if it be pleasing to the Gods this way, then be it this way.*” And again——“Anytus and Melitus, I grant, can kill me; but to hurt or injure me, is beyond their Power.” It would not have been beyond it, had he thought his Welfare dependent on any thing they could do; for they were then doing their worst——Whence then was it beyond them?——Because his *Happiness* was derived not from *without*, but from *within*; not from the *Success*, which perhaps was due to the *Rectitude* of his Life, but from that *Rectitude* alone, every other thing disregarded. He had not, it seems, so far renounced his own Doctrine, as not to remember his former Words;

VOL. I.

Q

that

Part II. that——“*To whom ever all things, conducive to Happiness, are derived*
 “*solely, or at least nearly from himself, and depend not on the Welfare*
 “*or Adversity of others, from the Variety of whose Condition his own*
 “*must vary also: He it is, who has prepared to himself the most excellent*
 “*of all Lives—He it is, who is the Temperate, the Prudent, and the*
 “*Brave—He it is, who, when Wealth or Children either come or are taken*
 “*away, will best obey the Wise Man's Precept——For neither will he be*
 “*seen to grieve, nor to rejoice in excess, from the Trust and Confidence*
 “*which he has reposed in himself.*”——You have a Sketch at least of
 his Meaning, tho' far below his own *Attic* and truly elegant Expression.

I grant, said I, your Example; but this and the rest are but single Instances. What are three or four in Number, to the whole of Human Kind?

If you are for Numbers, replied he, what think you of the numerous Race of Patriots, in all Ages and Nations, who have joyfully met Death, rather than desert their Country, when in danger? They must have thought surely on *another* Happiness than *Success*, when they could gladly go, where they saw Death often inevitable. Or what think you of the many Martyrs for Systems wrong as well as right, who have dared defy the worst, rather than swerve from their Belief? You have brought indeed, said I, more Examples than could have been imagined.

BESIDES, continued he, what is that *Comfort of a GOOD CONSCIENCE*, celebrated to such a height in the Religion which we profess, but the Joy arising from a Conscience of right *Energies*; a Conscience of having done nothing, but what is consonant to our Duty?

I replied, It indeed appeared so.

EVEN

EVEN the Vulgar, continued he, recognize a *Good* of this very Character, when they say of an Undertaking, tho' it *succeed not*, that they are *contented*; that they have *done their best*, and can accuse themselves of nothing. For what is this, but placing their *Content*, their *Good*, their *Happiness*, not in the *Success* of Endeavours, but in the *Rectitude*? If it be not the *Rectitude* which contents them, you must tell me what it is else. It appears, replied I, to be that alone.

I HOPE then, continued he, that tho' you accede not to this Notion of Happiness, which I advance; you will at least allow it not to be such a Paradox, as at first you seemed to imagine. That indeed, replied I, cannot be denied you.

§ 4. GRANTING me this, said he, you encourage me to explain myself—We have supposed the *Sovereign Good* to lie in *Rectitude of Conduct*. We have. And think you there can be *Rectitude of Conduct*, if we do not *live consistently*? In what Sense, said I, would you be understood? To *live consistently*, said he, is the same with me, as *To live agreeably to some one single and consonant Scheme or Purpose*. Undoubtedly, said I, without this, there can be no *Rectitude of Conduct*. All *Rectitude of Conduct* then, you say, implies such *Consistence*. It does. And does all *Consistence*, think you, imply such *Rectitude*? I asked him, Why not? It is possible, indeed it may, said he, for aught we have discovered yet, to the contrary. But what if it should be found that there may be numberless Schemes, each in particular *consistent with itself*, but yet all of them *different*, and some perhaps *contrary*? There may,

Part II.

you know, be a *consistent* Life of Knavery, as well as a *consistent* Life of Honesty; there may be a *uniform* Practice of Luxury, as well as of Temperance, and Abstemiousness. Will the Consistence, *common to all of these Lives*, render the *Conduct* in each *right*? It appears, said I, an Absurdity, that there should be the same Rectitude in two Contraries. If so, said he, we must look for something more than *mere Consistence*, when we search for that *Rectitude* which we at present talk of. A *consistent* Life indeed is requisite, but that alone is not enough. We must determine its *peculiar Species*, if we would be accurate and exact. It indeed appears, said I, necessary.

NOR is any thing, continued he, more easy to be discussed. For what can that *peculiar Consistence* of Life be else, than a Life, whose several Parts are not only consonant to *each other*, but to the *Nature* also of the Being, by whom that Life has been adopted? Does not this *last* Degree of Consistence appear as requisite as the *former*? I answered, it could not be otherwise.

You see then, said he, the true Idea of right Conduct. It is not, merely *To live consistently*; but it is *To live consistently with Nature*. Allow it.

BUT what, continued he, Can we live *consistently with Nature*, and be at a loss how to behave ourselves? We cannot. And can we know how to behave ourselves, if we know nothing of *what befalls us*; nothing of those *Things* and *Events*, which perpetually surround, and affect us? We cannot. You see then, continued he, how we are again fallen insensibly into that Doctrine, which proves the

3

Necessity

Necessity of *scrutinizing* and *knowing the Value of Externals*.

Part II.

I replied, it was true. If you assent, said he, to this, it will of course follow, that, *To live consistently with Nature, is, To live agreeably to a just Experience of those Things, which happen around us.* It appears so.

BUT farther still, said he.—Think you any one can be deemed to live agreeably to such *Experience*, if he *select* not, as far as possible, the things most *congruous to his Nature*? He cannot. And by the same Rule, as far as possible, must he not *reject* such as are *contrary*? He must. And that not occasionally, as Fancy happens to prompt; but *steadily, constantly*, and without Remission.

I should imagine so. You judge, said he, truly. Were he to act otherwise in the least instance, he would falsify his Professions; he would not live according to that *Experience*, which we now suppose him to possess. I replied, He would not.

It should seem then, said he, from hence, as a natural Consequence of what we have admitted, that the *Essence of right Conduct* lay in SELECTION and REJECTION. So, said I, it has appeared.

And that such *Selection* and *Rejection* should be *consonant with our proper Nature*. It is true. And be *steady* and *perpetual*, not occasional and interrupted. It is true. But if this be the *Essence of Right Conduct*, then too it is the *Essence of our Sovereign Good*; for in such *Conduct* we have supposed this Good to consist. We have.

SEE then, said he, the Result of our Inquiry.—The SOVEREIGN GOOD, as constituted by *Rectitude of Conduct*, has, on our strictest Scrutiny,

Part II. Scrutiny, appeared to be this—TO LIVE PERPETUALLY SELECTING, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS CONGRUOUS TO NATURE, AND REJECTING WHAT IS CONTRARY, MAKING OUR END THAT SELECTING AND THAT REJECTING ONLY. It is true, said I, so it appears.

§ 5. BEFORE we hasten then farther, said he, let us stop to recollect, and see whether our present Conclusions accord with our former.—We have now supposed the *Sovereign Good* to be *Rectitude of Conduct*, and this *Conduct* we have made consist in a certain *Selecting* and *Rejecting*. We have. And do you not imagine that the *Selecting* and *Rejecting*, which we propose, as they are purely governed by the Standard of *Nature*, are capable in every instance of being *rationaly justified*? I replied, I thought they were. But if they admit a *rational Justification*, then are they *Moral Offices* or *Duties*; for thus * you remember yesterday a *Moral Office* was defined. It was. But if so, *To live in the Practice of them*, will be *To live in the Discharge of Moral Offices*. It will. But *To live in the Discharge of these*, is the same as *Living according to Virtue*, and *Living according to Nature*. It is. So therefore is *Living in that Selection, and in that Rejection, which we propose*. It is.

WE need never therefore be at a loss, said he, for a Description of the SOVEREIGN GOOD.—We may call it, RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT.—If that be too contracted, we may enlarge and say, it is—TO LIVE PERPETUALLY SELECTING AND REJECTING ACCORDING TO THE STANDARD OF OUR BEING.—If we are for still different

* Sup. p. 101.

different Views, we may say it is——To LIVE IN THE DISCHARGE OF MORAL OFFICES——To LIVE ACCORDING TO NATURE——To LIVE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE——To LIVE ACCORDING TO JUST EXPERIENCE OF THOSE THINGS, WHICH HAPPEN AROUND US.——Like some finished Statue, we may behold it every way; it is the same Object, tho' variously viewed; nor is there a View, but is natural, truly graceful, and engaging.

§ 6. I CANNOT deny, said I, but that as you now have explained it, your Hypothesis seems far more plausible, than when first it was proposed. You will believe it, said he, more so still, by considering it with more Attention.—In the first place, tho' perhaps it esteems nothing *really* GOOD but VIRTUE, nothing *really* EVIL, but VICE, yet it in no manner takes away the *Difference*, and *Distinction* of *other Things*. So far otherwise, it is for establishing their Distinction to the greatest Accuracy. For were this neglected, what would become of *Selection* and *Rejection*, those important Energies, which are its very Soul and Essence? Were there no DIFFERENCE, there could be no CHOICE. It is true, said I, there could not.

AGAIN, said he. It is no meagre, mortifying System of *Self-denial*—It suppresses no Social and Natural Affections, nor takes away any Social and Natural Relations—It prescribes no Abstainings, no Forbearances *out of Nature*; no gloomy, sad, and lonely Rules of Life, *without* which it is evident Men may be as honest as *with*, and be infinitely more useful and worthy Members of *Society*.——It refuses no Pleasure, not inconsistent with *Temperance*—It rejects no Gain, not inconsistent with *Justice*——Universally, as far as *Virtue* neither *forbids* nor *dissuades*,

Part II. *diffuades*, it endeavours to render Life, even in the *most vulgar* Acceptation, as chearful, joyous, and easy as possible. Nay, could it mend the Condition of Existence in any the *most trivial* Circumstance, even by adding to the amplest Possessions the poorest meanest Utensil, it would in no degree condemn an Addition even so mean. Far otherwise—It would consider, that to neglect the least Acquisition, when fairly in its power, would be to fall short of that *perfect* and *accurate Conduct*, which it ever has in view, and on which alone all depends.

AND yet, tho' thus exact in every the minutest Circumstance, it gives us no Solicitude as to what *Rank* we maintain in Life. Whether noble or ignoble, wealthy or poor; whether merged in Business, or confined to Inactivity, it is *equally consistent with every Condition*, and equally capable of adorning them all. Could it indeed choose its own Life, it would be always that, where most social Affections might extensively be exerted, and most done to contribute to the Welfare of Society. But if Fate order otherwise, and this be denied; its Intentions are the same, its Endeavours are not wanting; nor are the *Social, Rational Powers* forgotten, even in Times and Circumstances, where they can least become conspicuous.

It teaches us to consider *Life*, as one great important *Drama*, where we have each our *Part* allotted us to act. It tells us that our *Happiness*, as *Actors* in this *Drama*, consists not in the *Length* of our Part, nor in the *State* and *Dignity*, but in the *just*, the *decent*, and the *natural Performance*,

IF

IF its Aims are successful, it is thankful to Providence. It accepts all the Joys, derived from their *Succesfs*, and feels them as fully, as those who know *no other* Happiness. The only Difference is, that having a *more excellent Good* in view, it fixes not, like the Many, its *Happiness* on *Succesfs* alone, well knowing that in such case, if *Endeavours fail*, there can be nothing left behind but Murmurings and Misery. On the contrary, when this happens, it is then it retires into itself, and reflecting on what is *Fair*, what is *Laudable* and *Honest* (the truly *beatific Vision*, not of *mad Enthusiasts*, but of the Calm, the Temperate, the Wise, and the Good) it becomes *superiour to all Events*; it *acquiesces in the Consciousness of its own Rectitude*; and, like that Mansion founded, not on the Sands, but on the Rock, it defies all the Terrors of Tempest and Inundation.

§ 7. HERE he paused, and I took the Opportunity to observe, how his Subject had warmed him into a degree of Rapture; how greatly it had raised both his Sentiments and his Style. No wonder, said he. Beauty of every kind excites our Love and Admiration; the Beauties of Art, whether *Energies* or *Works*; the Beauties of Nature, whether Animal or Inanimate. And shall we expect less from *this Supreme Beauty*; this *moral, mental, and original Beauty*; of which all the rest are but as *Types* or *Copies*?—Not however by high Flights to lose Sight of our Subject, the whole of what we have argued, may be reduced to this—

ALL MEN PURSUE GOOD, and would be *happy*, if they knew how; not happy for Minutes, and miserable for Hours, but *happy*, if possible, *thro' every Part of their Existence*. Either therefore *there is a*

Part II. *GOOD of this steady durable Kind, or there is none. If none, then all Good must be transient and uncertain; and if so, an Object of lowest Value, which can little deserve either our Attention, or Inquiry. But if there be a better Good, such a Good as we are seeking; like every other thing, it must be derived from some Cause; and that Cause must be either external, internal, or mixt, in as much as except these three, there is no other possible. Now a steady, durable Good, cannot be derived from an external Cause, by reason all derived from Externals must fluctuate, as they fluctuate. By the same Rule, not from a Mixture of the Two; because the Part which is external, will proportionally destroy its Essence. What then remains but the Cause internal; the very Cause which we have supposed, when we place the Sovereign Good in Mind; in Rectitude of Conduct; in just Selecting and Rejecting?* There seems indeed no other Cause, said I, to which we can possibly assign it.

FORGIVE me then, continued he, should I appear to boast—— We have proved, or at least there is an Appearance we have proved, that *either there is no GOOD except this of our own; or that, if there be any other, it is not worthy our Regard.* It must be confessed, said I, you have said as much, as the Subject seems to admit.

§ 8. BY means then, said he, of our Hypothesis, behold one of the fairest, and most amiable of Objects, behold THE TRUE AND PERFECT MAN: that Ornament of Humanity; that Godlike Being; who, *without regard either to Pleasure or Pain, uninfluenced equally by either Prosperity or Adversity, superiour to the World and its best and worst Events, can fairly rest his All upon the Rectitude of his own Conduct;*
can

can constantly, and uniformly, and manfully maintain it; thinking that, and that alone, wholly sufficient to make him happy. Part II.

AND do you seriously believe, said I, there ever was such a Character? And what, replied he, if I should admit, *there never was, is, or will be such a Character?*—that we have been talking the whole time of a Being, not to be found;

A faultless Monster, which the World ne'er saw?

Supposing, I say, we admit this, what then? Would not your System in such a case, said I, a little border upon the chimerical? I only ask the Question. You need not be so tender, he replied, in expressing yourself. If it be false, if it will not endure the Test, I am as ready to give it up, as I have been to defend it. He must be a poor Philosopher indeed, who, when he sees *Truth* and a *System* at variance, can ever be solicitous for the Fate of a System.

BUT tell me, I pray—Do you object to mine, from its *Perfection*, or from its *Imperfection*? From its being too excellent for Human Nature, and *above* it; or from its being too base, and *below* it? It seems to require, said I, a *Perfection*, to which no *Individual* ever arrived. That very *Transcendence*, said he, is an Argument on its behalf. Were it of a Rank inferior, it would not be that Perfection, which we seek. Would you have it, said I, *beyond Nature*? If you mean, replied he, *beyond any particular or individual Nature*, most undoubtedly I would.—As you are a Lover of Painting, you shall hear a Story on the Subject.

Part II.

“ IN ancient days, while *Greece* was flourishing in Liberty and Arts, a celebrated Painter, having drawn many excellent Pictures for a certain free State, and been generously and honourably rewarded for his Labours, at last made an Offer to paint them a *Helen*, as a Model and Exemplar of the most exquisite Beauty. The Proposal was readily accepted, when the Artist informed them, that in order to draw *one* Fair, it was necessary he should contemplate *many*. He demanded therefore a Sight of all their finest Women. The State, to assist the Work, assented to his Request. They were exhibited before him; he selected the most beautiful; and from these formed his *Helen*, more beautiful than them all.”——

YOU have heard the Fact, and what are we to infer?—Or can there be any other Inference than this—that the *Standard of Perfection, with respect to the Beauty of Bodies, was not* (as this Artist thought) *to be discovered in any Individual; but being dispersed by Nature in Portions thro’ the many, was from thence and thence only, to be collected and recognized?* It appears, said I, he thought so. The Picture, continued he, is lost, but we have Statues still remaining. If there be Truth in the Testimony of the best and fairest Judges, no Woman ever equalled the Delicacy of the *Medicean Venus*, nor Man the Strength and Dignity of the *Farnhesian Hercules*. It is generally, said I, so believed.

AND will you, said he, from this unparalleled and transcendent Excellence, deny these Works of Art to be truly and strictly *Natural*?

Their Excellence, replied I, must be confessed by All; but how they

they can be called so strictly *Natural*, I must own a little startles me.

That the *Limbs* and their *Proportions*, said he, are selected from *Nature*, you will hardly I believe doubt, after the Story just related.

I replied, it was admitted. The *Parts* therefore of these Works are *Natural*. They are. And may not the same be asserted, as to the *Arrangement* of these *Parts*? Must not *this* too be *natural*, as it is analogous we know to *Nature*? It must. If so, then is the *Whole Natural*. So indeed, said I, it should seem.

It cannot, replied he, be otherwise, if it be a Fact beyond dispute, that the *Whole* is nothing more, than the *Parts under such Arrangement*. Enough, said I, you have satisfied me.

If I have, said he, it is but to *transfer* what we have asserted of this *subordinate* Beauty, to Beauty of a *higher Order*; it is but to pass from the *External*, to the *Moral* and *Internal*. For here we say, by parity of Reason, that no where in any *particular* Nature is the *perfect Character* to be seen intire. Yet one is *brave*; another is *temperate*; a third is *liberal*; and a fourth is *prudent*. So that in the *Multitude of mixed imperfect Characters*, as before in the *Multitude of imperfect Bodies*, is expressed that *IDEA*; that *MORAL STANDARD OF PERFECTION*, by which *all* are tried and compared to one another, and at last upon the whole are either justified or condemned—that *Standard of Perfection*, which cannot be but *most Natural*, as it is purely collected from *Individuals of Nature*, and is the *Test* of all the *Merit* to which they aspire. I acknowledge, said I, your Argument.

I MIGHT add, said he, if there were Occasion, other Arguments which would surprize you. I might inform you of the natural Pre-eminence, and high Rank of *Specific Ideas*;—that every *Individual*
was

Part II. was but their *Type*, or Shadow;—that the *Mind* or *Intellect* was the *Region of Possibles*;—that whatever is *Possible*, to the *Mind*, actually *Is*; nor any thing a *Non-entity*, except what implies a *Contradiction*;—that the genuine Sphere and genuine Cylinder, tho' *Forms* perhaps *too perfect*, ever to exist conjoined to *Matter*, were yet as *true and real* Beings, as the *grosslest Objects of Sense*; were the *Source* of infinite *Truths*, which *wholly* depend on them, and which, as *Truths*, have a Being most *unalterable* and *eternal*. But these are Reasonings, which rather belong to *another* Philosophy; and if you are satisfied without them, they are at best but superfluous.

He waited not for my Answer, but proceeded as follows. It is thus, said he, have I endeavoured, as far as in my power, to give you an Idea of the *perfect Character*: a Character, which I am neither so absurd, as to impute to myself; nor so rigorous and unfair, as to require of others. We have proposed it only, as AN EXEMPLAR OF IMITATION, which tho' *None* we think can *equal*, yet *All* at least may *follow*—an Exemplar of Imitation, which in proportion as we approach, so we advance proportionably in *Merit* and in *Worth*—an Exemplar, which, were we more *selfish*, we should be Fools to reject; if it be true, that *to be Happy*, is the *ultimate Wish* of us *all*, and that *Happiness* and *Moral Worth* so reciprocally correspond, that there can be no Degree of *the one*, without an equal Degree of *the other*. If there be Truth, said I, in your Reasonings, it cannot certainly be otherwise.

He continued, by saying—The *Proficiency* of *Socrates*, and indeed of every honest Man, was sufficient to convince us, could we be steadfast to our Purpose, that *some Progress at least* might be

made toward this *Perfection*—How far, we knew not—The Field was open—The Race was free and common to All—Nor was the Prize, as usual, reserved only to the First; but All, who run, might depend on a Reward, having the Voice of Nature, would they but listen, to assure them,

* *Nemo ex hoc numero mihi non donatus abibit.*

§ 9. HERE he paused, and left me to meditate on what he had spoken. For some time we passed on in mutual Silence, till observing me on my part little inclined to break it, What, said he, engages you with an Attention so earnest? I was wondering, said I, whence it should happen, that in a Discourse of such a nature, you should say so little of *Religion*, of *Providence*, and a *Deity*. I have not, replied he, omitted them, because not *intimately united to Morals*; but because what ever we treat accurately, should be treated separately and apart. Multiplicity of Matter naturally tends to Confusion. They are weak Minds indeed, which dread a rational Suspence; and much more so, when in the Event, it only leads to a surer Knowledge, and often strengthens the very Subject, on which we suspend. Could I however repeat you the Words of a venerable Sage, (for I can call him no other) whom once I heard differting on the Topic of Religion, and whom still I hear, when ever I think on him; you might accept perhaps my *Religious Theories* as candidly, as you have my *Moral*. I pressed him to repeat them, with which he willingly complied.

THE

* *ÆNEID. l. v. N. 305.*

Part II.

THE Speaker, said he, whose Words I am attempting to relate, and whom for the present I name *Theophilus*, was of a Character truly amiable in every part. When young, he had been fortunate in a liberal Education; had been a Friend to the Muses, and approved himself such to the Public. As Life declined, he wisely retired, and dedicated his Time almost wholly to Contemplation. Yet could he never forget the Muses, whom once he loved. He retained in his Discourse (and so in the Sequel you will soon find) a large Portion of that rapturous, anti-prosaic Style, in which those Ladies usually choose to express themselves.

WE were walking, not (as now) in the chearful Face of Day, but late in the Evening, when the Sun had long been set. Circumstances of Solemnity were not wanting to affect us; the Poets could not have feigned any more happy—a running Stream, an ancient Wood, a still Night, and a bright Moonshine.—I, for my own part, induced by the Occasion, fell insensibly into a Reverie about Inhabitants in the Moon. From thence I wandered to other heavenly Bodies, and talked of States there, and Empires, and I know not what.

WHO lives in the Moon, said he, is perhaps more than we can well learn. It is enough, if we can be satisfied, by the help of our best Faculties, that *Intelligence* is not confined to this little Earth, which we inhabit; that tho' Men were not, the World would not want Spectators, to contemplate its Beauty, and adore the Wisdom of its Author.

“ THIS

“ THIS whole UNIVERSE itself is but ONE CITY or COMMON-
 “ WEALTH — *a System of Substances variously formed, and variously*
 “ *actuated agreeably to those forms* — a System of Substances both
 “ immensely great and small, *Rational, Animal, Vegetable, and Inani-*
 “ *mate.*

“ As many Families make one Village, many Villages one Pro-
 “ vince, many Provinces one Empire; so many Empires, Oceans,
 “ Wastes, and Wilds, combined, compose that Earth on which we
 “ live. Other Combinations make a Planet or a Moon; and these
 “ again, united, make one Planetary System. What higher Combi-
 “ nations subsist, we know not, their Gradation and Ascent it is
 “ impossible we should discover. Yet the generous Mind, not
 “ deterred by this Immenfity, intrepidly passes on, thro’ Regions
 “ unknown, from greater System to greater, till it arrive at *that*
 “ *greatest*, where Imagination stops, and can advance no farther.
 “ In this last, this mighty, this stupendous Idea, it beholds the UNI-
 “ VERSE itself, of which every Thing is a Part, and with respect to
 “ which not the smallest Atom is either foreign or detached.

“ WIDE as its Extent, is the Wisdom of its Workmanship, not
 “ bounded and narrow, like the humbler Works of Art. These are
 “ all of Origin no higher than *Human*. We can readily trace them
 “ to their utmost Limit, and with accuracy discern both their Begin-
 “ ning and their End. But where the Microscope that can shew
 “ us, from what Point Wisdom begins in Nature? Where the
 “ Telescope that can descry, to what Infinitude it extends? The

Part II. “ more diligent our Search, the more accurate our Scrutiny, the
 “ more only are we convinced, that our Labours can never finish;
 “ that Subjects inexhaustible remain behind, still unexplored.

“ HENCE the Mind truly wise, quitting the Study of *Particulars*,
 “ as knowing their *Multitude* to be *infinite* and *incomprehensible*, turns
 “ its intellectual Eye to what is general and comprehensive, and
 “ thro’ *Generals* learns to see, and recognize whatever exists.

“ IT perceives in this view, that every Substance, of every degree,
 “ has its *Nature*, its proper Make, Constitution or Form, by which it
 “ *acts*, and by which it *suffers*. It perceives it so to fare with every
 “ natural Form around us, as with those Tools and Instruments by
 “ which *Art* worketh its Wonders. The Saw is destined to one Act;
 “ the Mallet, to another; the Wheel answers this Purpose; and the
 “ Lever answers a different. So *Nature* uses the *Vegetable*, the *Brute*,
 “ and the *Rational*, agreeably to the proper Form and Constitution of
 “ every Kind. The *Vegetable* proceeds with perfect *Insensibility*.
 “ The *Brute* possesses a Sense of what is pleasurable and painful, but
 “ stops at mere *Sensation*, and is unable to go farther. The *Rational*,
 “ like the *Brute*, has all the Powers of mere *Sensation*, but enjoys
 “ superadded a farther transcendent *Faculty*, by which it is made
 “ conscious, not only of *what it feels*, but of *the Powers themselves*,
 “ which are the Sources of those very Feelings; a *Faculty*, which
 “ recognizing both *itself* and *all Things else*, becomes a *Canon*, a
 “ *Corrector*, and a *Standard Universal*.

“ HENCE

“ HENCE to the *Rational alone* is imparted that MASTER-SCIENCE,
 “ of *what* they are, *where* they are, and *the End* to which they are
 “ destined.

“ HAPPY, too happy, did they know their own Felicity; did they
 “ reverence the Dignity of their own superior Character, and never
 “ wretchedly degrade themselves into Natures to them subordinate.
 “ And yet alas! it is a Truth too certain, that as the Rational only
 “ are susceptible of a Happiness truly excellent, so these only merge
 “ themselves into Miseries past Indurance.

“ ASSIST us then, THOU POWER DIVINE, with the Light of that
 “ REASON, by which Thou lightenest the World; by which Grace
 “ and Beauty is diffused thro’ every Part, and the Welfare of the
 “ Whole is ever uniformly upheld; that Reason, of which *our own*
 “ is but a *Particle* or *Spark*, like some *Promethean* Fire, caught from
 “ Heaven above. So teach us *to know ourselves*, that we may attain
 “ that Knowledge, which alone is worth attaining. Check our vain,
 “ our idle Researches into the Laws, and Natures, and Motions of
 “ other Beings, till we have learnt and can practise those, which
 “ peculiarly respect ourselves. Teach us to be fit Actors in that
 “ general Drama, where Thou hast allotted every Being, great and
 “ small, its proper Part, *the due Performance of which is the only End*
 “ *of its Existence.*

“ ENABLE us to curb DESIRE within the Bounds of what is
 “ *Natural*. Enable us even to *suspend* it, till we can employ it to
 “ our Emolument. Be our *first* Work to have escaped from *wrong*

Part II. “ *Opinion, and bad Habit*; that the Mind, thus rendered sincere and
 “ incorrupt, may with Safety proceed to seek its genuine Good and
 “ Happiness.

“ WHEN we are thus previously exercised, thus duly prepared,
 “ let not our LOVE there stop, where it first begins; but insensibly
 “ conduct it, by thy invifible Influence, from lower Objects to higher,
 “ till it arrive at that *Supreme*, where only it can find what is ade-
 “ quate and full. Teach us to love THEE, and THY DIVINE AD-
 “ MINISTRATION——to regard the Universe itself as our true and
 “ genuine Country, not that little casual Spot, where we first drew
 “ vital Air. Teach us each to regard *Himself*, but as a PART of
 “ this great WHOLE; a Part which for its Welfare we are as patiently
 “ to resign, as we resign a fingle Limb for the Welfare of our whole
 “ Body. Let our Life be a continued Scene of ACQUIESCENCE
 “ and of GRATITUDE; of Gratitude, for what we *enjoy*; of Ac-
 “ quiescence, in what we *suffer*; as both can only be referable to
 “ that concatenated Order of Events, which cannot but be *best*, as
 “ being by Thee approved and chosen.

“ IN as much as Futurity is hidden from our Sight, we can have
 “ no other *Rule of Choice*, by which to govern our Conduct, than
 “ *what seems consonant to the Welfare of our own particular Natures*. If
 “ it appear not contrary to Duty and moral Office, (and how should
 “ we judge, but from what appears?) Thou canst not but forgive
 “ us, if we prefer Health to Sicknefs; the Safety of Life and Limb,
 “ to Maiming or to Death. But did we know that thefe Incidents,
 “ or any other were appointed us; were fated in that Order of
 “ incontrollable

“ incontrollable Events, by which Thou preservest and adornest the
 “ Whole, it then becomes our Duty, to meet them with Magna-
 “ nimity; to co-operate with Chearfulness in what ever Thou
 “ ordainest; that so we may know no other Will, than thine alone,
 “ and that the Harmony of our *particular* Minds with thy *Universal*,
 “ may be steady and uninterrupted thro’ the Period of our Ex-
 “ istence.

“ YET, since to attain this Height, this transcendent Height, is
 “ but barely possible, if possible, to the most perfect Humanity:
 “ regard what within us is *Congenial to Thee*; raise us above our-
 “ selves, and warm us into *Enthusiasm*. But let our Enthusiasm be
 “ such, as befits the Citizens of Thy Polity; liberal, gentle, rational,
 “ and humane—not such as to debase us into poor and wretched
 “ *Slaves*, as if Thou wert our Tyrant, not our kind and common
 “ Father; much less such as to transform us into savage *Beasts of*
 “ *Prey*, fullen, gloomy, dark, and fierce; prone to persecute, to
 “ ravage, and destroy, as if the Lust of Massacre could be grateful
 “ to thy Goodness. Permit us rather madly to avow Villainy in
 “ thy Defiance, than impiously to assert it under colour of thy Ser-
 “ vice. Turn our Mind’s Eye from every Idea of this Character;
 “ from the Servile, Abject, Horrid and Ghastly, to the Generous,
 “ Lovely, Fair and Godlike.

“ HERE let us dwell;—be here our Study and Delight. So
 “ shall we be enabled, in the silent Mirrour of *Contemplation*, to
 “ behold those *Forms*, which are hidden to Human Eyes—that
 “ animating WISDOM, which pervades and rules the Whole—that

“ LAW

Part II.

“ LAW irresistible, immutable, supreme, which leads the Willing,
 “ and compels the Averse, to co-operate in their Station to the
 “ general Welfare—that MAGIC DIVINE, which by an Efficacy
 “ past Comprehension, can transform every Appearance, the most
 “ hideous, into Beauty, and exhibit *all* things FAIR and GOOD to
 “ THEE, ESSENCE INCREATE, *who art of purer Eyes, than ever to*
 “ *behold Iniquity.*

“ BE these our Morning, these our Evening Meditations—with
 “ these may our Minds be unchangeably tinged—that loving
 “ Thee with a Love most disinterested and sincere; enamoured of
 “ thy Polity, and thy DIVINE ADMINISTRATION; welcoming
 “ every Event with Cheerfulness and Magnanimity, as being *best*
 “ upon the Whole, because ordained of Thee; proposing nothing of
 “ ourselves, but *with a Reserve* that Thou permittest; acquiescing
 “ in every Obstruction, as ultimately referable to thy Providence—
 “ in a word, that working this Conduct, by due exercise, into perfect
 “ *Habit*; we may never murmur, never repine; never miss what we
 “ would obtain, or fall into that which we would avoid; but being
 “ happy with that transcendent *Happiness*, of which no one can
 “ deprive us; and blest with that Divine *Liberty*, which no Tyrant
 “ can annoy; we may dare address Thee with pious Confidence, as
 “ the *Philosophic Bard* of old,

“ *Conduct me, Thou, of Beings Cause Divine,*
 “ *Where-e'er I'm destin'd in thy great Design.*
 “ *Active I follow on: for should my Will*
 “ *Resist, I'm impious; but must follow still.*”

IN

IN this manner did *Theophilus*, said he, pursue the Subject, to which I had led him. He adorned his Sentiments with Expressions even more splendid than I have now employed. The Speaker, the Speech, the happy Circumstances which concurred, the Night's Beauty and Stillness, with the Romantic Scene where we were walking, all together gave the Whole such an Energy and Solemnity, as it is impossible you should feel from the Coldness of a bare Recital. I, continued he, for my own part, returned home sensibly touched, and retained the strongest Feelings of what I had heard, till the following Morning. Then the Business of the Day gently obliterated all, and left me by Night as little of a Philosopher, as I had ever been before.

§ 10. AND is it possible, said I, so soon to have forgotten, what seems so striking and sublime, as the Subject you have been now treating? It is HABIT, replied he, is all in all. It is *Practice and Exercise, which can only make us truly any thing*. Is it not evidently so, in the most common vulgar Arts? Did mere *Theory* alone ever make the meanest Mechanic? And is the *Supreme Artist of Life and Manners* to be formed more easily, than such a one? Happy for us, could we prove it near so easy. But believe me, my Friend, good Things are not so cheap. *Nothing is to be had gratis*, much less that which is most valuable.

YET however for our Comfort, we have this to encourage us, that, tho' the Difficulty of *acquiring* Habits be great and painful, yet nothing so easy, so pleasant, as their *Energies*, when once wrought by Exercise to a due Standard of Perfection. I know you have made

some

Part II.

some Progress in *Musick*. Mark well what you can do, as a Proficient this way—You can do that, which without Habit, as much exceeds the wisest Man, as to walk upon the Waves, or to ascend a Cliff perpendicular. You can even do it with Facility; and (lest you should think I flatter) not you yourself alone, but a thousand others beside, whose low Rank and Genius no way raise them above the Multitude. If then you are so well assured of this Force of Habit in one Instance, judge not in other Instances by your own present Insufficiency. Be not shocked at the *apparent Greatness* of the *perfect Moral Character*, when you compare it to the *Weakness* and *Imperfection* of your own. On the contrary, when these dark, these melancholy Thoughts assail you, immediately turn your Mind to the Consideration of *Habit*. Remember how *easy* its Energies to those, who *possess* it; and yet how *impracticable* to such, as *possess* it not.

It must be owned, said I, that this is a Satisfaction, and may be some kind of Assistance in a melancholy Hour. And yet this very Doctrine naturally leads to another Objection.—Does not *the Difficulty of attaining Habit* too well support a certain Assertion, that, *despise Virtue as we will, it is but a Scheme of Self-denial*?

By *Self-denial*, said he, you mean, I suppose, something like what follows——*Appetite* bids me eat; *Reason* bids me forbear——If I obey Reason, I deny Appetite; and Appetite being a *Part of myself*, to deny it, is a *Self-denial*. What is true thus in *Luxury*, is true also in other Subjects; is evident in Matters of Lucre, of Power, of Resentment, or whatever else we pursue by the Dictate of any Passion.

You appear, said I, to have stated the Objection justly.

To

To return then to our Instance, said he, of Luxury. *Appetite* bids me eat; *Reason* bids me forbear—If I obey *Reason*, I deny *Appetite*—and if I obey *Appetite*, do I not deny *Reason*? Can I act either way, without rejecting one of them? And is not *Reason* a Part of myself, as notoriously as *Appetite*?

OR to take another Example—I have a Deposit in my Hands. *Avarice* bids me retain—*Conscience* bids me restore. Is there not a reciprocal Denial, let me obey which I will? And is not *Conscience* a Part of me, as truly as *Avarice*?

POOR SELF indeed must be denied, take which Party we will. But why should *Virtue* be arraigned of thwarting it, more than *Vice* her contrary?—Make the most of the Argument, it can come but to this—If *Self-denial* be an Objection to *Virtue*, so is it to *Vice*—If *Self-denial* be no Objection to *Vice*, no more can it be to *Virtue*. A wonderful and important Conclusion indeed!

HE continued by saying, that the *Soul of Man* appeared not as a single Faculty, but as compounded of many—that as these Faculties were not always in perfect Peace one with another, so there were few Actions which we could perform, where they would be all found to concur. What then are we to do? Suspend till they agree?—That were indeed impossible.—Nothing therefore can remain, but to weigh well their several Pretensions; to hear all, that each has to offer in its behalf; and finally to pursue the Dictates of the *Wise* and the *Best*. This done, as for the *Self-denial*, which we force upon the rest; with regard to our own Character, it is a Matter of Honour and Praise—

Part II. with regard to the *Faculties denied*, it is a Matter of as small Weight, as to condemn the Noise and Clamours of a mad and senseless Mob, in deference to the sober Voice of the worthier, better Citizens. And what Man could be justified, should he reject these, and prefer a Rabble?

§ 10. IN this place he paused again, and I took occasion to acknowledge, that my Objection appeared obviated. As the Day advanced apace, he advised that we might return home; and walking along leisurely, thus resumed to himself the Discourse.

I DARE say, continued he, you have seen many a wise Head shake, in pronouncing that sad Truth, *how we are governed all by INTEREST*. —And what do they think should govern us else? Our Loss, our Damage, our *Disinterest*? —Ridiculous indeed! We should be Ideots in such case, more than rational Animals. The only Question is, *where Interest truly lies*? For if this once be well adjusted, no Maxim can be more harmless.

“ I FIND myself existing upon a little Spot, surrounded every way
 “ by an immense unknown Expansion.—Where am I? What Sort
 “ of a Place do I inhabit? Is it exactly accommodated, in every In-
 “ stance, to my Convenience? Is there no Excess of Cold, none of
 “ Heat, to offend me? Am I never annoyed by Animals, either of
 “ my own kind, or a different? Is every thing subservient to me, as
 “ tho’ I had ordered all myself?—No—nothing like it—the farthest
 “ from it possible——The World appears not then originally made
 “ for the *private Convenience of me alone*?—It does not.—But is it

“ not possible so to accommodate it, by my own particular Industry?
 “ ——— If to accommodate Man and Beast, Heaven and Earth; if
 “ this be beyond me, it is not possible——What Consequence then
 “ follows? Or can there be any other than this—*If I seek an*
 “ *Interest of my own, detached from that of others; I seek an Interest*
 “ *which is chimerical, and can never have Existence?*

“ How then must I determine? Have I no Interest at all?—If I
 “ have not, I am a Fool for staying here. It is a smoaky House, and
 “ the sooner out of it, the better—But why no Interest?—Can
 “ I be contented with none, but one separate and detached?—
 “ Is a SOCIAL INTEREST joined with others such an Absurdity,
 “ as not to be admitted? The Bee, the Beaver, and the Tribes of
 “ herding Animals, are enough to convince me, that the thing is,
 “ *somewhere at least*, possible. How then am I assured, that it is not
 “ equally true of *Man*?——Admit it; and what follows?——If
 “ so, then HONOUR and JUSTICE are my INTEREST—then the
 “ WHOLE TRAIN OF MORAL VIRTUES are my INTEREST; *without*
 “ *some Portion of which, not even Thieves can maintain Society.*

“ BUT farther still—I stop not here—I pursue this *Social Interest*,
 “ as far as I can trace my several *Relations*. I pass from my own
 “ Stock, my own Neighbourhood, my own Nation, to the *whole Race*
 “ *of Mankind*, as dispersed throughout the Earth.—Am I not *related*
 “ *to them all*, by the mutual Aids of Commerce; by the general In-
 “ tercourse of Arts and Letters; by that *common Nature*, of which
 “ we all participate?—Again—I must have Food and Cloathing.
 “ ———Without a proper genial Warmth, I instantly perish.——

Part II. “ Am I not related, in this view, to the very *Earth* itself? To the
 “ distant *Sun*, from whose beams I derive Vigour? To that stupen-
 “ dous *Course and Order of the infinite Host of Heaven*, by which the
 “ Times and Seasons ever uniformly pass on?—Were this Order once
 “ confounded, I could not probably survive a Moment; *so absolutely*
 “ *do I depend on this common general Welfare.*”

“ WHAT then have I to do, but to enlarge VIRTUE into PIETY?
 “ Not only *Honour and Justice*, and what I owe to MAN, is my In-
 “ terest; but *Gratitude*, also *Acquiescence, Resignation, Adoration*, and
 “ all I owe to this great *Polity*, and its greater GOVERNOR, OUR COM-
 “ MON PARENT.”

“ BUT if all these MORAL and DIVINE HABITS be my INTEREST,
 “ I need not surely seek for a better. I have an Interest *compatible*
 “ with the Spot on which I live—I have an Interest which may
 “ exist, without *altering* the Plan of Providence; without *mending* or
 “ *marring* the general Order of Events.—I can bear whatever hap-
 “ pens with manlike Magnanimity; can be contented, and fully
 “ happy in the *Good*, which I possess; and can pass thro’ this turbid,
 “ this fickle, fleeting Period, without Bemoanings, or Envyings, or
 “ Murmurings, or Complaints.”

AND thus my Friend, have you my Sentiments, as it were abridged;
 my Sentiments on that Subject, which engages every one of us. For
 who would be unhappy? Who would not, if he knew how, enjoy *one*
perpetual Felicity? Who are there existing, who do not at every In-
 stant, seek it? It is the Wish, the Employ, not of the Rational Man
 only,

only, but of the Sot, the Glutton, the very lowest of our kind. For my own System, whether a just one, you may now examine, if you think proper. I can only say on its behalf, if it happen to be erroneous, it is a grateful Error, which I cherish and am fond of. And yet if really such, I shall never deem it so sacred, as not willingly, upon Conviction, to resign it up to Truth. Part II.

LITTLE passed after this worth relating. We had not far to walk, and we fell into common Topics. Yet one Observation of his I must not omit. It was what follows.——When we are once, said he, well *habituated* to this CHIEF, this MORAL SCIENCE, then LOGIC and PHYSICS become two profitable *Adjuncts*: *Logic*, to secure to us the Possession of our Opinions; that, if an Adversary attack, we may not basely give them up: *Physics*, to explain the Reason and Oeconomy of Natural Events, that we may know something of that Universe, where our Dwelling has been appointed us. But let me add a Saying (and may its Remembrance never escape you) while you find this great, this *Master-Science wanting*, value *Logic* but as *Sophistry*, and *Physics* but as *Raree-show*; for both, assure yourself, will be found nothing better.

It was soon after this that our Walk ended. With it ended a Conversation, which had long engaged us; and which, according to my Promise, I have here endeavoured to transcribe.

THE END.

only, but of the 2d, the Clutter, the very lowest of our kind. For
 my own System, whether a just one, you may now examine, it you
 think proper. I can only say on its behalf, it is better to be ex-
 amined, it is a grateful thing which I cherish and am fond of. And
 yet it really such, I shall never deem it is forced, as not willingly
 upon Conviction, to resign it up to I think.

Letter passed after the foregoing. We had not far to walk,
 and we fell into common Topics. Yet one Observation of his I must
 not omit. It was what follows. When we are once, said he, well
 acquainted to the error, this moral Science, then Logic and
 Politics become two feasible subjects: Logic, to learn to us
 the Possession of our Opinions: that, if an Advantage, we may
 not easily give them up: And to explain the Reason and Con-
 sequence of various Events, that we may know something of that Uni-
 verse, where our Dwelling has been appointed us. But let me add
 a Saying (and may its Remembrance never escape you) which you
 had this great, this happy, Science, where Logic but as so-
 phistry, and Politics but as Rascaldom; for both, unless you will
 be found nothing better.

It was soon after this that our Walk ended. With it ended a
 Conversation, which had long engaged us; and which, according to
 my Promise, I have here endeavored to transcribe.

THE END.

NOTES

ON

TREATISE the First;

CONCERNING

A R T.

NOTE I. p. 9. ALL ART IS CAUSE.] *Artis maxime proprium, creare & gignere.*
Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 22. "Ἐστὶ δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν. All Art is employed in Production, that is, in making something to be. *Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. l. 6. c. 4.*

THE active efficient Causes have been ranged and enumerated after different manners. In the same *Ethics*, they are enumerated thus—*αἰτία γὰρ δοκῶσιν εἶναι φύσις, καὶ ἀνάγκη, καὶ τύχη· ἔτι δὲ νῆς, καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου.* The several Causes appear to be Nature, Necessity, and Chance; and besides these, Mind or Intellect, and whatever operates by or thro' Man. l. 3. c. 3. The Paraphrast *Andronicus*, in explaining this last Passage, Πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου, adds οἷον τέχνη, ἢ ἄλλη τις πράξις, as for instance, Art, or any other human Action.

ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS speaks of efficient Causes as follows: Ἀλλὰ μὲν τὰ κυρίως αἰτία ποιητικὰ, φύσις τε, καὶ τέχνη, καὶ προαίρεσις. The Causes, which are strictly and properly efficient, are Nature, Art, and each Man's particular Choice of Action. περὶ Ψύχης. p. 160. B. Edit. Ald.

IN what manner ART is distinguished from the rest of these efficient Causes, the subsequent Notes will attempt to explain.

NOTE II. p. 9. OF THAT PAINTER FAMED IN STORY, &c.] See *Valer. Max. l. 8. c. 11.* See also *Dion. Chrysostom. Orat. 63. p. 590.*

NOTE III. p. 12. ART IS MAN BECOMING A CAUSE, INTENTIONAL AND HABITUAL.] *Aristotle*, in his *Rhetoric*, thus accurately enumerates all the possible manners, either

either direct or indirect, in which Mankind may be said to *act* or *do* any thing. Πάντες δὴ πράττεισι πάντα, τὰ μὲν, ἢ δι' αὐτῶν· τὰ δὲ, δι' αὐτῶν· τῶν μὲν ἔν μὴ δι' αὐτῶν, τὰ μὲν διὰ τύχην πράττεισι, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τῶν δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὰ μὲν βία, τὰ δὲ φύσει· ὥστε πάντα, ὅσα μὴ δι' αὐτῶν πράττεισι, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης· τὰ δὲ φύσει· τὰ δὲ βία. Ὅσα δὲ δι' αὐτῶν, καὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ μὲν δι' ἔθος, τὰ δὲ δι' ὀρέξιν· καὶ τὰ μὲν διὰ λογιστικὴν ὀρέξιν, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀλόγιστον. ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν βέλησις, μετὰ λόγου ὀρέξις ἀγαθῶν — ἀλλογοὶ δ' ὀρέξεις, ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία· ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττεισιν, ἀνάγκη πράττειν δι' αὐτῶν· ἔπλα· διὰ τύχην, διὰ βίαν, διὰ φύσιν, δι' ἔθος, διὰ λογισμὸν, διὰ θυμὸν, δι' ἐπιθυμίαν.

All Men do all Things, either of themselves, or not of themselves. The Things which they do not of themselves, they do either by Chance, or from Necessity; and the Things done from Necessity, they do either by Compulsion, which is External Necessity, or by Nature, which is Internal. So that all Things whatsoever, which Men do not of themselves, they do either by Chance, or from Compulsion, or by Nature.

Again, the Things which they do of themselves, and of which they are themselves properly the Causes, some they do thro' Custom and acquired Habit, others thro' original and natural Desire. Farther, the Things done thro' natural Desire they do, either thro' such Desire assisted by Reason, or thro' such Desire devoid of Reason. If it be assisted by Reason, then it assumes the Denomination of Will,—on the contrary, the irrational Desires are Anger and Appetite.

Hence it appears that all Things whatever, which Men do, they necessarily do thro' one of these seven Causes; either thro' Chance, Compulsion, Nature, Custom, Will, Anger, Appetite. Arist. Rhet. l. 1. c. 10.

It remains, agreeably to this Enumeration, to consider with which of these Causes we ought to arrange ART.

As to CHANCE, it may be observed in general of all *Casual Events*, that they always exclude *Intention* or *Design*: But *Intention* and *Design*, are from *Art* inseparable. Thus is the Difference between *Art* and *Chance* manifest.

As to EXTERNAL COMPULSION, we have it thus described — Βίαιον δὲ ἢ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐξωθεν. That is, an *Act of Compulsion*, the *efficient Principle of which is from without, independent of the Doer*. *Ethic. Nic. l. 3. c. 1.* Again, in the same Treatise, l. 6. c. 4. we are told of the Works of *Art*, that they are such, ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιῶντι, the *efficient Principle of which is in the Doer or Agent*. Thus therefore is *Art* distinguished from *Compulsion*.

THESE two Causes, *Chance* and *Compulsion*, are mentioned and considered in the Dialogue, Page 9.

NATURE, or rather NATURAL NECESSITY, is that Cause, thro' which we breathe, perspire, digest, circulate our Blood, &c. *Will, Anger, and Appetite*, are (as already observed) but so many Species of NATURAL DESIRE, considered either as assisted by Reason, or else as devoid of it. Now tho' *Natural Desire* and *Natural Necessity* differ, because in the one we act spontaneously, in the other not spontaneously, yet both of them meet in the common Genus of *Natural Power*. Moreover this is true of *all Natural Power*, that the *Power* itself is prior to any *Energies* or *Acts* of that Power. Ὅτι γὰρ ἐκ τῆς πο-

λῆσεως

λάμεις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκῆσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, & χρησάμενοι ἔχομεν. For [to instance in the natural Powers of Sensation] it was not from often seeing, and often hearing, that we acquired those Senses; but on the contrary, being first possessed of them, we then used them, not through any Use or Exercise did we come to possess them. *Arist. Ethic. 1. 2. c. 1.*

Now the contrary to this is true in the case of any Powers or Faculties not natural, but acquired by Custom and Usage. For here there are many Energies and Acts, which must necessarily precede the Existence of such Power or Habit, it being evident (as is said in the same Chapter) that ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἔξεις γίνονται, from similar and homogeneous Energies it is that Habits are obtained. So again, in the same Place, ἀ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, τὰυτα ποιεῖντες μαθάνομεν· οἷον οἰκοδομῶντες οἰκοδομοὶ γίνονται, καὶ καθαρίζοντες καθαρίζονται. The Things which we are to do by having learnt, we learn by doing. Thus by building Men become Builders, and by practising Music they become Musicians.

THUS therefore is ART distinguished from ALL NATURAL POWER OF MAN, whether Natural Necessity, Will, Anger, or Appetite. But ART has been already distinguished from CHANCE and COMPULSION. So that being clearly not the same with six of those seven Causes, by which all men do all Things, it must needs be referred to the seventh, that is, to CUSTOM or HABIT.

IT must be observed, the natural Causes or Powers in Man, considered as distinct from Art, are treated in the Dialogue, Pages 9 and 10.

AND now, as we have shewn Art to be a certain Cause working in Man, it remains to shew how it is distinguished from those other Causes beside Man, which we suppose to operate in the Universe. These are either such Causes as are below him, like the Vegetative Power, which operates in Vegetables, the Sensitive in Animals; or else such Causes as are above him, like GOD, and whatever is else of Intelligence more than human.

THE CAUSES BELOW us may be all included in the common Genus of NATURE; and of Nature we may say universally, as well of Nature without us as within us, that its several Operations, contrary to those of Art, are not in the least degree derived from Custom or Usage. Thus the author above cited—'Οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθιζέσθαι· οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος, ἐκ ἀν' ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, ἐδ' ἀν' μυρίακις αὐτὸν ἐθιζῇ τις ἄνω ρίπτων, ἐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω. None of those Things, which are what they are by Nature, can be altered by being accustomed. Thus a Stone, which by Nature is carried downward, can never be accustomed to mount upward, no, not tho' any one should ten thousand times attempt it, by throwing the Stone upward. The same may be said of accustoming Fire to move downward. *Ethic. Nicom. 1. 2. c. 1.* Again, in the Works of Nature, such as Trees, Animals, and the like, the efficient Principle, is vitally united to the Subjects, wherein it operates.—ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχουσι τὰυτα τὴν ἀρχὴν. *Ethic. Nicom. 1. 6. c. 4.* But in the Works of Art, such as Statues or Houses, the efficient Principle is disunited from the Subjects, and exists not in the Things done or made, but in the Doer or Artist—ὡν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιῶντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιημένῳ. *Ethic. Nic. 1. 6. c. 4.* It is indeed possible that, even in Works of Art, the Subject and efficient Cause may be united, as in the Case of a

Physician becoming his own Patient, and curing himself. But then it must be remembered that this Union is *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, merely *accidental*, and no way *essential* to the constituting of Art, considered as Art. By this therefore is ART clearly distinguished from NATURE, whose Definition informs us that it is—*ἀρχὴ τίς καὶ ἄλλια τῷ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἡρεμεῖν ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει πρῶτως, καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. A certain Principle or Cause of moving and ceasing to move, in some Subject wherein such Principle exists immediately, essentially, and not by way of Accident. Arist. Natur. Aufc. l. 2. c. 1.

THE CAUSES, which are of Rank SUPERIOUR to Man, such as the DEITY, can have nothing to do with Art, because being (as is said in the Dialogue, p. 11.) *perfect and complete, and knowing all from the Beginning, they can never admit of what is additional and secondary*. Art therefore can only belong to Beings, like Men, who being imperfect know their Wants, and endeavour to remove them by Helps *secondary and subsequent*. It was from a like Consideration that Pythagoras called himself a PHILOSOPHER, that is to say (according to his own Explication of the Name) a Lover and Seeker of what was wise and good, but not a Possessor, which he deemed a character above him. Consonant to this we read in Plato's Banquet, *θεῶν ἑδείς φιλοσοφεῖ, ἑδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι* ἔτι γὰρ, &c. No GOD philosophizes, or desires to become wise, FOR HE IS SO ALREADY. Nor, if there be any other Being wise, doth he philosophize for the same Reason. On the other hand, neither do the Indocil philosophize; for this is the Misfortune of Indocility, without being virtuous, good or prudent, to appear to ones self sufficient in all these Respects. In general therefore, he who thinketh himself in no want, desireth not that, which he thinks himself not to need. Who then, said Socrates to Diotima, (the Speaker of this Narration) WHO ARE THOSE WHO PHILOSOPHIZE, if they are neither the Wise nor the Indocil? That (replied she) may be now conspicuous even to a Child. THEY ARE THOSE OF MIDDLE RANK, BETWEEN THESE EXTREMES. Plat. p. 203. tom. 3. Edit. Serrani.

HERE we see (agreeably to what is said in the Dialogue, pages 11. and 12.) that as to acquired or secondary Habits, some Beings are too excellent for them, and others too base; and that the DEITY above all is in the number of those transcendent, and is thus, as a Cause, distinguished from ART. Vid. *Amm. περὶ Ἑρμην.* p. 26. b. et omnino εἰς καλὴν. p. 127, 128.

THERE are, besides the Deity and Nature now spoken of, certain other external Causes, which are mentioned in the first Note as distinct from Art; namely Chance and Necessity. But of these hereafter, when we consider the Subject of Art.

NOTE IV. p. 13. FACULTIES, POWERS, &c. ARE OBSCURE AND HIDDEN THINGS—
ENERGIES AND OPERATIONS LIE OPEN TO THE SENSES.] *Ἐἰ δὲ χρὴ λέγειν τί ἕκαστον τῶτων, οἷον τί τὸ νοητικόν, ἢ τί τὸ αἰσθητικόν, πρότερον ἐπισκεπτέον, τί τὸ νοεῖν, καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι* πρότεροι γὰρ καὶ σαφέστεροι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τῶν δυνάμεων εἰσι αἱ ἐνέργειαι. προεῖνυγχάζομεν γὰρ αὐταῖς, καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀπὸ τῶτων ἐπινοῶμεν. If we are to explain what each of these Things are, as for instance, what the intelligent Principle, what the sensitive, we must first inquire what it is to think, what to see, hear, and use the Senses. For with respect to us Men, the ENERGIES are PRIOR and MORE EVIDENT than the POWERS, because it is in the Energies we are first conversant, and comprehend

comprehend the Powers from them. Themist. in lib. 2. de Animâ, p. 76. Edit. Ald. Fol. Aristot. de An. II. 4.

NOTE V. p. 14. ARE THERE NOT PRECEPTS, &c.] Vid. Plat. in Min. tom. 2. p. 316, 17. Edit. Serran. et in Gorgia, tom. i. p. 465. A. ἐγὼ δὲ τεχνὴν ἔ καλῶ, ὃ ἀνὴρ ἢ ἀλογον πρᾶγμα.

As to those *low Habits* here mentioned, from which we distinguish *Art* by the *Number* and *Dignity* of its Precepts, they fall in general under the Denomination of *Μαλαιοτεχνία*, of which *Quintilian* gives the following Account. *Μαλαιοτεχνία quoque est quædam, id est, supervacua Artis Imitatio, quæ nihil sane nec boni nec mali habeat, sed vanum laborem: qualis illius fuit, qui grana ciceris, ex spatio distante missa, in acum continuo & sine frustratione inferebat; quem, cum spectasset Alexander, donasse dicitur ejusdem leguminis modio. Quod quidem præmium fuit illo opere dignissimum.* Inst. Orat. l. 2. c. 20.

NOTE VI. p. 15. AN HABITUAL POWER IN MAN OF BECOMING THE CAUSE OF SOME EFFECT, ACCORDING TO A SYSTEM OF VARIOUS AND WELL-APPROVED PRECEPTS—]

THE *Peripatetic* Definition of Art is "Ἐξίς μετὰ Λόγῃ ἀληθῆς ποιστικῇ—*an efficient Habit, joined with sound and true Reason.* Aristot. Ethic. Nic. l. 6. c. 4.

THE *Stoic* Definition, as we find it in *Sext. Empir. adversus Logicos*, p. 392. is, Σύστημα ἐκ κατὰλήψεων ἐγγεγυμνασμένων πρὸς τὸ τέλος εὐχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Thus translated by *Cicero* in *Diodemes de Grammat. l. 2.* *Ars est Perceptionum exercitatarum collectio, ad unum exitum vitæ utilem pertinentium.* And again by *Quintilian*, Inst. Orat. l. 2. c. 18. *Artem constare ex perceptionibus consentientibus & coexercitatis ad finem utilem vitæ.* The same Definition is also alluded to in the *Academics* of *Cicero*, l. 2. c. 7. where it is said—*Ars vero quæ potest esse, nisi quæ non ex una, aut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat?*

THERE is a third Definition of Art cited by *Quintilian* in the same place, and ascribed by him to *Cleanthes*—*Ars est potestas viâ (id est, ordine) efficiens.* The Greek, from which this Latin Definition is taken, is fuller and more philosophical. The Words are—Ἐξίς ὁδῷ βαδίζουσα μετὰ φαντασίας—which may be rendered, *an Habit, which proceeds in a Road or Method, having a Sense withal of what it is about.* The last Character distinguishes Art from the natural Energies of all things *insensitive*, which, tho' they proceed *methodically*, yet want a *Sense* of what they are doing. Vid. *Niceph. Blemmid. Epit. Logic.* p. 20.

Now if we compare these Definitions with that in the Dialogue, we shall find them all to correspond. The *Habitual Power in Man of becoming the Cause of some Effect*, is the same as Ἐξίς ποιστικῇ in the *Peripatetic* Definition. According to a *System of various and well-approved Precepts*, is the same as μετὰ λόγῃ ἀληθῆς. For *sound and true Reason* must needs be the Basis of all such Precepts.

AGAIN, as to the second Definition—The Words Σύστημα καλαλήπειων [*a System of Comprehensions, or of certain and evident Truths*] correspond to the latter Part of the Definition in the Dialogue—According to a System of various and well-approved Precepts. The Word ἐξηγεγυμνασμένων [that is to say, *worked in by Habit and Exercise*] corresponds to the first Part, that *Art is a Cause founded in Habit*. And the rest [πρὸς τὸ τέλος, &c. that is to say, *a System which has respect to some useful and serviceable End or Purpose in Human Life*] shews the System here mentioned to regard *Practice and Action*, not *Theory and Speculation*. And thus does it correspond with the Definition of the Dialogue, where it is said that Art is an *Habitual Power* not of merely *contemplating and knowing*, but of *becoming the Cause of some Effect*. It is not indeed expressed in the Dialogue, that this Effect has respect to the *Utility of Human Life*, because this latter Circumstance is reserved to the Definition of the final Cause of Art, given page 21.

As to the third Definition of Art, *potestas viâ efficiens, a Power of operating methodically*, it may be observed, that by being called an *operating Power*, it is distinguished from Powers *purely speculative*: and as it is said to *operate methodically*, or *in a Road and regular Process*, it is distinguished from *Chance* as well as *blind Necessity*. And thus far it corresponds with what is offered in the Dialogue. But it does not appear from this Definition, whether the Power therein mentioned be *Original and Natural*, or *Secondary and Habitual*, because Powers of either sort may operate methodically. And perhaps *Cleanthes* intended not to distinguish so far, but took *Art* in that larger and more general Sense, adopted sometimes by the *Stoics*; as when they describe *Nature herself* to be a Πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῶ βαδίζον πρὸς γένεσιν, *an artificial Fire, proceeding methodically to Production or Creation*. For it is not to be imagined, they intended by this to insinuate that *Nature* was a *Fire*, which had learnt by *Habit* so to operate. On the contrary, by *artificial* it is probable they intended no more than some *active efficient Principle, working with Reason, Order, and Method*; of which Principle they considered *Fire* to be the *properest* vehicle, as being of all Bodies the most *subtle*, and that into which the rest are all *ultimately* resolvable. *Vide Diog. Laert. l. 7. Sect. 156. Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 22.*

NOTE VII. page 17. IT SHOULD SEEM THAT THE COMMON OR UNIVERSAL SUBJECT OF ART WAS—ALL THOSE CONTINGENT NATURES, WHICH LIE WITHIN THE REACH OF HUMAN POWERS TO INFLUENCE.]

THE CAUSE here treated is the MATERIAL, the ὕλη, or ὑποκείμενον, or τὸ ἐξ ἧς γινέσθαι τε ἐνυπάρχοντι.

OF a *Contingent* we have the following Definition—λέγω δ' ἐνδεχέσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, ἢ μὴ ὄντι ἀναγκαίως, τεθέντι δ' ὑπάρχειν, ἔδεν εἶναι διὰ τῶν ἀδύνατον. I call that a *CONTINGENT*, which not being necessary, but being supposed to be, there will follow nothing impossible from such a supposition. *Arist. Anal. prior. l. i. c. 13. Diog. Laert. l. 3. § 10.*

THAT this is true in Works of *Art*, is evident. It is not necessary, that a given Fragment of such a Rock should assume the Figure of *Hercules*: but there follows *nothing impossible*, if we suppose it so figured. It is for this reason, that the *Subject of Art* is in the Dialogue called a *Contingent*.

BUT

BUT however, to explain the whole of what is said in this Place, it is necessary to go backward, and deduce what we would say from some remoter Considerations.

THE *Peripatetics* held the *End* or Aim of their Philosophy to be the discovering and knowing the ἀρχή, the *primary and creative Principle of all Things*. They pursued this Inquiry, when they reasoned *analytically*, that is to say, *upwards*, by beginning their Contemplation from those things, which are *to us first* in the Order of our Comprehension, and so ascending gradually to that which is *truly first in the real Order of Beings*. Ammon. εις E. φων. p. 36.

THE *first* and *original Objects* of our Comprehension are those nearer and more immediate, viz. the *Objects of Sense*, with which we are surrounded on every Side. These *Objects* we perceive to be *all in motion*; and the *Motions* are *multiform, various*, and often *opposite* to each other. The Consequences of this we perpetually behold. By such *Motions* we see that not only the mere *local Site* of these Beings is changed, but their very *Bulk*, and *Figure*, and *Qualities*; nay more than this, even the *Beings themselves* are made to *separate* and *perish*, while *new Beings arise* from the Re-assembly of the scattered Parts, which Parts different *Motions* can as well *bring together*, as *disunite*. The *Beings* or *Objects* of the Character here described, the *Peripatetics* denoted under the common Appellation of the τὰ κινούμενα καὶ φθαρτά, the *Beings moving and corruptible*.

FROM these *moving and perishable Objects*, they passed to those *sublimier and more transcendent Objects of Sense*, which they saw *adorn the Heavens*. Here likewise they discovered *Motion*; but then this *Motion* was *uniform and constant*; affecting not the *Beings moved*, save in the relation of *local Site*. As therefore they beheld no *Change* in the *Form and Essence* of these Beings, they deemed them (*upon their Hypothesis*) *incorruptible*, and out of them established another *Class* of Beings, that is to say, the τὰ κινούμενα καὶ ἀφθάρτα, the *Beings moving and incorruptible*.

FROM these *sublimier Objects of Sense*, they passed to *Objects of pure Intellect*; to *Bodies devoid of all Motion*, and of all *Quality*, save that inseparable one of *Figure*; such Bodies for instance as the *Cube*, the *Sphere*, and the rest of *Bodies mathematical*. From *mathematical Bodies*, and the *Truths resulting from them*, they passed to the Contemplation of *Truth in general*; to the *Soul*, and its Powers both of *Intuition* and *Syllogization*; to *Being universal*, and above both *Time* and *Place*; and thus at last to that *supreme Cause*, the great Principle of the whole, which is ever the *same immutable and eternal*. The several *Objects* of this *intellectual Comprehension* they stiled not merely ἀφθάρτα, but ἀφθάρτα καὶ ἀκίνητα, *Beings incorruptible and immoveable*. V. inf. Note xvii.

IN this manner did the *Peripatetics* speculate. And hence was it they established to themselves *three Species* of Philosophical Employment—one about Beings *motionless and eternal*; another, about Beings *moveable and eternal*; and a third, about Beings *moveable and perishable*. The first they held the proper Employment of the *Metaphysician*; the two last of the *Astronomer* and the *Naturalist*.

Διὸ τρεῖς αἱ πραγματεῖαι· ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀκίνητον· ἡ δὲ, περὶ κινέμενον μὲν, ἀφθαρτον δὲ· ἡ δὲ, περὶ τὰ φθαρτά.
Idcirco tres sunt tractationes; una, de immobili: altera de eo, quod movetur quidem, sed est interitus expers; tertia de rebus, interitui obnoxiiis. Aristot. Natural. Aufc. l. 2. c. 7.
 Διὸ καὶ τρεῖς αἱ πραγματεῖαι· ἡ μὲν, περὶ κινέμενα καὶ φθαρτά· ἡ δὲ περὶ κινέμενα, ἀφθάρτα δὲ· ἡ δὲ, περὶ ἀκίνητα καὶ ἀφθάρτα. Themistii Paraphrasis in loc.

THIS threefold Subject of Philosophic Inquiry is elegantly explained in the following Passage. Τί δὲ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτελικῆς φιλοσοφίας; φαμέν ὅτι γινώσκειν τὴν πάντων ἀρχὴν, τὴν τῶν πάντων δημιουργὸν αἰτίαν, τὴν αἰεὶ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν· ἀποδείκνυσθαι γὰρ πάντων ἀρχὴν, καὶ ἀσώματον· ἐξ ἐκείνης δὲ τὰ πάντα παράγεσθαι. Τίνα δὲ τὰ ἀγνοῖα ἡμᾶς εἰς τὸ τέλος; φαμέν ὅτι ἡ διδασκαλία τῶν ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ μεταβολῇ ὑπαρχόντων· τοιαῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ· ἀπὸ γὰρ τέτων, διὰ μεσῶν μαθηματικῶν, ἀνάλομεν εὐελπὲς ἐπὶ τὰ αἰεὶ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ ὑράνια· καὶ ἔτι, μετὰ τὰς ἀσωμάτους ἐστίαις, ἐπὶ τὴν πρῶτην πάντων ἀρχὴν. Πάσης γὰρ κινήσεως ἡ κατ' ἐστίαν ἔσης, ἡ κατὰ ποιόν, ἡ κατὰ τόπον, τὰ μὲν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ κατὰ πάσαν κίνησιν κινῆναι· τὰ δὲ ὑράνια κατὰ μόνην τὴν κατὰ τόπον. Διὸ χρὴ εὐλόγως ὀδεύειν ἀπὸ τῶν πολυτρόπως κινουμένων ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ μίαν, καὶ μόνην κίνησιν κινέμενα, καὶ ἔτι, ἐπὶ ΤΗΝ ΑΚΙΝΗΤΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΕΙ ΩΣΑΥΤΩΣ ΕΧΟΥΣΑΝ ΑΡΧΗΝ. Αμμονίς εἰς τὰς κατηγορίας, p. 12. Edit. Venit. 8vo. 1545.

THE Author of the Dialogue has had Reference to this threefold Division of Subjects, as may be seen in that Part of his Dialogue, which gives occasion to the present Comment. He has chosen however to stile the τὰ Ὑράνια, or Heavenly Bodies, rather Contingents of higher Order, than Beings necessary, as imagining the former to be their truer Character.

It may be here added, that the Peripatetics confined Φύσις, or Nature, for the most part, to this Earth of our's, where they considered her as the active Principle of Life in Plants and Animals. Hence therefore they distinguished not her Effects from those of Art, by their Necessity (for the Effects of both they treated as contingent) but from the Cause in Natural Subjects operating within, in Artificial without, as has been already observed, p. 145, 146. See Diog. Laert. p. 459.

It may be farther added, that they placed these Effects of Art and Nature, and indeed all other Contingents whatever, in a middle Rank between Things Necessary and Things Impossible. The Reason was evident. Things Necessary could not but be; Things Impossible could not be; but Contingents were τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, that is, were equally susceptible both of Being and Non-being.

BUT still tho' all Contingents admitted on their Hypothesis both of Being and Non-being, yet they supposed some to have a greater Tendency to Existence, and others to have a less. The first Species of these they stiled τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεον, the Things which happen for the most part; the last, τὰ ἐπ' ἑλαττον, the Things which happen less frequently.

Now as it is evident that both Nature and Art oftener obtain their End, than miss it (for complete Animals are more frequently born than Monsters, and the Musician, if an Artist, strikes oftener the right String than the wrong) hence it was, that they ranged the

the Effects of Nature and Art among those Contingents which were τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολλόν, Contingents of greater Frequency. But yet as these Effects were not from the Hypothesis necessary, and contrary to these upon occasion happened, hence it was, that whenever either Nature or Art became Causes of the τὰ ἐπ' ἑλαττον, those rarer Events, in such case they (Nature and Art) were considered by these Philosophers as αἰτίαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, Causes by way of Accident, and not according to their own Essence and distinguishing Character. In such Instances it was, that they assumed the Names of Τύχη and Ἀυτόματον, FORTUNE and CHANCE, Τύχη having mostly Reference to Works of Men, Ἀυτόματον to Works of Nature. The Instances given by Themistius, in cases of Chance and Fortune, are as follow. A Tile falls from a House. The End of its falling is to arrive at that lower Place, whither Nature would carry it by the common Law of Gravity. In falling it strikes and wounds a Passenger. This last Event is from Chance. Again, a Man digs in his Garden, to plant. In digging, he discovers a hidden Treasure. This last Event is from Fortune. And thus, adds Themistius, ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις καὶ μία, ἄλλως μὲν καὶ αὐτὴν αἰτία, ἄλλως δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The same individual Action is the Cause of one Thing from its own peculiar Character, and of another Thing, by way of Accident. And again, ἔστι μὲν ἓν καὶ τῶν ἕτως συμβαινόντων ἢ τὴν φύσιν ἢ τὴν προαίρεσιν αἰτίαν πῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἔ καὶ αὐτὴν ἔ γὰρ τῶν χάριν ἔτε προήλθεν ὁ ἀνθρώπος, ἔτε ἢ κέραις κατηνέχθη, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, κατὰ συμβεβηκός.—Of these Events we may call Nature or Human Will in a manner the Cause, but yet not so from themselves, and according to their own peculiar Essence; for it was not for the sake of what happened that either the Passenger WENT FORTH, or the Tile FELL DOWNWARD, but if any Thing it was by Accident. Themist. in lib. 2. Natur. Aufcult. p. 26. Edit. Ald. See also Aristot. Natur. Aufcult. l. 2. c. 4, 5, 6: Ammon in Prædicam. p. 113. b. This Doctrine came originally from Plato, whose Definition of Fortune was—Σύμπτωμα φύσεως ἢ προαιρέσεως, a Symptom, or thing co-incident either with Nature or Human Will. Vid. Suidam in Voc. Ἐμαρμέν.

It must be here observed, that κατὰ συμβεβηκός [by accident] means in no Part of these Quotations accidental, as standing for casual; for this would be mere Tautology, as to what is here said concerning Chance. It means rather something by way of Appendage; something Adventitious; in other Words, it means Accident, as adhering to Substance, without which it can have no Being, tho' suppose it absent or taken away, the Nature of Substance is no way affected. It was in this Sense the Peripatetics supposed Chance and Fortune to be Accidents or Appendages to Nature, and Mind. According therefore to them, the Supposition of Chance and Fortune was so far from excluding Nature and Mind from the Universe, that they demonstrably proved their Existence in it. For admitting their Account of Chance and Fortune to be just; if we grant the Accidents to exist, much more must we grant the Subjects, and this too with that superior Dignity and Priority of Existence, which is evidently due to all Subjects above their Accidents: Well therefore did the Philosopher conclude ὕστερον ἄρα τὸ Ἀυτόματον, καὶ ἡ Τύχη τῷ Νῷ, καὶ τῇ φύσει. Subsequent in Existence, are CHANCE and FORTUNE to MIND and NATURE. Aristot. Natur. Aufc. l. 2. c. 6.

FROM what has been said, we see the Reason of that Enumeration of Causes mentioned in the Beginning of the first Note, where they are described to be NECESSITY, NATURE, MAN, and FORTUNE,

To

NOTES on TREATISE the First.

TO NECESSITY they referred all those Things and Events, which they *supposed of necessary Existence*; such as the Universe, the Heavenly Bodies, together with their *uniformly regular Motions*.

TO NATURE, MAN, and CHANCE, they referred all *Contingents*; to *Nature*, and *Man*, obtaining their *End*, all *Contingents of greater Frequency*; to the same Causes, either falling short of their *End*, or going beyond it, and thus becoming *Chance* or *Fortune*, those opposite *Contingents of Existence less usual*.

AND hence, as *Art* and *Fortune* were both conversant about the same Subjects (*viz.* such *Contingents* as respected Human Life) we find the Meaning of that Verse of *Agatho's* cited by *Aristotle*, in his *Ethics*, l. 6. c. 5.

Τέχνη τύχην ἔσπερξε, καὶ τύχη τέχνην,
Art loveth Fortune; Fortune loveth Art.

THE whole Chapter indeed is well worth perusal. But we shall not venture to lengthen this Note, which may be probably deemed too long already, and which can be only excused, as giving some Sample of a Philosophy, which, from its Rarity perhaps, may possibly furnish some Amusement.

NOTE VIII. p. 18. I MEAN, SAID HE, BY BEGINNING, THAT CAUSE FOR THE SAKE OF WHICH, &c.

As the CAUSE here spoken of, is that Cause usually called FINAL, it may be asked, how it comes in this Place to be considered as a *Beginning*. The Answer is, that what comes last in *Practice*, stands in *Theory* first; or in other Words, the Order of *Ideas* in the *Intellect* of the Artist is exactly *inverted*, with respect to the Order of his *Energies*.

THUS Ammonius——Καθόλου γὰρ τῆς μὲν θεωρίας τὸ τέλος γίνεται ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως· ἔμπαλιν δὲ τῆς πράξεως τὸ τέλος, ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας. οἷον ὁ Οἰκοδόμος, ἐπιλαγείς οἶκον, λέγει καθ' ἑαυτὸν, ἐπετάγην οἶκον ποιεῖσθαι· ὅπερ ἐστὶ σκέπασμα, κωλυτικὸν ὁμίεων καὶ καυμάτων. τῆτο δὲ ἐκ ἂν γένοιτο, μὴ γινομένης ὁροφῆς. Ἐντεῦθεν ἔν ἀρχαίαι τῆς θεωρίας, προβαίνων δὲ φησὶν· Ἄλλα τῆτο ἐκ ἂν γένοιτο, μὴ γινομένων τοίχων· ἔτοι δὲ ἐκ ἂν γένοιτο, μὴ ὑποβληθέντων θεμελίων· οἱ δὲ θεμελίοι ἐκ ἂν βληθεῖεν, μὴ ὀρυχθείσης τῆς γῆς. ἐνταῦθα κατέληξεν ἡ θεωρία. Ἐντεῦθεν ἔν ἀρχεται ἡ πράξις. πρότερον γὰρ ὀρύττει τὴν γῆν. εἰθ' ἔτω βάλλει τὸν θεμέλιον. εἰτα ἐγείρει τοίχους· καὶ ὕστερον ἐπιτίθησι τὴν ὁροφὴν, ἥτις ἐστὶ τέλος τῆς πράξεως. ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, τέλος τῆς θεωρίας. Αμμ. εἰς κατηγ. p. 15. Edit. Venet. 8vo.

FOR in general the End of Theory is the Beginning of Practice; and so reciprocally, the End of Practice, the Beginning of Theory. Thus for instance: An Architect, being ordered to build a House, says to himself, I am ordered to build a House; that is to say, a certain Defence, to protect against the Rains and the Heats. But this cannot be without a Roof or Covering. From this Point therefore he begins his Theory. He proceeds and says—But there can be no Roof, if there be no Walls; and there can be no Walls, without some Foundations; nor can there be laid Foundations, without opening the Earth. At this Point, the Theory is at an End. Hence therefore commences the Practice or Action, For
first

first he opens the Earth; then lays the Foundation; then raises the Walls; and lastly puts on the Roof; which is the End of the Action or Practice, [but Beginning of the Theory] as the Beginning of the Practice was the End of the Theory. See also *Arist. Ethic. Nicom.* l. 3. c. 3. et de *Animá*, l. 3. c. 3.

NOTE IX. p. 18. Was it not the Absence of Health, &c.] *Vide Platon. de Rep.* l. i. tom. 2. p. 341. *Edit. Serrani.* Ὡς περ (ἔφη ἐγὼ) εἴ με ἔροιο εἰ ἐξαρκεῖ σῶματι, εἶναι σῶματι, ἢ προσδεῖται τίνος· εἴποιμι ἂν, ὅτι παντάπασιν μὲν ἐν προσδεῖται. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν ἰατρικὴ νῦν εὐρεμένη, ὅτι σῶμα ἐστὶ πονηρὸν, καὶ ἐκ ἐξαρκεῖ αὐτῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι. *Quemadmodum, inquam, si a me quæreres, an satis sit Corpori, ut sit Corpus, an aliâ quâpiam re indigeat: responderem, omninò indigere. Atque hæc quidem de Causâ medicinæ ars nunc est inventa, quoniam Corpus per se profligatum est, neque ipsi satis est, ut sit hujusmodi.* So likewise the acute *Scaliger*—*Motionis enim Appetentia Causâ est; Appetentiæ, Privatio.* De *Caus. L. Lat.* l. 15. c. 114. p. 235.

NOTE X. p. 20. OR IS IT NOT ABSURD TO SUPPOSE THERE SHOULD BE AN ART OF IMPOSSIBILITIES?] What is here said concerning the Difference between those Things for which we may possibly wish, and those which we actually pursue, is expressed in the *Ethics* of *Aristotle*, l. 3. c. 2. Προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ ἐκ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοῖν ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι. βέλησις δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. *There is indeed no determined Choice of Action with respect to Things impossible; and if any one should say he had so determined, he would appear to be a Fool. But there may be a Willing or Longing after Things impossible; as for instance, never to die.*

NOTE XI. p. 20. THE SUGGESTIONS OF WILL, AND UNINSTRUCTED INSTINCT.] *Will*, βέλησις, or Ὁρεξις λογιστικὴ; *uninstructed Instinct*, ὁρεξις ἀλόγιστος. See before, Note III.

NOTE XII. p. 21. THE WANT OR ABSENCE OF SOMETHING APPEARING GOOD; RELATIVE TO HUMAN LIFE, AND ATTAINABLE BY MAN, BUT SUPERIOR TO HIS NATURAL AND UNINSTRUCTED FACULTIES.]

THE CAUSE here described is the τὸ ἕνεκα, or FINAL.—*Aristotle* in his *Physics*, l. 2. c. 3. in enumerating the various Sorts of Causes, reckons among the rest—τὸ δ' ὡς τὸ τέλος, καὶ τ' ἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων. τὸ γὰρ ἕνεκα βέλτιστον, καὶ τέλος τῶν ἄλλων ἐθέλει εἶναι. *To these may be added that Cause, which is considered as the End, and Good of all the rest. For that, for whose Sake all the others are deemed necessary, has just pretensions to be best, and to be the End of them all.* To this he subjoins, consonant to what is said in the Dialogue—διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν αὐτὸ εἶπεῖν ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν.—*Let it make no Difference whether we call this End, real Good, or only apparent Good.* So in the Beginning of his *Ethics*—Πᾶσα τέχνη, καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πράξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθὸν τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ. Διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφώνησαν τ' ἀγαθόν, ἃ πάντα ἐφίεται. *Every Art, and every orderly Speculation, so likewise every Action, and determined Choice of Pursuit, appear all of them to tend toward some Good. Well therefore have they pronounced Good to be that, toward which all things tend.* See also *Plat.* in *Gorg.* p. 499. E. tom. i. *Edit. Serrani.*

NOTES on TREATISE the First.

IN the Definition here treated, the Words [*relative to Human Life*] express that Part of the Stoic Definition of Art [$\pi\rho\sigma\ \tau\acute{\iota}\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\theta\ \epsilon\upsilon\chi\eta\sigma\tau\omicron\nu\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \epsilon\nu\ \tau\acute{\omega}\ \beta\acute{\iota}\omega.$] They were omitted in the Definition p. 15. as more properly belonging to the present Definition, which respects Art in its final Cause. See page 147.

THAT what is *perfect* and *self-sufficient* is above the *secondary Helps* of ART; that our own *Weakness* and *Insufficiency*, and the Prospect of procuring that *absent Good*, by which we all hope to supply ourselves, where deficient; that this is the Source not only of all *Arts*, but (joined to social Affection) is the *Origin* and *Cement* of HUMAN SOCIETY; see (besides the Place here treated) pages 11, 12; and of the *Third Treatise*, p. 85 to p. 91.

Thus the Poet in Stobæus, p. 515.

$\chi\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omega\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\iota\ \epsilon\delta\acute{\iota}\delta\alpha\acute{\xi}\epsilon\cdot\ \tau\acute{\iota}\ \delta\prime\ \epsilon\ \chi\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omega\ \kappa\epsilon\nu\ \alpha\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\rho\sigma\iota;$

Need all Things taught: What cannot Need invent?

AGREEABLY also to this, *Virgil*, in his first *Georgic*, having told us of the various Changes to the worse, which happened in the *natural World* immediately subsequent to the *Golden Age*, goes on to enumerate the several *Inventions* of Men, which were the *natural Result* of this their newly indigent State. He at last sums up the whole by saying—

Tum variæ venere artes: labor omnia vicit

Improbis, & duris urgens in rebus EGESTAS.

WHERE (according to the Doctrine in the Dialogue) WANT is made the *Beginning* or *Origin* of ARTS. The Poet even refers this *Dispensation*, this Introduction of *Indigence*, *Care*, and *Solicitude*, to the immediate Will of PROVIDENCE, acting for the Good of Mankind; lest Plenty should lull them into slothful *Lethargy*, so as to forget their noblest and most active *Faculties*.

—*Pater ipse colendi*

Haud facilem esse viam voluit, primusque per artem

Movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda,

Nec torpere gravi passus sua regna veterno.

NOTE XIII. p. 23. CO-EXISTENT, REPLIED HE, AS IN A STATUE, &c. SUCCESSIVE, AS IN A TUNE OR DANCE, &c.] This Division of Beings or Productions we find mentioned by *Aristotle* in his *Physics*, (l. 3. c. 8.) where explaining his Doctrine concerning *Infinite*, he says— $\alpha\lambda\lambda\prime\ \epsilon\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\kappa\iota\varsigma\ \tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota,$ $\omega\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho\ \eta\ \eta\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\ \epsilon\acute{\sigma}\tau\iota,$ $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \delta\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\omega\nu,$ $\tau\acute{\omega}\ \acute{\alpha}\epsilon\iota\ \alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\ \gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota,$ $\epsilon\tau\omega\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \tau\acute{o}\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu.$ In as much as BEING is manifold, such as is the Being of a Day or public Festival, (which exist by continually becoming something farther) such also is the Being and Nature of Infinite. The same Sentiment soon after is more fully explained and opened. $\Omega\varsigma\epsilon\ \tau\acute{o}\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\ \epsilon\ \delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \lambda\alpha\mu\beta\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\iota\nu,$ $\omega\varsigma\ \tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon\ \tau\acute{\iota},$ $\omicron\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu\ \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\nu,$ $\eta\ \epsilon\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu\ \alpha\lambda\lambda\prime\ \omega\varsigma\ \eta\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\lambda\alpha\iota,$ $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \delta\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\omega\nu\ \delta\iota\varsigma\ \tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota,$ $\epsilon\kappa\ \omega\varsigma\ \epsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\ \tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\epsilon\nu,$ $\alpha\lambda\lambda\prime\ \acute{\alpha}\epsilon\iota\ \epsilon\nu\ \gamma\epsilon\nu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \phi\theta\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}.$

We

We are not to conceive of Infinite, as of a positive particular Substance, like a Man or a House; but rather as we pronounce Existence of a Day or public Festival, which have their Essence, not as sensible, individual Substances, but by a continued Procedure of Being and ceasing to be. Vid. Scalig. de Caus. Ling. Lat. 3. C. 72. p. 124. Aristot. Categ. Cap. 6. Ammon. Com. εις Κατ. p. 82. b. Scal. Poetic. L. 3. C. 1. p. 82.

NOTE XIV. p. 23. WHAT IS HUMAN LIFE, BUT A COMPOUND OF PARTS THUS FLEETING, &c.] It is not inelegantly said in the *Ethics* so often referred to—Ἡ δὲ ζῶν ἐνεργεία τίς ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τέτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἅ καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾷ· οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς, τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς, τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος. LIFE is a certain ENERGY, and each Man energizes about those Subjects, and with those Faculties, for which he hath the greatest Affection; the Musician, with his Hearing, about Sounds harmonious; the Studious, with his Intellect, about Matters of Speculation; and in like manner each Man else of the various sorts beside. *Ethic. Nicom. l. 10. c. 4.*

NOTE XV. p. 24. EVERY ART WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AND ENDED IN A WORK OR ENERGY.] The CAUSE here treated is the FORMAL, called by various Names; the εἶδος, the λόγος, the τί ἐστι, the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. Vid. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. L. v. c. 113. p. 232. *Imperfectum autem Græci, &c.*

IN the Beginning of the above cited *Ethics*, after the Author has told us that every Art, and Human Action tend to some Good or End, he adds Διαφορὰ δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τέλων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνεργεῖαι· τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτάς, ἔργα τινά—But there appears a Difference in Ends: For some are ENERGIES; some, over and above these Energies, are certain WORKS. In Quintilian's *Institutes* the same Distinction, with respect to the End of Arts, is mentioned, l. 2. c. 18. Vid. *Plat. in Dio. Laert. L. 3. C. 84. p. 216. C. 100. p. 225.*

BUT here perhaps it may be asked, if all Arts are ended and accomplished in some Energy or Work, and this Energy or Work be almost universally that absent Good, toward which they all tend, and for the sake of which they are all exerted? (for a Dance, which is an Energy, and a House, which is a Work, are certain absent Goods or Pleasures, for the sake of which certain Arts operate) if this be allowed, it may be asked, whence then the Difference between the Formal Cause and the Final; the Final, as in Note XII. it has been already treated?

THE Answer to this is, that they concur and are the same. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστι, καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἓν ἐστι. The FORMAL Cause and the FINAL are ONE. *Arist. Nat. Aufc. l. 2. c. 7.* If they differ, it is (as Joannes Grammaticus observes in commenting on this Place) a Difference rather in the Time and Manner of our viewing them, than in their own Essence and Nature. It may not perhaps be improper to transcribe his own Words. Ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ εἶδος, τῇ σχέσει μόνῃ διαφέρον, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὡς γινόμενον, καὶ μήπω ὄν θεωρῇται, τέλος ἐστίν· ὅταν δὲ ὡς ἤδη γεγόμενον, εἶδος. The END and the FORM are numerically the same, differing (as has been said) in the RELATION only, and TIME. For thus the same Thing, while considered as in its Progress to Completion, but as not yet

complete, is so long an END; when considered as actually complete, is no longer an End, but a FORM. And thus is this Question one way answered, by acknowledging that these two Causes co-incide, and differ not in their *Essence* or real Character, but rather in the Time and Manner of our contemplating them.

BUT there is another Answer, and that is derived from the twofold Nature of final Causes. According to this Doctrine, Arts have not only a nearer and more immediate End, (as a Ship is the End of Ship-building, or Navigation the End of Pilotry) but they have a still remoter and higher End, a τέλος τελιώτατον, that is to say, MAN, Human-kind, or (in other Words) the Utility or Elegance of Human Life. Thus the Stagirite. Ἔσμεν γὰρ πῶς καὶ ἡμεῖς τέλος διχῶς γὰρ τὸ ἔνεκα. For we ourselves also are in some sort AN END; for the final Cause is twofold. Natur. Aufcult. l. 2. c. 2. If therefore we have respect to this ULTIMATE END, these two Causes will be found to differ, and be really distinct from each other.

AND thus it is that in some respects they agree, and in others they differ, according to the above Distinctions established by this Philosophy.

NOTE XVI. p. 26. O ART! THOU DISTINGUISHING ATTRIBUTE, &c.] This alludes to a capital Distinction of ART, taken from a View of her different Ends. ART may in some respects be said to FINISH NATURE, in others TO IMITATE HER. She finishes her, where Nature, having given the Powers, is of herself unable to give them Perfection. It is thus the Gymnastic Arts, Dancing, Riding, &c. finish the Corporeal Powers; while the sublimer Arts, Logic, Rhetoric, Moral Virtue, &c. finish the Mental. Where she does not finish Nature, she imitates her, as in Sculpture, Painting, Dramatic Poetry, &c.

ARISTOTLE expresses the above sentiment, as follows. Ὅλως, τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ, αὖν ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται. Physic. L. 2. C. 8.

NOTE XVII. p. 30. THE EFFICIENT, THE MATERIAL, THE FINAL, AND THE FORMAL.] That is to say, τὸ κινῆσαν, ἡ ὕλη, τὸ ἔνεκα, τὸ εἶδος.

THUS Seneca, in his 65th Epistle. Causam Aristoteles putat tribus modis dici. Prima, inquit, causa est ipsa Materia, sine qua nihil potest effici. Secunda, Opifex. Tertia, Forma quæ unicuique operi imponitur, tanquam statuæ; nam hanc Aristoteles Idos (εἶδος) vocat. Quarta quoque, inquit, his accedit, Propositum totius operis.

QUID sit hoc, aperiā. Æs prima statuæ causa est: nunquam enim facta esset, nisi fuisset id, ex quo ea funderetur, ducereturve. Secunda causa, Artifex est: non potuisset enim æs illud in habitum statuæ figurari, nisi accessissent peritæ manus. Tertia causa est Forma: neque enim statua ista Doryphoros aut Diadumenos vocaretur, nisi hæc illi esset impressa facies. Quarta causa est, faciendi Propositum: nam nisi hoc fuisset, facta non esset. Quid est Propositum? Quod invitavit artificem, quod ille secutus fecit. Vel pecunia est hoc, si venditurus fabricavit; vel gloria, si laboravit in nomen; vel religio, si donum

donum templo paravit. Ergo & hæc Causa est, propter quam fit. An non putas inter causas facti operis numerandum, quo remoto factum non esset.—

ARISTOTLE'S OWN Words are as follow. "Ἐνα μὲν ἔν τῷ τρόπῳ αἰτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ ὃ γίνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντ'· οἷον, ὁ χαλκὸς τῷ ἀνδριάντῳ, καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῇ φιάλῃ, καὶ τὰ τέτων γένη. Ἄλλον δὲ, τὸ εἶδ'· καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα· τῷτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος· ὃ τῷ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ τὰ τέττα γένη· οἷον τῷ διὰ πασῶν τὰ δύο πρὸς ἓν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς, καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. Ἔτι, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἢ πρώτη, ἢ ἡ τῆς ἡρεμίας· οἷον ὁ βελεύσας, αἰτιον· καὶ ὁ παῖς, τῷ τέκνῳ· καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιῶν τῷ ποιημένῳ, καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τῷ μεταβαλλομένῳ. Ἔτι, ὡς τὸ τέλος· τῷτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὅτι ἐνεκα· οἷον τῷ περιπατεῖν ἢ ὑγίαι· διὰ τί γὰρ περιπατεῖ; φαιμέν ἵνα ὑγιαίνη, καὶ εἰπόντες ἔτι, οἰόμεθα ἀποδεσθῆναι τὸ αἰτιον.

IN one manner that may be called a Cause, out of which, existing as a Part of it, any thing is made or compounded. Thus is Brass the Cause of a Statue, Silver of a Cup, and so also the higher Genera, in which these are included [as Metal, the Genus including Brass and Silver; Body, the Genus including Metal, &c. &c.] In another way, the Form and Exemplar of any Thing is its Cause; that is to say, in other Words, the Definition, the Detail or Narrative of its Essence [that which, characterizing it to be such a particular thing, distinguishes it from all things else] and of this Definition the several higher Genera. Thus the Cause of the Diapason or Octave is the Proportion of two to one; and more generally than that, is Number; and is moreover the several Parts, out of which this Definition is formed. Add to this Cause, that other, from whence the original Principle of Change, or of ceasing to change; as for Instance, the Person who deliberates is the Cause of that which results from such Deliberation; the Father is the Cause of the Son; and in general, the Efficient, of the Thing effected; the Power changing, of the Thing changed. Besides these Causes, there is that also, which is considered as the End; that is to say, the Cause, for the sake of which the thing is done. Thus the Cause of Exercising is Health. For if it be asked, Why does he use Exercise? We say, To preserve his Health; and having said thus much, we think we have given the proper Cause. Aristot. Natur. Aufcult. 1. 2. c. 3.

ADDITION to NOTE III.

THE Peripatetic Definition of Nature, given p. 146, tho' in some degree illustrated p. 150, yet being still from its Brevity perhaps obscure, the following Explication of it is subjoined.

IN the first place, by NATURE the Peripatetics meant that Vital Principle in Plants, Brutes, and Men, by which they are said to live, and to be distinguished from Things inanimate. Nature therefore being another Name for Life or a vital Principle, the first Act of this Principle, throughout all Subjects, is universally found to be of the following kind; namely, to advance the Subject, which it enlivens, from a Seed or Embryo to something better and more perfect. This Progression, as well in Plants as in Animals, is called Growth. And thus is it that NATURE is a Principle of Motion.—But then this Progression or Growth is not infinite. When the Subject is mature, that is, hath obtained its Completion and perfect Form, then the Progression ceases. Here therefore the Business of

of the *vital Principle* becomes *different*. It is from henceforward no longer employed to acquire a *Form*, but to preserve to its *Subject* a *Form* already acquired. And thus is it that NATURE is a *Principle of Rest, Stability, or Ceasing to move*. And such indeed she continues to be, maintaining, as long as possible, the *Form* committed to her Care, till *Time* and *external Causes* in the first Place impair it, and induce at length its *Dissolution*, which is *Death*.

AND thus it has been shewn how NATURE may be called a PRINCIPLE BOTH OF MOTION AND CEASING TO MOVE.

As to the rest of the Definition, namely, that NATURE is a *Principle*, which inheres in its *Subject* immediately, essentially, and not by way of *Accident*; no more is meant by this, than that the NATURE or *Life* in every Being, which hath such Principle, is really and truly A PART OF THAT BEING, and not detached and separate from it, like the Pilot from the Ship, the Musician from the Instrument. For to these *Subjects* tho' those *Artists* are *Principles of Motion and Rest*, yet do they in no sense participate with them in *vital Sympathy and Union*.

END of the NOTES on TREATISE the First.

NOTES

ON

TREATISE the Third;

CONCERNING

HAPPINESS.

NOTE I. p. 63. NATURE SEEMS TO TREAT MAN, &c.] *Ut Phidias potest a primo instituere signum, idque perficere; potest ab alio inchoatum accipere & absolvere: huic est sapientia similis. Non enim ipsa genuit hominem, sed accepit a natura inchoatum: hanc ergo intuens, debet institutum illud, quasi signum absolvere. Cic. de Fin. IV. 13. p. 334. Edit. Davif.*

NOTE II. p. 66. PRACTICE TOO OFTEN CREEPS, &c.] See p. 79. and Note X.

NOTE III. p. 67. THE SOVEREIGN GOOD IS THAT, THE POSSESSION OF WHICH RENDERS US HAPPY.] *Κτήσεται γὰρ ἀγαθῶν, οἱ εὐδαίμονες, εὐδαίμονες. By the Possession of Things GOOD, are the Happy made HAPPY. Platon. Conviv. p. 204. tom. 2. Edit. Serrani. Phileb. Plat. p. 60. B. See Arrian Epict. l. 3. c. 22. p. 453.*

THE Reader will be pleased to observe, that, in all Quotations from the Dissertations of *Epicetus* collected by *Arrian*, the Author refers to the late Edition in two Volumes Quarto, published by his learned and ingenious friend, Mr. UPTON.

NOTE IV. p. 67. CERTAIN ORIGINAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PRE-CONCEPTIONS, &c.] The *Pre-conceptions* here spoken of, are called by the *Latins* *Prænotiones*, or *Anticipationes*; by the *Greeks*, *προλήψεις*, or *ἔννοιαι*, with the occasional Epithets of either *κοιναί*, *ἐμφυτοί*, or *φυσικαί*.

It is evident that all Men, without the least Help of Art, exert a kind of *Natural Logic*; can in some degree *refute*, and *prove*, and *render a Reason*.

Now this cannot be (as the meanest Proficient in Logic well knows) without *general Ideas*, and *general Propositions*, because a Syllogism of *Particulars* is an Impossibility. There must be therefore some *natural Faculty* to provide us these *Generals*. This Faculty cannot be any of the *Senses*, for they all respect *Particulars* only. Nor can it be the *reasoning* or *syllogizing Faculty*, for this does not *form* such *Generals*, but *use* them when formed.

formed. There only therefore remains the Faculty called Νᾶς, that is to say, the *Inductive* Faculty; the Faculty, which, by *Induction of similar Individuals*, forms out of the *particular* and the *many* what is *general* and *one*. This Species of *Apprehension* is evidently our *first* and *earliest* Knowledge, because all Knowledge by *Reasoning* dates its Origin from it, and because, except *these two*, no other knowledge is possible.

As therefore *every* Ear, not absolutely depraved, is able to make some *general Distinctions of Sound*; and in like manner *every* Eye, with respect to Objects of *Vision*; and as this general Use of these Faculties, by being diffused through all Individuals, may be called *common* Hearing, and *common* Vision, as opposed to those *more accurate* *Energies*, peculiar only to *Artists*: So fares it with respect to the *Intellect*. There are Truths, or Universals of so *obvious* a kind, that *every* Mind, or *Intellect*, not absolutely depraved, without the least Help of Art, can hardly fail to recognize them. The *Recognition* of these, or at least the *Ability* to recognize them, is called Κοινὸς Νᾶς, COMMON SENSE, as being a *Sense common to all*, except Lunatics and Ideots.

FARTHER, as this Power is called Κοινὸς Νᾶς, so the several *Propositions*, which are its proper Objects, are called προλήψεις, or *Preconceptions*, as being *previous* to all other Conceptions. It is easy to gather from what has been said, that these προλήψεις, must be *general*, as being formed by *Induction*; as also *natural*, by being *common to all Men*, and *previous* to all Instruction. Hence therefore their Definition. "Ἐστὶ δ' ἡ προλήψις, ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου." "A PRE-CONCEPTION is the natural Apprehension of what is general, or universal." Diog. Laert. l. 7. s. 54. See also Arrian. *Epiet.* l. 1. c. 22. l. 3. c. 6. Cic. *de Naturâ Deor.* l. 1. c. 16, 17. Plut. *de Placit. Philosoph.* 910. c. Aristot. *de Anim.* III. 11.

NOTE V. p. 67, 68.—AND THAT THE DIFFERENCE LAY ONLY IN THE APPLYING THEM TO PARTICULARS.] This was called Ἐφαρμογή τῶν προλήψεων ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρος ἑσίοις—τὰς φυσικὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρος ἑσίοις. Arr. *Epiet.* l. 1. c. 22. p. 114, 116. Edit. Upt. See an eminent Instance, illustrating the Truth of this Reasoning, in the same Author, l. 4. c. 1. p. 545. Ἐνωόμεν γὰρ, ὅτι, &c. Boet. *de Conf.* L. 3. Prosa. 2. p. 106.

NOTE VI. p. 70. WHY ARE THERE, WHO SEEK RECESSES, &c.] Multi autem & sunt, & fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, tranquillitatem expetentes, a negotiis publicis se removerint, ad otiumque perfugerint.—His idem propositum fuit, quod regibus; ut ne quâ re egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate uterentur: cujus proprium est sic vivere, ut velis. Quare cum hoc commune sit potentia cupidorum cum iis, quos dixi, otiosis: alteri se adipisci id posse arbitrantur, si opes magnas habeant; alteri si contenti sint & suo, & parvo. Cic. *de Offic.* l. 1. c. 20, 21.

NOTE VII. p. 71.—THE SOVEREIGN GOOD, THEY HAVE TAUGHT US, OUGHT TO BE, &c.] The ORIGINAL PRE-CONCEPTIONS of the SOVEREIGN GOOD here recited, may be justified by the following Authorities, from among many which are omitted.

AGREE-

AGREEABLE TO NATURE,—*Neque ulla alia in re, nisi in NATURA, quærendum esse illud SUMMUM BONUM, quo omnia referrentur.* Cic. Acad. l. 1. c. 5. p. 27. Edit. Davif.

CONDUCTIVE TO WELL-BEING.—*Epicetetus* calls that *Truth or Knowledge, which respects our real Happiness* [τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὴν περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας] the *Truth or Knowledge, which regards not mere Living, but which conduces to LIVING WELL* [ἐ τὴν περὶ τῆς ΖΗΝ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ΕΥ ΖΗΝ.] *Arrian. Epict.* l. 1. c. 4. p. 28. Edit. Upt. 'Αἱ κοῖναι περὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἑννοίαι.—TO ZHN KATA ΦΥΣΙΝ, καὶ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον, ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΝ λέγουσι πρὸς δὲ ταύταις, TO ΕΥ ΖΗΝ, καὶ τὸ εὖ βίειν, καὶ τὴν εὐζωίαν, 'ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΝ φασὶν εἶναι. Our common Pre-conceptions concerning HAPPINESS call it the LIVING ACCORDING TO NATURE; farther than this, they say it is Living or Existing well; THE LIFE OF WELL-BEING. *Alex. Aphrod.* περὶ ψυχ. p. 157. Edit. Ald.

ACCOMMODATE TO ALL PLACES and TIMES—*Antoninus*, speaking of that *Happiness*, which he deemed our *Sovereign Good*, calls it something which was in our Power ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΥ καὶ ΔΙΗΝΕΚΩΣ, EVERY WHERE and PERPETUALLY. l. 7. f. 54.

DURABLE—and INDEPRIVABLE—*Nisi* STABILI & FIXO & PERMANENTE BONO, BEATUS esse nemo potest. *Tusc. Disp.* l. 5. c. 14. p. 372. Edit. Davif. So immediately after, in the same page—*An dubium est, quin nihil sit habendum in eo genere quo vita beata completur, si id possit amitti; nihil enim interarefcere, nihil exstingui, &c.* Καὶ τίς αὐτὴ ἡ εὐροία, ἣν ὁ τυχὼν ἐμποδίσαι δύναται, ἢ λέγω Καίσαρ ἢ Καίσαρος φίλος, ἀλλὰ κόραξ, ἀνλητὴς, πυρετός, ἄλλα τρισμύρια; ἢ δ' ΕΥΡΟΙΑ ἔδεν ἕτως ἔχει ὡς ΤΟ ΔΙΗΝΕΚΕΣ καὶ ΑΝΕΜΠΟΔΙΣΤΟΝ. And what sort of Happiness is this, which any thing intervening may embarrass; I say not Cæsar, or Cæsar's Friend, but a Crow, a Piper, a Fever, a thousand things beside? HAPPINESS surely implies nothing so much, as PERPETUITY and BEING SUPERIOR TO HINDRANCE OR IMPEDIMENT. *Arrian. Epict.* l. 4. c. 4. p. 585. Edit. Upt. See also l. 2. c. 11. p. 227.

SELF-DERIVED.—*Atque hoc dabit, ut opinor, si modo sit aliquid esse beatum, id oportere TOTUM PONI IN POTESTATE SAPIENTIS: nam si amitti vita beata potest, beata esse non potest.* Cic. de Fin. l. 2. c. 27. p. 163.—καὶ τοῖς μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν κακοῖς ἵνα μὴ περεπίπῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἐπ' αὐτῷ [οἱ θεοὶ] τὸ πᾶν ἐθελο. That Man might not fall into real Evils, the Gods have put the whole in his own Power. *M. Ant.* l. 2. f. 11. Τί γὰρ ἐστίν, ὃ ζητεῖ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος; Εὐσταθῆναι, εὐδαιμονῆσαι, ΠΑΝΤΑ ΩΣ ΘΕΛΕΙ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ, μὴ κωλύεσθαι, μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι. For what is it, that every Man seeks? To be securely fixed, to be happy, TO DO ALL THINGS ACCORDING TO HIS OWN WILL, not to be hindered, not to be compelled. *Arr. Epict.* l. 4. c. 1. p. 539, 540. Aristotle joins self-derived and indeprivable in his idea of Good. Τὰγαθὸν δὲ οἰκεῖον τι καὶ δυσσφαίρετον εἶναι μαρτυρούμεθα. *Eth. Nic.* l. 1. c. 5.

NOTE VIII. p. 73. THE POLITICAL AND LUCRATIVE, THE CONTEMPLATIVE AND PLEASURABLE.] This fourfold Distinction of Lives is mentioned in *Aristotle's Ethics*, l. 1. c. 5.

NOTE IX. p. 77. PLEASURE

WHOM LOVE ATTENDS, &c.

alluding to *Homer, Iliad* Ζ. V. 214.

NOTE X. p. 79. SUPPOSE AN EVENT WERE TO HAPPEN—NOT AN INUNDATION, &c.] See *Arrian. Epict.* l. 4. c. 4. which Chapter is peculiarly addressed to the Seekers of *Leisure, Retirement, and Study*. Part of it has been already quoted, p. 290. καὶ τίς αὐτῇ ἡ εὐροία, &c. See also the same Author, l. 4. c. 1. p. 567. Πῶς ἀνέσεις, &c. and of the Dialogue here commented, p. 113.

NOTE XI. p. 80.—IS ACTING A CIRCUMSTANCE, &c.] *Etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturæ manca quodammodo atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequatur. Ea autem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur.* Cic. de Offic. l. 1. c. 43. The whole Chapter, as well as the Subsequent, is well worthy of Perusal.

NOTE XII. p. 82.—IF A PIECE OF METAL BE TENDERED US, &c.] See *Arr. Epict.* l. 1. c. 10. p. 110. Ὁρᾶτε καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ νομίσματι, &c.

NOTE XIII. p. 84.—ARE ALIENATED FROM IT, OR INDIFFERENT TO IT?] *Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simul atque natum sit animal (hinc enim est ordiendum) ipsum sibi conciliari, & commendari ad se conservandum, & suum statum, & ad ea quæ conservantia sunt ejus statûs, diligenda; alienari autem ab interitu, iisque rebus, quæ interitum videantur afferre.* Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 5. p. 211. Edit. Dav. See also l. 5. c. 9. De Offic. l. 1. c. 4. 'Οικειώμεθα πρὸς αὐτὰς ἐνθὺς γεγόμενοι. *Plut. Mor.* p. 1038. b.

NOTE XIV. p. 90. LET IT NOT BE FORGOT THEN, SAID HE, IN FAVOUR OF SOCIETY, &c.] The whole *Argument* to prove *Society natural to Man*, from p. 147 to the page here cited, is taken from the second Book of *Plato's Republic*. See *Plat. tom. 2. p. 369, &c. Edit. Serrani*. See also the same Argument hinted at in the *Protagoras* of *Plato*, p. 322. C. Edit. Serr. Tom. 1.

NOTE XV. p. ibid.—ARE NOT THE POWERS AND CAPACITIES OF SPEECH, &c.] The Argument in favour of *Society*, from our being possessed of λόγος, or the *speaking Faculty*, seems to have been much insisted on by the best Authors of Antiquity.

Διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν, πάσης μελίττης καὶ πάντῃ ἀγελαίᾳ ζῷᾳ μᾶλλον, δῆλον. 'Οὐδὲν γὰρ, ὡς φάμεν, μάτην ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῶων. Ἡ μὲν ἔν φωνῇ τῷ ἡδέῳ καὶ λυπηρῇ ἐστὶ σημεῖον διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζῷοις· μέχρι γὰρ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθεν, ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ λυπηρῇ καὶ ἡδέῳ, καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις. Ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τὸ δηλῆν ἐστὶ τὸ σύμφορον, καὶ τὸ βλαβερὸν ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον. Τῆτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν, καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀδίκον αἰσθῆσιν ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τῶν κοινωνία ποιεῖ δίκαιον καὶ πόλιν. The Reason why MAN is a SOCIAL ANIMAL, more than any Bee, or any herding Species whatever, is evident from hence. Nature, we say, makes nothing in vain; and Man, of all Animals, is only possessed of SPEECH. Bare Sound indeed may be the Sign of what is pleasurable

or painful; and for that reason is it common even to other Animals also. For so far we perceive even their Nature can go, that they have a Sense of those Feelings, and signify them to each other. But Speech is made to indicate what is expedient, and what hurtful, and in consequence of this, what is just and unjust. It is therefore given to Men, because this, with respect to other Animals, is to Men alone peculiar, that of Good and Evil, Just and Unjust,—they only possess a Sense or Feeling.—Now it is the Participation or Community of these, which makes and constitutes both a FAMILY and a POLITY. *Aristot. Polit.* l. 1. c. 2.

Ἐιδόντες γὰρ εἶσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν πραγμάτων [τὰ νοήματα]. αἱ δὲ φωναὶ τῶν νοημάτων εἰσὶν ἐξαγγελτικαί· καὶ διὰ τὸτο δίδονται ἡμῖν ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, πρὸς τὸ δι' αὐτῶν σημαίνειν ἡμᾶς ἀλλήλοις τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ νοήματα—ἵνα καὶ δυνώμεθα κοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμπολιτεύεσθαι· κοινωνικὸν γὰρ ζῶον ὁ Ἄνθρωπος. Ideas are Images of Things in the Soul; and Sounds are declarative of these Ideas. And for this reason were these SOUNDS imparted to us by Nature, not only that we might indicate to each other these Ideas, but that we might be enabled to COMMUNICATE and LIVE IN ASSOCIATIONS. For MAN is by Nature a SOCIAL ANIMAL. *Ammon. in l. de Interpret.* p. 16. b.

THUS Cicero, speaking of Human Nature—*Omitto opportunitates habilitatesque reliqui corporis, moderationem vocis, ORATIONIS vim, quæ conciliatrix est humanæ maxime societatis.* *De Leg.* l. 1. c. 9. p. 35. *Edit. Davis.*

AGAIN in his Offices—*Sed quæ natura principia sint communitalis & societatis humanæ, repetendum altius videtur. Est enim primum, quod cernitur in universi generis humani societate. Ejus enim vinculum est Ratio, & ORATIO; quæ docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, dijudicando, conciliat inter se homines, conjungitque naturali quadam societate.* *De Offic.* l. 1. c. 16.

THUS too in his Treatise *De Nat. Deor.*—*Jam vero domina rerum (ut vos soletis dicere) ELOQUENDI VIS quam est præclara, quamque divina? Quæ primum efficit ut ea, quæ ignoramus, discere, & ea, quæ scimus, alios docere possimus. Deinde hac cohortamur, hac persuademus, hac consolamur afflictos, hac deducimus perterritos a timore, hac gestientes comprimimus, hac cupiditates iracundiasque restringimus: hæc nos juris, legum, urbium societate devinxit: hæc a vitâ immani & ferâ segregavit.* *De Nat. Deor.* l. 2. c. 59. p. 243. *Edit. Davis.*—See also *Quint. Inst.* l. 2. c. 16. and *Alex. Aphrod.* περὶ ψυχ. p. 155. b. *Edit. Ald. Sanctii Min.* l. 1. c. 2. p. 15. *Plat. in Sophistâ,* p. 260. A. *Edit. Serr.*

NOTE XVI. p. 96.—IT IS FROM AMONG THE FEW, &c.] *In omni enim arte, vel studio, vel quavis scientia, vel in ipsa virtute, optimum quodque rarissimum est* *Cic. de Fin.* l. 2. c. 25. p. 158. *Edit. Dav.* Thus too *Aristotle* joins the rare and the excellent.—τὸ εὖ, καὶ σπάνιον, καὶ ἐπαίνετον, καὶ καλόν. *Eth. Nic.* l. 2. c. 9. τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, ὡς Εὐθύδημος, τίμιον. *Plat. in Euthyd.* p. 304. b. *Edit. Serr.*

NOTE XVII. p. 97.—WORKING EVER UNIFORMLY ACCORDING TO THIS IDEA OF PERFECTION, &c.

Thus, *Boethius*, addressing the Deity,

*O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas,
Terrarum cælique Sator, qui tempus ab ævo
Ire jubes, stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri;
Quem non externæ pepulerunt fingere causæ
Materiæ fluitantis opus; verum INSITA SUMMI
FORMA BONI, livore carens: Tu cuncta SUPERNO
Ducis ab EXEMPLO, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse
Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.*

Consol. Philos. l. 3. Metr. 9.

NOTE XVIII. p. 97.—FROM SOME HIDDEN HIGHER MOTIVE, &c.] Μήποτε δὲ μήδε ταῦτα [sc. τὰ τέρατα] παρὰ φύσιν εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν μερικῇ φύσει ἔ φύσει, ἀλλὰ παρὰ φύσιν· τῇ δὲ καθόλου, καὶ φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν· Ἡ μὲν γὰρ μερικὴ φύσις ἐνὸς εἶδους τοχάζεται, καὶ μίαν γένησιν φεύγει. Διὰ τὸτο τῇ μὲν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ φύσει τὸ τέρας ἔτε φύσει ἐστὶν ἔτε κατὰ φύσιν· τῇ δ' ὅλη φύσει ἐπεὶ μηδὲν τῷ παντὶ παρὰ φύσιν (ἔδεν γὰρ κακὸν ἐν τῷ παντὶ) οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν. Joannes Gram. in Aristot. lib. 2. Natural. Auscult. *Nihil enim fieri sine causâ potest: nec quicquam fit, quod fieri non potest: nec, si id factum est quod potuit fieri, portentum debet videri.* Cic. de Divin. l. 2. c. 28. p. 189. Edit. Davis.

NOTE XIX. p. 98.—MAN IS A SOCIAL RATIONAL ANIMAL.] Ζῶον λογικόν, καὶ πολιτικόν, λογικόν καὶ κοινωνικόν, λογικόν καὶ ἡμερον, these are Descriptions of Humanity, which we meet in every Page of *Epicletus* and *Antoninus*.

It seems indeed to have been a received Opinion of old, that so intimate was the Relation between these two Attributes, that wherever there was Rationality, Sociality followed of course. Thus *Antoninus*—ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ λογικόν, ἐνθὺς καὶ πολιτικόν. l. 10. f. 2. And again, more fully—καὶ τοίνυν πᾶν τὸ τῆς νοεῖας φύσεως μέτοχον, πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς ὁμοίως σπένδεται, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον· ὅσῳ γὰρ ἐστὶ κρείττον παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα, τοσάτω καὶ πρὸς τὸ συγκρινᾶσθαι τῷ οἰκείῳ καὶ συγκαίεσθαι ἐτοιμότερον. l. 9. f. 9.

It is not perhaps foreign to the present Subject to observe, that were the Eyes of any two Men whatever to view the same Object, they would each, from their different Place, and their different Organization, behold it differently, and have a different Image. But were all the Minds in the Universe to recognize the same Truth, they would all recognize it as one, their Recognition would be uniform, and themselves in a manner would be one also. The Reason is, Perception by the Senses admits of more and less, better and worse; but Perception by the Intellect, like Truth, its Object, admits of no degrees, and is either nothing at all, or else total, uniform, complete, and ONE. Hence therefore one Source of the Society, and as it were Communion of all Minds, considered as Minds, namely, the Unity of Truth, their common Object.

AGAIN, every just and perfect Society stands on the Basis of certain Laws. But LAW is nothing more, than right and perfect REASON, seen in bidding and forbidding, according

cording to the Nature and Essence of those Beings, to which it is a Law. If therefore this UNIVERSE be one WHOLE, or general Society, there must be some COMMON, GENERAL LAW for its Conduct and Welfare; and this Law must, of consequence, be some right and perfect REASON, which passes thro' all things, and extends to every Part. Well therefore might Antoninus say in the Beginning of this Note, that every thing rational, was of course social, since REASON and LAW appear to be the same, and LAW to be the Support and Basis of all SOCIETY. Thus too Cicero—*sequitur, ut eadem sit in his [sc. Diis] quæ humano generi RATIO; eadem VERITAS utrobique sit; eademque LEX, quæ est recti præceptio, pravique depulsio.* De Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 31. p. 180. See also the same Author, De Leg. l. 1. c. 8, 12, 15. p. 29, 41, 51. Edit. Davis. De Fin. l. 2. c. 14. p. 123. See also Diog. Laert. l. 7. f. 88. M. Anton. l. 5. c. 16. l. 6. c. 23. Arist. Polit. as quoted in Note XV.

NOTE XX. p. 98. NOTHING CAN BE PURSUABLE, which is DESTRUCTIVE OF SOCIETY.] *Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet, aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est eam, quæ maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis Societatem.* Cic. de Offic. l. 3. c. 5.

NOTE XXI. p. 100.—FOR CONTRARIES ARE EVER RECOGNIZED THROUGH THE SAME HABIT, &c.] Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων, ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι. There seems to be one and the same error, and one and the same Science, with respect to things contrary. Arist. de Anim. l. 3. c. 3. This by Themistius, in his Paraphrase, is thus illustrated. Τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ μία ἄγνοια· ὁ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ὠφέλιμον γινώσκων, καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὅτι βλαβερὸν συνεπίσκαται· καὶ ὁ περὶ δάτερον ἐξαπατάμενος, ἐξαπαλᾶται καὶ περὶ δάτερον. Of Things contrary there is one Science, and one Ignorance. For thus he, who knows Good to be something beneficial, knows Evil at the same time to be something pernicious; and he, who is deceived with respect to one of these, is deceived also with respect to the other. See the Io of Plato, p. 531. T. 1. Edit. Serr.

NOTE XXII. p. 101.—THOSE FOUR GRAND VIRTUES, &c.] Stobæus having told us, that of the Virtues some were primary, some subordinate, adds—πρώτας δὲ τέτταρας εἶναι, φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, ἀνδρείαν, δικαιοσύνην· καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν, περὶ τὰ καθήκοντα γίνεσθαι· τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τῶ ἀνθρώπου· τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν, περὶ τὰς ὑπομονάς· τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην, περὶ τὰς ἀπονεμήσεις. The primary Virtues are four; PRUDENCE, TEMPERANCE, FORTITUDE, and JUSTICE: Prudence is employed in moral Offices; Temperance, in Mens natural Appetites and Pursuits; Fortitude, in Endurings; and Justice, in Distributions. Ecl. Ethic. p. 167.

THAT the Life according to VIRTUE, was deemed the Life according to NATURE, appears from what is said by the same Author, in the Page following—Πασῶν δὲ τέτων τῶν ἀρετῶν τὸ τέλος εἶναι, τὸ ἀκολλάσθαι τῇ φύσει ζῆν· ἐκάστην δὲ τέτων διὰ τῶν ἰδίων παρέχεσθαι τυχερόν τι τὸν ἄνθρωπον. The End of all these Virtues is, to live agreeably to Nature; and each of them, by those Means, which are peculiar to itself, is found to put a Man in possession of this End.

So

So likewise Cicero—*Etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, convenienter naturæ vivere, id habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam, cum virtute congruere semper.* De Offic. l. 3. c. 3.

NOTE XXIII. p. 101. THAT LIFE, WHERE THE VALUE OF ALL THINGS IS JUSTLY MEASURED, &c.] See pages 143, 146, 168, 203, 204.

NOTE XXIV. p. ibid.—THAT, WHICH BEING DONE, ADMITS OF A RATIONAL JUSTIFICATION.] In the Original it is—ὁ πραχθέν ἔυλογον ἴσχει ἀπολογισμὸν. Diog. Laert. l. 7. f. 107. ὅπερ πραχθέν ἔυλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογίαν. Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathem. l. 7. Thus rendered by Cicero—*Officium id esse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit.* De Offic. l. 1. c. 3. The Reason of its Greek Name, καθήκον is given by Simplicius. Καθήκοντά ἐστι τὰ γινόμενα κατὰ τὰ ἥκοντα καὶ ἐπιβέλοντα—*Moral Offices are those things which are done agreeably to what is fitting, and expedient.* Simplic. in Ench. c. 37.

NOTE XXV. p. 102.—AND WHEN OUR SEVERAL ENERGIES, EXERTED ACCORDING TO THE VIRTUES ABOVE, HAVE PUT US IN POSSESSION OF, &c.] This was the Idea of HAPPINESS, adopted by the old Academy, or Platonics. *Secundum naturam vivere, sic affectum, ut optimè affici possit, ad naturamque accommodatissimè.* Cic. de Fin. l. 5. c. 9. p. 370. The Peripatetics, who were originally of the same School, held the same. Ἐὶ δ' ἔτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίγνεται καὶ ἀρετήν—τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειότατην—ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. If this be admitted, it follows that HUMAN GOOD or HAPPINESS is, the energizing of the Soul according to the best and most consummate Virtue, in a perfect and complete Life. Ethic. Nic. l. 1. c. 7. A perfect and complete Life, they explained to be such a Life as was no way deficient either as to its Duration, its bodily Health, and its being attended with a proper Competence of external Goods, and Prosperity. By the best and most consummate Virtue, they not only meant that Virtue, which was in its kind most perfect, but which was the Virtue also of that Part, which is in each of us most excellent. For there are Virtues of the Body, such as Strength and Agility; and there are Virtues of the Senses, such as accurate Seeing, accurate Tasting; and the same of every Faculty, from the lowest to that which is supreme.

THE sovereign Good or Happiness here spoken of, is again repeated, in other Words, p. 179. where it is called, the ATTAINING the primary and just Requisites of our Nature, by a Conduct suitable to Virtue and moral Office.

THE PRIMARY AND JUST REQUISITES here mentioned, are all Things requisite to the Use and Enjoyment of our PRIMARY and NATURAL PERFECTIONS. These Primary and Natural Perfections mean the NATURAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS of both our MIND and BODY. They were called by the Latins, *Prima Naturæ, Prima secundum Naturam*; by the Greeks, τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ πρῶτα τῆς φύσεως. In them were included Health, Strength, Agility, Beauty, perfect Sensations, Memory, Docility, Invention, &c. See Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 163. Cic. de Fin. l. 5. c. 7. p. 364. A. Gell. l. 12. c. 5.

A like

A like Sentiment of Happiness, to this here spoken of, is that mentioned by Cicero—*Virtute adhibitâ frui PRIMIS a naturâ datis.* De Fin. l. 2. c. 11. p. 113. It is there called the Opinion of the old Academics, and Peripatetics. It is again repeated by the same Author. *Honeste vivere, fruentem rebus iis, quas PRIMAS homini natura conciliet.* Acad. l. 2. c. 42. p. 240.

It is to be observed that Cicero, speaking of this Hypothesis, says that it proposed an Idea of Happiness, which was not properly in our own Power. *Hoc non est positum in nostrâ actione: completur enim & ex eo genere vitæ, quod virtute finitur, & ex iis rebus quæ secundum naturam sunt, neque sunt in nostra potestate.* De Fin. l. 4. c. 6. p. 287.

HENCE therefore the DEFICIENCY of this Doctrine. However justifiable, however laudable its End, it could not insure a due Success to its Endeavours. And hence too the Force of what is objected to it in the Dialogue, from p. 177, to the End of the first Part.

NOTE XXVI. p. 106.—TO PLACE THE SOVEREIGN GOOD IN RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT, &c.] As the Conduct here mentioned implies a Conduct under the Direction of a befitting Rule or Law, and that, as opposed to wrong Conduct, which has either no rule at all, or at least one erroneous; it may not be an improper Place to enquire, what was the ancient Opinion concerning LAW UNIVERSAL, that great and general Law, which stood opposed to the municipal Laws of particular Cities and Communities.

EST quidem vera LEX, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat—nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac; sed & omnes gentes, & omni tempore una lex, & sempiterna, & immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister, & imperator omnium Deus. Ille hujus legis inventor, disceptator, lator. Cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernabitur; hoc ipso luet maximas pœnas, etiam si cætera supplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit. Fragm. Cic. de Rep. l. 3.

LEX est ratio summa, insita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. What follows is worth remarking. *Eadem ratio, cum est in hominis mente confirmata & confecta, lex est.* Cic. de Leg. l. 1. c. 6. p. 22.

AGAIN. *LEX vera—ratio est recta summi Jovis.* To which he subjoins, as above, *Ergo ut illa divina mens summa lex est; ita cum in homine est, perfecta est in mente sapientis.* De Leg. l. 2 c. 4, 5. p. 88.

It is in this Sense the Apostle tells us of the Gentiles, or Mankind in general, that they shew the Work of the Law written in their Hearts, their Conscience also bearing witness, and their Thoughts the mean while accusing, or else excusing one another. Rom. 1. 11.

As Cicero, in his Book of Laws above cited, follows the Stoic Discipline, so is it agreeable to their Reasoning, that he makes the original natural LAW, of which we here treat,

treat, to be the SOVEREIGN REASON OF THE DEITY himself. Thus Chrysippus—*Idem* [scil. Chrysippus] *legis perpetuæ & æternæ vim, quæ quasi dux vitæ & magistra officiorum sit, Jovem dicit esse.* Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 15. p. 41.

So by the same Philosophers in *Laertius*, we are ordered to live according to Nature, ἐδὲν ἐνεργείας ὧν ἀπαγορεύειν ἔωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὧν τῷ Διί, καθηγεμόνι τὰ τῶν τῶν ὄντων (for ὄλων) διοικήσεως ὄντι, doing nothing, forbidden by the UNIVERSAL LAW, that is to say, by that right Reason, which passeth thro' all Things, and which is the SAME with JOVE himself, the Governor and Conductor of this universal Administration. *Laert.* l. 7. f. 88. Edit. Aldobrand.

AGREEABLY to this Reasoning, *Plutarch* corrects those, who made Δίκη, a Goddess, and the Assessor of JOVE; for, says he, ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ἔχει μὲν τὴν Δίκην πάρεδρον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς Δίκη καὶ Θέμις ἐστὶ, καὶ νόμων ὁ πρεσβύτατος καὶ τελειότατος, JOVE has not Δίκη or RIGHT for his Assessor, but is himself RIGHT, and JUSTICE, and of all LAWS the most ANTIENT and PERFECT. *Moral.* p. 781. B.

THUS *Antoninus*—τέλος δὲ λογικῶν ζώων, τὸ ἐπεσθαι τῷ τῆς πόλεως καὶ πολιτείας τῆς πρεσβυτάτης λόγῳ καὶ θεσμῳ. The End of Rational Animals is to follow the REASON and SACRED LAW of that City, and most ancient Polity, [in which all rational Beings are included] l. 2. f. 16.

THE most simple Account of this Law, which the *Stoics* gave, seems to be that recorded by *Stobæus*; according to which they called it λόγον, ὀρθὸν ὄντα, προσαυτικὸν μὲν τῶν ποιητέων, ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ τῶν ἐκ ποιητέων, RIGHT REASON, ordaining what is to be done, and forbidding what is not to be done. *Ecl. Ethic.* 178. See also the Notes of *Turnebus* and *Davis* upon *Cic. de Leg.* l. 1. c. 6.

HAVING premised thus much concerning *Law universal*, it remains to say something of that RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT, which is in this Part of the Dialogue proposed as our *Happiness*. RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT is intended to express the Term Καλόρθωσις which *Cicero* translates *recta Effectio*. Καλόρθωμα he translates *Rectum Factum*. See *De Fin.* l. 3. c. 14. p. 242. Now the Definition of a Καλόρθωμα, was Νόμος πρόσταγμα, a Thing commanded by Law; to which was opposed ἀμάσθημα, a Sin or Offence, which was defined Νόμος ἀπαγόρευμα, a Thing forbidden by Law. *Plut. Mor.* 1037. C. What Law is here meant, which thus commands or forbids, has been shewn above.

HENCE therefore may be seen the Reason, why we have said thus much on the Nature and Idea of *Law universal*; so intimate being the Union between this and right Conduct, that we find the latter is nothing more than a perfect Obedience to the former.

HENCE too we see the Reason, why in one view it was deemed HAPPINESS, to be void of Error or Offence, ἀναμάσθηλον εἶναι, as we find it in *Arrian. Epict.* l. 4. c. 8. p. 633. For to be thus inculpable was the necessary Result of Rectitude of Conduct, or rather in a manner the same thing with it.

I cannot

I cannot conclude this Note, without remarking on an elegant Allusion of *Antoninus* to the primary Signification of the Word *Καθ' ὁρὴν*, that is to say, *κατὰ ὁρὴν*, right onwards, straight and directly forwards. Speaking of the Reasoning Faculty, how, without looking farther, it rests contented in its own Energies, he adds——Καθ' ὁρὴν αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις ὀνομάζονται, τὴν ὁρὴν τῆς ὁδῆς σημαίνειν.——For which Reason Actions of this sort are called RECTITUDES, as denoting the Directness of their Progression RIGHT ONWARDS. l. 5. f. 14. So again in the same Sense, εὐθεῖαν περᾶναι, to keep on, the straight Road. l. 5. f. 3. l. 10. f. 11.

ONE would imagine that our Countryman *Milton*, had this Reasoning in view, when in his 19th Sonnet, speaking of his own Blindness, he says with a becoming Magnanimity,

——Yet I argue not
Against Heav'n's Hand or Will; nor bate one jot
Of Heart or Hope; but still bear up, and steer
RIGHT ONWARDS.——

The whole Sonnet is not unworthy of Perusal, being both sublime and simple.

NOTE XXVII. p. 106.—THE MERE DOING WHATEVER IS CORRESPONDENT TO SUCH AN END, EVEN THO' WE NEVER ATTAIN IT——] Thus *Epicetus* in *Arrian*, speaking of Address to Men in Power, and admitting such Address, when justified by certain Motives, adds, that such Address ought to be made, without Admiration, or Flattery. Upon this an Objector demands of him, πῶς ἐν τύχῃ, ἔδεομαι; But how then am I to obtain that, which I want?——The Philosopher answers, Ἐγὼ δὲ σοι λέγω, ὅτι ὡς ΤΕΤΕΛΩΜΕΝΟΣ ἀπέρχεσθαι ἐχὼ δὲ μόνον, ἵνα πράξῃς τὸ σαυτῷ πρέπον; Did I ever say to thee, that thou shouldst go and address, as tho' thou wert to SUCCEED; and not rather with this only view, that thou mightest DO THAT, WHICH IS BECOMING THY CHARACTER?——And soon after, when an Objection is urged from Appearance, and the Opinion of Mankind, he answers,——ἐκ οἷός ἐστι ἀνὴρ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἐδὲν ποιεῖ τὰ δόξαι ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ΠΕΠΡΑΧΘΑΙ ΚΑΛΩΣ; Knowest thou not, that a fair and good Man does nothing for the sake of Appearance, but for the sake only of having DONE WELL AND FAIRLY? *Arr. Epicet.* l. 3. c. 24. p. 497, 498. This Doctrine indeed seems to have been the Basis of the Stoic Morals; the Principle, which included, according to these Philosophers, as well Honour and Honesty, as Good and Happiness. Thus *Cicero*—*Facere omnia, ut adipiscamur quæ secundum naturam sint, et si ea non adsequamur, id esse & honestum, & solum per se expetendum & summum bonum Stoici dicunt.* *De Fin.* l. 5. c. 7. p. 365, 6. To this is consonant that Sentiment of theirs in *Plutarch*——Τὴν μὲν φύσιν αὐτὴν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι· τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ὁμολογεῖν, ἀγαθόν——And again——τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν, τέλος εἶναι——τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀδιάφορα εἶναι. *Plut. Mor.* 1060. D. E. See below, Note XXX. *Socrates* was of the same Opinion, as appears from all parts of the *Platonic* and *Xenophontean* Dialogues. Take one Example out of many.—τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖτε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἂν ἂν πράττοι· τὸν δὲ εὖ πράττοντα, μακάριον τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. *Gorg. Plat.* p. 507. Edit. Serr.

NOTE XXVIII. Ibid.—WHAT IF WE MAKE OUR NATURAL STATE THE STANDARD ONLY TO DETERMINE OUR CONDUCT, &c.] It is in this sense we find it elegantly said
VOL. I. Z in

in *Plutarch* by the last mentioned Philosophers—τοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν φύσιν, καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν—that our NATURAL STATE and what is consonant to it, are the ELEMENTS of Happiness,—and just before, the same natural State is called τῆς καθήκουσας ἀρχῆς, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς, the SOURCE of Moral Office; and the SUBJECT MATTER of Virtue. *Plut. Mor.* 1069. E. F. *Atque etiam illud perspicuum est, constitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat, sequatur; idque initium esse naturæ accommodatum: nam aliter appetitio, &c. Cic. Acad.* 1. 2. c. 8. p. 85, 86. *Initia proponi necesse esse apta & accommodata naturæ quorum ex selectione Virtus possit existere. De Fin.* 1. 4. c. 17. p. 316. *Cum vero illa, quæ officia esse dixi, proficiscantur ab initiis naturæ; ea ad hæc referri necesse est: ut recte dici possit, omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturæ; nec tamen ut hoc sit BONORUM ULTIMUM—De Fin.* 1. 3. c. 6. p. 217.

NOTE XXIX. p. 106.—WE SHOULD NOT WANT A GOOD TO CORRESPOND, &c.] *Plutarch* quotes the following Sentiment of *Chrysippus*, who patronized this Idea of GOOD—Τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, ὃν αὐτὸς εἰσάγει καὶ δοκιμάζει, συμφωνότατον εἶναι φησι τῷ βίῳ, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐμφύτων ἀπλεσθαι προλήψεων. *Plut. Mor.* 1041. E.

NOTE XXX. p. 107.—YET WE LOOK NOT FOR HIS REPUTATION, &c.] What *Quintilian* says of *Rhetoric*, may with great propriety be transferred to *Morality*: *Noster orator, Arsque a nobis finita, non sunt posita in EVENTU. Tendit quidem ad victoriam, qui dicit; sed, cum bene dixit, etiamsi non vincat, id quod arte continetur, effecit. Nam & gubernator vult salvâ nave in portum pervenire: si tamen tempestate fuerit abreptus, non ideo minus erit gubernator, dicetque notum illud; dum clavum rectum teneam. Et medicus sanitatem ægri petit: si tamen aut valetudinis vi, aut intemperantiâ ægri, aliove quo casu summa non contingit; dum ipse omnia secundum rationem fecerit, medicinæ fine non excidit. Ita oratori bene dixisse, finis est. Nam est ars ea—in ACTU posita, non in EVENTU. Inst. Orat.* 1. 2. c. 17.

NOTE XXXI. Ibid.—HE FOR A SUBJECT HAS THE WHOLE OF HUMAN LIFE, &c.] 'Ουσία τῆς ἀγαθῆς, προαίρεσις ποιά· τῆς κακῆς προαίρεσις ποιά. Τί ἐν τῷ ἐνός; Ὅτι τῇ προαίρεσει, περὶ ἧς ἀναστροφόμεν τενύξεται τῆς ἰδίας ἀγαθῆς ἢ κακῆς. The Essence of GOOD, is a peculiar Direction of Mind; and the Essence of EVIL, is a peculiar Direction also. What then are EXTERNALS? They serve as SUBJECTS to the Mind's Direction, from conversing with which it obtains its proper Good or Evil. *Arr. Epict.* 1. 1. c. 29. Again—'Αἱ ὕλαι, ἀδιάφοροι· ἢ δὲ χρῆσις αὐτῶν ἐκ ἀδιάφορου. The SUBJECTS are indifferent, but not so the USE of them. *Arr. Epict.* 1. 2. c. 5.

Thus HORACE:

*Non possidentem multa vocaveris
Recte beatum; rectius occupat
Nomen beati, qui Deorum
Muneribus SAPIENTER UTI,
Duramque callet pauperiem pati,
Pejusque leto flagitium timet:
Non ille, &c.*

Od. 1. iv. 9.

EVEN

EVEN the Comic Poet seems not to have been unacquainted with this Doctrine:

Ch. Quid nárrat? Cl. Quid ille? míserum se esse.

Ch. Míserum? quem minus crédere est?

Quid rélliqui est, quin hábeat quæ quidem in hómine dicuntúr bona?

Paréntis, patriam incólumen, amicos, génuS, cognatos, dívitias:

Atque hæc perinde súnť ut illius ánimus, qui ea póssidet:

Qui UTÍscit, ei BONA; illi, qui non útitur recté, mala.

Heauton. Act. I. S. 2. V. 18.

Vid. Platon. in Euthydemo, p. 281. Edit Serr. ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δ', ἔφην, ὃ Κλεινία, κινδυνεύει.

NOTE XXXII. p. 108.—THE END IN OTHER ARTS IS EVER DISTANT, &c.] *Sed in cæteris artibus cum dicitur Artificiosè, posterum quodam modo & consequens putandum est, quod illi ἐπιγεννησιακὸν appellant; quod autem in quo Sapienter dicitur, id adprimo rectissime dicitur: quicquid enim a sapiente proficiscitur, id continuo debet expletum esse omnibus suis partibus; in eo enim positum est id, quod dicimus esse expetendum. Nam ut peccatum est patriam prodere, parentes violare, fana depeculari, quæ sunt in effectu: sic timere, sic mære, sic in libidine esse, peccatum est, etiam sine effectu. Verum ut hæc, non in posteris & in consequentibus, sed in primis continuo peccata sunt: sic ea quæ proficiscuntur a virtute, SUSCEPTIONE prima, non PERFECTIÖNE, recta sunt judicanda. Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 9. p. 228. Τὸ ἰδίᾳ τέλος τυγχάνει [ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ] ὅπως ἂν τὸ τῆ βίης πέρας ἐπιτύῃ· ἔχῃ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ὀρχήσεως καὶ ὑποκρίσεως καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀτελὲς γίνεσθαι ἢ ὅλην πρᾶξιν, εἴαν τι ἐγκόψῃ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παντὸς μέρους, καὶ ὅπως ἂν καὶ ἀληθεύῃ, πλήρες καὶ ἀπροσδεὶς ἑαυτῇ τὸ προλεθὲν ποιεῖ· ὥστε εἰπεῖν, ἐγὼ ἀπέχω τὰ ἐμὰ. M. Ant. l. 11. f. 1. Et quemadmodum opportunitas (sic enim adpellemus ἐνκαιρίαν) non fit major productione temporis (habent enim suum modum quæcunque opportuna dicuntur) sic recta effectio (καλόρθωσι enim ita adpello, quoniam rectum factum καλόρθωμα) recta igitur effectio, item convenientia, denique IPSUM BONUM, quod in eo positum est ut naturæ consentiat, crescendi accessionem nullam habet. Ut enim opportunitas illa, sic hæc de quibus dixi, non fiunt temporis productione maiora: ob eamque causam Stoicis non videtur optabilior nec magis expetenda vita beata, si sit longa, quam si brevis: utunturque simili, ut, si cothurni laus illa est ad pedem apte convenire, neque multi cothurni paucis anteponerentur, nec majores minoribus: sic quorum omne bonum convenientiâ atque opportunitate finitur, nec plura paucioribus, nec longinquiora brevioribus anteponentur. Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 14. p. 242. See also Dio. Laert. l. 7. f. 101. M. Ant. l. 6. f. 23. l. 3. f. 7. Senec. Epist. 66.*

NOTE XXXIII. p. 110.—RECOLLECT THEN, SAID HE, DO YOU NOT REMEMBER THAT ONE PRE-CONCEPTION, &c.] In this, and the subsequent Pages, the general Pre-conceptions of Good are applied to the particular Hypothesis of Good, advanced in this Treatise. See before, p. 67, 71.

NOTE XXXIV. Ibid.—AND IS THERE ANY TIME OR PLACE, WHENCE RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT MAY BE EXCLUDED?] ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΥ καὶ ΔΙΗΝΕΚΩΣ ἐπὶ σοὶ ἐστὶ, καὶ τῇ παύσῃ συμβάσει θεοσεβῶς εὐαρεστεῖν, καὶ τοῖς παρῆσιν ἀνθρώποις καλὰ δικαιοσύνην προσφέρεισθαι —M. Ant. l. 7. f. 54.

NOTE XXXV. p. 110.—WHERE IT SHALL NOT BE IN HIS POWER TO ACT BRAVELY AND HONESTLY.] Μήκειν ἔν μοι λέγε, πῶς γένηται; ὅπως γὰρ ἂν γένηται, σὺ αὐτὸ θήσεις, καλῶς, καὶ ἔσται σοι τὸ ἀποδοῦν εὐλύχημα. Arrian. Epict. l. 4. c. 10. p. 650.

NOTE XXXVI. p. 112.—THERE ARE INSTANCES INNUMERABLE OF MEN BAD, AS WELL AS GOOD, &c.] See a long Catalogue of these in Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*; Spartan Boys; Barbarian Sages; Indian Wives; Egyptian Devotees, &c. &c. The whole Passage is worth reading. *Tusc. Disp.* l. 5. c. 27. p. 400, 401, &c.

NOTE XXXVII. p. 112, 113.—THIS I WRITE YOU (SAYS HE IN ONE OF HIS EPISTLES) WHILE, &c.] Τὴν μακαρίαν ἀγόνιες καὶ ἅμα τελευταίαν ἡμέραν τῆ βίης, ἐγγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταῦτα· γραφείατε παρηκολυθήκει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη, ὑπερβολὴν ἐκ ἀπολείποντα τῆ ἐν ἐαυτοῖς μεγέθους· ἀντιπαρελάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τῆτοις τὸ καλὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμη.—Dio. Laer. l. 10. f. 22. Cum ageremus vitæ beatum & eundem supremum diem, scribebamus hæc. Tanti autem morbi aderant vesicæ & viscerum, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem possit accedere. Compensabatur tamen cum his omnibus animi lætitia, quam cupiebam memoriâ rationum inventorumque nostrorum.—Cic. de Fin. l. 2. c. 30. p. 173.

Soon after we have another Sentiment of Epicurus, that a rational Adversity was better than an irrational Prosperity. The original Words are—κρεῖττον εἶναι εὐλογίως ἄτυχεῖν, ἢ ἀλογίως εὐτυχεῖν. Dio. Laert. l. 10. f. 135.

NOTE XXXVIII. p. 113. O CRITO, IF IT BE PLEASING TO THE GODS, &c.] The three Quotations in this Page are taken from Plato; the first from the *Crito*, quoted by Epictetus at the End of the *Enchiridion*, and in many other Places; the second from the *Apology*, quoted as frequently by the same Author; the third, from the *Menexenus* or *Epitaph*. Plat. Opera, tom. 2. p. 248. Edit. Serran. see also Cic. *Tuscul.* l. 5. c. 12.

NOTE XXXIX. p. 114. IF YOU ARE FOR NUMBERS, REPLIED HE, WHAT THINK YOU OF THE NUMEROUS RACE OF PATRIOTS, &c.] Sed quid duces & principes nominem; cum legiones scribat Cato sæpe alacres in eum locum profectas, unde redituras se non arbitrantur? Pari animo Lacedæmonii in Thermopylis occiderunt: in quos Simonides,

Dic hospes Spartæ, nos te hic vidisse jacentes,
Dum sanctis patriæ legibus obsequimur.

Tuscul. Disp. l. 1. 42. p. 101.

NOTE XL. Ibid.—MARTYRS FOR SYSTEMS WRONG, &c.] That there may be a bigotted Obstinacy in favour of what is absurd, as well as a rational Constancy in adhering to what is right, those Egyptians above mentioned may serve as Examples. *Ægyptiorum morem quis ignoret? quorum imbutæ mentes pravitate erroribus quamvis carnificinam prius subierint, quam ibim aut aspidem aut felem aut canem aut crocodilum violent: quorum etiam si imprudentes quidpiam fecerint, pœnam nullam recusent.* *Tuscul. Disp.* l. 5. c. 27 p. 402. See before, Note XXXVI.

NOTE

NOTE XLI. p. 114.—CELEBRATED TO SUCH A HEIGHT, IN THE RELIGION, WHICH WE PROFESS, &c.] It is probable that some Analogies of this sort induced a *Father of the Church* (and no less a one than *St. Jerom*) to say of the *Stoics*, who made *moral Rectitude* the ONLY GOOD,—NOSTRO DOGMATI IN PLERISQUE CONCORDANT. *Vid. Menag. in D. Laert. l. 7. f. 101. p. 300. and Gatak. Præfat. in M. Anton. See also of this Treatise page 64, and below, Note XLIV.*

NOTE XLII. p. 115. TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY, &c.] TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY is here explained to be LIVING ACCORDING TO SOME ONE SINGLE CONSONANT SCHEME OR PURPOSE; and our GOOD OR HAPPINESS is placed in such CONSISTENCE, upon a supposition that those, who live *inconsistently*, and without any such *uniform Scheme*, are of consequence *miserable*, and *unhappy*. Τὸ τέλϑ, ὁ μὲν Ζήνων ἔτως ἀπέδωκε, τὸ ὁμολογεμένως ζῆν· τῷτο δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἓνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχομένων ζώων κακαδαίμονέων. *Stob. Ecl. Ethic. p. 171.*

THIS CONSISTENCE was called in *Greek* ὁμολογία, in *Latin* *Convenientia*, and was sometimes by itself alone considered as the END. Τὴν ὁμολογίαν λέγουσι τέλϑ εἶναι. *Stob. Ecl. Ethic. p. 172.* See also *Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 6. p. 216.* So also in the same last named Treatise, c. 7. p. 220.—*Ut enim histrioni actio, saltatori motus, non quivis, sed certus quidam est datus: sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus CONVENIENS CONSENTANEUMQUE dicimus. Nec enim gubernationi aut medicinæ similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, & saltationi; ut in ipsa ARTE insit, NON FORIS petatur EXTREMUM, id est, artis effectio.*

It is upon this Principle we find it a Precept in *Cicero's Offices*.—*In primis autem constituendum est, quos nos & quales esse velimus, & in quo genere vitæ*—l. 1. c. 32. So likewise in the *Enchiridion of Epictetus*, c. 33.—Τάξον τινὰ ἢδὲ χαρακτῆρα σαυτῷ καὶ τύπον, ὃν φυλάξῃς ἐπὶ τε σαυτῷ ὄν, καὶ ἀνθρώποις ἐπισυγχάων. *Ordain to thyself some Character and Model of Life, which thou mayst maintain both by thyself, and when thou art conversant with Mankind.*

So much indeed was rested upon this Principle of *Consistence*, that even to be any Thing *consistently*, was held better than the *contrary*. Thus *Epictetus*.—Ἐνα σε δεῖ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν· ἢ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν σε δεῖ ἐξεργάζεσθαι τὸ σαυτῷ, ἢ τὰ ἐκτός.—*It behoves thee to be ONE UNIFORM MAN, either good or bad; either to cultivate thy own Mind, or to cultivate Things external*.—*Arr. Epict. l. 3. c. 15. p. 421.* And more fully than this does he express himself in a place subsequent; where having first counselled against that *False Complaisance*, which makes us, to please Mankind, forget our proper *Character*; and having recommended as our *Duty* a Behaviour contrary, he adds—Ἐἰ δὲ μὴ ἀρέσκει ταῦτα, ὅλϑ ἀπόκλινον ἐπὶ τ' ἀναντία· γενεῖ εἰς τῶν κιναιδῶν, εἰς τῶν μοιχῶν.—Διάφορα δ' ἔτω πρόσωπα & μίγνυσθαι. & δύνασθαι καὶ Θηρσίτην ὑποκρίνασθαι καὶ Ἀγαμέμνονα.—*Arr. Epict. l. 4. c. 2. p. 580.* But if what I recommend to thee do not please, then turn thee totally to all that is contrary; become a profligate of the most profligate kind—*Characters so different are not to be blended; thou canst not act at once Thermites and Agamemnon.*

So.

So too HORACE:

—Quanto CONSTANTIOR idem
In vitiis, tanto levius miser, ac prior ille
Qui jam contento, jam laxo fune laborat.

Sat. 7. l. 2. v. 18.

See also *Characteristics*, V. 1. p. 131.

NOTE XLIII. p. 116.—IT IS NOT MERELY TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY; BUT TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY WITH NATURE.] Ὁμολογμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν. Cleanthes in Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 171.—*Congruenter naturæ convenienterque vivere.* Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 7. p. 221. The first Description of our *End* [to live consistently] was deemed *defective*, and therefore was this *Addition* made. See *Stobæus* in the Place cited. *Arr. Epict.* l. 3. c. 1. p. 352.

NOTE XLIV. p. 117.—TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY WITH NATURE IS TO LIVE ACCORDING TO JUST EXPERIENCE OF THOSE THINGS, WHICH HAPPEN AROUND US.] Τέλϑ ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμολογμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν· ὅπερ ὁ Χρύσιππος σαφέστερον βαλόμενος ποιῆσαι, ἐξήνεγκε τὸν τρόπον τῆτον, Ζῆν καὶ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων. Stob. Ecl. Ethic. 171. Diog. Laert. l. 7. c. 87. *His verbis* [scil. *vivere secundum naturam*] *tria significari Stoici dicunt.* *Unum ejusmodi, vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quæ naturâ evenirent—* De Fin. l. 4. c. 6. p. 286. See also the same Treatise, l. 3. c. 9. p. 227. l. 2. c. 11. p. 113. where it is expressed—*Vivere cum intelligentiâ earum rerum quæ naturâ evenirent.*

NOTE XLV. p. 118.—TO LIVE PERPETUALLY SELECTING, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS CONGRUOUS TO NATURE, AND REJECTING WHAT IS CONTRARY, MAKING OUR END THAT SELECTING, AND THAT REJECTING ONLY.] Ὁ τε Ἀντίπατρος, —τὸ τέλϑ κείσθαι, Ἐν τῷ διηγεῖσθαι καὶ ἀπαρᾶς ἐκλέγεσθαι μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλέγεσθαι δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν, ὑπολαμβάνει. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 2. p. 497. *Edit. Potter.* This Sentiment was sometimes *contracted*, and expressed as follows—τὸ εὐλογισεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς—sometimes, more concisely still, by the single Term τὸ εὐλογισεῖν. See *Plutarch* 1071, 1072. *Cicero* joins this, and the foregoing Descriptions of *Happiness*, together. *Circumscriptis igitur his sententiis, quas posui, & si quæ similes earum sint; relinquitur, ut summum bonum sit, vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum, quæ naturâ eveniant, feligentem quæ secundum naturam, & quæ contra naturam sunt rejicientem, id est, convenienter congruenterque naturæ vivere.* De Fin. l. 3. c. 9. p. 227. See also De Fin. l. 2. c. 11. p. 113. See also *Diog. Laert.* l. 7. c. 88.—*Stob. Ecl. Eth.* 171.

NOTE XLVI. Ibid. TO LIVE IN THE DISCHARGE OF MORAL OFFICES.] Ἀρχέδημος δὲ [τέλϑ φησὶ] τὸ πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελεῖν ζῆν. Laert. l. 7. c. 88.—*Stob. Ecl. Eth.* 171.—*Officia omnia—servantem vivere.* Cic. de Fin. l. 4. c. 6. p. 286.

Soon after we meet the Phrases—TO LIVE ACCORDING TO NATURE; TO LIVE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE. Ὁ Ζήνων—τέλϑ εἶπε, τὸ ὁμολογμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀρετὴν ζῆν. Laert. l. 7. c. 87.—*Consentire naturæ; quod esse volente virtute, id est, honestate vivere*

vivere—De Fin. l. 2. c. 11. p. 113. Where, as has been already observed page 101, and in the Note likewise on the Place, we find the *Lives* according to *Nature* and *Virtue* are considered as the *same*.

HOWEVER, to make this Assertion plainer, (if it be not perhaps sufficiently plain already) it may not be improper to consider what Idea these *Philosophers* had of VIRTUE.

IN *Laertius* (where he delivers the Sentiments of *Zeno* and his followers) *Virtue* is called Διάθεσις ὁμολογούμενη, a consistent Disposition; and soon after, ψυχὴ πεποιημένη πρὸς τὴν ὁμολογίαν παντὸς τοῦ βίου. A Mind formed to Consistence thro' every Part of Life. Laert. 7. c. 89.

IN *Stobæus* (according to the Sentiments of the same School) it is called Διάθεσις ψυχῆς σύμφωνος αὐτῇ περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον. A Disposition of Mind, consonant to itself throughout the whole of Life. Ecl. Eth. p. 167.

So *Cicero* in his *Laws*—Constans & perpetua ratio vite, quæ est VIRTUS.—l. 1. c. 17. p. 55.

So *Seneca* in his 74th *Epistle*—VIRTUS enim CONVENIENTIA constat: omnia opera ejus cum ipsâ concordant, & congruunt.

THUS therefore Consistence being the Essence of *Virtue*, and upon the Hypothesis here advanced, the Essence also of *Happiness*; it follows first that a *Virtuous* Life will be a *Happy* Life. But if a *Happy* one, then of course a Life according to *Nature*; since nothing can be *Good*, which is contrary to *Nature*, nor indeed which is not consonant, in the strictest manner, to it.

AND here (as a proper Opportunity seems to offer) we cannot but take notice of the great Similitude of Sentiments, it may be even said the Unanimity of almost all *Philosophers*, on this important Subject concerning ENDS and HAPPINESS.

THOSE, whose Hypothesis we have followed in this Dialogue, supposed it to be VIRTUE and CONSISTENT ACTION, and that without regard to Fortune or Success. But even they, who from their Hypothesis made some Degree of Success requisite; who rested it not merely on right Action, but on a proportion of bodily Welfare, and good Fortune concomitant, even these made RIGHT ACTION and VIRTUE to be PRINCIPAL.

THUS *Archytas*, according to the Doctrine of the *Pythagorean* School. Ἐυδαιμοσύνη κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐν εὐτυχίᾳ. Happiness is the Use or Exercise of Virtue, attended with external good Fortune. Opusc. Mytholog. p. 678. Consonant to this Sentiment, he says in the beginning of the same Treatise, ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἐνθέως εὐδαίμων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ εὐδαίμων, καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ἐστίν. The good Man is not of necessity Happy; [because, upon this Hypothesis, external Fortune may be wanting;] but the happy Man is of necessity Good, [because, upon the same Hypothesis, without Virtue was no Happiness.] Ibid. p. 673. Again—Ἀεὶ μὲν γὰρ κακὸς ἀνὴρ ἀνάγκη τὸν κακὸν, αἰεὶ ἔχει ὕψαν (κακῶς τε γὰρ αὐτῷ χρεῖσται)

χρεῖται) αἵτε σπανίζοι.—The bad Man (says he) must needs at all times be miserable, whether he have, or whether he want, the Materials of external Fortune; for if he have them, he would employ them ill. Ibid. p. 696. Thus we see this Philosopher, tho' he made *Externals* a *Requisite* to *Happiness*, yet still without *Virtue* he treats them as of no Importance. Again—Δύο δ' ὁδοὶ τέμνονται ἐν τῷ βίῳ· ἡ μὲν σκυθρωπότέρα, ἣν ὁ τλάμων ἐξάδιζεν Ὀδυσσεύς· ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονιότερα· τὰν ἐπορεύετο Νέστωρ. Τὰν ὧν ἀρετὴν φαμι δηλῆσθαι (lege δηλεῖσθαι, Dorice pro θέλειν) μὲν τάυταν, δύνασθαι δὲ καὶ τήναν. There are two Roads in Life distinct from each other; one the rougher, which the suffering Ulysses went; the other more smooth, which was travelled by Nestor. Now of these Roads (says he) *Virtue* desires indeed the latter; and yet is she not unable to travel the former. Ibid. p. 696. From which last Sentiment it appears, that he thought *VIRTUE*, even in any Fortune, was capable of producing at least some degree of *HAPPINESS*.

As for the *Socratic* Doctrine on this Subject, it may be sufficiently seen by what is quoted from it, in the Dialogue pag. 113, 114. And as the Sentiments, there exhibited, are recorded by *Plato*, they may be called not only *Socratic*, but *Platonic* also. However, lest this should be liable to dispute, the following Sentiment is taken from *Xenocrates*, one of *Plato's* immediate Successors in the old *Academy* by him founded. Ξενοκράτης φησὶν, Ἐυδαιμόνα εἶναι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπερδαίαν· τάυτην γὰρ ἐκάστω εἶναι Δαίμονα· *Xenocrates* held that he was *Eudæmon*, or *HAPPY*, who had a virtuous Mind; for that the Mind was every one's *Dæmon* or *Genius*. *Arist. Top.* 1. 2. c. 6.

HERE we see *VIRTUE* made the *Principle* of *HAPPINESS*, according to the Hypothesis of the Dialogue. There is an elegant *Allusion* in the Passage to the *Etymology* of the Word *Ἐυδαιμων*, which signifies both [*Happy*] and [*possessed of a good Genius or Dæmon*]; an *Allusion* which in translating it was not possible to preserve. See below, *Note LVIII*.

As for the *Peripatetic School*, we find their Idea of *HAPPINESS*, as recorded by *Laertius*, to be in a manner the same with that of the *Pythagoreans*. It was χρῆσις ἀρετῆς ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ—The Use or Exercise of *Virtue* in a complete and perfect Life. *Laert.* 1. 5. c. 30. We have already, in *Note XXV*, cited the same Doctrine (tho' somewhat varied in Expression) from the Founder of the *Peripatetics*, in his first Book of *Ethics*. So again we learn from him——ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς καὶ ἐνέργεια λέγονται τὸ τέλος, that it is certain *Actions* and *Energies* which are to be deemed THE END. *Ethic. Nic.* 1. 1. c. 8.—And again—Ἐστὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. For it is the very Rectitude of Action, which is itself the End. Ibid. 1. 6. c. 5. And again, Ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργεια τίς ἐστι—Happiness is a certain *Energizing*. 1. 9. c. 9. And more explicitly than all these Passages in that elegant Simile, 1. 1. c. 8.—Ὡς περ δὲ ὀλυμπιάσιν ἔχ' οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι τεφανῆναι, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τέτων γάρ τινες νικῶσιν) ἔτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν Οἱ ΠΡΑΤΤΟΝΤΕΣ ΟΡΘΩΣ ἐπιήκοιοι γίγνονται. For as in the Olympic Games, not those are crowned, who are handsomest and strongest, but those who combat and contend, (for it is from among these come the Victors;) so, with respect to things laudable and good in human Life, it is the right Actors only that attain the Possession of them. Nay, so much did this Philosopher make *Happiness* depend on right Action, that tho' he required some Portion of *Externals* to that *Felicity*, which he

he held *supreme*; yet still it was *Honour* and *Virtue* which were its *principal* Ingredients. Thus speaking of the Calamities and external Casualties of Life, which he confesses to be *Impediments* to a *Happiness perfectly complete*, he adds—ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τέτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὴν φέρη τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὦν καὶ μεγαλόφυχος. 'Εἰ δ' εἰσιν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, ἔδειξεν ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· ἔδειπτο γὰρ πράξει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ φαῦλα. Τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφορον πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αἰεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν· καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα, καὶ σκυτολόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυλῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τεχνίτας ἀπαντας. 'Εἰ δ' ἔτι, ἄθλιος μὲν ἔδειπτο γένοιτο ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων. And yet, even in such Incidents, the fair Principle of Honour and Virtue shines forth, when a Man with becoming Calmness endures many and great Misfortunes, and that not thro' Insensibility, but being brave and magnanimous. Nay more, if it be true, as we have already affirmed, that it is Actions, which are predominant in constituting a happy Life, then can no one be completely miserable, who is happy in his right Conduct, because he will never be the Actor of what is detestable and base. For it is our Opinion that the Man, truly wise and good, endures all Fortunes with becoming Decency, and from whatever happens to arise, still frames the fairest Actions; like as the good Commander uses the Army, which he happens to find, after the manner most agreeable to the Rules of War; and the Shoemaker, from such Skins as others provide him, makes a Shoe, the best that can be made from such Materials; and so in the same manner all other Artists beside. But if this be true, then he, who is happy in this Rectitude of Genius, can in no Instance be truly and strictly miserable. Eth. Nic. l. 1. c. 10.

As for Epicurus, tho' he was an Advocate for *Pleasure*, yet so high was his Opinion of a *wise and right Conduct*, that he thought *rational* Adversity better than *irrational* Prosperity. See Dial. p. 113. Hence too he represented that *Pleasure*, which he esteemed our *Sovereign Happiness*, to be as inseparable from *Virtue*, as *Virtue* was from that. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδὲως ζῆν, ἄνευ τῆς φρονίμως, καὶ καλῶς, καὶ δικαίως· ἔδὲ φρονίμως, καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, ἄνευ τῆς ἡδὲως. It is impossible to live pleasurably, without living prudently, and honourably, and justly; or to live prudently and honourably and justly without living pleasurably. Epic. in Laert. l. 10. f. 132.

To conclude the whole, our Countryman *Thomas Hobbes*, though he professedly explodes all this Doctrine concerning *Ends*, yet seems insensibly to have established an *End* himself, and to have founded it (like others) in a certain *ENERGY* or *ACTION*. For thus it is he informs us, in his Treatise called *Human Nature*, that *there can be no CONTENTMENT, but in PROCEEDING; and that FELICITY consisteth, not in HAVING—but in PROSPERING*. And again, some time after, having admitted the Comparison of *Human Life* to a *Race*, he immediately subjoins—*But this RACE we must suppose to have no other GOAL, nor other GARLAND, but being FOREMOST and IN IT*.

AND thus much as to the concurring Sentiments of Philosophers on the Subject of *Ends*, here treated.

NOTE XLVII. p. 119.—YET IT IN NO MANNER TAKES AWAY THE DIFFERENCE AND DISTINCTION OF OTHER THINGS.] *Cum enim virtutis hoc proprium sit, earum rerum quæ secundum naturam sint, habere delectum; qui omnia sic exæquaverint, ut in utramque partem ita paria redderent, uti nullâ selectione uterentur, virtutem ipsam sustulerunt.* Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 4. p. 207.

QUID autem apertius, quam, si selectio nulla sit ab iis rebus, quæ contra naturam sint, earum rerum quæ sint secundum naturam, tollatur omnis ea, quæ quærat laudeturque prudentia? Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 9. p. 227.

DEINCEPS explicatur differentia rerum: quam si non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone; nec ullum sapientiæ munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter eas res, quæ ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset; neque ullum delectum haberi oporteret. Itaque cum esset satis constitutum, id solum esse bonum quod esset honestum, & id malum solum quod turpe; tum inter hæc & illa, quæ nihil valerent ad beate misere vivere, aliquid tamen, quo differrent, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia æstimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. Ibid. l. 3. c. 15. p. 246.

CÆTERA autem, etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat, alia naturæ esse contraria: iis ipsis alia interjecta & media numerabat. Acad. l. 1. c. 11. p. 46. See Dial. p. 107.

NOTE XLVIII. Ibid. IT SUPPRESSES NO SOCIAL AND NATURAL AFFECTIONS, &c.] As much has been said concerning the STOIC APATHY, or *Insensibility with respect to Passion*, it may not be improper to inquire, what were their real Sentiments on this Subject.

Πάθος, which we usually render a *Passion*, is always rendered by Cicero, when speaking as a Stoic, *Perturbatio*, a *Perturbation*. As such therefore in the first place we say it ought always to be treated.

THE Definition of the Term Πάθος, as given by these Philosophers, was ὁρμή πλεονάζουσα, translated by Cicero, *Appetitus vehementior*. Tusc. l. 4. c. 9. p. 273. Now this Definition may be more easily explained, if we first inquire, what they meant by ὁρμή. Ὅρμη they defined to be πορὰ ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τι, a *Tendency or Motion of the Soul toward something*. Stob. Ecl. Ethic. p. 175. A Πάθος therefore, or *Perturbation*, must have been, according to their Definition, a *Tendency or Motion of the Soul, which was excessive and beyond Bounds*. Stobæus, from whom this Definition is taken, in commenting upon it observes, & λέγει πεφυκίᾳ πλεονάζειν, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἐν πλεονάσμῳ ἔσθαι & γὰρ δυνάμει, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνεργείᾳ.—that Zeno (its Author) does not call a Πάθος something capable by Nature to pass into Excess, but something actually in Excess already, as having its Essence, not in mere Capacity, but in Actuality. Ecl. Eth. p. 159.

THERE is another Definition of the same Term, which makes it to be ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις, a *Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to Nature*. D. Laert. l. 7.

L. 7. f. 110. *Andronicus Rhodius* adds, to this latter Definition, the Words, δι' ὑπόληψιν καὶ ἢ ἀγαθῆς, from the Opinion of something Good or Evil. Περὶ Πάθ. p. 523. So that its whole Idea is as follows. *A Perturbation, or Stoic Passion, is a Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to Nature, arising from the Opinion of something Good or Evil.* These last Words, founding the Πάθος or Perturbation on Opinion, correspond to what *Cicero* says, where he gives it as the Sentiment of the Stoic Philosophers, omnes perturbationes judicio fieri & opinione, Tusc. l. 4. c. 7. p. 276. *Laertius* informs us, that they even made the Perturbations themselves to be Judgments. Δοκεῖ δὲ ἀνθρώποις τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι. Laert. l. 7. f. 111. He subjoins an Instance to illustrate. Ἦτε γὰρ φιλαργυρία ὑπόληψις ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀργυρίου καλὸν εἶναι. For thus (says he) the Love of Money is the Judgment or Opinion, that Money is a thing good and excellent. *Plutarch* records the same Sentiment of theirs, in a fuller and more ample manner. Πάθος—λόγος πονηρὸς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, ἐκ φάουλῆς καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβών. *A Perturbation is a vitious and intemperate Reasoning, which assumes Vehemence and Strength from bad and erroneous Judgment.* Mor. p. 441. D. To these Testimonies may be added that of *Themistius*.—καὶ οὐ κακῶς οἱ ἀπὸ Ζηνῶνος, τὰ πάθη τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς τῆς λόγου διατροφῆς εἶναι τιθέμενοι, καὶ λόγους κρίσεις ἡμαρτημένας. Themist. Paraph. in Aristot. de Animâ, L. 3. p. 90. b. Edit. Aldinæ.

THE Substance of what is said above, seems to amount to this; that Πάθος, in a Stoic Sense, implied a Perturbation, and not a Passion, and that such Perturbation meant an irrational and violent Motion of the Soul, founded on Opinion or Judgment, which was erroneous and faulty.

Now from hence it follows, that THE MAN OF PERFECT CHARACTER (according to their Hypothesis) must of necessity be ἀπαθής, APATHETIC, OR VOID OF PERTURBATION. For such a Character, as has been shewn, implies perfect Rectitude of Conduct. But perfect Rectitude of Conduct implies perfect Rectitude of Judgment; and such Rectitude of Judgment excludes all Error and wrong Judgment: But if Error and wrong Judgment, then Perturbation of consequence, which they suppose to be derived from thence alone.

THAT this was the Sense, in which they understood APATHY, we have their own Authority, as given us by *Laertius*. Φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν, διὰ τὸ ἀνέμπλωτον εἶναι. Laert. l. 7. p. 117. They say the wise Man is apathetic, by being superior to Error—by being superior to ERROR, if they may be credited themselves; not, as for the most part we absurdly imagine, by being superior to all Sense, and Feeling, and Affection. The Sentence immediately following the foregoing, looks as if these Philosophers had foreseen, how likely they were to be misunderstood. Εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ἀπαθῆ τὸν φαῦλον, ἐν ᾧ λεγόμενον τῷ σκληρῷ καὶ ἀτρέπτῳ—There is also another Sort of Apathetic Man, who is bad; who is the same in Character, as the hard and inflexible. To the same Purpose *Epictetus*. Οὐδεὶς γὰρ με εἶναι ἀπαθῆ, ὡς ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰς σχέσεις τηρεῖν τὰς φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθέτας, ὡς εὐσεῖν, ὡς υἱόν, ὡς ἀδελφόν, ὡς πατέρα, ὡς πολίτην. FOR I AM NOT TO BE APATHETIC, LIKE A STATUE, but I am withal to observe Relations, both the natural and adventitious; as the Man of Religion, as the Son, as the Brother, as the Father, as the Citizen. Arr. Epict. l. 3. c. 2. p. 359.

IMMEDIATELY before this, he tells us in the same Chapter, Πάθῃ γὰρ ἄλλως ἢ γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὴ ὀρέξεως ἀπολυγχανέσεως, ἢ ἐκκλίσεως περιπιπλέσεως, that a Perturbation in no other way ever arises, but either when a Desire is frustrated, or an Aversion falls into that which it would avoid. Where it is observable, that he does not make either Desire or Aversion, Πάθῃ, or Perturbations, but only the Cause of Perturbations, when erroneously conducted.

AGREEABLY to this, in the second Chapter of the *Enchiridion*, we meet with Precepts about the Conduct and Management of these two Affections—Not a word is said about lopping off either; on the contrary, Aversion we are directed how to employ immediately, and Desire we are only ordered to suspend for the present, because we want a proper Subject of fit excellence to excite it.

To this may be added, what the same Philosopher speaks, in his own Person, concerning himself. *Arr. Epict.* l. 1. c. 21. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἀρκῶμαι, ἂν ὀρέγομαι καὶ ἐκκλίνω κατὰ φύσιν—I, for my part, am satisfied and contented, if I can DESIRE and AVOID agreeably to Nature. He did not remain it seems dissatisfied, till he had eradicated these Affections; but he was satisfied in reducing them to their natural Use.

In *Laertius* we read recorded for a Stoic Sentiment, that as the vicious Man had his πάθῃ, or Perturbations; so opposed to these, had the Virtuous his Εὐπαθείαι, his Eupathies or Well feelings, translated by *Cicero* *Constantiæ*. The three chief of these were Βέλησις, WILL, defined ὀρεξις εὐλογῇ, rational Desire; Εὐλάβεια, CAUTION, defined Ἐκκλισις εὐλογῇ, rational Aversion; and Χαρά, JOY, defined ἔπαρσις εὐλογῇ, rational Exultation. To these three principal Eupathies belonged many subordinate Species; such as εὐνοια, ἀγάπησις, αἰδώς, τέρψις, εὐφροσύνη, εὐθυμία, &c. See *Laert.* l. 7. f. 115, 116. *Andron. Rhod.* περὶ πάθων. *Cic. Tusc.* l. 4. c. 6.

CICERO makes *Cato*, under the Character of a Stoic, and in explaining their System, use the following expressions. *Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur, intelligi natura fieri, ut liberi a parentibus amentur; a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequuntur.* *De Fin.* l. 3. c. 19. The same Sentiment of the Stoics is recorded by *Laertius*. Φασὶ δὲ (οἱ Στωϊκοί) καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὰ τέκνα φιλοστοργίαν φύσιν εἶναι αὐτοῖς—They say Parental Affection is natural to them. l. 7. f. 120.

AGAIN, soon after, in the same Treatise *de Finibus*. *Quodque nemo in summa solitudine vitam agere velit, ne cum infinita quidem voluptatum abundantia; facile intelligitur, nos ad conjunctionem congregationemque hominum, & ad naturalem communitatem esse natos.* So *Laertius*. Ἀλλὰ μὲν ἔδ' ἐν ἐρημίᾳ (φασὶ) βιώσεσθαι ὁ σπευδῶν κοινωνικὸς γὰρ φύσει, καὶ πρακτικὸς. The virtuous Man (say they, the Stoics) will never be for living in Solitude; for he is by Nature social, and formed for Action, l. 7. f. 123.

AGAIN, *Cicero*, in the above-cited Treatise. *Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus; consentaneum est huic naturæ, ut sapiens velit gerere, & administrare rempublicam; atque ut e natura vivat, uxorem adungere, & velle ex ea liberos. Ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur—Ut vero conser-*
vetur

tetur omnis homini erga hominem societas, conjunctio, caritas; & emolumenta & detrimenta — communia esse voluerunt. De Fin. l. 3. c. 20, 21.

IN *Epicetus* the leading Duties, or moral Offices of Man, are enumerated as follows. Πολιτεύεσθαι, γαμῆν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι, θεὸν σέβειν, γονέων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καθόλου ὀρέγεσθαι, ἐκκλίνειν, ὁρμᾶν, ἀφορμᾶν, ὧν ἕκαστον τέτων δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὡς πεφύκαμεν. Arr. *Epicet.* l. 3. c. 7. p. 386. The same Sentiments may be found repeated both in *Stobæus* and *Laertius*.

I SHALL only add one more Sentiment of these *Philosophers*, and that is concerning *Friendship*. Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ἐν μόνοις τοῖς σπουδαίοις εἶναι—They say that *Friendship* exists among the *Virtuous* only. Laert. l. 7. f. 124.

THE Sum of these Quotations appears to be this; that the *Stoics*, in the Character of their virtuous Man, included rational Desire, Aversion, and Exultation; included Love and parental Affection; Friendship, and a general Charity or Benevolence to all Mankind; that they considered it as a Duty, arising from our very Nature, not to neglect the Welfare of public Society, but to be ever ready, according to our Rank, to act either the Magistrate or the private Citizen; that their *APATHY* was no more than a Freedom from Perturbation, from irrational and excessive Agitations of the Soul; and consequently that the strange Apathy, commonly laid to their Charge, and in the demolishing of which there have been so many Triumphs, was an imaginary Apathy, for which they were no way accountable.

NOTE XLIX. p. 119. IT REJECTS NO GAIN, NOT INCONSISTENT WITH JUSTICE.] The *Stoics* were so far from rejecting Wealth, when acquired fairly, that they allowed their perfect Man, for the sake of enriching himself, to frequent the Courts of Kings, and teach Philosophy for a Stipend. Thus *Plutarch* from a Treatise of *Chrysippus*—Τὸν μὲν σοφὸν καὶ βασιλεύσει συνέσεσθαι φησὶν ἕνεκα χρηματισμοῦ, καὶ σοφιστεύσειν ἐπ' ἀργυρίῳ—Mor. p. 1047. F.

So likewise the *Stoic Hecato*, in his Treatise of Offices, as quoted by *Cicero*, *Sapientis esse, nihil contra morēs, leges, instituta facientem, habere rationem rei familiaris. Neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis, propinquis, amicis, maximeque reipublicæ. Singulorum enim facultates & copię, divitię sunt civitatis.* De Offic. l. 3. c. 15.

NOTE L. *Ibid.*—UNIVERSALLY AS FAR AS VIRTUE NEITHER FORBIDS NOR DIS-
SUADES, IT ENDEAVOURS TO RENDER LIFE, EVEN IN THE MOST VULGAR ACCEPTA-
TION, AS CHEARFUL, JOYOUS, AND EASY AS POSSIBLE.] *Etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, Convenienter naturę vivere, id habet hanc (ut opinor) sententiam, Cum virtute congruere semper: cętera autem, quę secundum naturam essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti non repugnarent.* Cic. de Offic. l. 3. c. 3.

ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, speaking of the *Stoic* Doctrine concerning the external Conveniencies, and common Utilities of Life, delivers their Sentiment in the following Words—ἀλλὰ καὶ διχα κειμένων ἀρετῆς τε σὺν τέτοις καὶ ἀρετῆς μόνῃς, μηδέποτ' ἂν τὸν σοφὸν τὴν κεχωρισ-
μένην

μένην ἐλεσθαι, εἰ εἴη αὐτῇ δυνατὸν τὴν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων λαβεῖν. Supposing there lay Virtue on the one side, attended with these Externals, and Virtue on the other side, alone by herself, the wise Man would never choose that Virtue, which was destitute and single, if it was in his Power to obtain that other, which was accompanied with these Advantages. Περὶ Ψυχ. p. 157.

NOTE LI. p. 120.—NAY, COULD IT MEND THE CONDITION OF EXISTENCE—BY ADDING TO THE AMPLEST POSSESSIONS THE POOREST, MEANEST UTENSIL, IT WOULD IN NO DEGREE CONTEMN, &c.]—*Si ad illam vitam, quæ cum virtute degatur, ampulla aut strigilis accedat, sumpturum sapientem eam vitam potius, cui hæc adjecta sint.*—De Fin. l. 4. c. 12. p. 300.

NOTE LII. *Ibid.*—COULD IT INDEED CHOOSE ITS OWN LIFE, IT WOULD BE ALWAYS THAT, WHERE MOST SOCIAL AFFECTIONS MIGHT BE EXERTED, &c.] *Itemque magis est secundum naturam, pro omnibus gentibus (si fieri possit) conservandis aut juvandis maximos labores molestiasque suscipere, imitantem Herculem illum, quem hominum fama, beneficiorum memor, in concilio cælestium conlocavit, quam vivere in solitudine, non modo sine ullis molestiis, sed etiam in maximis voluptatibus, abundantem omnibus copiis; ut excellas etiam pulchritudine & viribus. Quocirca optimo quisque & splendidissimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic anteponebat.* Cic. de Offic. l. 3. c. 5.

NOTE LIII. *Ibid.*—IT TEACHES US TO CONSIDER LIFE, AS ONE GREAT IMPORTANT DRAMA, WHERE, &c.] Thus *Aristo the Chian*—Εἶναι γὰρ ὁμοίον τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑποκριτῇ τὸν σοφόν· ὃς ἂντε Θερσίτεα ἂντε Ἀγαμέμνονα πρόσωπον ἀναλάβῃ, ἐκάτερον ὑποκρίνεται προσσηκόντως. *The wise Man is like the good Actor; who whether he assume the Character of Therfites or Agamemnon, acts either of the two Parts with a becoming Propriety,* D. Laert. l. 7. f. 160.

THIS Comparison of *Life* to a *Drama* or *Stageplay*, seems to have been a Comparison much approved by Authors of Antiquity. See *Epiet. Enchirid.* c. 17. and the Notes of the late learned Editor Mr. Upton. See also *M. Anton.* l. 12. f. 36. and the Notes of *Gataker*, Plat. Gorg. p. 512. T. 1. Ed. Serr.

NOTE LIV. p. 121.—IT ACCEPTS ALL THE JOYS DERIVED FROM THEIR SUCCESS, &c. IT FIXES NOT, LIKE THE MANY, ITS HAPPINESS ON SUCCESS ALONE, &c.] One of the wisest Rules that ever was, with respect to the Enjoyment of External good Fortune, is that delivered by *Epietetus*; to enjoy it, ὡς δέδοται, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον δέδοται, in such manner as it is given, and for such Time as it is given, remembering that neither of these Conditions we have the Power to command. See *Arr. Epiet.* l. 4. c. 1. p. 556. See also p. 573. of the same.

NOTE LV. *Ibid.* ON THE CONTRARY, WHEN THIS HAPPENS, IT IS THEN IT RETIRES INTO ITSELF, AND REFLECTING ON WHAT IS FAIR, WHAT IS LAUDABLE, &c.] See before, p. 177. ὁμῶς δὲ καὶ ἐν τέτοις διαλάμπει, &c.

NOTE LVI. *Ibid.* ALL MEN PURSUE GOOD, &c.] This is a Principle adopted by all the Stoics, and inculcated thro' every part of the Dissertations of *Epietetus*. Take an example

example or two out of many. Φύσις δ' αὕτη παντός, τὸ διώκειν τὸ ἀγαθόν, φεύγειν τὸ κακόν—τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ συγγενέστερον ἔδεν. *It is the Nature of every one to pursue GOOD, and fly Evil—for nothing is more intimately allied to us than GOOD.* Arr. Epiet. l. 4. c. 5. p. 606. Again, l. 2. c. 22. p. 313. Πᾶν Ζῶον ἔδεν ἑαυτῷ ὡς κείνῳ, ὡς τῷ ἰδίῳ συμφέρονι. *To nothing is every ANIMAL so intimately allied, as to its own peculiar WELFARE, and INTEREST.*

So Cicero. *Omnes enim expetimus UTILITATEM, ad eamque rapimur, nec facere aliter ullo modo possumus.* De Offic. l. 3. c. 28. Platon. Gorg. p. 468. T. 1. Edit. Serr. Ibid. p. 499. E.

NOTE LVII. p. 122.—ALL DERIVED FROM EXTERNALS MUST FLUCTUATE, AS THEY FLUCTUATE.] See before, p. 74, 76, 78.

NOTE LVIII. Ibid.—WHEN WE PLACE THE SOVEREIGN GOOD IN MIND.—] DEMON OR GENIUS means every Man's particular MIND, and REASONING FACULTY. Δαίμων—ἕτος δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐκάστη νῆς καὶ λόγος. M. Anton. l. 5. p. 27. *Genium esse uniuscujusque animum rationalem; & ideo esse singulos singulorum*—Varro in Fragm. It is from this Interpretation of Genius, that the Word, which in Greek expresses HAPPINESS, is elegantly etymologized to mean A GOODNESS OF GENIUS OR MIND. Εὐδαιμονία ἐστὶ δαίμων ἀγαθός. M. Anton. l. 7. f. 17. See Gataker on the Place. The Sentiment came originally from the old Academics. See before, page 176.

NOTE LIX. Ibid.—BEHOLD THE TRUE AND PERFECT MAN: THAT ORNAMENT, &c.] *Quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis? Qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus, vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quæ inrideri ab imperitis solent. Rectius enim appellabitur rex, quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit: rectius magister populi, &c.* Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 22. p. 269. *Ergo hic, quisquis est, qui moderatione & constantia quietus animo est, sibi que ipse placatus; ut nec tabescat molestiis, nec frangatur timore, nec sitienter quid expetens ardeat desiderio, nec alacritate futili gestiens deliquescat; is est sapiens, quem quærimus, is est beatus: cui nihil humanarum rerum aut intolerabile ad demittendum animum, aut nimis latabile ad ecferendum videri potest. Quid enim videatur ei magnum, &c.* Tusc. Disp. l. 4. c. 17. p. 298.

NOTE LX. p. 123.—WOULD NOT YOUR SYSTEM IN SUCH A CASE A LITTLE BORDER UPON THE CHIMERICAL? &c.] Chrysippus seems to have been sensible of this, if we may judge from a Passage of his, preserved in Plutarch. Διὸ καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῶν μεγέθους καὶ τῆς κάλλους, πλάσμασι δοκῶμεν ὁμοίᾳ λέγειν, καὶ ἔκαστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν. *For this reason, thro' the excessive Greatness and Beauty of what we assert, we appear to say things which look like Fictions, and not such as are suitable to MAN and HUMAN NATURE.* Mor. 1041. F.

NOTE LXI. p. 124.—IN ANTIENT DAYS, WHEN GREECE, &c.] See Cic. de Invent. l. 2. c. 1. See also Maximus Tyrius, Diff. 23. p. 277. of the late Quarto Edition; and Xenoph. Memor. l. 3. c. 10.

NOTE

NOTE LXII. p. 125.—NO WHERE IN ANY PARTICULAR NATURE IS THE PERFECT CHARACTER TO BE SEEN INTIRE.] The Stoics themselves acknowledged, as we learn from Clemens of Alexandria, that their ὁ σοφός, or PERFECT MAN, was difficult to be found to an exceeding great degree; δυσεύρετον πάνυ σοφόν. Strom. p. 348. Sextus Empiricus gives it as their Opinion, that they had never as yet found him, μέχρι τῆ νῦν ἀνευρέτα ὄντων καὶ ἀνθρώπων τῶ σοφῷ. Adv. Phys. p. 582. Edit. Lipsienf.

WHAT Sextus says, seems to be confirmed by Cicero, who, speaking in his Offices the Language of a Stoic, has the following Expressions. *Nec vero, cum duo Decii, aut duo Scipiones, fortes viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius Aristidesve justī nominantur; aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut ab his justitiæ, tanquam a SAPIENTIBUS, petitur exemplum. Nemo enim horum sic SAPIENS est, ut SAPIENTEM volumus intelligi. Nec ii, qui sapientes habiti sunt, & nominati, M. Cato & C. Lælius, sapientes fuerunt; ne illi quidem septem: sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant, speciemque sapientum.* De Offic. l. 3. c. 4. Again, in his Lælius, speaking of the same consummate Wisdom, he calls it, *Sapientia quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus.*

So too Quintilian. *Quod si defuit his viris summa virtus, sic quærentibus, an oratores fuerint, respondebo, quo modo Stoici, si interrogentur, an SAPIENS Zeno, an Cleanthes, an Chrysippus, respondeant; magnos quidem illos ac venerabiles; non tamen id, quod natura hominis summam habet, consecutos.* Inst. Orat. l. 12. c. 1. p. 721, 722. Edit. Caper.

So likewise Seneca: *Scis, quem nunc bonum virum dicam? Hujus secundæ notæ. Nam ille alter fortasse, tanquam phœnix, semel anno quingentesimo nascitur.* Epist. 42.

NOTE LXIII. Ibid.—I MIGHT INFORM YOU OF THE NATURAL PRE-EMINENCE, AND HIGH RANK OF SPECIFIC IDEAS.] See Cicero in his Orator, near the Beginning. *Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non, &c. &c.* See also the Verses of Boethius before cited, Note XVII. p. 175.

NOTE LXIV. p. 126.—AN EXEMPLAR OF IMITATION, WHICH THO' NONE WE THINK CAN EQUAL; YET ALL AT LEAST MAY FOLLOW—AN EXEMPLAR, &c.] Seneca gives it as a general Confession of the greatest Philosophers, that the Doctrine they taught, was not *quemadmodum ipsi viverent, sed quemadmodum vivendum esset.* De vitâ beatâ, c. 18.

THERE appears indeed to be ONE COMMON REASONING with respect to all MODELS, EXEMPLARS, STANDARDS, CORRECTORS, whatever we call them, and whatever the Subjects, which they are destined to adjust. According to this Reasoning, if a Standard be less perfect than the Subject to be adjusted, such Adjusting (if it may be so called) becomes a Detriment. If it be but equally perfect, then is the Adjusting superfluous. It remains therefore that it must be more perfect, and that to any Transcendence, any Accuracy conceivable. For suppose a Standard as highly accurate, as can be imagined. If the Subjects to be adjusted have a Nature suitable, then will they arrive, by such Standard,

Standard, to a degree of Perfection, which thro' a Standard less accurate they could never possibly attain. On the contrary, if the Subjects be not so far capable, the Accuracy of the Standard will never be a hindrance, why they should not become as perfect, as their Nature will admit.

IT seems to have been from some Sentiments of this kind, that the Stoics adorned their ὁ σοφὸς, or perfect Character, with Attributes so far superior to ordinary Humanity. Ἐκεῖν' ὁλοῖ', ἐκεῖν' ἀπροσδεής, ἐκεῖν' αὐτάρκης μακάρι', τέλει'—'Twas he was fortunate; 'twas he was above want; 'twas he was self-sufficient, and happy, and perfect. Plutarch, Mor. 1068. B. See Note LXII.

SOME Philosophers have gone so far, as not to rest satisfied with the most perfect Idea of Humanity, but to substitute for our Exemplar, even the supreme Being, GOD HIMSELF. Thus PLATO, in his *Theatetus*, makes the great Object of our endeavours, to be ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, the becoming like to GOD, as far as in our power. He immediately explains, what this resemblance is. Ὁμοίωσις δὲ, δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. It is the becoming just and holy, along with Wisdom or Prudence. Plat. tom. 1. p. 176. Edit. Serrani. See this Sentiment explained by Ammonius, in *V. Voces Porph.* p. 5. See also Aristotle's *Ethics*, L. 10. C. 8. p. 465.

THE Gospel appears to favour the same Hypothesis. Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in Heaven is perfect. Matt. v. 48.

WHAT has been above said, will be, it is hoped, a sufficient Apology for the Transcendence of the Character described in the Dialogue.

NOTE LXV. p. 126. THE PROFICIENCY OF SOCRATES—WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVINCE US—THAT SOME PROGRESS, &c.] See *Diog. Laert.* l. 7. c. 91. p. 420. Τεκμήριον δὲ τὸ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν—τὸ γενέσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τὴν περὶ Σωκράτην, καὶ Διογένην, &c.

NOTE LXVI. p. 127.—NOR WAS THE PRIZE, AS USUAL, RESERVED ONLY TO THE FIRST; BUT ALL, WHO RUN, MIGHT DEPEND UPON A REWARD, HAVING, &c.] *Verum ut transeundi spes non sit, magna tamen est dignitas subsequendi.* Quint. Inst. l. 12. c. 11. p. 760. *Exigo itaque a me, non ut optimis par sim, sed ut malis melior.* Senec. de Vita beatâ, c. 17. Ὁυδὲ γὰρ Μίλων ἔσομαι, καὶ ὅμως ἐκ ἀμελῶ τὴν σώμαλ'. ἔδὲ Κροῖσ', καὶ ὅμως ἐκ ἀμελῶ τῆς κτήσεως· ἔδ' ἀπλῶς ἄλλα τινὸς τῆς ἐπιμελείας, διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῶν ἁκρῶν, ἀφιστάμεθα. For neither shall I be Milo, and yet I neglect not my Body; nor Croesus, and yet I neglect not my Estate; nor in general do we desist from the proper Care of any thing, thro' Despair of arriving at that which is supreme. Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 2. See also Horat. Epist. 1. l. 1. v. 28, &c.

NOTE LXVII. p. 129.—THIS WHOLE UNIVERSE—IS ONE CITY OR COMMONWEALTH—] Ὁ κόσμος ἓτ' μία πόλις ἐστὶ—Arr. Epict. l. 3. c. 24. p. 486. This was a Stoic Doctrine, of which Epictetus and the Emperor Marcus make perpetual mention. See of the last, l. 12. f. 36.

So Cicero, *Universus hic mundus una civitas communis Deorum atque hominum existimandus*. De Leg. l. 1. c. 7. p. 29. See De Fin. l. 3. c. 19. De Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 62.

NOTE LXVIII. p. 130.—HENCE THE MIND TRULY WISE, QUITTING THE STUDY OF PARTICULARS, &c.] The *Platonics*, considering SCIENCE as something ascertained, definite, and steady, would admit nothing to be its Object, which was vague, infinite, and passing. For this reason they excluded all INDIVIDUALS, or OBJECTS OF SENSE, and (as Ammonius expresses it) raised themselves, in their Contemplations, from *Beings particular* to *Beings universal*, and which as such, from their own Nature, were eternal and definite. The whole Passage is worth transcribing. *Εἰρηλαί ὅτι ἡ φιλοσοφία, γνῶσις πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἢ ὄντα ἐστίν. Ἐξήτησαν ἔν οι φιλόσοφοι, τίνα ἂν τρόπον γένωνται τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστήμονες· καὶ ἐπειδὴ εἴρων τὰ κατὰ μέρος γενετὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ ὄντα, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄπειρα, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη αἰδιώτικη καὶ πεπερασμένων ἐστὶ γνῶσις (τὸ γὰρ γνωστὸν βέβαιον ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως περιλαμβανέσθαι· τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον ἀπερίληπτον) ἀνήγαγον ἐαυτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν μερικῶν ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου, αἰδία ὄντα καὶ πεπερασμένα. Ὡς γὰρ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, Ἐπιστήμη εἰρηλαί, παρὰ τὸ εἰς Ἐπίστασιν ἡμᾶς καὶ ὄρον τινὰ προάγειν τῶν πραγμάτων· τέτο δὲ ποριζόμεθα διὰ τῆς εἰς τὰ καθόλου ἀναδρομῆς.* Ammonius in his Preface to Porphyry's *Isagogue*, p. 14. Edit. 8vo.

CONSONANT to this, we learn it was the Advice of Plato, with respect to the Progress of our Speculations and Inquiries, when we proceed Synthetically, that is to say, from first Principles downwards, that we should descend from those higher Genera, which include many subordinate Species, down to the lowest Rank of Species, those which include only Individuals. But here it was his Opinion, that our Inquiries should stop, and, as to Individuals, let them wholly alone; because of these there could not possibly be any Science. Διὸ μέχρι τῶν ἐιδικωμάτων ἀπὸ τῶν γενικωμάτων καλίστως παρεκκλέυετο ὁ Πλάτων παύεσθαι——τὰ δὲ ἄπειρά φησιν ἔαν, μὴ δὲ γὰρ ἂν ποτὲ γενέσθαι τῶν ἐπιστήμην. Porphyr. *Isagog.* c. 2.

SUCH was the Method of antient Philosophy. The Fashion at present appears to be somewhat altered, and the Business of Philosophers to be little else, than the collecting from every Quarter, into voluminous Records, an infinite Number of sensible, particular, and unconnected Facts, the chief Effect of which is to excite our Admiration. So that if that well-known Saying of Antiquity be true, *it was Wonder which induced Men first to philosophize*, we may say that Philosophy now ends, whence originally it began.

NOTE LXIX. *Ibid.*—A FACULTY, WHICH RECOGNIZING BOTH ITSELF, AND ALL THINGS ELSE, BECOMES A CANON, A CORRECTOR, AND A STANDARD UNIVERSAL.] See before, p. 94. In *Epicetus*, l. 1. c. 1. p. 6. the Δύναμις λογικὴ or reasoning Power, is called the Power ἡ καὶ αὐτὴν θεωρεῖσα, καὶ τ' ἄλλα πάντα. So Marcus—Τὰ ἴδια τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς· ἐαυτὴν ἰδῆ, ἐαυτὴν διαθεροῖ, &c. The Properties of the reasoning Soul are, it beholdeth itself; it formeth itself, &c. l. 11. c. 1. So again *Epicetus*,—ὑπὲρ μὲν τῶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ νῆ Δία ὑπὲρ αὐτῶ τῶ ζῆν, καὶ τῶν συνεργῶν πρὸς αὐτὸ, ὑπὲρ καρπῶν ξηρῶν, ὑπὲρ οἴνου, ὑπὲρ ἐλαίου εὐχαρίσει τῷ θεῷ· μέμνησο δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τί σοι δέδωκε κρεῖττον ἀπάντων τῶντων, τὸ χρησόμενον αὐτοῖς, τὸ δοκιμάζον, τὸ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκάστη λογόμενον. For seeing, for hearing, and indeed for Life itself, and the various Means which co-operate to its Support; for the Fruits of the Earth, for Wine and Oil, for all these Things be thankful to God: yet be mindful that he hath given thee something else,

WHICH

WHICH IS BETTER THAN ALL THESE; something which is to use them, to prove them, to compute the Value of each. Arr. Epict. l. 2. c. 23. p. 321.

NOTE LXX. p. 131.—THAT MASTER-SCIENCE, OF WHAT THEY ARE, WHERE THEY ARE, AND THE END TO WHICH, &c.] See Arr. Epict. l. 2. c. 24. p. 337.—See also l. 1. c. 6. p. 36. and Perf. Satyr. 3. v. 66.

NOTE LXXI. Ibid.—AND NEVER WRETCHEDLY DEGRADE THEMSELVES INTO NATURES TO THEM SUBORDINATE.] See Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 3. p. 21. *Διὰ τάντην τὴν συγγένειαν, οἱ μὲν ἀποκλίναντες, λύκοις ὅμοιοι γινόμεθα, ἄπιστοι καὶ ἐπίθελοι καὶ βλαβεροί· οἱ δὲ λέεσιν, ἄγριοι καὶ θηριώδεις καὶ ἀνήμεροι· οἱ πλείους δ' ἡμῶν ἀλώπεκες, &c.* Thro' this Affinity (he means our Affinity to the Body, or baser Part) some of us, degenerating, become like Wolves, faithless, and treacherous, and mischievous; others, like Lions, fierce, and savage, and wild; but the greater Part turn Foxes, little, fraudulent, wretched Animals. Cum autem duobus modis, id est, aut vi aut fraude, fiat injuria; fraus, quasi vulpeculæ, vis, leonis videtur. Cic. de Offic. l. 1. c. 19. See also Arr. Epict. l. 2. c. 9. p. 210. In our own Language we seem to allude to this Degeneracy of Human Nature, when we call Men, by way of reproach, Sheepish, Bearish, Hoggish, Ravenous, &c.

NOTE LXXII. Ibid.—THAT REASON, OF WHICH OUR OWN IS BUT A PARTICLE, OR SPARK, &c.]—*αἱ ψυχαὶ μὲν ὅσως εἰσὶν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφῆς τῷ θεῷ, ἅτε αὐτῆς μόρια ἔσται, καὶ ἀποσπάσματα.*—Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 14. p. 81.—*ὁ δαίμων, ὃν ἐκάλεσεν προσάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ.* ἔτ' δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐκάλεσεν νῦν καὶ λόγ'· Mar. Ant. l. 5. f. 27. *Humanus autem animus, decerptus ex mente divinâ, cum nullo alio nisi cum ipso Deo (si hoc fas est dictu) comparari potest.* Tusc. Disp. l. 5. c. 13. p. 371.

NOTE LXXIII. Ibid.—FIT ACTORS IN THAT GENERAL DRAMA, WHERE THOU HAST ALLOTTED EVERY BEING, GREAT AND SMALL, ITS PROPER PART, &c.] See before p. 120. and Note LIII. See also Arr. Epict. l. 3. c. 22. p. 444.—*Σὺ ἤλ' εἰ δύνασαι, &c.* The Passage is sublime and great, but too long to be here inserted.

NOTE LXXIV. Ibid.—ENABLE US TO CURB DESIRE, &c. ENABLE US EVEN TO SUSPEND IT, &c. BE OUR FIRST WORK TO HAVE ESCAPED, &c.] *Ἀπόσχ'ε ποτὲ πανταπάσιν ὀρέξεως, ἵνα ποτὲ καὶ εὐλόγως ὀρεχθῇς.* Abstain for a time from Desire altogether, that in time thou mayst be able to desire rationally. Arr. Epict. l. 3. c. 13. p. 414. Again the same Author—*Σήμερον—ὀρέξει οὐκ ἐχρήσαμεν, ἐκκλίσει πρὸς μόνον τὰ προσαιρέλικα.*—To day my Faculty of Desire I have not used at all; my Aversion I have employed with respect only to things, which are in my power. l. 4. c. 4. p. 588. See also Enchir. c. 2. and Charact. V. III. p. 202. Plat. Gorg. p. 505. B. Tom. 1. Edit. Serr. *περὶ δὲ ψυχὴν*—

HORACE seems also to have alluded to this Doctrine:

*Virtus est, vitium fugere; & sapientia prima,
Stultitia caruisse*—Epist. 1. l. 1. v. 41.

NOTES on TREATISE the Third.

NOTE LXXV. p. 132.—LET NOT OUR LOVE THERE STOP, WHERE IT FIRST BEGINS, BUT INSENSIBLY CONDUCT IT, &c.] See *Plat. Symp.* p. 210. tom. 3. Edit. Serrani. Δεῖ γὰρ, ἔφη, τὸν ὀρθῶς ἰόντα ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ πράγματος ἀρχεσθαι, &c.

NOTE LXXVI. *Ibid.*—NOT THAT LITTLE CASUAL SPOT, WHERE, &c.] See *Arrian. Epict.* l. 1. c. 9. p. 51. *Socrates quidem, cum rogaretur, cujatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit: totius enim mundi se incolam & civem arbitrabatur.* *Tusc. Disp.* l. 5. c. 37. p. 427.

NOTE LXXVII. *Ibid.*—TEACH US EACH TO REGARD HIMSELF, BUT AS A PART OF THIS GREAT WHOLE; A PART, &c.] Πῶς ἔν λέγεται τῶν ἐκτός τινα κατὰ φύσιν, &c. In what Sense then (says the Philosopher, since all is referable to one universal Providence) are some things called agreeable to our Nature, and others the contrary? The Answer is, They are so called, by considering ourselves as detached, and separate from the Whole. For thus may I say of the Foot, when considered so apart, that it is agreeable to its Nature, to be clean and free from Filth. But if we consider it as a Foot, that is, as something not detached, but the Member of a Body, it will behoove it both to pass into the Dirt, and to trample upon Thorns, and even upon occasion to be lopped off, for the Preservation of the Whole. Were not this the case, it would be no longer a Foot. Something therefore of this kind should we conceive with respect to ourselves.—What art thou? A Man. If thou consider thy Being as something separate and detached, it is agreeable to thy Nature, in this View of Independence, to live to extreme Age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if thou consider thyself as a Man, and as the Member of a certain Whole; for the sake of that Whole, it will occasionally behoove thee, at one while to be sick, at another while to sail and risque the Perils of Navigation, at another while to be in want, and at last to die perhaps before thy time. Why therefore dost thou bear those Events impatiently? Knowest thou not, that after the same manner as the Foot ceaseth to be a Foot, so dost thou too cease to be longer a Man? *Arr. Epict.* l. 2. c. 5. p. 191.

NOTE LXXVIII. *Ibid.*—IN AS MUCH AS FUTURITY, &c.] Μέχρις ἂν ἀδελὰ μοι ἡ τὰ ἐξῆς, αἰεὶ τῶν εὐφρατέρων ἔχομαι, πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· αὐτὸς γὰρ μὲν ὁ θεὸς τοῖσιν ἐκλεκτοῖς ἐποίησεν· εἰ δὲ γε ἥδην, ὅτι νοσεῖν μοι καθεύμαρται νῦν, καὶ ὥρων ἂν ἐπ' αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πῶς, εἰ φρένας εἶχεν, ὥρμα ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ πηλᾶσθαι. *Arr. Epict.* l. 2. c. 6. p. 195. It appears that the above Sentiment was of *Chrysippus*. In the tenth Chapter of the same Book we have it repeated, tho' in Words somewhat different. Διὰ τῷ καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ φιλοσοφοὶ, ὅτι, &c. So *Seneca*—*Quicquid acciderit, sic ferre, quasi tibi volueris accidere. Debuisses enim velle, si scisses omnia ex decreto Dei fieri.* *Nat. Quæst.* iii. in Præfat.

NOTE LXXIX. p. 133.—THAT WE MAY KNOW NO OTHER WILL, THAN THINE ALONE, AND THAT THE HARMONY OF OUR PARTICULAR MINDS WITH THY UNIVERSAL, &c.—] Εἶναι δ' αὐτὸ τῷ τὴν τῷ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὐροίαν βίβ, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τῷ παρ' ἐκάστου δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τῷ ὅλῳ διοικήσει βέλῃσιν. The Virtue of a happy Man, and the Felicity of Life is this, when all things are transacted in Harmony of a Man's Genius, with the Will of Him, who administers the Whole. *Diog. Laert.* l. 7. c. 88.

p. 418.

p. 418. This is what *Epicetetus* calls τὴν αὐτῆ βέλῃσιν. συνάρμοσαι τοῖς γινομένοις, to attune or harmonize one's Mind to the things, which happen. Diff. l. 2. c. 14. p. 242.

NOTE LXXX. p. 133. YET SINCE TO ATTAIN THIS HEIGHT—IS BUT BARELY POSSIBLE, &c.] See before, page 123, &c. See also Notes LX. and LXII.

NOTE LXXXI. *Ibid.*—SUCH AS TO TRANSFORM US INTO SAVAGE BEASTS OF PREY, SULLEN, &c.] See before, Note LXXI.

NOTE LXXXII. *Ibid.* THAT ANIMATING WISDOM, WHICH PERVADES, AND RULES THE WHOLE, &c.] This Power is called by the Emperor *Marcus*—τὸν διὰ τῆς ἐσίας δῆκονία λόγον, καὶ—οἰκονομεῖν τὸ πᾶν. l. 5. f. 32.

NOTE LXXXIII. p. 134.—THAT MAGIC DIVINE, WHICH, &c.]—καὶ τὸ χάσμα ἐν τῇ λέοντι, καὶ το δηλητήριον, καὶ πᾶσα κακουργία, ὡς ἀκανθα, ὡς βόρβορος, ἐκείνων ἐπιγενήματα τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ καλῶν· μὴ ἐν αὐτῇ ἀλλότρια τέτε, ἢ σέσεις, φανιάζῃ· ἀλλὰ τὴν πάντων πηγὴν ἐπιλογίζε. M. Ant. l. 6. f. 36.—See also l. 4. f. 44. l. 3. f. 2. Ὡς περ γὰρ αἱ κωμῳδία (φῃσὶν) ἐπιγράμματα γελοῖα φέρουσιν, αὐτὰ καὶ ἐαυτὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φαῦλα, τῷ δὲ ὅλῳ ποιήματι χάριν τινα προστίθουσιν· ἔτως ψέξεις αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἐαυτῆς τὴν κακίαν, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἐκ ἀχρηστός ἐστι. Chrysip. and Plutarch. p. 1065. D.

Οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σὲ δίχα, Δαίμων,
Οὔτε καὶ αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον, ἔτ' ἐπὶ πόντῳ,
Πλὴν ὅποσα ῥέξουσιν κακοὶ σφειλέρουσιν ἀνοίαις.
Ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρλια θεῖναι,
Καὶ κοσμεῖν τὰ ἄκοσμα· καὶ ἔ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἔστιν.
Ὡδὲ γὰρ εἰς ἐν ἀπαντὰ συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν,
Ὡς θ' ἓνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντων. forf. ἐόντα.

Cleanthis Hymn. apud Steph. in *Poesi Philos.* p. 49, 50.

[THE Reader will observe that the fourth of the above Verses is supplied by the *Miscell. Observationes Criticæ*, Vol. VII. from a Manuscript of *Vossius* at *Leyden*.]

NOTE LXXXIV. *Ibid.*—WITH THESE MAY OUR MINDS BE UNCHANGEABLY TINGED, &c.]—βάπτεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ ψυχὴ—M. Ant. l. 5. f. 16.

NOTE LXXXV. *Ibid.*—WITH A RESERVE, &c.] μεθ' ὑπεξαίρεσως. See *Epicet.* *Enchirid.* c. 2. M. Ant. l. 4. f. 1. l. 5. f. 20. *Seneca* translates it, cum exceptione. See *De Beneficiis*, l. 4. f. 34.

NOTE LXXXVI. *Ibid.*—NEVER MISS WHAT WE WOULD OBTAIN, OR FALL INTO THAT WHICH WE WOULD AVOID, &c.] μήτε ὀρεγόμενον ἀποτυγχάνειν, μήτ' ἐκκλίνουσα περιπίπτειν. Arr. *Epicet.* l. 3. c. 12. p. 404.

NOTE LXXXVII. *Ibid.*—CONDUCT ME, THOU, &c.]

*Ἄγε δὲ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ γ' ἡ πεπρωμένη,
*Ὡποι ποθ' ὑμῖν ἐμὶ διατεταγμένῳ.
*Ὡς εἶφομαι γ' ἄκνῳ· ἦν δὲ γε μὴ θέλω,
Κακὸς γενόμενός, ἔδεν ἥττον εἶφομαι.

Cleanthes in *Epicet. Ench.* c. 52.

Thus

NOTES on TREATISE the Third.

Thus translated by Seneca :

*Duc me, parens, celsique dominator poli,
Quocunque placuit : nulla parendi mora est :
Adsum impiger, fac nolle : comitabor gemens,
Malusque patiar, quod bono licuit pati.* Epist. 107.

NOTE LXXXVIII. p. 135. IT IS HABIT, REPLIED HE, IS ALL IN ALL. IT IS PRACTICE AND EXERCISE, WHICH CAN ONLY, &c. &c. to the End of the Paragraph. — Ἀλλὰ πολλῆς ἔχει χρείαν παρασκευῆς καὶ πόνου πολλῆ καὶ μαθημάτων. Τί ἐν; ἐλπίζεις, ὅτι τὴν μεγίστην τέχνην ἀπὸ ὀλίγων ἐστὶν ἀπολαβεῖν; — But (says one, with respect to the virtuous Character) there is need of much Preparation, of much Labour and Learning. And what? Dost thou expect it should be possible (answers the Philosopher) to obtain, by little Pains, the chiefest GREATEST ART? Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 20. p. 111. Ἄφνω δὲ ταῦτα ἐγίνετο, ἐδὲ γενναῖον ἀνθρώπον ἀλλὰ δεῖ χεῖμασκήσθαι, παρασκευάσασθαι, καὶ μὴ ἐκτὴ προσπηδᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ μηδὲν προσήκοντα. No robust and mighty Animal is complete at once; nor more is the brave and generous Man. It is necessary to undergo the severest Exercise and Preparation, and not rashly plunge into things, which are no way suitable. Ejsfd. Dissert. l. 1. c. 2. p. 18. See also the same Author, l. 1. c. 15. p. 86. l. 2. c. 14. p. 243. Sed ut nec medici, nec imperatores, nec oratores, quamvis artis præcepta perceperint, quidquam magna laude dignum sine usu & exercitatione consequi possunt : sic officii conservandi præcepta traduntur illa quidem (ut facimus ipsi;) sed rei magnitudo usum quoque exercitationemque desiderat. Cic. de Offic. l. 1. c. 18. ἢ δ' ὉΙΚΗ ΕΞ ἘΘΟΥΣ περὶ γίνεσθαι ὁθεν καὶ τᾶνομα ἔσχηκε — Ethic. Nicom. l. 2. c. 1.

NOTE LXXXIX. Ibid. NOTHING IS TO BE HAD GRATIS, &c.] Προῖκα ἐδὲν γίνεσθαι. Arr. Epict. l. 4. c. 10. p. 653. The same Sentiment is often repeated by the same Author.

NOTE XC. p. 138. — WE ARE ALL GOVERNED BY INTEREST, &c.] See of the Dialogue, p. 121. 140. See also Notes LVI. and XCII.

NOTE XCI. p. 139. — IT IS A SMOAKY HOUSE — Καπνός ἐστι ἀπέρχομαι. M. Ant. l. 5. c. 29. See Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 25. p. 129.

NOTE XCII. Ibid. IS A SOCIAL INTEREST, &c.] As the STOICS, above all Philosophers, opposed a lazy inactive Life, so they were perpetually recommending a proper regard to the Public, and encouraging the Practice of every social Duty. And tho' they made the original Spring of every particular Man's Action, to be Self-love, and the prospect of private Interest; yet so intimately united did they esteem this private Interest with the public, that they held it impossible to promote the former, and not at the same time promote the latter. Τοιαύτην φύσιν τῆ λογικῆ ζῶας κατεσκευάσεν, ἵνα μηδενὸς τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθῶν δύνῃται τυχεῖν, εἰ μὴ τι εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ὠφέλιμον προσφέρῃται. οὕτως οὐκέτι ἀκοινώνητον γίνεσθαι, τὸ πάντα αὐτῷ ἕνεκα ποιεῖν. God hath so framed the Nature of the rational Animal, that it should not be able to obtain any private Goods, if it contribute not withal something profitable to the Community,

Community. Thus is there no longer any thing UNSOCIAL, IN DOING ALL THINGS FOR THE SAKE OF SELF. Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 19. p. 106.

THE Peripatetic Doctrine was much the same. Πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν, καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, κοινῇ τ' ἂν παντὶ εἴη τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι· ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν, δεῖ φιλαυτοῦ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὠφελήσει. Were all to aim jointly at the fair Principle of Honour, and ever strive to act what is fairest and most laudable, there would be to every one in common whatever was wanting, and to each Man in particular of all Goods the greatest, if Virtue deserve justly to be so esteemed. So that the good Man is necessarily a FRIEND to SELF: For by doing what is laudable, he will always himself be profited, as well as at the same time be beneficial to others. Ethic. Nicom. l. 9. c. 8.

NOTE XCIII. p. 139.—IF SO, THEN HONOUR AND JUSTICE ARE MY INTERESTS, &c.] Thus Cicero, after having supposed a social common Interest to be the natural Interest of Man; subjoins immediately—*Quod si ita est, una continemur omnes & eadem lege naturæ. Idque ipsum si ita est, certe violare alterum lege naturæ prohibemur.* De Offic. l. 3. c. 6.

NOTE XCIV. Ibid.—WITHOUT SOME PORTION OF WHICH NOT EVEN THIEVES, &c.]—*Cujus (sc. Justitiæ) tanta vis est, ut ne illi quidem, qui maleficio & scelere pascuntur, possint sine ulla particula justitiæ vivere. Nam qui eorum cuiquam, qui una latrocinantur, furatur aliquid aut eripit, is sibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum. Ille autem qui archipirata dicitur, nisi æquabiliter prædam, &c.* De Offic. l. 2. c. 11.

—Ἄλλ' ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη, φυσικῆς ὕψης τῆς κοινωνίας, εἶναι φύσει καὶ τὰ δίκαια, δι' ὧν ἐστὶν ἡ κοινωνία. Ὅτι γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον συνέχει τὴν κοινωνίαν, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδικωλάτων εἶναι δοκέων· ἔτοι δὲ εἰσιν οἱ λεηταί· οἷς ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία ὑπὸ δικαιοσύνης σώζεται τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Διὰ τε γὰρ τὸ μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀλλήλους, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ ψεύδεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τιμᾶν τὸ κρεῖττον δοκεῖν, καὶ τὸ τὰ συλκείμενα φυλάττειν, καὶ διὰ τὸ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀσθενέτεροις, διὰ ταῦτα ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀλλοτρίως κοινωνία συμμενεῖ· ὧν πᾶν τὸναντίον εἰς ἑς ἀδικᾷ ποιεῖσιν. It is necessary, SOCIETY being natural, that JUSTICE should be natural also, by which Society exists. For that Justice holds Society together, is evident in those, who appear of all the most unjust, such I mean as Robbers or Banditti, whose Society with each other is preserved by their Justice to each other. For by not aspiring to any unequal Shares, and by never falsifying, and by submitting to what appears expedient, and by justly guarding the Booty amassed together, and by assisting their weaker Companions, by these things it is, that their Society subsists; the contrary to all which they do by those, whom they injure. Alex. Aphrod. περὶ ψυχ. p. 156. Edit. Ald. See also Plat. de Repub. l. 1. p. 351. tom. 11. Edit. Serrani.

NOTE XCV. p. 140. WHAT THEN HAVE I TO DO, BUT TO ENLARGE VIRTUE INTO PIETY? NOT ONLY HONOUR, &c.]

ALL manner of Events, which any way affect a Man, arise either from within himself, or from Causes independent. In the former case, he maintains an active Part; in the latter,

latter, a *passive*. The *active* Part of his Character seems chiefly to be the Care of VIRTUE, for it is Virtue which teaches us what we are to *act* or *do*; the *passive* Part seems to belong more immediately to PIETY, because by this we are enabled to *resign* and *acquiesce*, and *bear* with a manly Calmness whatever befalls us. As therefore we are framed by Nature both to *act* and to *suffer*, and are placed in a Universe, where we are perpetually compelled to both; neither *Virtue* nor *Piety* is of itself sufficient, but to pass becomingly thro' Life, we should participate of *each*.

SUCH appears to have been the Sentiment of the wise and good *Emperor*—ἀνὴρ κεν ὅλον ἑαυτὸν, δικαιοσύνη μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργούμενα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις συμβαίνειν, τῇ τῶν ὅλων φύσει. Τί δ' ἐρεῖ τις, ἢ ὑπολήψεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἢ πράξει καὶ αὐτὸς, ἢ εἰς νέον βάλλεται, δύο τέτοις ἀρκέμεν; αὐτὸς δικαιοπραγεῖν τὸ νῦν πρᾶσσόμενον, καὶ φιλεῖν τὸ νῦν ἀπονεμόμενον ἑαυτῷ.—He (the perfect Man) commits himself wholly to JUSTICE, and the UNIVERSAL NATURE; TO JUSTICE, as to those things which are done by himself; and in all other Events, to the NATURE OF THE WHOLE. What any one will say, or think about him, or act against him, he doth not so much as take into consideration; contented and abundantly satisfied with these two things, himself TO DO JUSTLY what is at this Instant doing, and to APPROVE and LOVE what is at this Instant allotted him. M. Anton. l. 10. f. 11. Πάντα ἐκεῖνα, ἐφ' ἃ διὰ περιόδου εὐχῇ ἐλθεῖν, ἥδη ἔχειν δύνασθαι, εἰ μὴ σαυτῷ φθονῆς· τὸ δὲ ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ τὸ παρελθὸν καὶ ἀλπίης, καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐπιτρέψης τῇ προνοίᾳ, καὶ τὸ παρὸν μόνον ἀπευθύνῃς πρὸς ὈΣΙΟΤΗΤΑ καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗΝ· ὁσιότητα μὲν, ἵνα φιλήῃς τὸ ἀπονεμόμενον· σοὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἡ φύσις ἔφερε, καὶ σὲ τῷ δικαιοσύνῃ δὲ, ἵνα ἐλευθέρως καὶ χωρὶς περιπλοκῆς λέγῃς τε τ' ἀληθῆ, καὶ πράσῃς τὰ κατὰ νόμον καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν.—All those things, at which thou wishest to arrive by a road round about, thou mayst instantly possess, if thou dost not grudge them to thyself; that is to say, in other words, if every thing past thou intirely quit, if the future thou trust to Providence, and the present alone thou adjust according to PIETY and JUSTICE: according to Piety, that so thou mayst approve, and love what is allotted, (for whatever it be, it was Nature brought it to thee, and thee to it;) according to Justice, that so thou mayst generously and without disguise both speak the Truth, and act what is consonant to [the general] Law, and the real Value of things. M. Ant. l. 12. c. 1. See also l. 7. c. 54. and Plato's Gorgias, p. 507. Tom. 1. Edit. Scr. καὶ μὴν ὅγε σὺ φρον. κ. τ. λ.

NOTE XCVI. p. 140.—I HAVE AN INTEREST WHICH MAY EXIST, WITHOUT ALTERING THE PLAN OF PROVIDENCE; WITHOUT MENDING, &c.] Παιδεύεσθαι—τρίβει τὸ μαρθάνειν ἕκαστα ὅτω θέλει, ὡς, &c. To be instructed—that is to say, to learn so to will all things, as in fact they happen. And how do they happen? As He, who ordains them, hath ordained. Now he hath ordained that there should be Summer and Winter, and Plenty and Famine, and Virtue and Vice, and all manner of Contrarieties, for the Harmony of the Whole; and to each of us hath He given a Body, and its Members, and a Fortune, and certain Associates. Mindful therefore of this Order, ought we to come for Instruction, not indeed how we may alter what is already established, (for that neither is permitted us, nor would it be better so to be;) but how, while things continue around us, just as they are, and as is their Nature, we may still preserve our Judgment in harmony with all that happens. Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 12. p. 74.

NOTE

NOTE XCVII. p. 140. WHO WOULD BE UNHAPPY? WHO WOULD NOT, IF HE KNEW HOW, ENJOY ONE PERPETUAL FELICITY, &c.] — τῆς (sc. εὐδαιμονίας) γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντες πάντα πράττομεν. *It is for the sake of Happiness, we all of us do all other things whatever.* Ethic. Nicom. l. 1. c. 12 *sub fin.* — See before, of the Dialogue pages 121, 138. and Notes LVI. and XCII. Plat. Protag. p. 358. T. 1. Ed. Serr.

NOTE XCVIII. p. 141. — IF IT HAPPEN TO BE ERRONEOUS, IT IS A GRATEFUL ERROR, WHICH I CHERISH, &c.] Ἐὰν δὲ ἐξαπατηθῇ τινα εἴδει μαθεῖν, ὅτι τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπροαιρέτων ἂν ἔστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐγὼ μὲν ἤθελον τὴν ἀπάτην ταύτην, ἐξ ἧς ἡμελλον εὐρώως καὶ ἀταράχως βιώσασθαι. *Were a Man to be deceived, in having learnt concerning Externals, that all beyond our Power was to us as nothing; I, for my own part, would desire a Deceit, which would enable me for the future to live tranquil and undisturbed.* Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 4. p. 27.

NOTE XCIX. Ibid. — WHEN WE ARE ONCE, SAID HE, WELL HABITUATED TO THIS — MORAL SCIENCE, THEN LOGIC AND PHYSICS BECOME TWO PROFITABLE ADJUNCTS, &c.] *Ad easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, Dialecticam etiam adjungunt & Physicam, easque ambas virtutum nomine adpellant: alteram, quod habeat rationem ne cui falso adsentiamur, neve, &c.* Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 21. p. 265.

THE THREEFOLD DIVISION of PHILOSOPHY into *Ethics*, *Physics*, and *Logic*, was commonly received by most Sects of Philosophers. See *Laert.* l. 7. c. 39. See also *Cicero* in his *Treatise de Legibus*, l. 1. c. 23. and in his *Academics*, l. 1. c. 5. *Fuit ergo jam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex, &c.* *Plutarch de Placit. Philos.* p. 874.

Note XCII. p. 110. Who would be unhappy? Who would not be happy?—
 to know how to be happy is the first step to happiness. It is the first step to
 the knowledge of the human mind. It is the first step to the knowledge of the
 human heart. It is the first step to the knowledge of the human soul.

Note XCIII. p. 111. It is a common error to suppose that a man is a
 man, when I know that he is a man. It is a common error to suppose that a
 man is a man, when I know that he is a man. It is a common error to suppose
 that a man is a man, when I know that he is a man. It is a common error to
 suppose that a man is a man, when I know that he is a man.

Note XCIX. p. 112. When we are angry, said he, we are well satisfied
 to this—Moral Science, then, Logic and Ethics, are the two pillars
 of the human mind. It is a common error to suppose that a man is a man,
 when I know that he is a man. It is a common error to suppose that a man
 is a man, when I know that he is a man.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Notes, chiefly taken from Greek Manuscripts, are
 added partly to explain, partly to give the Reader a Specimen of certain
 Works, valuable for their Rarity, as well as for their Merit.

A D D I T I O N A L N O T E O N T R E A T I S E the Second.

PAGE 33.—THE NECESSARY ARTS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN PRIOR, &c.

THE following Extract from a Manuscript of *Philoponus* may help to shew the comparative Priority of Arts and Sciences, by shewing (according to this Author) the order of their Revival in a *new formed Society*. Such Society he supposes to have arisen from scattered Individuals again assembling themselves, after former Societies had by various Incidents of War, Famine, Inundation, and the like, been dissipated and destroyed.

HAVING spoken of the Effects of *Deucalion's Flood*, he proceeds as follows—Οὗτοι ἦν οἱ περιλειφθέντες, μὴ ἔχοντες ὅθεν ἂν τραφεῖεν, ἐπενόησαν ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τὰ πρὸς χρείαν, οἷον τὸ ἀλήθειν μύλαις σῆτον, ἢ τὸ σπείρειν, ἢ τι τοιῶτον ἄλλο· καὶ ἐκάλεσαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπίνοιαν σοφίαν, τὴν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τῷ βίῳ τὸ λυσιτελεῖς ἐξευρίσκασαν, καὶ σοφὸν τὸν ἐπινενοηκότα.

Πάλιν ἐπενόησαν τέχνας, ὡς φησὶν ὁ ποιητής,

—ὑποθημοσύνησιν Ἀθῆνης,

ἔ μόνον τὰς μέχρι τῆς εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνάγκης ἱσαμένας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρι τῶ καλῶ καὶ ἀγέῃς προΐσας· καὶ τῷ πάλιν σοφίαν κενκήμασιν, καὶ τὸν εὐρόντα σοφόν· ὡς τὸ,

—σοφὸς ἦραρε τέκνων,

Ἐν εἰδῶς σοφίης—

—ὑποθημοσύνησι δ' Ἀθῆνης εἶπεν, ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῶν εὐρημάτων εἰς θεὸν τὴν τάτων ἐπίνοιαν ἀνέφερον.

Πάλιν, ἀπέβλεψαν πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, καὶ ἐξέυρον νόμους, καὶ πάντα τὰ συνιστᾶν τὰς πόλεις· καὶ ταύτην πάλιν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν σοφίαν ἐκάλεσαν· τοιοῦτοι γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ ἐπὶ σοφοί, πολιτικὰς τινὰς ἀρετὰς εὐρόντες.

Εἶτα λοιπὸν, ὁδῶ προϊόντες, καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὰ τὰ σώματα, καὶ τὴν δημιουργὸν αὐτῶν προῆλθον φύσιν, καὶ ταύτην ἐδικώτερον φυσικὴν ἐκάλεσαν θεωρίαν, καὶ σοφὸς τὸς τὴν τοιαύτην μετιόντας σκέψιν.

Additional Note on Treatise the Second.

Τελευταῖον δ' ἐπ' αὐτὰ λοιπὸν ἔφθασαν τὰ θεῖα, καὶ ὑπερκόσμια, καὶ ἀμετάβλητα παντελῶς, καὶ τὴν τῶν Γνῶσιν κυριωτάτην σοφίαν ὠνόμασαν.

THESE therefore, that were thus left, not having whence they could support themselves, began thro' necessity to contrive things relative to immediate Want, such as the grinding of Corn by Mills, or the sowing it, or something else of the like kind; and such Contrivance, discovering what was conducive to the Necessaries of Life, they called Wisdom, and him a wise Man, who had been the Contriver.

AGAIN, they contrived Arts (as Homer says)

By Precepts of Minerva—

that is, not only those Arts, that stop at the Necessity of Life, but those also that advance as far as the Fair and Elegant; and this too they called Wisdom, and the Inventor a wise Man. Thus the Poet:

—The Work

'Twas a wise Artist fram'd, his Wisdom taught

By Precepts of Minerva—

The last Words are added, because, from the Transcendence of the Inventions, they referred their contrivance to a Divinity.

AGAIN, they turned their Eyes to Matters Political, and found out Laws, and the several things that constitute Cities, or civil Communities; and this Contrivance in its turn they called Wisdom, and of this sort were those celebrated Seven Wise Men, the Inventors of certain Virtues Political.

AFTER this, still advancing in a road, they proceeded to corporeal Substances, and to Nature, their efficient Cause; and this Speculation, by a more specific Name, they called Natural Speculation, and those Persons wise, who pursued such Inquiries.

LAST of all, they attained even to Beings divine, supramundane, and wholly unchangeable; and the Knowledge of these they named THE MOST EXCELLENT WISDOM.

A FEW Observations on this important Passage may not perhaps be improper.

OUR first Observation is, that tho' we give it from *Philoponus*, yet is it by him (as he informs us) taken from a Work of *Aristocles*, an ancient Peripatetic, intitled, *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*, *Concerning Philosophy*. Some indeed have conjectured that for *Aristocles* we ought to read *Aristoteles*, because the last published a Work under this title, which he quotes himself in his Treatise, *De Animâ*. Be this as it may, the Extract itself is valuable, not only for its Matter, but for being the Fragment of a Treatise now no longer extant.

OUR next Observation is, that by *Matters Political* in the third Paragraph, the Author means not the *first* Associations of Mankind, for these were prior to almost every thing

thing else, and were not referable to *Art*, but to the *innate* Impulse of the social Principle: He means on the contrary those *more exquisite* and *artificial Forms*, given to Societies already established, in order to render them happy, and rescue and preserve them from *tyrannic Power*. Such was the Polity given by *Lycurgus* to the *Lacedemonians*, by *Solon* to the *Athenians*, by *Numa* to the *Romans*, &c. Those great and good Men, in meditating their Institutions, had the same Sentiment with *Alcidamas*, according to that noble Fragment of his preserved in the Scholiast upon *Aristotle's Rhetoric*—
 Ἐλευθέρας ἀφῆκε πάντας θεός· ἔδνα δ᾽ ἄλλον ἢ φύσις πεποίηκεν. *God hath sent forth all Men free; Nature hath made no Man a Slave.*

OUR third Observation is, that by the *most excellent Science*, in the last Paragraph, is meant the Science of *Causes*, and, above all others, of *Causes efficient* and *final*, as these necessarily imply pervading Reason, and superintending Wisdom. This Science, as Men were naturally led to it from the Contemplation of *Effects*, which Effects were the Tribe of Beings *natural* or *physical*, was, from being thus *subsequent to these physical Inquiries*, called *Metaphysical*; but with a View to itself, and the transcendent Eminence of its *Object*, was more properly called ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία, *THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY*.

OUR fourth Observation is on the *Order* of these Inventions, namely, *Arts necessary*; *Arts elegant*; *Arts political*; *Science physical*; *Science metaphysical*; in all, *five Habits*, or *Modes of Wisdom*. The *necessary Arts* it is evident must on all Accounts have come first. When these were once established, the Transition to the *Elegant* was easy and obvious. Inventions of *Necessity*, by the Super-additions of Dispatch, Facility, and the like, soon ripened into Inventions of *Convenience*; and again these, having in their very nature a certain Beauty and Grace, easily suggested Inventions of pure and simple *Elegance*.

THAT the Legislators, tho' in Rank and Genius far superior to all natural Philosophers, should come before them in point of time, is owing to the nature of their *Subject*, which had a more immediate Connection with *Man*, and *Human Happiness*. It was not indeed till Societies were thoroughly established, and Peace had been well secured both internally and externally, that Men had Leisure, or even Inclination, to reflect on the Objects round them, or to recognize that vast Mansion, in which they found themselves existing.

LASTLY, as the *tremendous Part* of *physical Events* led weak Minds, who could not explain them, into the Abyss of dark and dreary *Superstition*; so those *physical Events*, which had *Beauty* and *Order*, being in their turn equally striking, and equally Objects of Admiration, led strong and generous Minds into Principles the very reverse. They conceived it probable, as their own Views were limited, that, even where Beauty and Order were not to them apparent, they might still in other views have a most real Existence. Farther, as these Observers could perceive nothing done either by themselves, or those of their own Species, which, if it in the least aspired to Utility, or Beauty, was not necessarily the Effect of a *conscious* and *intelligent Cause*, they were, from the superior Utility and Beauty of *physical Effects*, induced to infer a *conscious* and *intelligent Cause* of these, *far superior* to themselves; a Cause, which from the *Universality* of these Events,

Additional Note on Treatise the Second.

as well as from their *Union* and *Sympathy*, was not, as are the Sons of Men, a *Multitude of limited Causes*, but a *simple Cause, universal* and *one*; a Cause too, which, from the never-ceasing of its Events, was not, like the same human Beings, an *intermittent Cause*, but a *Cause, ever operating, ever in Energy*.

WE see therefore the Reason why this FIRST PHILOSOPHY was *subsequent in point of Time* to *physical Speculation*, and why of course to the other Habits or Modes of Wisdom here enumerated, tho' in its own Dignity and Importance far superior to them all.

OUR fifth Observation is, that as a Nation may be said to be in a State of Perfection, which is in the full Possession of all these Habits, or Modes of Wisdom; so those Nations are nearest to Perfection, that possess them in the greatest *Number*, or in a state of the greatest *Maturity*.

A MAN of Ingenuity might find rational Amusement from this Speculation, by comparing the same Nation as to these Matters, either with itself in different Periods, or with its Neighbours in the same Periods, either past or present. He might for example compare *antient Britain* with *antient Greece*; *present Britain* with *present Greece*; *Britain* in the Age of *Crusades*, with *Britain* in the Age of *Elizabeth*; *present Britain*, with her Colonies; with *Italy*, *France*, *Holland*, and the enlightened Countries; with *Spain*, *Portugal*, *Barbary*, &c. But this we leave, as foreign to our Work, and drawing us into a Theory, which merits a better place than an occasional Note.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

TREATISE the Third.

PAGE 67, &c.—AND THAT THE DIFFERENCE LAY ONLY IN THE APPLYING THEM TO PARTICULARS.] So *Proclus* in his *Manuscript Comment* on the *first Alcibiades* of *Plato*, p. 139. Ἡ κοινὴ καὶ ἀδιάστροφος ἐννοία τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῇ αὐταρκείᾳ χαρακτηρίζει· παρ' ὧν γὰρ τὸ εὖ, παρὰ τέτων καὶ τὸ αὐταρκές. καὶ ὅρᾳς δὴ πάλιν ὅπως ἐνταῦθα καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης κατορθοῖ μὲν κατὰ τὴν μείζονα, σφάλλεται δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐλάττωνα πρότασιν. Συλλογίζεται γὰρ ἕτως· ἐγὼ διὰ σῶμα, καὶ γένος, καὶ φίλους, καὶ πλῆτον, εὐδαίμων· ὁ εὐδαίμων ἀνευδής· ἐγὼ (φησὶν) ἀνευδής ἔκην. ὅτι μὲν ὁ εὐδαίμων ἀνευδής, ἀληθές· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὸς εὐδαίμων, ψευδές. τὸ γὰρ συμπέρασμα ψευδές διὰ τὴν ἐλάττωνα. καὶ ἕτως εὐρήσεις καὶ τὸν φιλήδονον, καὶ τὸν φιλοχρήματον, διὰ ταύτην ψευδομένους· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡδονὴν, ὁ δὲ χρήματα τίθεται τὸ ἀγαθόν· ὅτι δὲ πᾶν τὸ ἐφετὸν ἀγαθόν, κοινὸν ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς. καὶ συνελόντι φάναι, τὰς μὲν μείζους τῶν προτάσεων ἕκαστοι τιθέασιν, ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν καὶ τῆς λόγου ταύτης προβάλλοντες, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττω ἀπὸ φαύλας, ἀπὸ αἰσθησεως, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων προφέρονται παθῶν· διὸ καὶ ταύταις μὲν διαφέρονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐκείναις δὲ ὁμοφρονέσι. τὰ μὲν γὰρ πάθη μερισμῷ καὶ διαστάσεως ἐστὶν αἷτια ταῖς ψυχαῖς· τιτανικὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ, καὶ διασπᾷ, καὶ σπαράττει τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν νῦν· ὁ δὲ λόγος κοινὸς ἐστὶ πᾶσι, καὶ ἡ τῆς λόγου προβολή, καὶ διὰ τῆτο ΚΟΙΝΟΣ Ο ΕΡΜΗΣ, ἵνα δὴ καὶ ἠθικῶς αὐτὴ ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἐξήγησιν.

The UNIVERSAL and unperverted Idea of Man characterises HAPPINESS by SELF-SUFFICIENCY. For with whomever Well-being exists, with them the Self-sufficient exists also. You see therefore, how here again Alcibiades is right as to his MAJOR PROPOSITION, but mistaken as to the MINOR. For thus it is he syllogizes—"I, on account of my Person and Family and Friends and Wealth, am HAPPY.—The Person HAPPY is SUPERIOR TO WANT—therefore am I SUPERIOR TO WANT." Now that, THE PERSON HAPPY IS SUPERIOR TO WANT, is true; but that HE WAS HAPPY, was false. THE CONCLUSION therefore is FALSE thro' the MINOR PROPOSITION.

It is thus also You will find the Lover of Pleasure, and the Lover of Money, erring in their Reasonings, thro' the same Proposition. For one of them lays down the Good of Man to be Pleasure, the other to be Riches; but that every thing DESIRABLE is GOOD, this they possess in common, and assent to on both sides.

IT

It may be said indeed universally, that all Individuals produce the GENERAL PROPOSITIONS, which they lay down, from their COMMON or UNIVERSAL IDEAS, and from the Faculty of REASON; but that their MINOR PROPOSITIONS are produced from IMAGINATION, from SENSE, and from irrational PASSIONS. And hence it is, that about these LAST they differ one with another, while in the FORMER they all agree. THE PASSIONS indeed may be considered within the Souls of Men as the Causes of Division and Distance; for they are TITANIC, and distract and tear our Intellect to pieces. But REASON is the same and common to all, as is also the Faculty of Speech, the Medium of its Promulgation. And hence it is, that HERMES (the Type of rational Discourse) is called COMMON and UNIVERSAL, if we may be allowed to give of him an Ethical Explanation.

P. 106.—FIX OUR HAPPINESS IN THE MERE DOING.] So Proclus—Πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ τῆς σπουδαίας πράξεις πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔχουσι τὴν ἀναφορὰν· ἐνεργήσας ἢ ἐνεργητικῶς καὶ θεοπρεπῶς, ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ τέλος ἔχει. All the Actions of the virtuous Man have reference to himself. When therefore he has energized beneficently and divinely, it is IN THE VERY ENERGY ITSELF THAT HE OBTAINS HIS END.—This from the same MS. Comment as the Note preceding.

P. 126.—THE GENUINE SPHERE AND GENUINE CYLINDER, &c.]—ἀλλ' ἦγε ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ πολλῶ καὶ ἀκριβέστερα καὶ καθαρώτερα τῶν φαινομένων ἐπινοεῖν δύναται, καὶ γεννᾶν· τὸν γ' ἐν φαινόμενον κύκλον ἐπιδιορθῶται, καὶ λέγει, καθόσον ἔτος ἀπολείπεται τῆς ἀκριβείας, καὶ δῆλον, ὡς ὁρῶσά τι τέττα κάλλιον ἄλλο καὶ τελειότερον εἶδος· ἔ γάρ τις μηδενὸς ἐφαπτομένη, μηδὲ εἰς τι καθαρώτερον βλέψασα, τῆτο μὲν ἔ φησιν ὄντως εἶναι καλόν, τῆτο δὲ ἔ πάντη ἴσον· αὐτὴ γὰρ τῷ λέγειν ταῦτα, δείκνυσιν ὡς ὅρα· ΤΟ ΠΑΝΘΙ ΚΑΛΟΝ καὶ ΠΑΝΘΙ ΙΣΟΝ. Our Soul is able both to perceive and to produce Objects much more accurate and pure, than those which are visibly apparent. It corrects therefore the apparent Circle, and says, how much that Circle wants of the Perfect one; and this it evidently does, by beholding some FORM, which is fairer than the visible one, and more perfect. It is not indeed possible, that, without connection with any thing else, or without looking upon something more pure, it should say that this is not really Fair, this is not in every respect Equal: For by these very Assertions, it proves that it beholds THAT WHICH IS IN EVERY RESPECT FAIR, AND IN EVERY RESPECT EQUAL. From the MS. Comment of Proclus on the Parmenides, Book the Third.

Ibid.—The Source of infinite Truths, &c.] The Antients held four Methods or Processes in their Dialectic for the Investigation of Truth: First the Divisive (ἡ διαζευκτική) by which we divide and separate the real Attributes of Being; next the Definitive, (ἡ ὁριστική) by which we bring them again together, and by a just arrangement form them into Definitions; thirdly, the Demonstrative; (ἡ ἀποδεικτική) in which we employ those Definitions, and by syllogizing descend thro' them from Causes to Effects; and lastly the Analytic (ἡ ἀναλυτική) in which, by an inverse Process we unravel Demonstrations, and so ascend from Effects to Causes.

Now to all these Methods they held ΕΙΔΗ, that is, SPECIFIC FORMS or IDEAS to be indispensably requisite, from their two important Characters of Permanence, and Comprehension.

HENCE

HENCE it is that *Proclus*, in the fifth Book of his Comment on the *Parmenides*, having gone thro' the several Methods above mentioned, concludes with the following remark.

Εἰ ἄρα μή ἐστι τὰ Εἰδή, ἐκ ἑσονται αἱ διαλεκτικοὶ μέθοδοι, καὶ ὅς τὰ ὄντα γινώσκωμεν, ἐδ' ὅποι πρέφομεν τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχομεν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς, μάλιστα ποθέουσα τὴν αἰτίαν, ἐπὶ τὰ Εἰδή καταφεύγει. *If therefore there are no SPECIFIC IDEAS or FORMS, there can be none of those Dialectic Methods, by which we come to the Knowledge of things, nor shall we know whither to direct our Discursive Faculty; for this is that Power of the Soul, which, desiring above all others the Cause or Reason of things, flies for that Purpose to FORMS or SPECIFIC IDEAS.*

P. 129.—NOT THE SMALLEST ATOM IS EITHER FOREIGN OR DETACHED.]—ἐδὲν ἔν ἐστιν ἄτιμος καὶ φαῦλον, ὃ μὴ μετέχει τῆ ἀγαθῆς, καμειθεν ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν ὕλην εἴποις, εὐρήσεις καὶ ταύτην ἀγαθόν· καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ κακόν, εὐρήσεις καὶ τῆτο μετέχον ἀγαθῆς τινός, καὶ ἐδὲ ἄλλως ὑποσηναί δύναμενον, ἢ τῷ ἀγαθῷ χρωρυνόμενον, καὶ μεταλαμβάνον ἀγαθῆς τινός· ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων δοξαὶ σμικρὰ καὶ ἐντελῇ τῆς θείας αἰτίας ἐξάπλιν ἐξαισχύνοινται, πρὸς τὴν τέτων ἀποβλέπεται φύσιν, ἢ πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνης δύναμιν, καὶ ὅτι τῶν μειζόνων ἔσα γεννητικὴ πολλὰ πλεον ἐστὶ τῶν ἐλασσόνων· οἱ δὲ ὄντως φιλόσοφοι, πάντα ὅσα πέρα ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ σμικρὰ προνοίας ἐξάψαντες, ἐδὲν ἄτιμον, ἐδὲ ἀποβλητὸν ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τῆς Διὸς ὀρῶσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀγαθὰ, καθόσον ἐκ προνοίας ὑφέστηκε, καὶ καλὰ, κατ' αἰτίαν γεγονότα τὴν θείαν. *There is therefore nothing ignoble and base, which doth not participate of THE GOOD PRINCIPLE, and hath not from thence its Origin. Should you even instance MATTER, you will find even that to be Good; should you instance EVIL itself, you will find that also participating of some Good, and no otherwise able to subsist, than as COLOURED BY GOOD, and partaking of it. The Opinions indeed of ordinary men are ashamed to refer little and contemptible Things to the [primary and] divine Cause, looking [in their reasonings] to the Nature of the Subjects, not to the Power of the Cause, and [to this necessary consequence] that if it be productive of the greater Effects, much more so is it of the inferior. But those on the contrary, who are truly Philosophers, referring all Things both great and small, that exist in the Universe, to a PROVIDENCE, behold nothing fit to be rejected in this MANSION of JOVE, but all Things GOOD, as having been established by a PROVIDENCE, and FAIR, as having been produced by a CAUSE, WHICH IS DIVINE. Proclus in his manuscript Comment on the Parmenides of Plato.*

P. 134.—WHO ART OF PURER EYES, THAN EVER TO BEHOLD INIQUITY.]—An Ear, that was to hear a musical Discord *alone*, would have Ideas of Dissonance, unknown to that Ear, which, *along with* the Discord, was to hear its Preparation and Resolution. An Eye, that was to see *only* the Words—*venis & cæco carpitur*—would have Ideas of Absurdity, unknown to that Eye, which was to behold the Verse *intire*:

Vulnus alis venis, et cæco carpitur igni.

Numerous are the Ideas of Defect, Errour, Absurdity, Falshood, &c. all referable to this Class; Ideas, which arise purely from *partial* and *incomplete* Comprehension, and which

VOL. I.

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have

have no Existence, where the Comprehension is *universal* and *complete*. It seems to be from this reasoning, that *Themistius* asserts—τιμιώτερος γὰρ Νῆς, ἔχ' ὁ τὰ πλείω νοῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ τὰ ἀμείω. THE MORE RESPECTABLE MIND is not that, which perceiveth the GREATER NUMBER of Objects, but THE BETTER and MORE EXCELLENT ones. *Them. in Aristot. de Anim. p. 92. Edit. Ald.*

P O S T S C R I P T.

WE must not conclude, without saying a few words on the elegant Frontispiece, with which these Three Treatises are adorned.

THE Figure in the middle represents NATURE; that, which is crowning her, VIRTUE; both after the antique. The several *Genii*, or *Youths*, represent the tribe of ARTS, all of which are seen in various manners attending upon NATURE, as having a necessary * Reference to her in all their Operations.

OF ARTS (as has been † said already) some imitate Nature, others cultivate and finish her.

THE *Genii* or *Youths* in the fore-ground represent the *Imitative Arts*; He with the Lyre, *Music*; He with the Scroll, *Poetry*; He with the Tablet, *Painting*. A Busto stands near them, to denote *Sculpture*; and they are grouped together from their known Affinity.

IF we proceed, we may imagine the different Parts of the Column to denote *Architecture*; the *Youth*, plowing with Oxen, to denote *Agriculture*; two Arts, which have this in common, that they exert their Powers on the ‡ insensitive Parts of Nature. Not so the *Youth*, who is managing the Horse: In Him we see the Force of Art, where Nature is living and || sensitive.

ALL these latter Arts are distinguished from the *imitative*, as being Powers, by which Nature is adorned and cultivated.

To the same Class we may refer those Arts, characterised by the three *Youths*, placed immediately over Nature, of whom one holds a Basket of Flowers, which the others are throwing upon her; as also the two below, who are decorating her with a Festoon.

As these last *Youths* by their several Employments appear to co-operate with the Figure representing VIRTUE, they may be supposed to exhibit those higher Arts of Cultivation, which

* P. 17.

† P. 26, 156.

‡ P. 27.

|| P. 27.

P O S T S C R I P T.

which peculiarly respect the * *rational* Nature; those *Arts*, that *Virtue* presides over, by prescribing their Mode and Limits, and while these in an *inferior* Degree render *Nature* more accomplished, VIRTUE with a superior dignity *places the Crown upon her Head*.

MR. STUART, the ingenious Designer of this Piece, has not only distinguished himself as a Painter in the *Disposition* of his Figures, and in their graceful *Attitudes*; but has contrived withal, that each of them should have a *meaning*; each *apply with Propriety* to some one of the several Treatises.

THE whole Design *taken together*, by exhibiting NATURE as a *passive Subject*, on which ART in all its Species is seen to operate as an *efficient Cause*, has an immediate reference to THE FIRST TREATISE, *where Art is considered in a view the most general and comprehensive*.

THE *three Youths*, that bear the Symbols of a Lyre, a Scroll, and Tablet, by denoting the MIMETIC OR IMITATIVE ARTS, have reference to THE SECOND TREATISE, *where those Arts in particular are examined and compared*.

THE *two principal Figures* in the Design, one of which is seen crowning the other, as they shew the *Honours* and *Pre-eminence* that NATURE derives from VIRTUE, characterise very aptly the Subject of THE THIRD TREATISE, which professes to prove, that the *Perfection and Happiness* of Human Nature are only to be obtained thro' the *Medium of a moral and a virtuous Life*.



J. A. Stuart Esq. del.

J. A. Baire sculpt.

HERMES.

HERMES
OR
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQVIRY
CONCERNING
VNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

ΕΙΣΙΕΝΑΙ ΘΑΡΡΟΥΝΤΑΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΓΑΡ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΤΑΥΘΑ ΘΕΟΥΣ.

First published in the Year 1751.

THE HERMITE

A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

CONCERNING THE

SCIENCE OF THE

UNIVERSE

BY

THE

HERMITE

OF

THE

UNIVERSE

BY

THE

HERMITE

OF

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UNIVERSE

BY

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HERMITE

OF

THE

To the Right Honourable

PHILIP *Lord* HARDWICKE,

Lord High Chancellor of *Great Britain**.

MY LORD,

AS no one has exercised the Powers of Speech with juster and more universal applause, than yourself; I have presumed to inscribe the following Treatise to your Lordship, its End being to investigate the Principles of those Powers. It has a farther claim to your Lordship's Patronage, by being connected in some degree with that politer Literature, which, in the most important scenes of Business, you have still found time to cultivate. With regard to myself, if what I have written be the

* The above Dedication is printed as it originally stood, the Author being desirous that what he intended as a real Respect to the noble Lord, when living, should now be considered, as a Testimony of Gratitude to his Memory.

fruits

DEDICATION.

fruits of that Security and Leisure, obtained by living under a mild and free Government; to whom for this am I more indebted, than to your Lordship, whether I consider you as a Legislator, or as a Magistrate, the first both in dignity and reputation? Permit me therefore thus publicly to assure your Lordship, that with the greatest gratitude and respect I am,
My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obliged,

and most obedient humble Servant,

*Close of Salisbury,
Oct. 1, 1751.*

James Harris.

P R E F A C E.

THE chief End, proposed by the Author of this Treatise in making it public, has been to excite his Readers to curiosity and inquiry; not to teach them himself by prolix and formal Lectures, (from the efficacy of which he has little expectation) but to induce them, if possible, to become Teachers to themselves, by an impartial use of their own understandings. He thinks nothing more absurd than the common notion of Instruction, as if Science were to be poured into the Mind, like water into a cistern, that passively waits to receive all that comes. The growth of Knowledge he rather thinks to resemble the growth of Fruit; however external causes may in some degree co-operate, it is the internal vigour, and virtue of the tree, that must ripen the juices to their just maturity.

This then, namely, the exciting men to inquire for themselves into subjects worthy of their contemplation, this the Author declares to have been his first and principal motive for appearing in print. Next to that, as he has always been a lover of Letters, he would willingly approve his studies to the liberal and ingenuous. He has particularly named these, in distinction to others; because, as his studies were never prosecuted with the least regard to lucre, so they are no way calculated for any lucrative End. The liberal therefore and ingenuous (whom he has mentioned already) are those, to whose perusal he offers what he has written. Should they judge favourably of his attempt, he may not perhaps hesitate to confess,

Hoc juvat et melli est.—

VOL. I.

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For

H E R M E S:

For tho' he hopes he cannot be charged with the foolish love of vain Praise, he has no desire to be thought indifferent, or insensible to honest Fame.

From the influence of these sentiments, he has endeavoured to treat his subject with as much order, correctness, and perspicuity as in his power; and if he has failed, he can safely say (according to the vulgar phrase) that the failure has been his misfortune, and not his fault. He scorns those trite and contemptible methods of anticipating pardon for a bad performance, that "it was the hasty fruits of a few idle hours; " written merely for private amusement; never revised; published against " consent, at the importunity of friends, copies (God knows how) having by stealth gotten abroad;" with other stale jargon of equal falsehood and inanity. May we not ask such Prefacers, If what they allege be true, what has the world to do with them and their crudities.

As to the Book itself, it can say this in its behalf, that it does not merely confine itself to what its title promises, but expatiates freely into whatever is collateral; aiming on every occasion to rise in its inquiries, and to pass, as far as possible, from small matters to the greatest. Nor is it formed merely upon sentiments that are now in fashion, or supported only by such authorities as are modern. Many Authors are quoted, that now-a-days are but little studied; and some perhaps, whose very names are hardly known.

The Fate indeed of antient Authors (as we have happened to mention them) is not unworthy of our notice. A few of them survive in the Libraries

P R E F A C E.

braries of the learned, where some venerable Folio, that still goes by their name, just suffices to give them a kind of nominal existence. The rest have long fallen into a deeper obscurity, their very names, when mentioned, affecting us as little, as the names, when we read them, of those subordinate Heroes,

Alcandrumque, Haliumque, Noemonaque, Prytanimque.

Now if an Author, not content with the more eminent of antient Writers, should venture to bring his reader into such company as these last, among people (in the fashionable phrase) that nobody knows; what usage, what quarter can he have reason to expect? Should the Author of these speculations have done this (and it is to be feared he has) what method had he best take in a circumstance so critical?—Let us suppose him to apologize in the best manner he can, and in consequence of this, to suggest as follows—

He hopes there will be found a pleasure in the contemplation of antient sentiments, as the view of antient Architecture, tho' in ruins, has something venerable. Add to this, what from its antiquity is but little known, has from that very circumstance the recommendation of novelty; so that here, as in other instances, Extremes may be said to meet. Farther still, as the Authors, whom he has quoted, lived in various ages, and in distant countries; some in the full maturity of Grecian and Roman Literature; some in its declension; and others in periods still more barbarous, and depraved; it may afford perhaps no unpleasing speculation, to see how the SAME REASON has at all times prevailed; how there is ONE TRUTH, like one Sun, that has enlightened human Intelligence through

H E R M E S :

every age, and saved it from the darkness both of Sophistry and Error.

Nothing can more tend to enlarge the Mind, than these extensive views of Men, and human Knowledge ; nothing can more effectually take us off from the foolish admiration of what is immediately before our eyes, and help us to a juster estimate both of present Men, and present Literature.

It is perhaps too much the case with the multitude in every nation, that as they know little beyond themselves, and their own affairs, so out of this narrow sphere of knowledge, they think nothing worth knowing. As we BRITONS by our situation live divided from the whole world, this perhaps will be found to be more remarkably our case. And hence the reason that our studies are usually satisfied in the works of our own Countrymen ; that in Philosophy, in Poetry, in every kind of subject, whether serious or ludicrous, whether sacred or profane, we think perfection with ourselves, and that it is superfluous to search farther.

The Author of this Treatise would by no means detract from the just honours due to those of his Countrymen, who either in the present, or preceding age, have so illustriously adorned it. But tho' he can with pleasure and sincerity join in celebrating their deserts, he would not have the admiration of these, or of any other few, to pass thro' blind excess into a contempt of all others. Were such Admiration to become universal, an odd event would follow ; a few learned men, without any fault of their own, would contribute in a manner to the extinction of Letters.

A like

P R E F A C E.

A like evil to that of admiring only the authors of our own age, is that of admiring only the authors of one particular Science. There is indeed in this last prejudice something peculiarly unfortunate, and that is, the more excellent the Science, the more likely it will be found to produce this effect.

There are few Sciences more intrinsically valuable, than MATHEMATICS. It is hard indeed to say, to which they have more contributed, whether to the Utilities of Life, or to the sublimest parts of Science. They are the noblest Praxis of LOGIC, or UNIVERSAL REASONING. It is thro' them we may perceive, how the stated Forms of Syllogism are exemplified in one Subject, namely the Predicament of Quantity. By marking the force of these Forms, as they are applied here, we may be enabled to apply them of ourselves elsewhere. Nay farther still—by viewing the MIND, during its process in these syllogistic employments, we may come to know in part, what kind of Being it is; since MIND, like other Powers, can be only known from its Operations. Whoever therefore will study Mathematics in this view, will become not only by Mathematics a more expert Logician, and by Logic a more rational Mathematician, but a wiser Philosopher, and an acuter Reasoner, in all the possible subjects either of science or deliberation.

*But when Mathematics, instead of being applied to this excellent purpose, are used not to exemplify Logic, but to supply its place; no wonder if Logic pass into contempt, and if Mathematics, instead of furthering science, become in fact an obstacle. For when men, knowing nothing of that Reasoning which is universal, come to attach themselves for years to a single Species, a species wholly involved in Lines and
Numbers*

P R E F A C E.

Numbers only; they grow insensibly to believe these last as inseparable from all Reasoning, as the poor Indians thought every horseman to be inseparable from his horse.

And thus we see the use, nay the necessity of enlarging our literary views, lest even Knowledge itself should obstruct its own growth, and perform in some measure the part of ignorance and barbarity.

Such then is the Apology made by the Author of this Treatise, for the multiplicity of antient quotations, with which he has filled his Book. If he can excite in his readers a proper spirit of curiosity; if he can help in the least degree to enlarge the bounds of Science; to revive the decaying taste of antient Literature; to lessen the bigotted contempt of every thing not modern; and to assert to Authors of every age their just portion of esteem; if he can in the least degree contribute to these ends, he hopes it may be allowed, that he has done a service to mankind. Should this service be a reason for his Work to survive, he has confessed already, it would be no unpleasing event. Should the contrary happen, he must acquiesce in its fate, and let it peaceably pass to those destined regions, whither the productions of modern Wit are every day passing,

— in vicum vendentem thus et odores.

HERMES

OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

CONCERNING

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

INTRODUCTION.

Design of the Whole.

IF Men by nature had been framed for Solitude, they had never felt an Impulse to converse one with another: And if, like lower Animals, they had been by nature irrational, they could not have recognized the proper Subjects of Discourse. Since SPEECH then is the joint Energie of our best and noblest Faculties (*a*), (that is to say, of our *Reason* and our *social Affection*) being withal our peculiar Ornament and Distinction, as *Men*; those Inquiries may surely be deemed interesting as well as liberal, which either search how SPEECH may be naturally *resolved*; or how, when resolved, it may be again *combined*.

Ch. I.

HERE

(a) See p. 85 to 98. See also Note xv. p. 162, and Note xix. p. 164,

Ch. I.

HERE a large field for speculating opens before us. We may either behold SPEECH, as divided into *its constituent Parts*, as a Statue may be divided into its several Limbs; or else, as resolved into its *Matter and Form*, as the same Statue may be resolved into its Marble and Figure.

THESE different *Analysings* or *Resolutions* constitute what we call (b) PHILOSOPHICAL, or UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

WHEN we have viewed SPEECH thus *analysed*, we may then consider it, as *compounded*. And here in the first place we may contemplate that (c) *Synthesis*, which *by combining simple Terms* produces a *Truth*; then *by combining two Truths* produces a *third*; and thus others, and others, in continued Demonstration, till we are led, as by a road, into the regions of SCIENCE.

Now this is that *superior* and most excellent *Synthesis*, which alone applies itself to our *Intellect* or *Reason*, and which to conduct according to Rule, constitutes the Art of LOGIC.

AFTER

(b) *Grammaticam etiam bipartitam ponemus, ut alia sit literaria, alia philosophica, &c. Bacon, de Augm. Scient. VI. 1. And soon after he adds—Verumtamen hanc ipsam re moniti, cogitatione complexi sumus Grammaticam quandam, quæ non analogiam verborum ad invicem, sed analogiam inter verba et res sive rationem sedulò inquirat.*

(c) *Aristotle says—τῶν δὲ καὶ ἀμνηστῶν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕθεν ἢτε ἀληθὲς ἢτε ψευδὲς εἶναι οἷον ἄνθρωπος, λευκός, τρέχει, νικά—Of those words which are spoken without Connection, there is no one either true or false; as for instance, Man, white, runneth, conquereth. Cat. C. 4. So again in the beginning of his Treatise De Interpretatione, περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν εἶναι τὸ ψευδὲς τε καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. True and False are seen in Composition and Division. Composition makes affirmative Truth, Division makes negative, yet both alike bring Terms together, and so far therefore may be called synthetical.*

AFTER this we may turn to those (*d*) inferior Compositions, which are productive of the *Pathetic*, and the *Pleasant* in all their kinds. These latter Compositions aspire not to the Intellect, but being addressed to the *Imagination*, the *Affections*, and the *Sense*, become from their different heightnings either RHETORIC or POETRY.


NOR need we necessarily view these Arts distinctly and apart; we may observe, if we please, how perfectly they co-incide. GRAM-

MAR

(*d*) Ammonius in his Comment on the Treatise Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, p. 53, gives the following Extract from Theophrastus, which is here inserted at length, as well for the Excellence of the Matter, as because it is not (I believe) elsewhere extant.

Διτῆς γὰρ ἔστι τῆς λόγου σχέσεως, (καθ' ἣν διώρισεν ὁ φιλόσοφος Θεόφραστος) τῆς τε ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΚΡΟΩΜΕΝΟΥΣ, οἷς καὶ σημαίνει τι, καὶ τῆς ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ λέγων πείσσαι προτίθεται τὰς ἀκροωμένους, περὶ μὲν ἕν τὴν σχέσιν αὐτῆς τὴν ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΚΡΟΑΤΑΣ καταγίνονται ποιητικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ, διότι ἔργον αὐταῖς ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰ σεμνότερα τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δεδημευμένα, καὶ ταῦτα ἑναρμονίως συμπλέκειν ἀλλήλοις, ὥστε διὰ τῶν καὶ τῶν τῆς ἐπομένῃς, οἷον σαφηνείας, γλκύσεως, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ιδέων, ἔτι τε μακρολογίας, καὶ βραχυλογίας, καὶ αἰετὸν πάντων παραλαμ-
βανομένων, οἷσαι τε τὸν ἀκροατὴν, καὶ ἐκπλήξαι, καὶ πρὸς τὴν πείθω χειρωθέντα ἔχειν τῆς δὲ γε ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ τῆς λόγου σχέσεως ὁ φιλόσοφος προσηγμένως ἐπιμελήσεται, τό, τε ψεῦδος διελέγχων, καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποδεικνύς. The Relation of Speech being twofold (as the Philosopher Theophrastus hath settled it) one to the HEARERS, to whom it explains something, and one to the THINGS, concerning which the Speaker proposes to persuade his Hearers: With respect to the first Relation, that which regards the HEARERS, are employed Poetry and Rhetoric. Thus it becomes the business of these two, to select the most respectable Words, and not those that are common and of vulgar use, and to connect such Words harmoniously one with another, so as thro' these things and their consequences, such as Perspicuity, Delicacy, and the other Forms of Eloquence, together with Copiousness and Brevity, all employed in their proper season, to lead the Hearer, and strike him, and hold him vanquished by the power of Persuasion. On the contrary, as to the Relation of Speech to THINGS, here the Philosopher will be found to have a principal employ, as well in refuting the False, as in demonstrating the True.

Sanctius speaks elegantly on the same Subject. Creavit Deus hominem rationis participem; cui, quia Sociabilem esse voluit, magno pro munere dedit Sermonem. Sermoni autem perficiendo tres opifices adhibuit. Prima est Grammatica, quæ ab oratione solacismos & barbarismos expellit; secunda Dialectica, quæ in Sermonis veritate versatur; tertia Rhetorica, quæ ornatum Sermonis tantum exquirat. Min. l. 1. c. 2.

Ch. I.  MAR is equally requisite to every one of the rest. And though LOGIC may indeed subsist without RHETORIC or POETRY, yet so necessary to these last is a sound and correct LOGIC, that without it, they are no better than warbling Trifles.

Now all these Inquiries (as we have said already) and such others arising from them as are of still sublimer Contemplation, (of which in the Sequel there may be possibly not a few) may with justice be deemed Inquiries both interesting and liberal.

At present we shall postpone the whole synthetical Part, (that is to say, *Logic* and *Rhetoric*) and confine ourselves to the analytical, that is to say, UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. In this we shall follow the Order, that we have above laid down, first dividing SPEECH, as a WHOLE, into its CONSTITUENT PARTS; then resolving it, as a COMPOSITE, into its MATTER and FORM; two Methods of Analysis very different in their kind, and which lead to a variety of very different Speculations.

SHOULD any one object, that in the course of our Inquiry we sometimes descend to things which appear trivial and low; let him look upon the effects, to which those things contribute, then from the Dignity of the Consequences, let him honour the Principles.

THE following Story may not improperly be here inserted. “ When
 “ the Fame of *Heraclitus* was celebrated throughout *Greece*, there
 “ were certain persons, that had a curiosity to see so great a Man.
 “ They came, and, as it happened, found him warming himself in
 “ a Kitchen.

“ a Kitchen. The meanness of the place occasioned them to stop; Ch. I.
 “ upon which the Philosopher thus accosted them—ENTER (says
 “ he) BOLDLY, FOR HERE TOO THERE ARE GODS (e).”

WE shall only add, that as there is no part of Nature too mean for the Divine Presence; so there is no kind of Subject, having its foundation in Nature, that is below the Dignity of a philosophical Inquiry.

(e) See *Aristot. de Part. Animal.* l. 1. c. 5.

C H A P. II.

Concerning the Analysing of Speech into its smallest Parts.

Ch. II.

THOSE things which are *first to Nature*, are not *first to Man*. Nature begins from *Causes*, and thence descends to *Effects*. *Human Perceptions* first open upon *Effects*, and thence by flow degrees ascend to *Causes*. Often had Mankind seen the Sun in Eclipse, before they knew its Cause to be the Moon's Interposition: much oftner had they seen those unceasing Revolutions of Summer and Winter, of Day and Night, before they knew the Cause to be the Earth's double Motion (a). Even in Matters of Art and human Creation,

(a) This Distinction of *first to Man*, and *first to Nature*, was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic Philosophy. See *Arist. Phys. Auscult.* l. 1. c. 1. *Themistius's* Comment on the same, *Poster. Analyt.* l. 1. c. 2. *De Anima*, l. 2. c. 2. It leads us, when properly regarded, to a very important Distinction between Intelligence *Divine* and Intelligence *Human*. God may be said to view the First, as first; and the Last, as last; that is, he views *Effects* thro' *Causes* in their *natural Order*. MAN views the Last, as first; and the First, as last; that is, he views *Causes* thro' *Effects*, in an *inverse Order*. And hence the Meaning of that Passage in *Aristotle*: ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὄμματα πρὸς τὸ φέγγος ἔχει τὸ μεθ' ἡμέραν, ἔτω καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ Νῆς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανερώτατα πάντων. *As are the Eyes of Bats to the Light of the Day, so is Man's Intelligence to those Objects, that are by Nature the brightest and most conspicuous of all Things.* *Metaph.* l. 2. c. 1. See also l. 7. c. 4. and *Ethic. Nicom.* l. 1. c. 4. *Ammonius*, reasoning in the same way, says very pertinently to the Subject of this Treatise—Ἀγαπητὸν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ἐκ τῶν ἀτελεστέρων καὶ συνθέτων ἐπὶ τὰ ἀπλότερα καὶ τελειότερα προΐεναι· τὰ γὰρ σύνθετα μᾶλλον συνήθη ἡμῖν, καὶ γνωριμώτερα· Οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὁ παῖς εἶραι μὲν λόγον, καὶ εἰπεῖν, Σωκράτης περιπαλεῖ, οἶδε· τῆτον δὲ ἀναλύσαι εἰς ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς συλλαβὰς, κακείνα εἰς γοιχεῖα, ἐμέτι· *Human Nature may be well contented to advance from the more imperfect and complex to the more simple and perfect; for the complex Subjects are more familiar to us, and better known. Thus therefore it is that even a Child*

Creation, if we except a few Artists and critical Observers, the rest look no higher than to the *Practice* and mere *Work*, knowing nothing of those *Principles*, on which the whole depends.

THUS in SPEECH for example—All men, even the lowest, can speak their Mother-Tongue. Yet how many of this multitude can neither write, nor even read? How many of those, who are thus far literate, know nothing of that Grammar, which respects the Genius of their own Language? How few then must be those, who know GRAMMAR UNIVERSAL; *that Grammar*, which without regarding the several Idioms of particular Languages, *only respects those Principles, that are essential to them all?*

'TIS our present Design to inquire about this Grammar; in doing which we shall follow the Order consonant to *human* Perception, as being for that reason the more easy to be understood.

WE shall begin therefore first from a *Period* or *Sentence*, that combination in Speech, which is obvious to all; and thence pass, if possible, to those its *primary Parts*, which, however essential, are only obvious to a few.

WITH respect therefore to the different Species of Sentences, who is there so ignorant, as if we address him in his Mother-Tongue, not to know when 'tis we *assert*, and when we *question*; when 'tis we *command*, and when we *pray* or *wish*?

FOR
a Child knows how to put a Sentence together, and say, Socrates walketh; but how to resolve this Sentence into a Noun and Verb, and these again into Syllables, and Syllables into Letters or Elements, here he is at a loss. Am. in Com. de Prædic. p. 29.

Ch. II.

For example, when we read in *Shakespeare**,

*The Man, that hath no music in himself,
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for Treasons——*

Or in *Milton*†,

*O Friends, I hear the tread of nimble feet,
Hasting this way——*

'tis obvious that these are *assertive Sentences*, one founded upon Judgment, the other upon Sensation.

WHEN the Witch in *Macbeth* says to her Companions,

*When shall we three meet again
In thunder, lightning, and in rain?*

this 'tis evident is an *interrogative Sentence*.

WHEN *Macbeth* says to the Ghost of *Banquo*,

*——Hence, horrible Shadow,
Unreal Mock'ry, hence!——*

he speaks an *imperative Sentence*, founded upon the passion of hatred.

WHEN

* *Merchant of Venice*.

† P. L. IV. 866.

WHEN Milton says in the character of his *Allegro*,

*Haste thee, Nymph, and bring with thee
Jest and youthful Jollity,*

he too speaks an *imperative Sentence*, tho' founded on the passion, not of hatred but of love.

WHEN in the beginning of the *Paradise Lost*, we read the following address,

*And chiefly thou, O Spirit, that dost prefer
Before all temples th' upright heart, and pure,
Instruct me, for thou know'st—*

this is not to be called an *imperative Sentence*, tho' perhaps it bear the same Form, but rather (if I may use the Word) 'tis a Sentence *precativè* or *optative*.

WHAT then shall we say? Are Sentences to be quoted in this manner without ceasing, all differing from each other in their stamp and character? Are they no way reducible to certain definite Classes? If not, they can be no objects of *rational* comprehension.—Let us however try.

'Tis a phrase often applied to a man, when speaking, that *he speaks his MIND*; as much as to say, that his Speech or Discourse is *a publishing of some Energie or Motion of his Soul*. So it indeed is in every

Ch. II. every one that speaks, excepting alone the Dissembler or Hypocrite; and he too, as far as possible, affects the appearance.

Now the POWERS OF THE SOUL (over and above the meer * nutritive) may be included all of them in those of PERCEPTION, and those of VOLITION. By the Powers of PERCEPTION, I mean the *Senses* and the *Intellect*; by the Powers of VOLITION, I mean, in an extended sense, not only the *Will*, but the several *Passions* and *Appetites*; in short, *all that moves to Action, whether rational or irrational.*

IF then the leading Powers of the Soul be these two, 'tis plain that every Speech or Sentence, as far as it exhibits the Soul, must of course respect one or other of these.

IF we *assert*, then is it a Sentence which respects the Powers of PERCEPTION. For what indeed is to *assert*, if we consider the examples above alleged, but to *publish some Perception either of the Senses or the Intellect*?

AGAIN, if we *interrogate*, if we *command*, if we *pray*, or if we *wish*, (which in terms of Art is to speak Sentences *interrogative, imperative, precative, or optative*) what do we but publish so many different VOLITIONS?—For who is it that *questions*? He that has a *Desire* to be informed.—Who is it that *commands*? He that has a *Will*, which he would have obey'd.—What are those Beings, who either *wish* or *pray*? Those, who feel certain wants either for themselves, or others.

IF

* Vid. Aristot. de An. II. 4.

IF then the *Soul's leading Powers* be the two above mentioned, and it be true that *all Speech is a publication of these Powers*, it will follow that EVERY SENTENCE WILL BE EITHER A SENTENCE OF ASSERTION, OR A SENTENCE OF VOLITION. And thus, by referring all of them to one of these two classes, have we found an expedient to reduce their infinitude (b).

THE Extensions of Speech are quite indefinite, as may be seen if we compare the *Eneid* to an Epigram of *Martial*. But the longest
Extension,

(b) Ῥηλεόν ἔν' ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρης διτλᾶς ἐχέσῃς δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν γνωστικὰς, τὰς δὲ ζωτικὰς, τὰς καὶ ὁρεκτικὰς λεγομένας· (λέγω δὲ γνωστικὰς μὲν, καθ' ἃς γινώσκομεν ἑκάστον τῶν ὄντων, οἷον νῦν, διάνοιαν, δόξαν, φαντασίαν καὶ αἰσθησιν· ὁρεκτικὰς δὲ, καθ' ἃς ὁρεγόμεθα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἢ τῶν ὄντων, ἢ τῶν δοκούντων, οἷον βέλυσιν λέγω, προαίρεσιν, θυμὸν, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν) τὰ ΜΕΝ τέτταρα εἶδη τῆς λόγου (τὰ παρὰ τὸν ἀποφαντικὸν) ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρεκτικῶν δυνάμεων προέρχονται τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐκ αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτὴν ἐνεργείας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀποτελειομένης (τὸν συμβάλλεσθαι δοκούντα πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς ὁρέξεως) καὶ ἥτοι λόγον παρ' αὐτῆς ζητήσης, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆ ΠΤΥΣΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ καὶ ΕΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ καλεμένῃς λόγῃ, ἢ πρᾶγμα, καὶ εἰ πρᾶγμα, ἥτοι αὐτῆς ἐκείνης τυχεῖν ἐφειμένης, πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆ ΚΛΗΤΙΚΟΥ, ἢ τινὸς παρ' αὐτῆς πράξεως· καὶ ταύτης, ἢ ὡς παρὰ κρείττονος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ΕΥΧΗΣ, ἢ ὡς παρὰ χείρονος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆ κυρίως καλεμένης ΠΡΟΣΤΑΞΕΩΣ· μόνον ΔΕ τὸ ΑΠΟΦΑΝΤΙΚΟΝ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωστικῶν, καὶ ἐστὶ τῷτο ἐξαγγελτικὸν τῆς γενομένης ἐν ἡμῖν γνώσεως τῶν πραγμάτων ἀληθῶς, ἢ φαινομένως, διὸ καὶ μόνον τῷτο δεκτικὸν ἐστὶν ἀληθείας ἢ ψεύδους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἕδεν. The Meaning of the above passage being implied in the Text, we take its translation from the Latin Interpreter. *Dicendum igitur est, cum anima nostra duplicem potestatem habeat, cognitionis, & vitæ, quæ etiam appetitionis ac cupiditatis appellatur, quæ vero cognitionis est, vis est, quâ res singulas cognoscimus, ut mens, cogitatio, opinio, phantasia, sensus: appetitus vero facultas est, quâ bona, vel quæ sunt, vel quæ videntur, concupiscimus, ut sunt voluntas, consilium, ira, cupiditas: quatuor orationis species, præter enunciantem, a partibus animi proficiscuntur, quæ concupiscunt; non cum animus ipse per se agit, sed cum ad alium se convertit, qui ei ad consequendum id, quod cupit, conducere posse videatur; atque etiam vel rationem ab eo exquirat, ut in oratione, quam Percunctantem, aut Interrogantem vocant; vel rem: sique rem, vel cum ipsum consequi cupit, quicum loquitur, ut in optante oratione, vel aliquam ejus actionem: atque in hac, vel ut a præstantiore, ut in Deprecatione; vel ut ab inferiore, ut in eo, qui proprie Jussus nominatur. Sola autem Enuncians a cognoscendi facultate proficiscitur: hæcque nunciat rerum cognitionem, quæ in nobis est, aut veram, aut simulatam. Itaque Hæc sola verum falsumque capit: præterea vero nulla.* Ammon. in Libr. de Interpretatione.

Ch. II. *Extension*, with which Grammar has to do, is the *Extension* here considered, that is to say, a *SENTENCE*. The greater *Extensions* (such as *Syllogisms*, *Paragraphs*, *Sections*, and complete *Works*) belong not to Grammar, but to Arts of higher order; not to mention that all of them are but *Sentences* repeated.

Now a *SENTENCE* (c) may be sketch'd in the following description—a *compound Quantity of Sound significant, of which certain Parts are themselves also significant*.

THUS when I say [*the Sun shineth*] not only the *whole quantity* of sound has a meaning, but *certain Parts* also, such as [*Sun*] and [*shineth*.]

BUT what shall we say? Have these *Parts* again other *Parts*, which are in like manner significant, and so may the progress be pursued to infinite? Can we suppose all *Meaning*, like *Body*, to be divisible, and to include within itself other *Meanings* without end? If this be absurd, then must we necessarily admit, that there is such a thing as a *Sound significant, of which no Part is of itself significant*. And this is what we call the proper character of a (d) *WORD*. For thus, though

(c) Λόγος δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ, ἥς ἔνια μέρη καθ' αὐτὰ σημαίνει τι. Arist. Poet. c. 20. See also de Interpret. c. 4.

(d) Φωνὴ σημαντικὴ, — ἥς μέρος ἕδεν ἔστι καθ' αὐτὸ σημαντικόν. De Poetic. c. 20. De Interpret. c. 2 & 3. Priscian's Definition of a Word (Lib. 2.) is as follows—*Dictio est pars minima orationis constructa, id est, in ordine composita. Pars autem, quantum ad totum intelligendum, id est, ad totius sensus intellectum. Hoc autem ideo dictum est, ne quis conetur vires in duas partes dividere, hoc est, in vi & res; non enim ad totum intelligendum hæc fit divisio.* To Priscian we may add Theodore Gaza.—Λέξις δὲ, μέρος ἐλάχιστον κατὰ σύνταξιν λόγου. Introd. Gram. l. 4. Plato shewed them this characteristic of a Word—See *Cratylus*, p. 385. Edit. Serr.

though the Words [*Sun*] and [*shineth*] have each a Meaning, yet is there certainly no Meaning in any of their Parts, neither in the Syllables of the one, nor in the Letters of the other.

IF therefore ALL SPEECH, whether in prose or verse, every Whole, every Section, every Paragraph, every Sentence, imply a certain *Meaning, divisible into other Meanings*, but WORDS imply a *Meaning, which is not so divisible*: it follows that WORDS *will be the smallest parts of speech*, in as much as nothing less has any Meaning at all.

To know therefore the species of Words, must needs contribute to the knowledge of Speech, as it implies a knowledge of its *minute* Parts.

THIS therefore must become our next Inquiry.

C H A P. III.

Concerning the species of Words, the smallest Parts of Speech.

Ch. III. **L**ET us first search for the *Species* of Words among those Parts of Speech, commonly received by Grammarians. For example, in one of the passages above cited—

*The Man, that hath no music in himself,
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons—*

Here the Word [*The*] is an ARTICLE;—[*Man*] [*No*] [*Music*] [*Concord*] [*Sweet*] [*Sounds*] [*Fit*] [*Treasons*] are all NOUNS, some *Substantive*, and some *Adjective*—[*That*] and [*Himself*] are PRONOUNS—[*Hath*] and [*is*] are VERBS—[*mov'd*] a PARTICIPLE—[*Not*] an ADVERB—[*And*] a CONJUNCTION—[*In*] [*with*] and [*For*] are PREPOSITIONS. In one sentence we have all those Parts of Speech, which the *Greek* Grammarians are found to acknowledge. The *Latins* only differ in having no Article, and in separating the INTERJECTION, as a Part of itself, which the *Greeks* include among the Species of *Adverbs*.

WHAT then shall we determine? why are there not more Species of Words? why so many? or if neither more nor fewer, why these and not others?

To

To resolve, if possible, these several Queries, let us examine any Sentence that comes in our way, and see what differences we can discover in its Parts. For example, the same Sentence above.

The Man that hath no Music, &c.

ONE Difference soon occurs, that some Words are *variable*, and others *invariable*. Thus the Word *Man* may be varied into *Man's* and *Men*; *Hath*, into *Have*, *Hast*, *Had*, &c. *Sweet* into *Sweeter* and *Sweetest*; *Fit* into *Fitter* and *Fittest*. On the contrary, the Words *The*, *In*, *And*, and some others, remain as they are, and *cannot be altered*.

AND yet it may be questioned, how far this Difference is essential. For in the first place, there are Variations, which can be hardly called necessary, because only some Languages have them, and others have them not. Thus the *Greeks* have the *dual* Variation, which is unknown both to the Moderns, and to the ancient *Latins*. Thus the *Greeks* and *Latins* vary their Adjectives by the *triple Variation* of Gender, Case, and Number; whereas the *English* never vary them in any of those ways, but thro' all kinds of Concord preserve them still the same. Nay even those very Variations, which appear most necessary, may have their places supplied by other methods; some by *Auxiliars*, as when for *Bruti*, or *Bruto*, we say, *of Brutus*, *to Brutus*; some by *meer Position*, as when for *Brutum amavit Cassius*, we say, *Cassius lov'd Brutus*. For here the *Accusative*, which in *Latin* is known any where from its *Variation*, is in *English* only known from its *Position* or place.

Ch. III. If then the Distinction of Variable and Invariable will not answer our purpose, let us look farther for some other more essential.

SUPPOSE then we should dissolve the Sentence above cited, and view its several *Parts* as they stand *separate* and detached. Some 'tis plain *still preserve a Meaning* (such as *Man, Music, Sweet, &c.*) others on the contrary *immediately lose it* (such as *And, Thee, With, &c.*) Not that these last have no meaning at all, but in fact they never have it, but when *in company, or associated*.

Now it should seem that this Distinction, if any, was essential. For all Words are significant, or else they would not be Words; and if every thing not *absolute*, is of course *relative*, then will all Words be significant either *absolutely* or *relatively*.

WITH respect therefore to this Distinction, the first sort of Words may be call'd *significant by themselves*; the latter may be call'd *significant by relation*; or if we like it better, the first sort may be call'd *Principals*, the latter *Accessories*. The first are like those stones in the basis of an Arch, which are able to support themselves, even when the Arch is destroyed; the latter are like those stones in its Summit or Curve, which can no longer stand, than while the whole subsists (*e*).

§ THIS

(*e*) Apollonius of Alexandria (one of the acutest Authors that ever wrote on the subject of Grammar) illustrates the different power of Words, by the different power of Letters. "Ἐτι, ὅν τρόπον τῶν στοιχείων τὰ μὲν ἐσι φωνήεντα, ἃ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ φωνὴν ἀποτελεῖ· τὰ δὲ σύμφωνα, ἅπερ ἄνευ τῶν φωνηέντων ἔχει ῥητὴν τὴν ἐκφώνησιν. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐστὶν ἐπινοῆσαι κατὰ τῶν λέξεων.

§ THIS Distinction being admitted, we thus pursue our Speculations. All things whatever either *exist as the Energies, or Affections, of some other thing*, or *without being the Energies or Affections of some other thing*. If they exist as the Energies or Affections of something else, then are they called ATTRIBUTES. Thus *to think* is the attribute of a Man; *to be white*, of a Swan; *to fly*, of an Eagle; *to be four-footed*, of a Horse. If they exist not after this manner, then are they called SUBSTANCES*. Thus *Man, Swan, Eagle, and Horse*, are none of them Attributes, but all Substances, because however they may exist in Time and Place, yet neither of these, nor of any thing else, do they exist as Energies or Affections.

AND thus all things whatsoever, being either (f) *Substances or Attributes*, it follows of course that all Words, which are significant as Principals,

λέξεων. αἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν, τρόπον τινὰ τῶν φωνηέντων ῥηταί ἐσι· καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ῥημάτων, ὀνομάτων, ἀντωνυμιῶν, ἐπιρρημάτων—αἱ δὲ, ὥσπερ εἰς σύμφωνον, ἀναμένεσι τὰ φωνήεντα, ἢ δυνάμενα κατ' ἰδίαν ῥητὰ εἶναι—καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν προθέσεων, τῶν ἀρθρῶν, τῶν συνδέσμων· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα αἰετὶ τῶν μορίων συσσημαίνει. In the same manner, as of the Elements or Letters, some are Vowels, which of themselves complete a Sound; others are Consonants, which without the help of Vowels have no express Vocality; so likewise may we conceive as to the nature of Words. Some of them, like Vowels, are of themselves expressive, as is the case of Verbs, Nouns, Pronouns, and Adverbs; others, like Consonants, wait for their Vowels, being unable to become expressive by their own proper strength, as is the case of Prepositions, Articles, and Conjunctions; for these parts of Speech are always Consignificant, that is, are only significant, when associated to something else. Apollon. de Syntaxi. L. 1. c. 3. Itaque quibusdam philosophis placuit NOMEN & VERBUM SOLAS ESSE PARTES ORATIONIS; cætera vero, ADMINICULA vel JUNCTURAS earum: quomodo navium partes sunt tabulæ & trabes, cætera autem (id est, cæra, stuppa, & clavi & similia) vincula & conglutinationes partium navis (hoc est, tabularum & trabium) non partes navis dicuntur. Priſc. L. XI. 913.

* SUBSTANCES.] Thus Aristotle. Νῦν μὲν ἐν τύπῳ εἴρηται, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένον, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ τὰ ἄλλα. Metaph. Z. γ. p. 106. Ed. Sylb.

(f) This division of things into Substance and Attribute seems to have been admitted by Philosophers of all Sects and Ages. See Categor. c. 2. Metaphys. L. VII. c. 1. De Cælo, L. III. c. 1.

Ch. III. *Principals*, must needs be significant of either the one or the other. If they are *significant of Substances*, they are call'd *Substantives*; if of *Attributes*, they are called *Attributives*. So that ALL WORDS *whatever, significant as Principals, are either SUBSTANTIVES or ATTRIBUTIVES*.

AGAIN, as to Words, which are only significant as *Accessories*, they acquire a signification either from being associated to one Word, or else to many. If to one Word alone, then as they can do no more than in some manner *define* or *determine*, they may justly for that reason be called DEFINITIVES. If to many Words at once, then as they serve to no other purpose than to connect, they are called for that reason by the name of CONNECTIVES.

AND thus it is that all WORDS whatever are either *Principals* or *Accessories*; or under other Names, either *significant from themselves*, or *significant by relation*.—If *significant from themselves*, they are either *Substantives* or *Attributives*; if *significant by relation*, they are either *Definitives* or *Connectives*. So that under one of these four Species, SUBSTANTIVES, ATTRIBUTIVES, DEFINITIVES, and CONNECTIVES, are ALL WORDS, *however different, in a manner included*.

IF any of these Names seem new and unusual, we may introduce others more usual, by calling the *Substantives*, NOUNS; the *Attributives*, VERBS; the *Definitives*, ARTICLES; and the *Connectives*, CONJUNCTIONS.

SHOU'D it be ask'd, what then becomes of *Pronouns*, *Adverbs*, *Prepositions*, and *Interjections*; the answer is, either they must be found included

included within the Species above-mentioned, or else must be admitted for so many Species by themselves.

Ch. III.

§ THERE were various opinions in ancient days, as to the *number* of these Parts, or Elements of Speech.

Plato in his * Sophist mentions only two, the *Noun* and the *Verb*. Aristotle mentions no more, where he treats of † Prepositions. Not that those acute Philosophers were ignorant of the other Parts, but they spoke with reference to *Logic* or *Dialectic* (g), considering the Effence of Speech as contained in these two, because *these alone* combined make a perfect *assertive* Sentence, which none of the rest without them are able to effect. Hence therefore Aristotle in his * *treatise of Poetry* (where he was to lay down the elements of a more variegated Speech) adds the *Article* and *Conjunction* to the Noun and Verb,

* Tom. I. p. 261. Edit. Ser.

† De Interpr. c. 2 & 3.

(g) *Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum Dialecticos duæ, NOMEN & VERBUM; quia hæ solæ etiam per se conjunctæ plenam faciunt orationem; alias autem partes συγκατασκευάσματα, hoc est, con significantia appellabant. Priscian. l. 2. p. 574. Edit. Putschii. Existit hic quædam quæstio, cur duo tantum, NOMEN & VERBUM, se (Aristoteles sc.) determinare promittat, cum plures partes orationis esse videantur. Quibus hoc dicendum est, tantum Aristotelem hoc libro diffinisse, quantum illi ad id, quod instituerat tractare, suffecit. Tractat namque de simplici enuntiativa oratione, quæ scilicet hujusmodi est, ut junctis tantum Verbis et Nominibus componatur.—Quare superfluum est quærere, cur alias quoque, quæ videntur orationis partes, non proposuerit, qui non totius simpliciter orationis, sed tantum simplicis orationis instituit elementa partiri. Boetius in Libr. de Interpretat. p. 295. Apollonius from the above principles elegantly calls the NOUN and VERB, τὰ ἐμψυχότατα μέρη τῶ λόγου, the most animated parts of Speech. De Syntaxi, l. 1. c. 3. p. 24. See also Plutarch. Quæst. Platon. p. 1009.*

* Poet. Cap. 20.

Ch. III. Verb, and so adopts the same Parts, with those established in this Treatise. To *Aristotle's* authority (if indeed better can be required) may be added that also of the elder *Stoics* (*h*).

THE latter *Stoics* instead of four Parts made five, by dividing the Noun into the *Appellative* and *Proper*. Others increased the number, by detaching the *Pronoun* from the Noun; the *Participle* and *Adverb* from the Verb; and the *Preposition* from the Conjunction. The *Latin Grammarians* went farther, and detached the *Interjection* from the Adverb, within which by the *Greeks* it was always included, as a Species.

WE are told indeed by (*i*) *Dionysius* of *Halicarnassus* and *Quintilian*, that *Aristotle*, with *Theodectes*, and the more early writers, held but three Parts of speech, the Noun, the Verb, and the Conjunction. This, it must be owned, accords with the oriental Tongues, whose Grammars (we are (*k*) told) admit no other. But as to *Aristotle*,

(*h*) For this we have the authority of *Dionysius* of *Halicarnassus*, *De Struct. Orat. Sect. 2.* whom *Quintilian* follows, *Inst. l. 1. c. 4.* *Diogenes Laertius* and *Priscian* make them always to have admitted five Parts. See *Priscian*, as before, and *Laertius*, *Lib. VII. Segm. 57.*

(*i*) See the places quoted in the note immediately preceding.

(*k*) *Antiquissima eorum est opinio, qui tres classes faciunt. Estque hæc Arabum quoque sententia—Hebræi quoque (qui, cum Arabes Grammaticam scribere desinerent, artem eam demum scribere ceperunt, quod ante annos contigit circiter quadringentos) Hebræi, inquam, hac in re secuti sunt magistros suos Arabes.—Immo vero trium classium numerum aliæ etiam Orientis linguæ retinent. Dubium, utrum cæ in re Orientales imitati sunt antiquos Græcorum, an hi potius secuti sunt Orientalium exemplum. Utut est, etiam veteres Græcos tres tantum partes agnovisse, non solum autor est Dionysius, &c. Voff. de Analog. l. 1. c. 1. See also Sanctii Minerv. l. 1. c. 2.*

Aristotle, we have his own authority to assert the contrary, who not only enumerates the *four* Species which we have adopted, but ascertains them each by a proper Definition*. Ch. III.

To conclude—the Subject of the following Chapters will be a distinct and separate consideration of the NOUN, the VERB, the ARTICLE, and the CONJUNCTION; which four, the better (as we apprehend) to express their respective natures, we chuse to call SUBSTANTIVES, ATTRIBUTES, DEFINITIVES, and CONNECTIVES.

* Sup. p. 34.

C H A P. IV.

Concerning Substantives, properly so called.

Ch. IV. **S**UBSTANTIVES are *all those principal Words, which are significant of Substances, considered as Substances.*

THE first sort of *Substances* are the NATURAL, such as Animal, Vegetable, Man, Oak.

THERE are other Substances *of our own making*. Thus by giving a Figure *not natural to natural Materials*, we create such Substances, as House, Ship, Watch, Telescope, &c.

AGAIN, by a *more refined operation of our Mind alone*, we abstract any Attribute from its necessary subject, and consider it *apart*, devoid of its dependence. For example, from Body we abstract *to Fly*; from Surface, *the being White*; from Soul, *the being Temperate*.

AND thus it is *we convert even Attributes into Substances*, denoting them on this occasion by proper *Substantives*, such as *Flight, Whiteness, Temperance*; or else by others more general, such as *Motion, Colour, Virtue*. These we call ABSTRACT SUBSTANCES; the second sort we call ARTIFICIAL.

Now all those several Substances have their Genus, their Species, and their Individuals. For example, in *natural Substances*, *Animal*
is

is a Genus; *Man*, a Species; *Alexander*, an Individual. In artificial Substances, *Edifice* is a Genus; *Palace*, a Species; *the Vatican*, an Individual. In abstract Substances, *Motion* is a Genus; *Flight*, a Species; *this Flight* or *that Flight* are Individuals. Ch. IV.

As therefore every (*a*) GENUS may be found *whole and intire in each one of its Species*; (for thus *Man*, *Horse*, and *Dog*, are each of them distinctly a complete and intire Animal) and as every SPECIES may be found *whole and intire in each one of its Individuals*; (for thus *Socrates*, *Plato*, and *Xenophon*, are each of them completely and distinctly a *Man*) hence it is, that every Genus, tho' ONE, is multiplied into MANY; and every Species, tho' ONE, is also multiplied into MANY, by reference to those beings, which are their proper subordinates. Since then no individual has any such subordinates, it can never in strictness be considered as MANY, and so is truly an INDIVIDUAL as well in Nature as in Name.

From these Principles it is, that Words following the nature and genius of Things, such Substantives admit of NUMBER as denote Genera or Species, while those, which denote (*b*) Individuals, in strictness admit it not.

BESIDES

(*a*) This is what *Plato* seems to have expressed in a manner somewhat mysterious, when he talks of *μίαν ιδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἐνὸς ἐκάστῃ κειμένην χωρὶς, πᾶντῃ διατεταμένην—καὶ πολλὰς, ἑτέρας ἀλλήλων, ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἑξωθεν περιεχομένης*. *Sophist*. p. 253. *Edit. Serrani*. For the common definition of Genus and Species, see the *Isagoge* or Introduction of *Porphyry* to *Aristotle's Logic*.

(*b*) Yet sometimes *Individuals* have plurality or Number, from the causes following. In the first place the Individuals of the human race are so large a multitude, even in the

Ch. IV. BESIDES *Number*, another characteristic, visible in Substances, is that of *SEX*. Every Substance is either *Male* or *Female*; or *both Male and Female*; or *neither one nor the other*. So that with respect to *Sexes* and their *Negation*, all Substances conceivable are comprehended under this *fourfold* consideration.

Now the existence of *Hermaphrodites* being rare, if not doubtful; hence Language, only regarding those distinctions which are more obvious,

the smallest nation, that it would be difficult to invent a new Name for every new-born Individual. Hence then instead of *one* only being call'd *Marcus*, and *one* only *Antonius*, it happens that *many* are called *Murcus* and many called *Antonius*; and thus 'tis the *Romans* had their Plurals, *Marci* and *Antonii*, as we in later days have our *Marks* and our *Anthotics*. Now the Plurals of this sort may be well called *accidental*, because it is merely by chance that the Names coincide.

There seems more reason for such Plurals, as the *Ptolemies*, *Scipios*, *Catos*, or (to instance in modern names) the *Howards*, *Pelhams*, and *Montagues*; because a *Race* or *Family* is like a *smaller sort of Species*; so that the *family Name* extends to the Kindred, as the specific Name extends to the Individuals.

A third cause which contributed to make proper Names become Plural, was the *high Character* or *Eminence* of some one Individual, whose Name became afterwards a kind of *common Appellative*, to denote all those, who had pretensions to merit in the same way. Thus every great *Critic* was call'd an *Aristarchus*; every great *Warrior*, an *Alexander*; every great *Beauty*, a *Helen*, &c.

A DANIEL come to Judgment! yea a DANIEL,

cries *Shylock* in the Play, when he would express the wisdom of the young Lawyer.

So *Martial* in that well known verse,

Sint MÆCENATES, non deerunt, Flacce, MARONES.

So *Lucilius*,

ΑΙΓΙΑΠΠΟΙ montes, ÆΤΝÆ omnes, asperi ΑΘΗΝΕΣ.

ποῖοι ΦΑΕΘΟΝΤΕΣ, ἢ ΔΕΥΚΑΛΙΩΝΕΣ. Lucian in *Timon*. T. I. p. 108.

obvious, considers *Words denoting Substances* to be either MASCULINE, FEMININE, or NEUTER *. Ch. IV.

As to our own Species, and all those animal Species, *which have reference to common Life*, or of which the Male and the Female, by their size, form, colour, &c. are *eminently distinguished*, most Languages have different Substantives, to denote the Male and the Female. But as to those animal Species, which either *less frequently occur*, or of which one Sex is *less apparently distinguished* from the other, in these a single Substantive commonly serves for both Sexes.

† In the *English Tongue* it seems a general rule (except only when infringed by a figure of Speech) that no Substantive is *Masculine*, but what denotes a *Male animal Substance*; none *Feminine*, but what denotes a *Female animal Substance*; and that where the Substance *has no Sex*, the Substantive is always *Neuter*.

BUT 'tis not so in *Greek, Latin*, and many of the *modern Tongues*. These all of them have Words, some masculine, some feminine (and those too in great multitudes) which have reference to Substances, where Sex never had existence. To give one instance for many. MIND is surely neither male, nor female; yet is ΝΟΥΣ, in *Greek*, masculine, and ΜΕΝΣ, in *Latin*, feminine.

IN

* After this manner they are distinguished by *Aristotle*. Τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα, τὰ δὲ θήλεα, τὰ δὲ μετὰξυ. Poet. cap. 21. Protagoras before him had established the same Distinction, calling them ἄρρενα, θήλεα, καὶ σκέυη. Aristot. Rhet. L. III. c. 5. Where mark what were afterwards called ἑδότερα, or Neuters, were by these called τὰ μετὰξυ καὶ σκέυη.

† Nam quicquid per Naturam Sexui non adsignatur, neutrum haberi oportet, sed id Ars, &c. Consent. apud Putsch. p. 2023, 2024.

The whole Passage from *Genera Hominum, quæ naturalia sunt*, &c. is worth perusing.

Ch. IV.

IN some Words these distinctions seem owing to nothing else, than to the mere casual structure of the Word itself: It is of such a Gender, from having such a Termination; or from belonging perhaps to such a Declension. In others we may imagine a more subtle kind of reasoning, a reasoning which discerns, even *in things without Sex*, a distant analogy to that great NATURAL DISTINCTION, *which* (according to *Milton*) *animates the World* ‡.

IN this view we may conceive such SUBSTANTIVES to have been considered as MASCULINE, which were “conspicuous for the Attributes of imparting or communicating; or which were by nature active, strong, and efficacious, and that indiscriminately whether to good or to ill; or which had claim to Eminence, either laudable or otherwise.”

THE FEMININE on the contrary were such, as were “conspicuous for the Attributes either of receiving, of containing, or of producing and bringing forth; or which had more of the passive in their nature, than of the active; or which were peculiarly beautiful and amiable; or which had respect to such Excesses, as were rather Feminine, than Masculine.”

UPON these Principles the two greater Luminaries were considered, one as Masculine, the other as Feminine; the SUN (ἥλιος, *Sol*) as *Masculine*, from communicating Light, which was native and original, as well as from the vigorous warmth and efficacy of his Rays;

‡ Mr. *Linnaeus*, the celebrated Botanist, has traced the *Distinction of Sexes* throughout the whole *Vegetable World*, and made it the Basis of his Botanic Method.

Rays; the MOON (Σελήνη, *Luna*) as *Feminine*, from being the Receptacle only of another's Light, and from shining with rays more delicate and soft.

Ch. IV.

THUS *Milton*,

*First in HIS East the glorious Lamp was seen,
Regent of Day, and all th' Horizon round
Invested with bright rays; jocund to run
HIS longitude thro' Heav'n's high road: the gray
Dawn, and the Pleiades before HIM danc'd,
Shedding sweet influence. Less bright the Moon,
But opposite, in levell'd West was set,
HIS mirrour, with full face borrowing HER Light
From HIM; for other light SHE needed none.* P. L. VII. 370.

By *Virgil* they were considered as *Brother* and *Sister*, which still preserves the same distinction.

Nec FRATRIS radiis obnoxia surgere LUNA. G. I. 396.

THE SKY or ETHER is in *Greek* and *Latin Masculine*, as being the source of those showers, which impregnate the Earth. * The EARTH on the contrary is universally *Feminine*, from being the grand Receiver, the grand Container, but above all from being the *Mother* (either

* Senecæ Nat. Quæst. III. 14.

Ch. IV. (either mediately or immediately) of every sublunary substance, whether animal or vegetable.

THUS *Virgil*,

*Tum PATER OMNIPOTENS fecundis imbribus ÆTHER
CONJUGIS in gremium LÆTÆ descendit, & omnes
Magnus alit magno commixtus corpore fœtus.* G. II. 325.

THUS *Shakespear*,

——‡COMMON MOTHER, *Thou*
Whose Womb unmeasurable, and infinite Breast
Teems and feeds all——Tim. of Athens.

So *Milton*,

Whatever Earth, ALL-BEARING MOTHER, yields. P. L. V.

So *Virgil*,

Non jam MATER alit TELLUS, virefque ministrat (c.)
Æn. XI. 71.

AMONG

‡ Παμμῆτορ γῆ, χαῖρε—Græc. Anth. p. 281.

(c)—διὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὴν ΓΗΣ φύσιν, ὡς ΘΗΛΥ καὶ ΜΗΤΕΡΑ νομίζουσιν ΟΥΡΑΝΟΝ δὲ καὶ ΗΛΙΟΝ, καὶ εἰ τι τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ΓΕΝΩΝΤΑΣ καὶ ΠΑΤΕΡΑΣ προσαγορεύουσι. Arist. de Gener. Anim. 1. c. 2.

AMONG *artificial* Substances the SHIP (*Ναῦς, Navis*) is *feminine*, as being so eminently a *Receiver* and *Container* of various things, of Men, Arms, Provisions, Goods, &c. Hence Sailors, speaking of their Vessel, say always, “*SHE rides at anchor,*” “*SHE is under sail.*”

Ch. IV.

A CITY (*Πόλις, Civitas*) and a COUNTRY, (*Πάτρις Patria*) are *feminine* also, by being (like the Ship) *Containers* and *Receivers*, and farther by being as it were the *Mothers* and *Nurses* of their respective Inhabitants.

THUS *Virgil*,

Salve, MAGNA PARENS FRUGUM, *Saturnia Tellus*,
MAGNA VIRUM—— Geor. II. 173.

So, in that Heroic Epigram on those brave Greeks, who fell at *Cheronea*,

Γαῖα δὲ Πάτρις ἔχει κόλποις τῶν πλεῖστα καμόντων
Σώματα——

Their PARENT COUNTRY in HER bosom holds
Their wearied bodies. —*

So *Milton*,

The City, which Thou seest, no other deem
Than great and glorious Rome, QUEEN of the Earth.

Par. Reg. L. IV.

As

* Demost. in Orat. de Coronâ.

Ch. IV.

As to the OCEAN, tho' from its being the *Receiver* of all Rivers, as well as the *Container* and *Productress* of so many Vegetables and Animals, it might justly have been made (like the Earth) *Feminine*; yet its *deep Voice* and *boisterous Nature* have, in spite of these reasons, prevailed to make it *Male*. Indeed the very found of *Homer's*

—μέγα σθένος Ὀκεανοῖο,

would suggest to a hearer, even ignorant of its meaning, that the Subject was incompatible with *female* delicacy and softness.

TIME (Χρόνος) from his mighty *Efficacy* upon every thing around us, is by the *Greeks* and *English* justly considered as *Masculine*. Thus in that elegant distich, spoken by a decrepit old Man,

* Ὁ γὰρ Χρόνος μ' ἔκαμψε, τέκτων ἔσοφος,
Ἄπαντα δ' ἐργαζόμενος ἀσθενέστερα †.

Me TIME hath bent, that sorry Artist, HE
That surely makes, what'er he handles, worse.

So too *Shakespear*, speaking likewise of TIME,

Orl. Whom doth HE gallop withal?

Rof. With a thief to the gallows.— As you like it.

THE

* Ω Χρόνε, παντοίων θνητῶν πανεπίσκοπε Δαίμον. Græc. Anth. p. 290.

† Stob. Ecl. p. 591.

The Greek Θάνατος or Αἴδης, and the English DEATH, seem from the same irresistible Power to have been considered as *Masculine*. Even the Vulgar with us are so accustomed to this notion, that a FEMALE DEATH they would treat as ridiculous (*d*).

TAKE a few examples of the masculine Death.

Callimachus upon the Elegies of his Friend *Heraclitus*—

Αἰ δὲ τεαὶ ζώουσιν ἀήδονες, ἥσιν ὁ πάντων
Ἀρπάκτηρ Αἴδης ἐκ ἐπὶ χεῖρα βαλεῖ.

—yet thy sweet warbling strains
Still live immortal, nor on them shall DEATH
His hand e'er lay, tho' Ravager of all.

IN the *Alcestis* of *Euripides*, Θάνατος or DEATH is one of the Persons of the drama; the beginning of the play is made up of dialogue between *Him* and *Apollo*; and towards its end, there is a fight between *Him* and *Hercules*, in which *Hercules* is conqueror, and rescues *Alcestis* from his hands.

IT is well known too, that SLEEP and DEATH are made *Brothers* by *Homer*. It was to this old *Gorgias* elegantly alluded, when
at

(*d*) Well therefore did *Milton* in his *Paradise Lost* not only adopt DEATH as a *Person*, but consider him as *Masculine*: in which he was so far from introducing a *Phantom* of his own, or from giving it a *Gender not supported by Custom*, that perhaps he had as much the *Sanction of national Opinion* for his *Masculine Death*, as the ancient Poets had for many of their Deities.

Ch. IV. at the extremity of a long life he lay flumbering on his Death-bed. A Friend asked him, "*How he did?*"—"SLEEP (replied "the old Man) *is just upon delivering me over to the care of his Brother* (e)."

Thus Shakespear, speaking of Life,

—merely *Thou art Death's Fool;*
For HIM Thou labour'st by thy flight to shun,
And yet run'st towards HIM still. Meaf. for Meaf.

So Milton,

Dire was the tossing, deep the groans; Despair
Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch:
And over them triumphant DEATH HIS dart
Shook; but delay'd to strike—— P. L. XI. 489 (f).

THE supreme Being (GOD, θεός *Deus*, *Dieu*, &c.) is in all languages *Masculine*, in as much as the masculine Sex is the superior and

(e) "Ὡς μὲν ὁ ΥΠΙΝΟΣ ἀρχεται παρακατατίθεσθαι τὸ ΑΔΕΛΦΩΙ. Stob. Ecl. p. 600.

(f) Suppose in any one of these examples we introduce a *female Death*; suppose we read,

And over them triumphant Death HER dart
Shook, &c.

What a falling off! How are the nerves and strength of the whole Sentiment weakened!

and more excellent; and as He is the Creator of all, the Father of Gods and Men. Sometimes indeed we meet with such words as Τὸ Πρῶτον, Τὸ Θεῖον, *Numen*, *DEITY* (which last we *English* join to a neuter, saying *Deity itself*) sometimes I say we meet with these *Neuters*. The reason in these instances seems to be, that as *GOD* is prior to all things, both in dignity and in time, this Priority is better characterized and expressed by a *Negation*, than by any of those Distinctions which are co-ordinate with some Opposite, as Male for example is co-ordinate with Female, Right with Left, &c. &c. (g).

Ch. IV.

VIRTUE (Ἀρετή, *Virtus*) as well as most of its Species, are all *Feminine*, perhaps from their Beauty and amiable Appearance, which are not without effect even upon the most reprobate and corrupt.

—abash'd the Devil stood,

And felt how awful Goodness is, and saw

VIRTUE in her shape how lovely; saw, and pin'd

His loss—

P. L. IV. 846.

THIS

(g) Thus *Ammonius*, speaking on the same Subject—ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ λέγομεν, ἐφ' ᾧ μὴ δὲ τῶν διὰ μυθολογίας παραδόντων ἡμῖν τὰς θεολογίας ἐτόλμησέ τις ἢ ἀρρενωπὸν, ἢ θυληπρεπῆ (lege *θυληπρεπῆ*) διαμόρφωσιν φέρειν· καὶ τῷτο· ἐικότως· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀρρενὶ τὸ θυλὺ σύτοιχον· τὸ (lege τῷ) δὲ ΠΑΝΘΙ ΑΠΑΛΩΣ ΑΙΤΙΩΙ σύτοιχον ἔδεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν ἀρσενικῶς ΤΟΝ ΘΕΟΝ ὀνομάζομεν, [πρὸς] τὸ σεμνότερον τῶν γενῶν τῇ ὑφειμένῃ προτιμῶντες, ἕτως αὐτὸν προσαγορεύομεν. PRIMUM dicimus, quod nemo etiam eorum, qui theologiam nobis fabularum integumentis obvolutam tradiderunt, vel maris vel fœminæ specie fingere ausus est: idque merito: conjugatum enim mari fœmininum est. CAUSÆ autem omnino ABSOLUTÆ AC SIMPLICI nihil est conjugatum. Immo vero cum DEUM masculino genere appellamus, ita ipsum nominamus, genus præstantius submissio atque humili præferentes. Ammon. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 30. b.—ὃ γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ Πρῶτῳ ἔδεν. Aristot. Metaph. A. p. 210. Sylb.

Ch. IV. THIS being allowed, VICE (*Κακία*) becomes *Feminine* of course, as being, in the *συνορχία*, or Co-ordination of things, Virtue's natural Opposite (*h*).

THE Fancies, Caprices, and fickle Changes of FORTUNE would appear but awkwardly under a Character that was Male: but taken together they make a very natural *Female*, which has no small resemblance to the Coquette of a modern Comedy, bestowing, withdrawing, and shifting her favours, as different Beaus succeed to her good graces.

*Transmutat incertos honores,
Nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna.* Hor.

WHY the FURIES were made *Female*, is not so easy to explain, unless it be that female Passions of all kinds were considered as susceptible of greater excess, than male Passions; and that the *Furies* were to be represented, as Things superlatively outrageous.

*Talibus Aleōto dictis exarsit in iras.
At Juveni oranti subitus tremor occupat artus:
Diriguere oculi: tot Erinnys sibilat Hydri,
Tantaque se facies aperit: tum flammea torquens*

Lumina

(*h*) They are both represented as *Females* by Xenophon, in the celebrated Story of *Hercules*, taken from *Prodicus*. See *Memorab.* L. II. c. 1. As to the *συνορχία* here mentioned, thus *Varro*—*Pythagoras Samius ait omnium rerum initia esse bina: ut finitum & infinitum, bonum & malum, vitam & mortem, diem & noctem.* De Ling. Lat. L. IV. See also *Arist. Metaph.* L. I. c. 5. and *Ecclesiasticus*, Chap. lxii. ver. 24.

Lumina cunctantem & quærentem dicere plura

Repulit, & geminos erexit crinibus angues,

Verberaque insonuit, rabidoque hæc addidit ore :

En ! Ego victa situ, &c.

Æn. VII. 455 (i).

HE,

(i) The Words above mentioned, *Time, Death, Fortune, Virtue, &c.* in *Greek, Latin, French*, and most modern Languages, though they are diversified with Genders in the manner described, yet never vary the Gender which they have once acquired, except in a few instances, where the Gender is doubtful. We cannot say *ἡ ἀρετή* or *ὁ ἀρετή*, *hæc Virtus* or *hic Virtus, la Vertu* or *le Vertu*, and so of the rest. But it is otherwise in *English*. We in our own language say, *Virtue is its own Reward*, or *Virtue is her own Reward*; *Time maintains its wonted Pace*, or *Time maintains his wonted Pace*.

There is a singular advantage in this liberty, as it enables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the Distinction between the severe or *Logical* Stile, and the ornamental or *Rhetorical*. For thus when we speak of the above Words, and of all others naturally devoid of Sex, as *Neuters*, we speak of them *as they are*, and as becomes a *logical* Inquiry. When we give them *Sex*, by making them Masculine or Feminine, they are from thenceforth *personified*; are a kind of *intelligent Beings*, and become, as such, the proper ornaments either of *Rhetoric* or of *Poetry*.

Thus *Milton*,

—The Thunder,

Wing'd with red light'ning and impetuous rage,

Perhaps hath spent HIS shafts—

P. Lost. I. 174.

The Poet, having just before called the *Hail*, and *Thunder*, God's *Ministers of Vengeance*, and so personified them, had he afterwards said *its* Shafts for *his* Shafts, would have destroyed his own Image, and approached withal so much nearer to Prose.

The following Passage is from the same Poem.

Should intermitted Vengeance arm again

HIS red right hand—

P. L. II. 174.

In this Place *His* Hand is clearly preferable either to *Her's* or *It's*, by immediately referring us to God himself, the Avenger.

I shall only give one instance more, and quit this Subject.

At his command th' up-rooted Hills retir'd

Each to HIS place : they heard his voice and went

Obsequious : Heav'n HIS wonted face renew'd,

And with fresh flourets Hill and Valley smil'd.

P. L. VI.

Ch. IV. HE, that would see more on this Subject, may consult *Ammonius* the Peripatetic, in his Commentary on the Treatise *de Interpretatione*, where the Subject is treated at large with respect to the Greek Tongue. We shall only observe, that as all such Speculations are at best but Conjectures, they should therefore be received with candour, rather than scrutinized with rigour. *Varro's* words on a Subject near akin, are for their aptness and elegance well worth attending. *Non mediocres enim tenebræ in silvâ, ubi hæc captanda; neque eò, quò pervenire volumus, semitæ tritæ; neque non in tramitibus quædam objecta, quæ euntem retinere possunt**.

To conclude this Chapter. We may collect from what has been said, that both NUMBER and GENDER appertain to WORDS, because in the first place they appertain to THINGS; that is to say, *because Substances are Many, and have either Sex, or no Sex; therefore Substantives have Number, and are Masculine, Feminine, or Neuter.* There is however this difference between the two Attributes: NUMBER in strictness descends no lower, than to *the last Rank of Species (k)*: GENDER on the contrary stops not here, but descends to *every Individual*, however diversified. And so much for SUBSTANTIVES, PROPERLY SO CALLED.

See also ver. 54, 55, of the same Book.

Here all things are personified; the Hills *hear*, the Valleys *smile*, and the *Face* of Heaven is renewed. Suppose then the Poet had been necessitated by the laws of his Language to have said—*Each Hill retir'd to its Place—Heaven renew'd its wonted face*—how prosaic and lifeless would these Neuters have appeared; how detrimental to the *Prosopopeia*, which he was aiming to establish! In this therefore he was happy, that the Language, in which he wrote, imposed no such necessity; and he was too wise a Writer, to impose it on himself. It were to be wished, his Correctors had been as wise on their parts.

* De Ling. Lat. L. IV.

(k) The reason why *Number* goes no lower, is that it does not naturally appertain to *Individuals*; the cause of which see before, p. 237.

C H A P. V.

Concerning Substantives of the Secondary Order.

WE are now to proceed to a SECONDARY RACE of SUBSTANTIVES, a Race quite different from any already mentioned, and whose Nature may be explained in the following manner.

EVERY Object which presents itself to the Senses or the Intellect, is either then perceived for the *first time*, or else is recognized as having been perceived *before*. In the former case it is called an Object τῆς πρώτης γνώσεως, of the *first knowledge* or *acquaintance* (a); in the latter it is called an Object τῆς δευτέρας γνώσεως, of the *second knowledge* or *acquaintance*.

Now as all Conversation passes between *Particulars* or *Individuals*, these will often happen to be reciprocally Objects τῆς πρώτης γνώσεως, that is to say, *till that instant unacquainted with each other*. What then is to be done? How shall the Speaker address the other, when he knows not his Name? or how explain himself by his own Name, of which the other is wholly ignorant? Nouns, as they have been described, cannot answer the purpose. The first expedient upon this

(a) See *Apoll. de Syntaxi*, l. 1. c. 16. p. 49. l. 2. c. 3. p. 103. Thus *Priscian*—*Interest autem inter demonstrationem & relationem hoc; quod demonstratio, interrogationi reddita, Primam Cognitionem ostendit; Quis fecit? Ego: relatio vero Secundam Cognitionem significat, ut, Is, de quo jam dixi. Lib. XII. p. 936. Edit. Putschii.*

Ch. V.

this occasion seems to have been Δειξίς, that is, *Pointing*, or *Indication by the Finger or Hand*, some traces of which are still to be observed, as a part of that Action, which naturally attends our speaking. But the Authors of Language were not content with this. They invented a race of *Words to supply this Pointing*; which Words, as they always stood for *Substantives or Nouns*, were characterized by the Name of Ἀντωνυμίαι, or PRONOUNS (b). These also they distinguished into three several sorts, calling them *Pronouns of the First*, the *Second*, and the *Third Person*, with a view to certain distinctions, which may be explained as follows.

SUPPOSE the Parties conversing to be wholly unacquainted, neither Name nor Countenance on either side known, and the Subject of the Conversation to be *the Speaker himself*. Here, to supply the place of Pointing by a Word of equal Power, they furnished the Speaker with the Pronoun, I. *I write, I say, I desire, &c.* and as the Speaker is always principal with respect to his own discourse, this they called for that reason *the Pronoun of the First Person*.

AGAIN, suppose the Subject of the Conversation to be *the Party addrest*. Here for similar reasons they invented the Pronoun, THOU. *Thou writest, Thou walkest, &c.* and as the Party addrest is next in dignity

(b) Ἐκεῖνο ἔν Ἀντωνυμία, τὸ μετὰ ΔΕΙΞΕΩΣ ἢ ἀναφορᾶς ἈΝΤΟΝΟΜΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ. Apoll. de Synt. L. II. c. 5. p. 106. Priscian seems to consider them so peculiarly destined to the expression of *Individuals*, that he does not say they supply the place of *any* Noun, but that of the *proper* Name only. And this undoubtedly was their original, and still is their true and natural use. PRONOMEN est pars orationis, quæ pro nomine proprio uniuscujusque accipitur. Prisc. L. XII. See also Apoll. L. II. c. 9. p. 117, 118.

dignity to the Speaker, or at least comes next with reference to the discourse; this Pronoun they therefore called *the Pronoun of the Second Person*.

LASTLY, suppose the Subject of Conversation neither the Speaker, nor the Party addrest, but *some Third Object, different from both*. Here they provided another *Pronoun*. HE, SHE, or IT, which in distinction to the two former was called *the Pronoun of the Third Person*.

AND thus it was that *Pronouns* came to be distinguished by their respective PERSONS (c).

As

(c) The Description of the different PERSONS here given is taken from *Priscian*, who took it from *Apollonius*. *Personæ Pronominum sunt tres; prima, secunda, tertia*. Prima est, cum ipsa, quæ loquitur, de se pronuntiat; Secunda, cum de eâ pronunciat, ad quam directo sermone loquitur; Tertia, cum de eâ, quæ nec loquitur, nec ad se directum accipit Sermonem. L. XII. p. 940. *Theodore Gaza* gives the same Distinctions. Πρώτον (πρόσωπον sc.) ὃ περὶ ἑαυτῆς φράζει ὁ λέγων· δεύτερον, ὃ περὶ τῆς, πρὸς ἣν ὁ λόγος· τρίτον, ὃ περὶ ἑτέρου. Gaz. Gram. L. IV. p. 152.

This account of *Persons* is far preferable to the common one, which makes the First the *Speaker*; the Second, the *Party addrest*; and the Third, the *Subject*. For tho' the First and Second be as commonly described, one the *Speaker*, the other the *Party addrest*; yet till they become *subjects of the discourse*, they have no existence. Again as to the Third Person's being the *subject*, this is a character, which it *shares in common* with both the other Persons, and which can never therefore be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by an instance or two. When *Eneas* begins the narrative of his adventures, *the second Person* immediately appears, because he makes *Dido*, whom he *addresses*, the immediate subject of his Discourse.

Infandum, Regina, jubes, renovare dolorem.

From hence forward for 1500 Verses (tho' she be all that time the party addrest) we hear nothing farther of this *Second Person*, a variety of other Subjects filling up the Narrative.

In

Ch. V.

As to NUMBER, the Pronoun of each Person has it: (I) has the plural (WE), because there may be many Speakers at once of the same Sentiment; as well as one, who, including himself, speaks the Sentiment of many. (THOU) has the plural (YOU), because a Speech may be spoken to many, as well as to one. (HE) has the plural (THEY), because the Subject of discourse is often many at once.

BUT tho' all these Pronouns have *Number*, it does not appear either in *Greek*, or *Latin*, or any modern Language, that those of the first and second Person carry the distinctions of SEX. The reason seems to be, that the Speaker and Hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to have marked a distinction by Art, which from Nature and even Dress was commonly (*d*) apparent on both sides. But this does not hold with respect to the third Person, of whose Character and Distinctions,

In the mean time the *First Person* may be seen every where, because the *Speaker* every where is himself the *Subject*. They were indeed Events, as he says himself,

—*quæque ipse miserrima vidi,*
Et quorum pars magna fui—

Not that the Second Person does not often occur in the course of this Narrative; but then it is always by a Figure of Speech, when those, who by their absence are in fact so many Third Persons, are converted into Second Persons by being introduced as *present*. The *real* Second Person (*Dido*) is never once hinted.

Thus far as to *Virgil*. But when we read *Euclid*, we find neither *First Person*, nor *Second*, in any Part of the whole Work. The reason is, that neither Speaker nor Party addrest (in which light we may always view the Writer and his Reader) can possibly become the Subject of pure Mathematics, nor indeed can any thing else, except abstract Quantity, which neither speaks itself, nor is spoken to by another.

(*d*) *Demonstratio ipsa secum genus ostendit.* Priscian. L. XII. p. 942. See *Apoll. de Syntax*. L. II. c. 7. p. 109.

tions, (including Sex among the rest) we often know no more, than what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is that in most Languages *the third Person* has its *Genders*, and that even *English* (which allows its Adjectives no Genders at all) has in this Pronoun the triple (*e*) distinction of *He*, *She*, and *It*.

HENCE too we see the reason why a *single Pronoun* (*f*) to each Person, an *I* to the *First*, and a *Thou* to the *Second*, are abundantly sufficient to all the purposes of Speech. But it is not so with respect to the *Third Person*. The various relations of the various Objects exhibited by this (I mean relations of near and distant, present and absent, same and different, definite and indefinite, &c.) made it necessary that here there should not be one, but *many* Pronouns, such as *He*, *This*, *That*, *Other*, *Any*, *Some*, &c.

IT

(*e*) The Utility of this Distinction may be better found in supposing it away. Suppose for example we should read in history these words—*He caused him to destroy him*—and that we were to be informed the [He], which is here thrice repeated, stood each time for something different, that is to say, for a Man, for a Woman, and for a City, whose Names were *Alexander*, *Thais*, and *Persopolis*. Taking the Pronoun in this manner, divested of its Genders, how would it appear, which was destroyed; which was the destroyer; and which the cause, that moved to the destruction? But there are not such doubts, when we hear the Genders distinguished; when instead of the ambiguous Sentence, *He caused him to destroy him*, we are told with the proper distinctions, that *SHE caused HIM to destroy IT*. Then we know with certainty, what before we could not: that the Promoter was the Woman; that her Instrument was the Hero; and that the Subject of their Cruelty was the unfortunate City.

(*f*) *Quæritur tamen cur prima quidem Persona & secunda singula Pronomina habeant, tertiam vero sex diversæ indicent voces? Ad quod respondendum est, quod prima quidem & secunda Persona ideo non egent diversis vocibus, quod semper præsentibus inter se sunt, & demonstrativæ; tertia vero Persona modo demonstrativa est, ut, Hic, Ille; modo relativa, ut Is, Ipse, &c. Priscian. L. XII. p. 933.*

Ch. V.

It must be confessed indeed, that all these Words do not always appear as *Pronouns*. When they stand by themselves, and represent some Noun, (as when we say, *THIS is Virtue*, or *δεικτικῶς*, *Give me THAT*) then are they *Pronouns*. But when they are associated to some Noun (as when we say, *THIS Habit is Virtue*; or *δεικτικῶς*, *THAT Man* defrauded me) then as they supply not the place of a Noun, but only serve to ascertain one, they fall rather into the Species of *Definitives* or *Articles*. That there is indeed a near relation between *Pronouns* and *Articles*, the old Grammarians have all acknowledged, and some words it has been doubtful to which Class to refer. The best rule to distinguish them is this—The genuine *PRONOUN* always stands by itself, assuming the *Power* of a Noun, and supplying its place—The genuine *ARTICLE* never stands by itself, but appears at all times associated to something else, requiring a Noun for its support, as much as *Attributives* or (g) *Adjectives*.

As

(g) Τὸ Ἄρθρον μετὰ ὀνόματι, καὶ ἡ Ἀντωνυμία ἀντὶ ὀνόματι. THE ARTICLE stands WITH a Noun; but THE PRONOUN stands FOR a Noun. Apoll. L. I. c. 3. p. 22. Ἀλλὰ ἐν ταῖς ἁρθραῖς, τῆς πρὸς τὰ ὀνόματα συναρτήσεως ἀποσάντα, εἰς τὴν ὑποτεταγμένην ἀντωνυμίαν μεταπίπτει. Now *Articles* themselves, when they quit their Connection with Nouns, pass into such *Pronoun*, as is proper upon the occasion. Ibid. Again—Ὅταν τὸ Ἄρθρον μὴ μετ' ὀνόματι παραλαβάνηται, ποιήσῃ δὲ σύνταξιν ὀνόματι ἢν προεκτεθείμεθα, ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης εἰς ἀντωνυμίαν μεταληφθήσεται, εἴγε ἐκ ἐγγινόμενον μετ' ὀνόματι δυνάμει ἀντὶ ὀνόματι παρελήφθῃ. When the Article is assumed without the Noun, and has (as we explained before) the same Syntax, which the Noun has; it must of absolute necessity be admitted for a *Pronoun*, because it appears without a Noun, and yet is in power assumed for one. Ejsfd. L. II. c. 8. p. 113. L. I. c. 45. p. 96. *Inter Pronomina & Articulos hoc interest, quod Pronomina ea putantur, quæ, cum sola sint, vicem nominis complent, ut QUI, ILLE, ISTE: Articuli vero cum Pronominibus, aut Nominibus, aut Participiis adjunguntur.* Donat. Gram. p. 1753.

Priscian, speaking of the Stoics, says as follows: ARTICULIS autem PRONOMINA connumerantes, FINITOS ea ARTICULOS appellabant; ipsos autem Articulos, quibus nos caremus, INFINITOS ARTICULOS dicebant. Vel, ut alii dicunt, Articulos connumerabant Pronominibus,

As to the *Coalescence* of these Pronouns, it is, as follows. The First or Second will, either of them, by themselves coalesce with the Third, but not with each other. For example, it is good sense, as well as good Grammar, to say in any Language—I AM HE—THOU ART HE—but we cannot say—I AM THOU—nor THOU ART I. The reason is, there is no absurdity for the *Speaker* to be the *Subject* also of the Discourse, as when we say, *I am He*; or for the *Person addrest*; as when we say, *Thou art He*. But for the same Person, in the same circumstances, to be at once the *Speaker*, and the *Party addrest*, this is impossible; and so therefore is the *Coalescence* of the First and Second Person.

AND now perhaps we have seen enough of *Pronouns*, to perceive how they differ from other Substantives. The others are *Primary*, these are their *Substitutes*; a kind of secondary Race, which were taken in aid, when for reasons already (*h*) mentioned the others could

Pronominibus, & ARTICULARIA eos PRONOMINA vocabant, &c. Prif. L. I. p. 574. *Varro*, speaking of *Quisque* and *Hic*, calls them both ARTICLES, the first *indefinite*, the second *definite*. *De Ling. Lat. L. VII.* See also L. IX. p. 132. *Vossius* indeed in his *Analogia* (L. I. c. 1.) opposes this Doctrine, because *Hic* has not the same power with the *Greek Article*, $\delta\iota$. But he did not enough attend to the antient Writers on this Subject, who considered all Words, as ARTICLES, which being associated to Nouns (and not standing in their place) served in any manner to ascertain, and determine their Signification.

(*h*) See these reasons at the beginning of this chapter, of which reasons the principal one is, that “no Noun, properly so called, implies its own Presence. It is therefore to ascertain such Presence, that the Pronoun is taken in aid; and hence it is it becomes “equivalent to $\delta\epsilon\iota\chi\iota\varsigma$, that is, to *Pointing or Indication by the Finger*.” It is worth remarking in that Verse of *Perfius*,

Sed pulchrum est DIGITO MONSTRARI, & dicier, HIC EST.

Ch. V.

could not be used. It is moreover by means of these, and of *Articles*, which are nearly allied to them, that “LANGUAGE, tho’ in “itself only significant of *general Ideas*, is brought down to denote “that infinitude of *Particulars*, which are for ever arising, and ceasing “to be.” But more of this hereafter in a proper place.

As to the three orders of Pronouns already mentioned, they may be called *Prepositive*, as may indeed all Substantives, because they are capable of introducing or leading a Sentence, without having reference to any thing previous. But besides those there is ANOTHER PRONOUN (in Greek *ὅς, ὅστις (i)*; in *Latin*, *Qui*; in *English*, *Who*,

how the *δείξῃς*, and the *Pronoun* are introduced together, and made to co-operate to the same end.

Sometimes by virtue of *δείξῃς* the Pronoun of the *third* Person stands for the *first*.

Quod si militibus parces, erit hic quoque Miles.

That is, *I also will be a Soldier.*

Tibul. L. II. El. 6. v. 7. See Vulpus.

It may be observed too, that even in Epistolary Correspondence, and indeed in all kinds of Writing, where the Pronouns *I* and *You* make their appearance, there is a sort of *implied Presence*, which they are supposed to indicate, though the parties are in fact at ever so great a distance. And hence the rise of that distinction in *Apollonius*, τὰς μὲν τῇν ὀφθαλμῶν εἶναι δείξει, τὰς δὲ τῷ νῷ, *that some Indications are ocular, and some are mental.* *De Syntaxi*, L. II. c. 3. p. 104.

(i) The *Greeks*, it must be confessed, call this Pronoun ὑποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον, the *subjunctive Article*. Yet, as it should seem, this is but an improper Appellation. *Apollonius*, when he compares it to the προτακτικὸν or true *prepositive Article*, not only confesses it to differ, as being expressed by a different Word, and having a different place in every Sentence; but in *Syntax* he adds, it is wholly different. *De Syntax. L. I. c. 43. p. 91.* *Theodore Gaza* acknowledges the same, and therefore adds—ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ἔκρυπτος ἂν εἴη ἄρθρον ταύτη—*for these reasons this (meaning the Subjunctive) cannot properly be an Article.* And just before he says, κυρίως γε μὴν ἄρθρον τὸ προτακτικόν—*however properly speaking it is the Prepositive is the Article.* *Gram. Introd. L. IV.* The *Latins* therefore have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with the Pronouns.

Who, Which, That) a Pronoun having a character peculiar to itself, the nature of which may be explained as follows.

Ch. V.

SUPPOSE I was to say—*LIGHT is a Body, LIGHT moves with great celerity*.—These would apparently be two distinct Sentences. Suppose, instead of the Second, *LIGHT*, I were to place the prepositive Pronoun, *IT*, and say—*LIGHT is a Body; IT moves with great celerity*—the Sentences would still be distinct and two. But if I add a *Connective* (as for Example an *AND*) saying—*LIGHT is a Body, AND it moves with great celerity*—I then by Connection make the two into one, as by cementing many Stones I make one Wall.

Now it is in the united Powers of a *Connective*, and another *Pronoun*, that we may see the force, and character of the Pronoun here treated. Thus therefore, if in the place of *AND IT*, we substitute *THAT*, or *WHICH*, saying *LIGHT is a Body, WHICH moves with great celerity*—the Sentence still retains its *Unity* and *Perfection*, and becomes if possible more compact than before. We may with just reason therefore call this Pronoun the *SUBJUNCTIVE*, because it cannot (like the Prepositive) introduce an original Sentence, but only serves to subjoin one to some other, which is previous (*k*).

THE

(*k*) Hence we see why the Pronoun here mentioned is always necessarily the Part of some complex Sentence, which Sentence contains, either express or understood, two Verbs, and two Nominatives.

Thus in that Verse of *Horace*,

QUI metuens vivit, liber mihi non erit unquam.

Ille non erit liber—is one Sentence; *qui metuens vivit*—is another. *Ille* and *Qui* are the two Nominatives; *Erit* and *Vivit*, the two Verbs; and so in all other instances.

Ch. V.

THE Application of this SUBJUNCTIVE, like the other Pronouns, is universal. It may be the Substitute of all kinds of Substantives, natural, artificial, or abstract; as well as general, special, or particular. We may say, the *Animal, Which, &c.* the *Man, Whom, &c.* the *Ship, Which, &c.* *Alexander, Who, &c.* *Bucephalus, That, &c.* *Virtue, Which, &c. &c.*

NAY, it may even be the Substitute of all the other Pronouns, and is of course therefore expressive of all three Persons. Thus we say,

The following passage from *Apollonius* (though somewhat corrupt in more places than one) will serve to shew, whence the above Speculations are taken. Τὸ ὑποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον ἐπὶ ῥῆμα ἴδιον φέρεται, συνδεδεμένον διὰ τῆς ἀναφορᾶς τῷ προκειμένῳ ὀνόματι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀπλὴν λόγον ἔπαριζάνει καὶ τὴν τῶν δύο ῥημάτων σύνταξιν (λέγω τὴν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἄρθρῳ) ὅπερ πάλιν παρείπετο τῷ ΚΑΙ συνδέσμῳ. Κοινὸν μὲν (lege TO ΚΑΙ γὰρ κοινὸν μὲν) παρελάμβανε τὸ ὄνομα τὸ προκείμενον, σύμπλεκον δὲ ἕτερον λόγον πάντως καὶ ἕτερον ῥῆμα παρελάμβανε, καὶ ἔτω τὸ, ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ Ο ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ, ΟΣ ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ, δυνάμει τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποτελεῖ τῷ (forf. τῷ) Ο ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ, ΚΑΙ ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ. *The subjunctive Article, (that is, the Pronoun here mentioned) is applied to a Verb of its own, and yet is connected withal to the antecedent Noun. Hence it can never serve to constitute a simple Sentence, by reason of the Syntax of the two Verbs, I mean that which respects the Noun or Antecedent, and that which respects the Article or Relative. The same too follows as to the Conjunction, AND. This Copulative assumes the Antecedent Noun, which is capable of being applied to many Subjects, and by connecting to it a new Sentence, of necessity assumes a new Verb also. And hence it is that the Words—the Grammarian came, who discoursed—form in power nearly the same sentence, as if we were to say—the Grammarian came, AND discoursed. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 43. p. 92. See also an ingenious French Treatise, called Grammaire generale & raisonnée, Chap. IX.*

The *Latins*, in their Structure of this Subjunctive, seem to have well represented its compound Nature of part *Pronoun*, and part *Connective*, in forming their *QUI* and *QUIS* from *QUE* and *IS*, or (if we go with *Scaliger* to the *Greek*) from *KAI* and *ὍΣ*, *KAI* and *Ὁ*. *Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 127.*

HOMER also expresses the Force of this *Subjunctive, Pronoun* or *Article*, by help of the *Prepositive* and a *Connective*, exactly consonant to the Theory here established. See *Iliad*, A. ver. 270, 553. N. 571. Π. 54, 157, 158.

say, I, WHO now read, have near finished this Chapter; THOU, WHO now readest; HE, WHO now readeth, &c. &c. Ch. V.

AND thus is THIS SUBJUNCTIVE truly a *Pronoun* from its *Substitution*, there being no Substantive existing, in whose place it may not stand. At the same time, it is *essentially distinguished* from the other Pronouns, by this peculiar, that it is not only a *Substitute*, but withal a *Connective* (1).

AND

(1) Before we quit this Subject, it may not be improper to remark, that in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues the two principal Pronouns, that is to say, the First and Second Person, the *Ego* and the *Tu*, are *implied* in the very Form of the Verb itself (*γράφω*, *γράφεις*, *scribo*, *scribis*) and are for that reason never *expressed*, unless it be to mark a Contradistinction; such as in *Virgil*,

Nos patriam fugimus; Tu, Tityre, lentus in umbrâ
Formosam resonare doces, &c.

This however is true with respect only to the *Casus rectus*, or *Nominative* of these Pronouns, but not with respect to their *oblique Cases*, which must always be added, because tho' we see the *Ego* in *Amo*, and the *Tu* in *Amas*, we see not the *TE* or *ME* in *Amat*, or *Amant*.

Yet even these *oblique Cases* appear in a different manner, according as they mark Contradistinction, or not. If they contradistinguish, then are they *commonly* placed at the beginning of the Sentence, or at least before the Verb, or leading Substantive.

Thus *Virgil*,

— Quid Theſea, magnum
Quid memorem Alciden? Et MI genus ab Jove ſummo.

Thus *Homer*,

ἽΜΙΝ μὲν θεοὶ δοῖεν —
Παῖδά δὲ ΜΟΙ λύσατε φίλῃν —

Iλ. A.

where the Ἵμιν and the Μοὶ stand, as contradistinguished, and both have precedence of their respective Verbs, the Ἵμιν even leading the whole Sentence. In other instances, these Pronouns commonly take their place behind the Verb, as may be seen in examples every

Ch. V.

AND now to conclude what we have said concerning Substantives. All SUBSTANTIVES are either *Primary*, or *Secondary*, that is to say, according to a Language more familiar and known, are either NOUNS or PRONOUNS. The NOUNS denote *Substances*, and those either *Natural*, *Artificial*, or *Abstract**. They moreover denote Things either *General*, or *Special*, or *Particular*. The PRONOUNS, their Substitutes, are either *Prepositive*, or *Subjunctive*. THE PREPOSITIVE is distinguished into three Orders, called the *First*, the *Second*, and the *Third* Person. THE SUBJUNCTIVE includes the powers of all those three, having *superadded*, as of its own, the peculiar force of a *Connective*.

HAVING done with SUBSTANTIVES, we now proceed to ATTRIBUTIVES.

every where obvious. The *Greek* Language went farther still. When the oblique Case of these Pronouns happened to contradistinguish, they assumed a peculiar Accent of their own, which gave them the name of ὀρθοτονούμεναι, or *Pronouns uprightly accented*. When they marked no such opposition, they not only took their place behind the Verb, but even gave it their Accent, and (as it were) inclined themselves upon it. And hence they acquired the name of ἑγκλιτικαὶ, that is, *Leaning* or *Inclining* Pronouns. The *Greeks* too had in the first person Ἐμῶ, Ἐμοί, Ἐμέ for *Contradistinctives*, and Μῶ, Μοί, Μὲ for *Enclitics*. And hence it was that *Apollonius* contended, that in the passage above quoted from the first *Iliad*, we should read παῖδα δ' ἘΜΟΙ, for παῖδα δὲ ΜΟΙ, on account of the Contradistinction, which there occurs between the *Grecians* and *Chryses*. See *Apoll. de Syntaxi*, L. I. c. 3. p. 20. L. II. c. 2. p. 102, 103.

This Diversity between the Contradistinctive Pronouns, and the Enclitic, is not unknown even to the *English* Tongue. When we say, *Give me Content*, the (*Me*) in this case is a perfect Enclitic. But when we say, *Give Mé Content*, *Give Him his thousands*, the (*Me*) and (*Him*) are no Enclitics, but as they stand in opposition, assume an Accent of their own, and so become the true ὀρθοτονούμεναι.

* See before, p. 236, 237.

CHAP. VI.


Concerning Attributives.

ATTRIBUTIVES are all those principal Words, that denote Attributes, considered as Attributes. Such for example are the Words, *Black, White, Great, Little, Wise, Eloquent, Writeth, Wrote, Writing, &c.* (a).

Ch. VI.

HOWEVER, previously to these, and to every other possible Attribute, whatever a thing may be, whether black or white, square or round, wise or eloquent, writing or thinking, it must *first* of necessity EXIST, before it can possibly be any thing else. For EXISTENCE may be considered as an universal Genus, to which all things of all kinds are at all times to be referred. The Verbs therefore, which denote it, claim precedence of all others, as being essential to the very

(a) In the above list of Words are included what Grammarians called *Adjectives, Verbs, and Participles*, in as much as all of them equally denote the *Attributes of Substance*. Hence it is, that as they are all from their very nature the Predicates in a Proposition (being all predicated of some Subject or Substance, *Snow is white, Cicero writeth, &c.*) hence I say the Appellation PHMA or VERB is employed by Logicians in an extended Sense to denote them all. Thus Ammonius explaining the reason, why Aristotle in his Tract de Interpretatione calls λευκός a Verb, tells us πᾶσαν φωνήν, κατηγορούμενον ὄρον ἐν προτάσει ποιεῖσαν, 'PHMA καλεῖσθαι, that every Sound articulate, that forms the Predicate in a Proposition, is called a VERB, p. 24. Edit. Ven. Priscian's observation, though made on another occasion, is very pertinent to the present. *Non Declinatio, sed proprietates excutienda est significationis.* L. II. p. 576. And in another place he says—*non similitudo declinationis omnimodo conjungit vel discernit partes orationis inter se, sed vis ipsius significationis.* L. XIII. p. 970.

Ch. VI.  very being of every Proposition, in which they may still be found, either *expressed*, or by *implication*; *expressed*, as when we say, *The Sun is bright*; by *implication*, as when we say, *The Sun rises*, which means, when resolved, *The Sun is rising* (b).

THE Verbs, *Is, Groweth, Becometh, Est, Fit*, ὑπάρχει, ἐστὶ, πέλει, γίγνεται, are all of them used to express this *general Genus*. The *Latins* have called them *Verba Substantiva, Verbs Substantive*, but the *Greeks* ῥήματα ὑπαρκτικά, *Verbs of Existence*, a Name more apt, as being of greater latitude, and comprehending equally as well *Attribute*, as *Substance*. The principal of those Verbs, and which we shall particularly here consider, is the Verb, ἔστι, *Est, Is*,

NOW all *EXISTENCE* is either *absolute* or *qualified*—*absolute*, as when we say, *B is*; *qualified*, as when we say, *B is an animal*; *B is black, is round, &c.*

WITH respect to this difference, the Verb (*is*) can by itself express *absolute Existence*, but never the *qualified*, without subjoining the particular Form, because the Forms of *Existence* being in number infinite, if the particular Form be not expressed, we cannot know which is intended. And hence it follows, that when (*is*) only serves to subjoin some such Form, it has little more force, than that of a mere *Affertion*. It is under the same character, that it becomes a latent part in every other Verb, by expressing that *Affertion*, which is one of their *Essentials*. Thus, as was observed just before, *Riseth* means, *is rising*; *Writeth*, *is writing*.

AGAIN—

(b) See *Metaphys. Aristot.* L. V. c. 7. Edit. *Du-Vall*.

AGAIN—As to EXISTENCE in general, it is either *mutable*, or *immutable*; *mutable*, as in the *Objects of Sensation*; *immutable*, as in the *Objects of Intellection and Science*. Now *mutable* Objects exist all in *Time*, and admit the several Distinctions of present, past, and future. But *immutable* Objects know no such Distinctions, but rather stand opposed to all things temporary.

AND hence two different Significations of the substantive Verb (IS) according as it denotes *mutable*, or *immutable* Being.

FOR example, if we say, *This Orange is ripe*, (IS) meaneth, *that it existeth so now at this present*, in opposition to *past* time, when it was green, and to *future* time, when it will be rotten.

BUT if we say, *The Diameter of the Square is incommensurable with its side*, we do not intend by (IS) that it is incommensurable *now*, having been *formerly* commensurable, or being to become so *hereafter*; on the contrary we intend that *Perfection of Existence*, to which *Time* and its *Distinctions* are utterly unknown. It is under the same meaning we employ this Verb, when we say, TRUTH IS, or, GOD IS. The opposition is not of *Time present* to *other Times*, but of *necessary Existence* to *all temporary Existence whatever* (c). And so much for *Verbs of Existence*, commonly called *Verbs Substantive*.

WE

(c) Cum enim dicimus, DEUS EST, non cum dicimus NUNC ESSE, sed tantum IN SUBSTANTIA ESSE, ut hoc ad immutabilitatem potius substantiæ, quam ad tempus aliquod referatur. Si autem dicimus, DIES EST, ad nullam diei substantiam pertinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constitutionem; hoc enim, quod significat, tale est, tanquam si dicamus, NUNC EST. Quare cum dicimus ESSE, ut substantiam designemus, simpliciter EST addimus; cum vero ita ut aliquid præsens significetur, secundum Tempus. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 307. See also Plat. Tim. p. 37, 38. Edit. Serrani.

Ch. VI.

WE are now to descend to the common Herd of Attributives, such as *black* and *white*, *to write*, *to speak*, *to walk*, &c. among which, when compared and opposed to each other, one of the most eminent distinctions appears to be this. Some, by being joined to a proper Substantive *make* without farther help a *perfect assertive* Sentence; while the rest, tho' otherwise perfect, are *in this respect* deficient.

To explain by an example. When we say, *Cicero eloquent*, *Cicero wise*, these are imperfect Sentences, though they denote a Substance and an Attribute. The reason is, that they want an *Assertion*, to shew that such Attribute appertains to such Substance. We must therefore call in the help of an Assertion elsewhere, an (*is*) or a (*was*) to complete the Sentence, saying *Cicero is wise*, *Cicero was eloquent*. On the contrary, when we say, *Cicero writeth*, *Cicero walketh*, in instances like these there is no such occasion, because the Words (*writeth*) and (*walketh*) imply in their own Form not an Attribute only, but an Assertion likewise. Hence it is they may be resolved, the one into *Is* and *Writing*, the other into *Is* and *Walking*.

Now all those Attributives, which have this complex Power of denoting both an Attribute and an Assertion, make that Species of Words, which Grammarians call VERBS. If we resolve this complex Power into its distinct Parts, and take *the Attribute alone* without the Assertion, then have we PARTICIPLES. All other Attributives, besides the two Species before, are included together in the general Name of ADJECTIVES.

AND thus it is, that ALL ATTRIBUTIVES are either VERBS, PARTICIPLES, or ADJECTIVES.

BESIDES

BESIDES the Distinctions abovementioned, there are others, which deserve notice. Some Attributes have their Essence in *Motion*; such are *to walk, to fly, to strike, to live*. Others have it in the *privation of Motion*; such are *to stop, to rest, to cease, to die*. And lastly, others have it in subjects, *which have nothing to do with either Motion or its Privation*; such are the Attributes of, *Great and Little, White and Black, Wise and Foolish*, and in a word the several *Quantities and Qualities* of all Things. Now these last are ADJECTIVES; those which denote *Motions*, or their *Privation*, are either VERBS or PARTICIPLES.

AND this Circumstance leads to a farther Distinction, which may be explained as follows. That *all Motion is in Time*, and therefore, wherever it exists, implies *Time* as its concomitant, is evident to all, and requires no proving. But besides this, *all Rest or Privation of Motion implies Time likewise*. For how can a thing be said to rest or stop, by being in *one Place* for *one Instant* only?—so too is that thing, which moves with the greatest velocity. † To stop therefore or rest, is to be in *one Place* for *more than one Instant*, that is to say, *during an Extension between two Instants*, and this of course gives us the Idea of TIME. As therefore *Motions* and their *Privation* imply *Time* as their concomitant, so VERBS, which denote them, come to denote TIME also (*d*). And hence the origin and use of TENSES,

“ which

† Thus *Proclus* in the Beginning of his Treatise concerning *Motion*. Ηρεμῶν ἐστὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ ὄν, καὶ αὐτὸ, καὶ τὰ μέρη.

(*d*) The ancient Authors of Dialectic or Logic have well described this Property. The following is part of their Definition of a Verb—ῥῆμα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, α' Verb-

Ch. VI. “ which are so many different forms, assigned to each Verb, to shew,
 “ without altering its principal meaning, the various TIMES in which
 “ such meaning may exist.” Thus *Scribit*, *Scripsit*, *Scripserat*, and
Scribet, denote all equally the Attribute, *To Write*, while the difference between them, is, that they denote *Writing in different Times*.

SHOULD it be asked, whether *Time* itself may not become upon occasion the Verb's *principal* Signification; it is answered, No. And this appears, because *the same Time* may be denoted by different verbs (as in the words, *writeth* and *speaketh*) and *different Times* by the same Verb (as in the words, *writeth* and *wrote*) neither of which could happen, were *Time* any thing more, than a mere *Concomitant*. Add to this, that when words denote Time, not collaterally, but principally, they cease to be verbs, and become either adjectives, or substantives. Of the adjective kind are *Timely*, *Yearly*, *Dayly*, *Hourly*, &c. of the substantive kind are *Time*, *Year*, *Day*, *Hour*, &c.

THE most obvious division of TIME is into Present, Past, and Future, nor is any language complete, whose verbs have not TENSES, to mark these distinctions. But we may go still farther. Time past and future are both *infinitely* extended. Hence it is that in *universal Time past* we may assume *many particular Times past*, and in *universal Time future*, *many particular Times future*, some more, some less remote,

Verb is something, which signifies Time OVER AND ABOVE (for such is the force of the Proposition, Πρὸς.) If it should be asked, *over and above what?* It may be answered, over and above its *principal* Signification, which is to denote some *moving* and *energizing* Attribute. See *Arist. de Interpret.* c. 3. together with his Commentators *Ammonius* and *Boethius*.

remote, and corresponding to each other under different relations. Even *present Time itself* is not exempt from these differences, and as necessarily implies *some degree of Extension*, as does every given line, however minute.

HERE then we are to seek for the reason, which first introduced into language that variety of Tenses. It was not it seems enough to denote *indefinitely* (or by Aorists) mere Present, Past, or Future, but it was necessary on many occasions to define with more precision, *what kind* of Past, Present, or Future. And hence the multiplicity of Futures, Præterits, and even Present Tenses, with which all languages are found to abound, and without which it would be difficult to ascertain our Ideas.

HOWEVER as the knowledge of TENSES depends on the Theory of TIME, and this is a subject of no mean speculation, we shall reserve it by itself for the following chapter.

C H A P. VII.

Concerning Time, and Tenses.

Ch. VII. **T**IME and SPACE have this in common, that they are both of them by nature things *continuous*, and as such they both of them imply *Extension*. Thus between *London* and *Salisbury* there is the *Extension* of *Space*, and between *Yesterday* and *To-morrow*, the *Extension* of *Time*. But in this they differ, that all the parts of *Space* exist *at once* and *together*, while those of *Time* only exist in *Transfition* or *Succeffion* (a). Hence then we may gain some Idea of *TIME*, by confidering it under the notion of a *transfient Continuity*. Hence also, as far as the affections and properties of *Transfition* go, *Time* is *different* from *Space*; but as to those of *Extension* and *Continuity*, they perfectly *coincide*.


LET us take, for example, such a part of *Space*, as a *Line*. In every given *LINE* we may assume any where a *Point*, and therefore in every given *Line* there may be assumed infinite *Points*. So in every given *TIME* we may assume any where a *Now* or *Instant*, and therefore in every given *Time* there may be assumed infinite *Nows* or *Instants*.

FARTHER

(a) See *ante*, p. 154. Note XIII. To which we may add, what is said by *Ammonius* — οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ὅλος ἅμα ὑφίσταται, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ μόνον τὸ ΝΥΝ· ἐν γὰρ τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθίβεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, *TIME doth not subsist the whole at once, but only in a single NOW or INSTANT; for it hath its Existence in becoming and in ceasing to be.* Amm. in *Predicam.* p. 82. b.

FARTHER still—A POINT is the *Bound* of every finite *Line*; and Ch. VII.
A NOW or INSTANT, of every finite *Time*. But altho' they are *Bounds*, they are neither of them *Parts*, neither the *Point* of any *Line*, nor the *Now* or *Instant* of any *Time*. If this appear strange, we may remember, that the *parts* of any thing *extended* are necessarily *extended* also, it being essential to their character, that they should *measure the Whole*. But if a *Point* or *Now* were *extended*, each of them would contain within itself *infinite other Points*, and *infinite other Nows* (for these may be assumed infinitely within the minutest Extension) and this, it is evident, would be absurd and impossible.

THESE assertions therefore being admitted, and both *Points* and *Nows* being taken as *Bounds*, but not as *Parts* (b), it will follow, that in the same manner as *the same Point* may be the *End* of one *Line*, and the *Beginning* of another, so the *same Now* or *Instant* may be the *End* of one *Time*, and the *Beginning* of another. Let us suppose for example, the Lines, AB, BC.



I say

(b) —φανερὸν ὅτι ἔδὲ μέριον τὸ ΝΤΝ τῷ χρόνῳ, ὥσπερ ἔδ' αἱ στιγμαὶ τῆς γραμμῆς· αἱ δὲ γραμμαὶ οὐκ αὐτῆς μίας μέρια. It is evident that a Now or Instant is no more a part of Time, than Points are of a Line. The parts indeed of one Line are two other Lines. Natur. Aufc. L. IV. c. 17. And not long before—Τὸ δὲ ΝΤΝ ἔ μέρϑ· μετρεῖ τε γὰρ τὸ μέρϑ, καὶ σύγκεισθαι δεῖ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν· ὁ δὲ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ ἔ δοκεῖ σύγκεισθαι ἐκ τῶν ΝΤΝ. A Now is no Part of Time; for a Part is able to measure its Whole, and the Whole is necessarily made up of its Parts; but TIME doth not appear to be made up of Nows. Ibid. c. 14.

Ch. VII. I say that the Point B is the End of the Line AB, and the Beginning of the Line BC. In the same manner let us suppose AB, BC to represent certain Times, and let B be a *Now* or *Instant*. In such case I say that the *Instant* B is the End of the Time AB, and the Beginning of the Time BC. I say likewise of these two Times, that with respect to the *Now* or *Instant*, which they include, the first of them is necessarily PAST TIME, as being *previous* to it; the other is necessarily FUTURE, as being *subsequent*. As therefore every Now or INSTANT always exists in Time, and without being Time, is *Time's Bound*; the Bound of *Completion* to the *Past*, and the Bound of *Commencement* to the *Future*: from hence we may conceive its nature or end, which is *to be the Medium of Continuity between the Past and the Future, so as to render Time, thro' all its Parts, one Intire and Perfect Whole (c)*.

FROM the above speculations, there follow some conclusions, which may be perhaps called paradoxes, till they have been attentively considered. In the first place *there cannot* (strictly speaking) *be any such Thing as Time present*. For if all Time be *transient* as well as *continuous*, it cannot like a Line be present all together, but part will necessarily be gone, and part be coming. If therefore any portion of its continuity were to be present *at once*, it would so far quit its *transient* nature, and be *Time* no longer. But if no portion of its continuity

(c) Τὸ δὲ ΝΥΝ ἐστὶ συνέχεια χρόνου, ὡς περ ἐλέχθη. συνέχει γὰρ τὸν χρόνον, τὸν παρελθόντα καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ ὅλως πέρας χρόνον ἐστίν· ἐστὶ γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀρχή, τῷ δὲ τελευτή. A Now or Instant is (as was said before) the Continuity or holding together of Time; for it makes Time continuous, the past and the future, and is in general its boundary, as being the beginning of one Time and the ending of another. Natur. Aufcult. L. IV. c. 19. Συνέχεια in this place means not Continuity, as standing for Extension, but rather that Junction or Holding together, by which Extension is imparted to other things.

continuity can be thus present, how can *Time* possibly be *present*, to which such Continuity is essential? Ch. VII.

FARTHER than this—If there be no such thing as *Time Present*, there can be no *Sensation of Time* by any one of the senses. For ALL SENSATION is of the * *Present only*, the Past being preserved not by *Sense* but by *Memory*, and the Future being anticipated by *Prudence* only and wise *Forefight*.

BUT if no *Portion* of Time be the object of any *Sensation*; farther, if the *Present* never exist; if the *Past* be no more; if the *Future* be not as yet; and if these are all the parts, out of which TIME is compounded: how strange and shadowy a Being do we find it? How nearly approaching to a perfect Non-entity (*d*)? Let us try however, since the senses fail us, if we have not faculties of higher power, to seize this fleeting Being.

THE World has been likened to a variety of Things, but it appears to resemble no one more, than some moving spectacle (such as a procession

* Ταυτῇ γὰρ (αἰσθήσει sc.) οὔτε τὸ μέλλον, οὔτε τὸ γιγνόμενον γνωρίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον. Αἰγ. περὶ Μνήμ. Α. α.

(*d*) "Ὅτι μὲν ἔν ὅλῳς ἔκ ἐστιν, ἢ μόγις καὶ ἀμυδρῶς, ἐκ τῶν δὲ τις ἂν ὑποπτεύσειε· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ γέγονε, καὶ ἔκ ἐστι· τὸ δὲ μέλλει, καὶ ἔπω ἐστίν· ἐκ δὲ τῶν καὶ ὁ ἄπειρος καὶ ὁ αἰεὶ λαμβανόμενος χρόνος σύγκειται· τὸ δ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντων συσκέμενον, ἀδύνατον ἂν δόξειε κατέχειν ποτὲ ἐσίᾳς. That therefore TIME exists not at all, or at least has but a faint and obscure existence, one may suspect from hence. A part of it has been, and is no more; a part of it is coming, and is not as yet; and out of these is made that infinite Time, which is ever to be assumed still farther and farther. Now that which is made up of nothing but Non-entities, it should seem was impossible ever to participate of Entity. Natural. Aufc. L. IV. c. 14. See also Philop. M. S. Com. in Nicomach. p. 10.

Ch. VII.  procession or a triumph) that abounds in every part with splendid objects, some of which are still departing, as fast as others make their appearance. The Senses look on, while the fight passes, perceiving as much as is *immediately present*, which they report *with tolerable accuracy* to the Soul's superior powers. Having done this, they have done their duty, being concerned with nothing, save what is present and instantaneous. But to the *Memory*, to the *Imagination*, and above all to the *Intellect*, the several *Nows* or *Instants* are not lost, as to the *Senses*, but are preserved and made objects of *steady* comprehension, however in their own nature they may be *transitory* and *passing*. "Now it is from contemplating two or more of these " Instants under one view, together with that Interval of Continuity, " which subsists between them, that we acquire insensibly the Idea " of TIME (e)." For example: *The Sun rises*; this I remember: *it rises again*; this too I remember. These Events are not together; there is an *Extension* between them—not however of *Space*, for we may

(e) Τότε φαμέν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τὰ πρότερον καὶ ὑστέρων ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἰσθησιν λάβωμεν. Ὅριζομεν δὲ τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτὰ, καὶ μεταξύ τι αὐτῶν ἕτερον· ὅταν γὰρ τὰ ἄκρα ἕτερα τὰ μέσων νοήσωμεν, καὶ δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ΝΥΝ, τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τὸτο φαμέν εἶναι ΧΡΟΝΟΝ. *It is then we say there has been TIME, when we can acquire a Sensation of prior and subsequent in Motion. But we distinguish and settle these two, by considering one first, then the other, together with an interval between them different from both. For as often as we conceive the Extremes to be different from the Mean, and the Soul talks of two Nows, one prior and the other subsequent, then it is we say there is TIME, and this it is we call TIME.* Natural. Aufcult. L. IV. c. 16, *Themistius's* Comment upon this passage is to the same purpose. Ὅταν γὰρ ὁ νῦν ἀναμνησθεὶς τὰ ΝΥΝ, ὁ χθὲς εἴπῃ, ἕτερον πάλιν εἴπῃ τὸ τήμερον, τότε καὶ χρόνον ἐνθὺς ἐνενόησεν, ὑπὸ τῶν δύο ΝΥΝ ὀριζόμενον, οἷον ὑπὸ πέρατων δυοῖν καὶ ἔτω λέγειν ἔχει, ὅτι πῶσόν ἐστι πεντεκάδεκα ὥρων, ἢ ἐκκαίδεκα, οἷον ἐξ ἀπείρου γραμμῆς πηχυαίαν δύο σημείοις ἀποτεμενόμενῃ. *For when the Mind, remembering the Now, which it talked of yesterday, talks again of another Now to-day, then it is it immediately has an idea of TIME, terminated by these two Nows, as by two Boundaries; and thus it is enabled to say, that the Quantity is of fifteen, or of sixteen hours, as if it were to sever a Cubit's length from an infinite Line by two Points.* Themist. Op. edit. Aldi. p. 45. b.

may suppose the place of rising the same, or at least to exhibit no sensible difference. Yet still we recognize *some* Extension between them. Now what is this Extension, *but a natural Day?* And what is that, but pure *Time?* It is after the same manner, by recognizing two new Moons, and the Extension between these: two vernal Equinoxes, and the Extension between these; that we gain Ideas of other Times, such as *Months* and *Years*, which are all so many Intervals, described as above; that is to say, *passing Intervals of Continuity between two Instants viewed together.*

AND thus it is THE MIND acquires the Idea of TIME. But this Time it must be remembered is PAST TIME ONLY, which is always the *first* Species, that occurs to the human intellect. How then do we acquire the Idea of TIME FUTURE? The answer is, we acquire it by *Anticipation.* Should it be demanded still farther, *And what is Anticipation?* We answer, that in this case it is a kind of reasoning by analogy from similar to similar; from successions of events, that are past already, to similar successions, that are presumed hereafter. For example: I observe as far back as my memory can carry me, how every day has been succeeded by a night; that night, by another day; that day, by another night; and so downwards in order to the Day that is now. Hence then I *anticipate a similar succession* from the present Day, and thus gain the Idea of days and nights *in futurity.* After the same manner, by attending to the periodical returns of New and Full Moons; of Springs, Summers, Autumns and Winters, all of which in Time past I find never to have failed, I *anticipate a like orderly and diversified succession*, which makes Months and Seasons, and Years, *in Time future.*

Ch. VII.

WE go farther than this, and not only thus anticipate in these *natural* Periods, but even in matters of *human* and *civil* concern. For example: Having observed in many past instances how health had succeeded to exercise, and sickness to sloth; we anticipate *future* health to those, who, being *now* sickly, use exercise; and *future* sickness to those, who, being *now* healthy, are slothful. It is a variety of such observations, all respecting one subject, which when systematized by just reasoning, and made habitual by due practice, form the character of a Master-Artist, or Man of *practical* Wisdom. If they respect the human body (as above) they form the Physician; if matters military, the General; if matters national, the Statesman; if matters of private life, the Moralist; and the same in other subjects. All these several characters in their respective ways may be said to possess a kind of prophetic discernment, which not only presents them *the barren prospect* of futurity (a prospect not hid from the meanest of men) but shews withal those events, which are likely to attend it, and thus enables them to act with superior certainty and rectitude. And hence it is, that (if we except those, who have had diviner assistances) we may justly say, as was said of old,

He's the best Prophet, who conjectures well (f).

FROM

(f) Μάντις δ' ἄριστος, ὅστις εἰκάζει καλῶς.

So Milton:

*Till old Experience do attain
To something like Prophetic Strain.*

Et facile existimari potest, Prudentiam esse quodammodo Divinationem.

Corn. Nep. in Vit. Attici.

There

FROM what has been reasoned it appears, that knowledge of *the Future* comes from knowledge of *the Past*; as does knowledge of *the Past* from knowledge of the *Present*, so that their *Order to us* is that of PRESENT, PAST, and FUTURE. Ch. VII.

OF these Species of knowledge, that of the *Present* is the lowest, not only as *first in perception*, but as far the more extensive, being necessarily common to all *animal Beings*, and reaching even to Zoophytes, as far as they possess *Sensation*. Knowledge of *the Past* comes next, which is superior to the *former*, as being confined to those animals, that have *Memory* as well as *Senses*. Knowledge of *the Future* comes last, as being derived from the other two, and which is for that reason *the most excellent* as well as *the most rare*, since Nature in her superadditions rises from worse always to better, and is never found to sink from better down to worse*.

Arist. de
An. II. 3.
p. 28.

AND now having seen, how we acquire the knowledge of *Time past*, and *Time future*; which is first in perception, which first in dignity; which more common, which more rare; let us compare them both to


There is nothing appears so clearly an object of the MIND or INTELLECT only, as *the Future* does, since we can find no place for its existence any where else. Not but the same, if we consider, is equally true of *the Past*. For tho' it may have once had another kind of being, when (according to common Phrase) it *actually was*, yet was it then something *Present*, and not something *Past*. As *Past*, it has no existence but in THE MIND or MEMORY, since had it in fact any other, it could not properly be called *Past*. It was this intimate connection between TIME, and the SOUL, that made some Philosophers doubt, *whether if there was no Soul, there could be any Time*, since Time appears to have its Being in no other region. Πότερον δὲ μὴ ἔσσης ψυχῆς εἴη ἂν ὁ χρόνος, ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, κ. τ. λ. Natur. Aufcult. L. IV. c. 20. Themistius, who comments the above passage, expresses himself more positively. Εἰ τούτων διχῶς λέγεται τότε ἀριθμητὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμώμενον, τὸ μὲν τὸ ἀριθμητὸν διὰ δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ ἂν ὑποσάιν, μὴ ὄντος τε ἀριθμήσοντος μήτε δυνάμει μήτε ἐνεργείᾳ, φανερόν ὡς οὐκ ἂν ὁ χρόνος εἴη, μὴ ἔσσης ψυχῆς. Them. p. 48. Edit. Aldi. Vid. etiam ejusd. Comm. in Lib. de An. p. 94.

* See below, Note (r) of this Chapter.

Ch. VII.  to the *present Now* or *Instant*, and examine what relations they maintain towards it.

IN the first place there may be *Times* both *past* and *future*, in which the *present Now* has no existence, as for example in *Yesterday*, and *To-morrow*.

AGAIN, the *present Now* may so far belong to *Time* of either sort, as to be the *End* of the *past*, and the *Beginning* of the *future*; but it cannot be included *within* the limits of either. For if it were possible, let us suppose C the *present Now* included



within the limits of the *past Time* AD. In such case CD, part of the *past Time* AD, will be subsequent to C the *present Now*, and so of course be *future*. But by the Hypothesis it is *past*, and so will be both *Past* and *Future* at once, which is absurd. In the same manner we prove that C cannot be included within the limits of a *future Time*, such as BE.

WHAT then shall we say of such *Times*, as *this Day*, *this Month*, *this Year*, *this Century*, all which include within them the *present Now*? They cannot be *past Times* or *future*, from what has been proved; and *present Time* has no existence, as has been proved likewise *. Or shall we allow them to be present, from the *present Now*, which exists within them; so that from the presence of that we call these

* Sup. p. 272.

these also present, tho' the shortest among them has infinite parts always absent? If so, and in conformity to custom we allow such *Times present*, as present Days, Months, Years, and Centuries, each must of necessity be *a compound of the Past and the Future*, divided from each other by some present Now or Instant, and *jointly* called PRESENT, while that Now remains within them. Let us suppose for example the Time XY, which

X A B C D E Y
f *g*

let us call a Day, or a Century; and let the present *Now* or *Instant* exist at A. I say, in as much as A exists within XY, that therefore XA is Time past, and AY Time future, and the whole XA, AY *Time present*. The same holds, if we suppose the present Now to exist at B, or C, or D, or E, or any where before Y. When the present Now exists at Y, then is the whole XY *Time past*, and still more so, when the Now gets to *g*, or onwards. In like manner before the Present Now entered X, as for example when it was at *f*, then was the whole XY *Time future*; it was the same, when the present Now was at X. When it had past that, then XY became *Time present*. And thus it is that TIME is PRESENT, while passing, in its PRESENT Now or INSTANT. It is the same indeed here, as it is in *Space*. A Sphere passing over a Plane, and being for that reason present to it, is only present to that Plane *in a single Point at once*, while during the whole progression its parts absent are *infinite (g)*.

FROM

(g) PLACE, according to the ancients, was either mediate, or immediate. I am (for example) in *Europe*, because I am in *England*; in *England*, because in *Wiltshire*; in *Wiltshire*,

Ch. VII. FROM what has been said, we may perceive that ALL TIME, of every denomination, is divisible and extended. But if so, then whenever we suppose a definite Time, even though it be a Time present, it must needs have a Beginning, a Middle, and an End. And so much for TIME.

Now from the above doctrine of TIME, we propose by way of Hypothesis the following Theorie of TENSES.

THE TENSES are used to mark Present, Past, and Future Time, either indefinitely without reference to any Beginning, Middle, or End; or else definitely, in reference to such distinctions.

IF indefinitely, then have we THREE TENSES, an Aorist of the Present, an Aorist of the Past, and an Aorist of the Future. If definitely, then have we three Tenses to mark the Beginnings of these three Times;

Wiltshire, because in Salisbury; in Salisbury, because in my own house; in my own house, because in my study. Thus far MEDIATE PLACE. And what is my IMMEDIATE PLACE? It is the internal Bound of that containing Body (whatever it be) which coincides with the external Bound of my own Body. Τὸ περιέχοντος πέρας, καθ' ὃ περιέχει τὸ περιεχόμενον. Now as this immediate Place is included within the limits of all the former Places, it is from this relation that those mediate Places also are called each of them my Place, tho' the least among them so far exceed my magnitude. To apply this to TIME. The Present Century is present in the present Year; that, in the present Month; that, in the present Day; that, in the present Hour; that, in the present Minute. It is thus by circumscription within circumscription that we arrive at THAT REAL AND INDIVISIBLE INSTANT, which by being itself the very Essence of the Present diffuses PRESENCE throughout all even the largest of Times, which are found to include it within their respective limits. Nicephorus Blemmides speaks much to the same purpose. Ἐνεσῶς ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶν ὃ ἐφ' ἑκάτερα παρακείμενος τῷ κυρίῳ ΝΥΝ· χρόνος μερικός, ἐκ παρεληλυθότος καὶ μέλλοντος συνεσῶς, καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ κυρίῳ ΝΥΝ γειννίασιν, ΝΥΝ λεγόμενος καὶ αὐτός. PRESENT TIME therefore is that which adjoins to the REAL NOW or INSTANT on either side, being a limited Time made up of Past and Future, and from its vicinity to that REAL NOW said to be Now also itself. Ἐπιλ. φυσικῆς Κεφ. θ'. See also Arist. Physic. L. VI. c. 2, 3, &c.

Times; three, to denote their *Middles*; and three to denote their *Ends*; in all NINE. Ch. VII.

THE three first of these Tenses we call the Inceptive Present, the Inceptive Past, and the Inceptive Future. The three next, the Middle Present, the Middle Past, and the Middle Future. And the three last, the Completive Present, the Completive Past, and the Completive Future.

AND thus it is, that the TENSES in their natural number appear to be TWELVE; *three* to denote *Time absolute*, and *nine* to denote it *under its respective distinctions*.

Aorist of the Present.

Γράφω. *Scribo.* I write.

Aorist of the Past.

Ἐγράψα. *Scripsi.* I wrote.

Aorist of the Future.

Γράψω. *Scribam.* I shall write.

Inceptive Present.

Μέλλω γράφειν. *Scripturus sum.* I am going to write.

Middle or extended Present.

Τυγχάνω γράφων. *Scribo* or *scribens sum.* I am writing.

Completive Present.

Γέγραφα. *Scripsi.* I have written.

Inceptive Past.

Ἐμελλον γράφειν. *Scripturus eram.* I was beginning to write.

Middle or extended Past.

Ἐγγραφον or ἐτύγχανον γράφων, *Scribebam*. I was writing.

Completive Past.

Ἐγεγράφειν. *Scripseram*. I had done writing.

Inceptive Future.

Μελλήσω γράφειν. *Scripturus ero*. I shall be beginning to write.

Middle or extended Future.

Ἐσομαι γράφων. *Scribens ero*. I shall be writing,

Completive Future.

Ἐσομαι γεγραφώς. *Scripsero*. I shall have done writing.

It is not to be expected that the above Hypothesis should be justified through all instances in every language. It fares with Tenses, as with other affections of speech; be the Language upon the whole ever so perfect, much must be left, in defiance of all analogy, to the harsh laws of mere authority and chance.

It may not however be improper to inquire, what traces may be discovered in favour of this system, either in languages themselves, or in those authors who have written upon this part of Grammar, or lastly in the nature and reason of things.

In the first place, as to AORISTS. *Aorists* are usually by Grammarians referred to the Past; such are ἦλθον, *I went*; ἔπεσον, *I fell*, &c. We seldom hear of them in the Future, and more rarely still in the Present. Yet it seems agreeable to reason, that wherever Time is signified

nified without any farther circumscription, than that of Simple present, Ch. VII.
past, or future, the Tense is AN AORIST.

THUS Milton,

*Millions of spiritual creatures WALK the earth
Unseen, both when we wake, and when we sleep.*

P. L. IV. 277.

Here the verb (WALK) means not that they were walking at that instant only, when Adam spoke, but ἀορίσως indefinitely, take any instant whatever. So when the same author calls *Hypocrisy*,

——the only Evil, that WALKS
Invisible, except to God alone,

the Verb (WALKS) hath the like aoristical or indefinite application. The same may be said in general of all Sentences of the Gnomologic kind, such as

*Ad pœnitendum PROPERAT, cito qui judicat.
Avarus, nisi cum moritur, nil recte FACIT, &c.*

ALL these Tenses are so many AORISTS OF THE PRESENT.

Gnomologic Sentences after the same manner make likewise AORISTS OF THE FUTURE,

Tu nihil ADMITTES in te, formidine pœnæ.

Hor.

O o 2

So

Ch. VII. So too *Legislative* Sentences, *Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not steal*, &c. for this means no one *particular* future Time, but is a prohibition extended *indefinitely* to every part of Time future (*h*).

WE pass from *Aorists*, to THE INCEPTIVE TENSES.

THESE may be found in part supplied (like many other Tenses) by verbs auxiliar. ΜΕΛΛΩ γράφειν. *Scripturus* SUM. I AM GOING to write. But the *Latins* go farther, and have a species of Verbs, derived from others, which do the duty of these Tenses, and are themselves for that reason called *Inchoatives* or *Inceptives*. Thus from *Caleo*, *I am warm*, comes *Calesco*, *I begin to grow warm*; from *Tumeo*, *I swell*, comes *Tumescō*, *I begin to swell*. These *Inchoative* Verbs are so peculiarly appropriated to the *Beginnings* of Time, that they are defective as to all Tenses, which denote it in its *Completion*, and therefore have neither *Perfectum*, *Plus quam-perfectum*, or *Perfect Future*. There is likewise a species of Verbs called in *Greek* ἑφετικὰ, in *Latin* *Desiderativa*, the *Desideratives* or *Meditatives*, which if they are not strictly *Inceptives*, yet both in *Greek* and *Latin* have a near affinity with them. Such are πολεμῶ, *Bellaturio*, *I have a desire to make war*;

(*h*) The *Latin* Tongue appears to be more than ordinarily deficient, as to the article of *Aorists*. It has no peculiar Form even for an *Aorist of the Past*, and therefore (as *Priscian* tells us) the *Præteritum* is forced to do the double duty both of that *Aorist*, and of the *perfect Present*, its application in particular instances being to be gathered from the Context. Thus it is that *FECI* means (as the same author informs us) both *ἔποινα* and *ἐποίησα*, *I have done it*, and *I did it*; *VIDI* both *ἑώρακα* and *εἶδον*, *I have just seen it*, and *I saw it once*. *Prisc. Gram. L. VIII. p. 814, 838. Edit. Putsch.*

war; βρωσείω, *Efurio*, *I long to eat* (i). And so much for THE IN-
CEPTIVE TENSES. Ch. VII.

THE two last orders of Tenses which remain, are those we called (k) THE MIDDLE TENSES (which express Time as *extended* and *passing*,) and the PERFECT or COMPLETIVE, which express its *Completion* or *End*.

Now for these the authorities are many. They have been acknowledged already in the ingenious Accidence of Mr. *Hoadly*, and explained and confirmed by Dr. *Samuel Clarke*, in his rational edition of *Homer's Iliad*. Nay, long before either of these, we find the same scheme in *Scaliger*, and by him (l) ascribed to † *Grocinus*, as
its

(i) As all *Beginnings* have reference to what is *future*, hence we see how properly these Verbs are formed, the *Greek* ones from a future Verb, the *Latin* from a future Participle. From πολεμήσω and βρώσω come πολεμῶ and βρωσείω; from *Bellaturus* and *Efurus* come *Bellaturio* and *Efurio*. See *Macrobius*, p. 691. Ed. Var. & πάνυ γέ με νῦν δὴ ΓΕΛΑΣΕΙΟΝΤΑ ἐποίησας γελάσαι. Plato in *Phædone*.

(k) Care must be taken not to confound these *middle* Tenses, with the Tenses of those Verbs, which bear the same name among Grammarians.

(l) *Ex his percipimus Grocinum acutè admodum Tempora divisisse, sed minus commodè. Tria enim constituit, ut nos, sed quæ bifariam secant, Perfectum & Imperfectum: sic, Præteritum imperfectum, Amabam: Præteritum perfectum, Amaveram. Rectè sanè. Et Præsens imperfectum, Amo. Rectè hæcenus; continuat enim amorem, neque absolvit. At Præsens perfectum, Amavi: quis hoc dicat?—De Futuro autem ut non malè sentit, ita controversum est. Futurum, inquit, imperfectum, Amabo: Perfectum, Amavero. Non malè, inquam: significat enim Amavero, amorem futurum & absolutum iri: Amabo perfectionem nullam indicat.* De Cauf. Ling. Lat. c. 113.

† His Name was *William Grocin*, an *Englishman*, contemporary with *Erasmus*, and celebrated for his learning. He went to *Florence* to study under *Landin*, and was Professor at *Oxford*. *Spec. Lit. Flor.* p. 205.

Ch. VII. its author. The learned *Gaza* (who was himself a *Greek*, and one of the ablest restorers of that language in the western world) characterizes the Tenses in nearly the same manner (*m*). What *Apollonius* hints, is exactly consonant (*n*). *Priscian* too advances the same doctrine from the *Stoics*, whose authority we esteem greater than all the rest, not only from the more early age when they lived, but from their superior skill in Philosophy, and their peculiar attachment to *Dialectic*, which naturally led them to great accuracy in these *Grammatical Speculations* (*o*).

BEFORE

(*m*) The PRESENT TENSE (as this Author informs us in his excellent Grammar) denotes τὸ ἐνεσάμενον καὶ ἀτελές, that which is now Instant and incomplete; THE PERFECTUM, τὸ παρεληλυθός ἄρτι, καὶ ἐντελές τῷ ἐνεσῶτος, that which is now immediately past, and is the Completion of the Present; THE IMPERFECTUM, τὸ παραλειπόμενον καὶ ἀτελές τῷ παρωχημένῳ, the extended and incomplete part of the Past; and THE PLUSQUAM-PERFECTUM, τὸ παρεληλυθός πάλαι, καὶ ἐντελές τῷ παρακειμένῳ, that which is past long ago, and is the completion of the præteritum. Gram. L. IV.

(*n*) Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πειθόμεθα, ὅτι ἡ παρωχημένη συντέλειαν σημαίνει ὁ παρακειμένος, τὴν γε μὴν ἐνεσῶσαν—Hence we are persuaded that the Perfectum doth not signify the completion of the Past, but PRESENT COMPLETION. *Apollon.* L. III. c. 6. The Reason, which persuaded him to this opinion, was the application and use of the Particle ἂν, of which he was then treating, and which, as it denoted *Potentiality* or *Contingence*, would assort (he says) with any of the passing, extended, and incomplete Tenses, but never with this PERFECTUM, because this implied such a complete and indefeasible existence, as never to be qualified into the nature of a *Contingent*.

(*o*) By these Philosophers the vulgar present Tense was called THE IMPERFECT PRESENT, and the vulgar Præteritum, THE PERFECT PRESENT, than which nothing can be more consonant to the system that we favour. But let us hear *Priscian*, from whom we learn these facts. PRÆSENS TEMPUS proprie dicitur, cujus pars jam præterit, pars futura est. Cum enim Tempus, fluvii more, instabili volvatur cursu, vix punctum habere potest in præsentī, hoc est, in instantī. Maxima igitur pars ejus (sicut dictum est) vel præterit vel futura est.—Unde STOICI jure HOC TEMPUS PRÆSENS etiam IMPERFECTUM vocabant (ut dictum est) eo quod prior ejus pars, quæ præterit, transacta est, deest autem sequens, id est, futura. Ut si in medio versu dicam, scribo versum, priore ejus parte scripta;

BEFORE we conclude, we shall add a few miscellaneous observations, which will be more easily intelligible from the hypothesis here advanced, and serve withal to confirm its truth.

AND first, the *Latins* used their *Præteritum Perfectum* in some instances after a very peculiar manner, so as to imply the very reverse of the verb in its natural signification. Thus, *VIXIT*, signified, IS DEAD; *FUIT*, signified, NOW IS NOT, IS NO MORE. It was in this sense that *Cicero* addressed the People of *Rome*, when he had put to death the leaders in the *Catalinarian* Conspiracy. He appeared in the Forum, and cried out with a loud voice, * *VIXERUNT*. So *Virgil*,

— || *FUIMUS Troes, FUIT Ilium & ingens*

Gloria Dardanidum—

Æn. II.

And

scriptâ; cui adhuc deest extrema pars, præsentî utor verbo, dicendo, scribo versum: sed IMPERFECTUM est, quod deest adhuc versui, quod scribatur—Ex eodem igitur Præsentî nascitur etiam Perfectum. Si enim ad finem perveniat inceptum, statim utimur PRÆTERITO PERFECTO; continuo enim, scripto ad finem versu, dico, scripsi versum—And soon after speaking of the Latin Perfectum, he says—sciendum tamen, quod Romani PRÆTERITO PERFECTO non solum in re modo completa utuntur, (in quo vim habet ejus, qui apud Græcos παρακείμενος vocatur, quem STOICI ΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ΕΝΕΣΤΩΤΑ nominaverunt) sed etiam pro Ἀορίσ accipitur, &c. Lib. VIII. p. 812, 813, 814.

* So among the *Romans*, when in a Cause all the Pleaders had spoken, the Cryer used to proclaim *DIXERUNT*, i. e. *they have done speaking*. *Ascon. Pæd. in Verr. II.*

|| So *Tibullus* speaking of certain Prodigies and evil Omens.

Hæc fuerint olim. Sed tu, jam mitis, Apollo,

Prodigia indomitis merge sub æquoribus.

Eleg. II. 5. ver. 19.

Let these Events HAVE BEEN in days of old;—by Implication therefore—But HENCEFORTH let them be no more.

So

Ch. VII. And again,

—*Locus Ardea quondam*

Dictus avis, & nunc magnum manet Ardea nomen,

* *Sed fortuna* FUIT— *Æn. VII.*

THE reason of these significations is derived from THE COMPLETIVE POWER of the Tense here mentioned. We see that the periods of Nature, and of human affairs, are maintained by the reciprocal succession of *Contraries*. It is thus with Calm and Tempest; with Day and Night; with Prosperity and Adversity; with Glory and Ignominy; with Life and Death. Hence then, in the instances above, the *completion* of one contrary is put for the *commencement* of the other, and to say, HATH LIVED, OR, HATH BEEN, has the same meaning with, IS DEAD, OR, IS NO MORE.

IT

So *Eneus* in *Virgil* prays to *Phæbus*.

Hac Trojana tenus fuerit fortuna secuta.

Let Trojan *Fortune* (that is, adverse, like that of *Troy*, and its inhabitants,) HAVE so far FOLLOWED us. By implication therefore, but let it follow us no farther, Here let it end, *Hic sit Finis*, as *Servius* well observes in the place.

In which instances, by the way, mark not only the force of the *Tense*, but of the *Mood*, the PRECATIVE or IMPERATIVE, not in the *Future* but in the PAST. See p. 300, 301.

* *Certus in hospitibus non est amor; errat ut, ipsi:*

Cumque nihil speres firmitus esse, FUIT. *Epist. Ovid. Helen. Paridi. ver. 190.*

Sive erimus, seu nos Fata FUISSE volent.

Tibull. III. 5. 32.

It is remarkable in * *Virgil*, that he frequently joins in the same sentence this *complete* and *perfect Present* with the *extended* and *passing Present*; which proves that he considered the two, as belonging to the same species of *Time*, and therefore naturally formed to co-incide with each other.

— *Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens*

Scorpius, & cæli justâ plus parte reliquit. G. I.

Terra tremit; fugere feræ— G. I.

Præsertim si tempestas a vertice sylvis

Incubuit, glomeratque ferens incendia ventus. G. II.

— *illa noto citius, volucrique sagittâ,*

Ad terram fugit, & portu se condidit alto. Æn. V.

In the same manner he joins the same two modifications of *Time* in the *Past*, that is to say, the *complete* and *perfect Past* with the *extended* and *passing*.

— *Inruerant Danaï, & tectum omne tenebant.* Æn. II.

Tres imbris torti radios, tres nubis aquosæ

Addiderant, rutili tres ignis, & alitis austri.

Fulgores nunc terrificos, sonitumque metumque

Miscebant operi, flammisque sequacibus iras (p). Æn. VIII.

As

* See also *Spencer's Fairy Queen*, B. I. C. 3. St. 19. C. 3. St. 39. C. 8. St. 9.

He hath his Shield redeem'd, and forth his Sword he draws.

(p) The Intention of *Virgil* may be better seen, in rendering one or two of the above passages into *English*.

— *Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens*
Scorpius, & cæli justâ plus parte reliquit.

Ch. VII.

As to the IMPERFECTUM, it is sometimes employed to denote what is *usual* and *Customary*. Thus *surgebat* and *scribebat* signify not only, *he WAS rising, he WAS writing*, but upon occasion they signify *he USED to rise, he USED to write*. The reason of this is, that whatever is *customary*, must be something which has been *frequently repeated*. But what has been *frequently repeated*, must needs require an *Extension of Time past*, and thus we fall insensibly into the TENSE here mentioned.

AGAIN, we are told by *Pliny* (whose authority likewise is confirmed by many gems and marbles still extant) that the ancient painters and sculptors, when they fixed their names to their works, did it *pendenti titulo, in a suspensive kind of Inscription*, and employed for that purpose the Tense here mentioned. It was Ἀπελλῆς ἐποίει, *Apelles faciebat*,

For thee the scorpion IS NOW CONTRACTING his claws, and HATH ALREADY LEFT thee more than a just portion of Heaven. The Poet, from a high strain of poetic adulation, supposes the scorpion so desirous of admitting *Augustus* among the heavenly signs, that though he *has already made* him more than room enough, yet he *still continues* to be making him more. Here then we have two acts, one *perfect*, the other *pending*, and hence the use of the two different Tenses. Some editions read *relinquit*; but *reliquit* has the authority of the celebrated *Medicean* manuscript.

—*Illa noto citius, volucrique sagittâ,
Ad terram fugit, & portu se condidit alto.*

The ship, quicker than the wind, or a swift arrow, CONTINUES FLYING to land, and IS HID within the lofty harbour. We may suppose this Harbour, (like many others) to have been surrounded with high Land. Hence the Vessel, immediately on entering it, was *completely hid* from those spectators, who had gone out to see the Ship-race, but yet might *still continue sailing* towards the shore within.

—*Inruerant Danaï, & tectum omne tenebant.*

The Greeks HAD ENTERED and WERE THEN POSSESSING the whole House; as much as to say, they had entered, and that was over, but their Possession continued still.

faciebat, Πολύκλειτος ἐποίει, *Polycletus faciebat*, and never ἐποίησε or *fecit*. Ch. VII.
By this they imagined that they avoided the shew of arrogance, and had in case of censure an apology (as it were) prepared, since it appeared from the work itself, that *it was once indeed in hand*, but no pretension that *it was ever finished* (q).

It is remarkable that the very manner, in which the *Latins* derive these Tenses from one another, shews a plain reference to the system here advanced. From *the passing Present* come the passing Past, and Future. *Scribo, Scribebam, Scribam*. From *the perfect Present* come the perfect Past, and Future. *Scripsi, Scripseram, Scripsero*. And so in all instances, even where the verbs are irregular, as from *Fero* come *Ferebam* and *Feram*; from *Tuli* come *Tuleram* and *Tulero*.

WE shall conclude by observing, that the ORDER of the Tenses, as they stand ranged by the old Grammarians, is not a fortuitous Order, but is consonant to our perceptions, in the recognition of Time, according to what we have explained already (r). Hence it is, that
the

(q) *Plin. Nat. Hist. L. I.* The first Printers (who were most of them Scholars and Critics) in imitation of the ancient Artists used the same Tense. *Excudebat H. Stephanus. Excudebat Guil. Morelius. Absolvebat Joan. Benenatus*, which has been followed by Dr. Taylor in his late valuable edition of *Demosthenes*.

(r) See before p. 275, 276, 277. Scaliger's observation upon this occasion is elegant.—*Ordo autem (Temporum scil.) aliter est, quam natura eorum. Quod enim præterit, prius est, quam quod est, itaque primo loco debere poni videbatur. Verum, quod primo quoque tempore offertur nobis, id creat primas species in animo: quamobrem Præsens Tempus primum locum occupavit; est enim commune omnibus animalibus. Præteritum autem iis tantum, quæ memoriâ prædita sunt. Futurum verò etiam paucioribus, quippe quibus datum est prudentiæ officium. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113. See also Senecæ Epist. 124. Mutum animal sensu comprehendit præsentia; præteritorum, &c.*

Ch. VII. the *Present Tense* stands first; then *the Past Tenses*; and lastly *the Future*.

AND now, having seen what authorities there are for Aorists, or those Tenses, which denote Time *indefinitely*; and what for those Tenses, opposed to Aorists, which mark it *definitely*, (such as the Inceptive, the Middle, and the Compleitive) we here finish the subject of TIME and TENSES, and proceed to consider THE VERB IN OTHER ATTRIBUTES, which it will be necessary to deduce from other principles.

C H A P. VIII.

Concerning Modes.

WE have observed already (*a*) that the Soul's leading powers are those of *Perception* and those of *Volition*, which words we have taken in their most comprehensive acceptation. We have observed also, that *all Speech or Discourse* is a *publishing* or exhibiting some part of our soul, either a certain *Perception*, or a certain *Volition*. Hence then, according as we exhibit it either in a *different part*, or after a *different manner*, hence I say the variety of *MODES* or *MOODS* (*b*).

Ch. VIII.

IF we simply *declare*, or *indicate* something to be, or not to be, (whether a *Perception* or *Volition*, it is equally the same) this constitutes that Mode called the *DECLARATIVE* or *INDICATIVE*.

A Perception.

—Nosco crines, incanaque menta


Regis Romani—

Virg. Æn. VI.

A Vo-

(*a*) See Chapter II.

(*b*) Gaza defines a Mode exactly consonant to this doctrine. He says it is—βέλημα, εἰς ἓν πάθημα ψυχῆς, διὰ φωνῆς σημαζόμενον—a *Volition* or *Affection* of the Soul, signified through some *Voice*, or *Sound* articulate. Gram. L. IV. As therefore this is the nature of Modes, and Modes belong to Verbs, hence it is Apollonius observes—τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐξαιρέτως παράκειται ἡ ψυχικὴ διάθεσις—the Soul's disposition is in an eminent degree attached to Verbs. De Synt. L. III. c. 13. Thus too Priscian: Modi sunt diversæ INCLINATIONES ANIMI, quas varia consequitur DECLINATIO VERBI. L. VIII. p. 821.



A Volition.

In nova FERT ANIMUS mutatas dicere formas

Corpora— Ovid. Metam. I.

If we do not strictly assert, as of something absolute and certain, but as of something *possible* only, and in the number of *Contingents*, this makes that Mode, which Grammarians call the *POTENTIAL*; and which becomes on such occasions the leading Mode of the sentence.

Sed tacitus pasci si posset Corvus, HABERET

Plus dapis, &c. Hor.

YET sometimes it is not the leading Mode, but only *subjoined* to the Indicative. In such case, it is mostly used to denote the *End*, or *final Cause*; which End, as in human Life it is always a Contingent, and may never perhaps happen in despite of all our foresight, is therefore express'd most naturally by the Mode here mentioned. For example,

Ut JUGULENT homines, surgunt de nocte latrones. HOR.

Thieves rise by night, that they may cut mens throats.

HERE that they *rise*, is *positively asserted* in the *Declarative* or *Indicative* Mode; but as to their *cutting mens throats*, this is only delivered *potentially*, because how truly soever it may be the *End* of their rising, it is still but a *Contingent*, that may never perhaps happen. This Mode, as often as it is in this manner subjoined, is called by Grammarians not the Potential, but *THE SUBJUNCTIVE*.

BUT

BUT it so happens, in the constitution of human affairs, that it is not always sufficient merely *to declare* ourselves to others. We find it often expedient, from a consciousness of our inability, to address them after a manner more interesting to ourselves, whether to have *some Perception informed*, or *some Volition gratified*. Hence then new Modes of speaking; if we *interrogate*, it is the INTERROGATIVE MODE; if we *require*, it is the REQUISITIVE. Even the Requisite itself hath its *subordinate Species*: With respect to inferiors, it is an IMPERATIVE MODE; with respect to equals and superiors, it is a PRECATIVE OR OPTATIVE*.

AND thus have we established a variety of Modes; the INDICATIVE OR DECLARATIVE, *to assert what we think certain*; the POTENTIAL, *for the Purposes of whatever we think Contingent*; THE INTERROGATIVE, *when we are doubtful, to procure us Information*; and THE REQUISITIVE, *to assist us in the gratification of our Volitions*. The Requisite too appears under two distinct Species, either as it is IMPERATIVE to inferiors, or PRECATIVE to superiors (c).

As

* It was the confounding of this Distinction, that gave rise to a Sophism of *Protagoras*. *Homer* (says he) in beginning his *Iliad* with—*Sing, Muse, the Wrath*,—when he thinks to *pray*, in reality *commands*. *ἐυχῆσθαι οἰόμενος, ἐπιτάττει*. *Aristot. Poet. c. 19*. The Solution is evident from the Division here established, the Grammatical Form being in both cases the same.

(c) The Species of *Modes* in great measure depend on the Species of *Sentences*. The *Stoics* increased the number of *Sentences* far beyond the *Peripatetics*. Besides those mentioned in Chapter II. Note (b) they had many more, as may be seen in *Ammonius de Interpret.* p. 4. and *Diogenes Laertius*, L. VII. 66. The *Peripatetics* (and it seems too with reason) considered all these additional *Sentences* as included within those, which they themselves acknowledged, and which they made to be five in number, the
Vocative,

Ch.VIII.

As therefore all these several Modes have their foundation in nature, so have certain marks or signs of them been introduced into

Vocative, the Imperative, the Interrogative, the Precative, and the Assertive. There is no mention of a *Potential* Sentence, which may be supposed to co-incide with the Assertive, or Indicative. The Vocative (which the Peripatetics called the εἶδος κλητικόν, but the Stoics more properly προσαγορευτικόν) was nothing more than the Form of address in point of names, titles, and epithets, with which we apply ourselves one to another. As therefore it seldom included any Verb within it, it could hardly contribute to form a verbal Mode. Ammonius and Boethius, the one a Greek Peripatetic, the other a Latin, have illustrated the Species of Sentences from *Homer* and *Virgil*, after the following manner.

Ἄλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ πέντε εἰδῶν, τῷ τε ΚΛΗΤΙΚΟΥ, ὡς τὸ, ὦ μάκαρ Ἀτρεΐδῃ —
καὶ τῷ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΚΤΙΚΟΥ, ὡς τὸ,
Βάσκει ἴθι, Ἴρι ταχεῖα —
καὶ τῷ ΕΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ, ὡς τὸ,
Τίς, πόθεν εἰς ἀνθρώπων; —
καὶ τῷ ΕΥΚΤΙΚΟΥ, ὡς τὸ,
Ἄι γὰρ Ζεῦ τε πάτερ —

καὶ ἐπὶ τέτοις, τῷ ΑΠΟΦΑΝΤΙΚΟΥ, καθ' ὃν ἀποφαινόμεθα περὶ οὐτιῶν τῶν πραγμάτων, οἷον
— Θεοὶ δὲ τε πάντα ἴσασιν —
ἔπερὶ πάντος, &c. Εἰς τὸ περὶ Ἑρμ. p. 4.

Boethius's Account is as follows. *Perfectarum vero Orationum partes quinque sunt: DEPRECATIVA, ut,*

*Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si flecteris ullis,
Da deinde auxilium, Pater, atque hæc omina firma.*

IMPERATIVA, ut,

Vade age, Nate, voca Zephyros, & labere pennis.

INTERROGATIVA, ut,

Dic mihi, Damata, cujum pecus? —

VOCATIVA, ut,

O! Pater, O! hominum rerumque æterna potestas.

ENUNTIATIVA, in quâ Veritas vel Falsitas invenitur, ut,

Principio arboribus varia est natura creandis.

Boeth. in Lib. de Interp. p. 291.

In

into languages, that we may be enabled by our discourse to signify Ch.VIII.
 them, one to another. And hence those various *Modes* or *Moods*,
 of which we find in common Grammars so prolix a detail, and which
 are in fact no more than “so many *literal* Forms, intended to express
 “these *natural* Distinctions” (d).

ALL

In *Milton* the same Sentences may be found, as follows:

THE PRECATIVE,

—*Universal Lord! be bounteous still*
To give us only Good—

THE IMPERATIVE,

Go then, Thou mightiest, in thy Father's might.

THE INTERROGATIVE,

Whence, and what art thou, execrable Shape?

THE VOCATIVE,

—*Adam, earth's hallow'd Mold,*
Of God inspir'd—

THE ASSERTIVE, or ENUNCIATIVE,

The conquer'd also and enslav'd by war
Shall, with their freedom lost, all virtue lose.

(d) The *Greek* Language, which is of all the most elegant and complete, expresses these several *Modes*, and all distinctions of Time likewise, by an adequate number of Variations in each particular Verb. These Variations may be found, some at the beginning of the Verb, others at its ending, and consist for the most part either in *multiplying* or *diminishing* the number of Syllables, or else in *lengthening* or *shortening* their respective Quantities, which two methods are called by Grammarians the *Syllabic* and the *Temporal*. The *Latin*, which is but a Species of *Greek* somewhat debased, admits in like manner a large portion of those Variations, which are chiefly to be found at the Ending of its Verbs, and but rarely at their Beginning. Yet in its Deponents and Passives it is so far defective, as to be forced to have recourse to the *Auxiliar*, *sum*. The modern Languages, which have still fewer of those Variations, have been necessitated all of them to assume two Auxiliars at least, that is to say, those which express in each Language the Verbs, *Have*, and *Am*. As to the *English* Tongue, it is so poor in this respect, as to admit no Variation for *Modes*, and only one for Time, which we apply to

Ch. VIII.

ALL these MODES have this in common, that they exhibit some way or other the SOUL and its AFFECTIONS. Their Peculiarities and Distinctions are in part, as follows.

THE REQUISITIVE and INTERROGATIVE MODES are distinguished from the *Indicative* and *Potential*, that whereas these *last* seldom call for a *Return*, to the two former it is *always necessary*.

IF we compare THE REQUISITIVE MODE with THE INTERROGATIVE, we shall find these also distinguished, and that not only in the *Return*, but in other Peculiarities.

The *Return* to the *Requisitive* is sometimes made in *Words*, sometimes in *Deeds*. To the request of *Dido* to *Eneas*—

—*a primâ dic, hospes, origine nobis*
Infidias Danâum—

the *proper* *Return* was in *Words*, that is, in an historical Narrative To the Request of the unfortunate Chief—*date obolum Belisario*—the *proper* *Return* was in a *Deed*, that is, in a charitable Relief. But

expresses an Aorist of the Past. Thus from *Write* cometh *Wrote*; from *Give*, *Gave*; from *Speak*, *Spake*, &c. Hence to express Time, and Modes, we are compelled to employ no less than seven Auxiliars, viz. *Do*, *Am*, *Have*, *Shall*, *Will*, *May*, and *Can*; which we use sometimes singly, as when we say, I *am* writing, I *have* written; sometimes two together, as, I *have been* writing, I *should have* written; sometimes no less than three, as I *might have been* lost, he *could have been* preserved. But for these, and all other speculations, relative to the *Genius* of the *English* Language, we refer the reader, who wishes for the most authentic information, to that excellent Treatise of the learned Dr. *Lowth*, intitled, *A short Introduction to English Grammar*.

But with respect to *the Interrogative*, the Return is necessarily made in Words alone, in Words, which are called a *Response* or *Answer*, and which are always actually or by implication some *definitive assertive Sentence*. Take Examples. *Whose Verses are these?*—the Return is a Sentence—*These are Verses of Homer*. *Was Brutus a worthy Man?*—the Return is a Sentence—*Brutus was a worthy Man*.

AND hence (if we may be permitted to digress) we may perceive the near affinity of this *Interrogative* Mode with the *Indicative*, in which last its Response or Return is mostly made. So near indeed is this Affinity, that in these two Modes alone the Verb retains the same Form (*e*), nor are they otherwise distinguished, than either by the Addition or Absence of some small particle, or by some minute change in the collocation of the words, or sometimes only by a change in the Tone, or Accent (*f*).

BUT

(*e*) Ἦγε ἂν προκειμένη ὀριστικὴ ἐγκλισις, τὴν ἐγκειμένην κατάφασιν ἀποβάλλουσα, μετέσται τῇ καλεῖσθαι ὀριστικῇ—ἀναπληρωθεῖσα δὲ τῆς καταφάσεως, ὑποτρέφει εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὀριστικῇ. *The Indicative Mode, of which we speak, by laying aside that Assertion, which by its nature it implies, quits the name of Indicative—when it re-assumes the Assertion, it returns again to its proper Character.* Apoll. de Synt. L. III. c. 21. *Theodore Gaza* says the same, *Introd. Gram.* L. IV.

(*f*) It may be observed of the INTERROGATIVE, that as often as the *Interrogation* is *simple* and *definite*, the Response may be made in almost the *same* Words, by converting them into a sentence affirmative or negative, according as the Truth is either one or the other. For example—*Are these Verses of Homer?*—Response—*These Verses are of Homer*. *Are those Verses of Virgil?*—Response—*Those are not Verses of Virgil*. And here the Artists of Language, for the sake of brevity and dispatch, have provided two Particles, to represent all such Responses; Yes, for all the affirmative; No, for all the negative.

But when the *Interrogation* is *complex*, as when we say—*Are these Verses of Homer, or of Virgil?*—much more, when it is *indefinite*, as when we say in general—*Whose are these*

Ch.VIII. BUT to return to our comparifon between the *Interrogative Mode* and the *Requifitive*.

THE INTERROGATIVE (in the language of Grammarians) has all *Persons* of both *Numbers*. The REQUISITIVE or IMPERATIVE has no *first Person* of the *ingular*, and that from this plain reason, that it is equally abfurd in *Modes* for a perfon to *request* or *give commands* to *himfelf*, as it is in *Pronouns*, for the fpeaker to become *the fubject* of *his own addrefs**.

AGAIN,

theſe Verſes?—we cannot then reſpond after the manner above mentioned. The Reaſon is, that no Interrogation can be answered by a ſimple *Yes*, or a ſimple *No*, except only thoſe, which are themſelves ſo ſimple, as of two poſſible answers to admit only one. Now the leaſt complex Interrogation will admit of four Answers, two affirmative, two negative, if not perhaps of more. The reaſon is, a complex Interrogation cannot conſiſt of leſs than two ſimples ones; each of which may be ſeparately affirmed and ſeparately denied. For inſtance—*Are theſe Verſes Homer's, or Virgil's?* (1.) *They are Homer's*—(2.) *They are not Homer's*—(3.) *They are Virgil's*—(4.) *They are not Virgil's*—we may add, (5.) *They are of neither*. The indefinite Interrogations go ſtill farther; for theſe may be answered by infinite affirmatives, and infinite negatives. For inſtance—*Whoſe are theſe Verſes?* We may answer affirmatively—*They are Virgil's, They are Horace's, They are Ovid's, &c.*—or negatively—*They are not Virgil's, They are not Horace's, They are not Ovid's*, and ſo on, either way, to infinity. How then ſhould we learn from a ſingle *Yes*, or a ſingle *No*, which particular is meant among infinite Poſſibles? Theſe therefore are Interrogations which muſt be always answered by a *Sentence*. Yet even here Cuſtom has conſulted for Brevity, by returning for Answer only the *ſingle eſſential characteristic Word*, and retrenching by an Ellipſis all the reſt, which reſt the Interrogator is left to ſupply from himſelf. Thus when we are asked—*How many right angles equal the angles of a triangle?*—we answer in the ſhort monofyllable, *Two*; whereas, without the Ellipſis, the answer would have been—*Two right angles equal the angles of a triangle*.

The Ancients diſtinguiſhed theſe two Species of Interrogation by different names. The ſimple they called *Ἑρώτημα*, *Interrogatio*; the complex, *πύσμα*, *Percontatio*. *Ammonius* calls the firſt of theſe *Ἑρώτησις διαλεκτική*; the other, *Ἑρώτησις πυγματική*. See *Am. in Lib. de Interpr.* p. 160. *Diog. Laert.* VII. 66. *Quintil. Inſt.* IX. 2.

* Sup. p. 257.

AGAIN, we may *interrogate as to all Times*, both Present, Past, and Future. *Who was Founder of Rome? Who is King of China? Who will discover the Longitude?*—But *Intreating* and *Commanding* (which are the essence of the *Requisitive Mode*) have a necessary respect to the *Future* (g) only. For indeed what have they to do with the present

Ch.VIII.

(g) *Apollonius's Account of the Future*, implied in all Imperatives, is worth observing. Ἐπὶ γὰρ μὴ γινόμενοις ἢ μὴ γεγενημένοις ἢ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΞΙΣ· τὰ δὲ μὴ γινόμενα ἢ μὴ γεγενημένα, ἐπιτηδεύοντα δὲ ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ ἔσεσθαι, ΜΕΛΛΟΝΤΟΣ ἔστι. A COMMAND has respect to those things which either are not doing, or have not yet been done. But those things, which being not now doing, or having not yet been done, have a natural aptitude to exist hereafter, may be properly said to appertain to THE FUTURE. De Syntaxi, L. I. c. 36. Soon before this he says—Ἀπαντα τὰ προσηκόντα ἐκκειμένην ἔχει τὴν τῷ μέλλοντος διάθεσιν—χρηδὸν γὰρ ἐν ἴσῳ εἰς τὸ, Ὁ ΤΥΡΑΝΝΟΚΤΟΝΗΣΑΣ ΤΙΜΑΣΘΩ, τῷ ΤΙΜΗΘΗΣΕΤΑΙ, κατὰ τὴν χρόνον ἔννοιαν τῇ ἐκκλίσει διηλλαχὸς, καθὸ τὸ μὲν προσηκόν, τὸ δὲ ὀριστικόν. All IMPERATIVES have a disposition within them, which respects THE FUTURE—with regard therefore to TIME, it is the same thing to say, LET HIM, THAT KILLS A TYRANT, BE HONOURED, or, HE, THAT KILLS ONE, SHALL BE HONOURED; the difference being only in the Mode, in as much as one is IMPERATIVE, the other INDICATIVE or DECLARATIVE. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 35. Priscian seems to allow Imperatives a share of Present Time, as well as Future. But if we attend, we shall find his Present to be nothing else than an immediate Future, as opposed to a more distant one. Imperativus vero Præsens & Futurum [Tempus] naturali quâdam necessitate videtur posse accipere. Ea etenim imperamus, quæ vel in præsentī statim volumus fieri sine aliquâ dilatione, vel in futuro. Lib. VIII. p. 806.

It is true the Greeks in their Imperatives admit certain Tenses of the Past, such as those of the *Perfectum*, and of the two *Aorists*. But then these Tenses, when so applied, either totally lose their temporary Character, or else are used to insinuate such a *Speed of execution*, that the deed should be (as it were) done, in the very instant when commanded. The same difference seems to subsist between our *English* Imperative, BE GONE, and those others of, GO, or BE GOING. The first (if we please) may be stiled the *Imperative of the Perfectum*, as calling in the very instant for the completion of our Commands: the others may be stiled *Imperatives of the Future*, as allowing a reasonable time to begin first, and finish afterward.

It is thus *Apollonius*, in the Chapter first cited, distinguished between σκαπλέτω τὰς ἀμπέλους, Go to digging the Vines, and σκαψάτω τὰς ἀμπέλους, Get the Vines dug. The first is spoken (as he calls it) εἰς παράτασιν, by way of Extension, or allowance of Time for the work; the second, εἰς συντελείωσιν, with a view to immediate Completion. And in another place,

Ch.VIII. present or the past, the natures of which are immutable and necessary?

It is from this connection of *Futurity* with *Commands*, that the *Future Indicative* is sometimes used for the *Imperative*, and that to say to any one, *YOU SHALL DO THIS*, has often the same force with the *Imperative*, *DO THIS*. So in the Decalogue—*THOU SHALT NOT KILL*—*THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESS*—which denote (we know) the strictest and most authoritative Commands.

As to the *POTENTIAL MODE*, it is distinguished from all the rest, by its *subordinate* or *subjunctive* Nature. It is also farther distinguished from the *Requisitive* and *Interrogative*, by implying a kind of feeble and weak *Affertion*, and so becoming in some degree susceptible of Truth and Falshood. Thus, if it be said potentially, *This may be*, or, *This might have been*, we may remark without absurdity, *It is true*, or *It is false*. But if it be said, *Do this*, meaning, *Fly to Heaven*, or, *Can this be done?* meaning, *to square the Circle*, we cannot say in either case, *it is true* or *it is false*, though the Command and the Question are about things impossible. Yet still the

Potential

place, explaining the difference between the same Tenses, *Σκάπτει* and *Σκάψον*, he says of the last, *ὃ μόνον τὸ μὴ γεγόμενον προστάσσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν παρατάσει ἀπαγορεύει*, that it not only commands something, which has not been yet done, but forbids also that, which is now doing in an *Extension*, that is to say, in a slow and lengthened progress. Hence, if a man has been a long while writing, and we are willing to hasten him, it would be wrong to say in Greek, *ΓΡΑΦΕ*, WRITE (for that he is now, and has been long doing) but *ΓΡΑΨΟΝ*, GET YOUR WRITING DONE; MAKE NO DELAYS. See *Apoll. L. III. c. 24*. See also *Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Græc. & Lat. p. 680. Edit. Varior. Latini non æstimaverunt, &c.*

Potential does not aspire to the Indicative, because it implies but a *dubious* and *conjectural* Assertion, whereas that of the Indicative is absolute, and without reserve. Ch.VIII.

THIS therefore (the INDICATIVE I mean) is the Mode, which, as in all Grammars it is the first in order, so is truly first both in dignity and use. It is this, which publishes our sublimest perceptions; which exhibits the Soul in her purest Energies, superior to the Imperfection of desires and wants; which includes the whole of *Time*, and its minutest distinctions; which, in its various *Past* Tenses, is employed by History, to preserve to us the Remembrance of former Events; in its *Futures* is used by Prophecy, or (in default of this) by wise Foresight, to instruct and forewarn us, as to that which is coming; but above all in its *Present* Tense serves Philosophy and the Sciences, by just Demonstrations to establish *necessary Truth*; THAT TRUTH, which from its nature *only exists in the Present*; which knows no distinctions either of Past or of Future, but is every where and always invariably one (*h*).

THROUGH

(*h*) See the quotation, Note (*c*) Chapter the Sixth. *Cum enim dicimus, DEUS EST, non eum dicimus nunc esse, sed, &c.*

Boethius, author of the sentiment there quoted, was by birth a *Roman* of the first quality; by religion, a Christian; and by philosophy, a Platonic and Peripatetic; which two Sects, as they sprang from the same Source, were in the latter ages of antiquity commonly adopted by the same Persons, such as *Themistius*, *Porphyry*, *Iamblichus*, *Ammonius*, and others. There were no Sects of Philosophy, that lay greater Strefs on the distinction between things existing *in Time* and *not in Time*, than the two above-mentioned. The Doctrine of the Peripatetics on this Subject (since it is these that *Boethius* here follows) may be partly understood from the following Sketch.

“ THE THINGS, THAT EXIST IN TIME, are *those whose Existence Time can measure.*
 “ But if their Existence may be measured by Time, then there may be assumed a Time
 “ greater

Ch. VIII.

THROUGH all the above Modes, with their respective Tenses, the Verb being considered as denoting an ATTRIBUTE, has always reference to some Person, or SUBSTANCE. Thus if we say, *Went*, or *Go*, or *Whither goeth*, or, *Might have gone*, we must add a Person or Substance, to make the Sentence complete. Cicero *went*; Cæsar *might have gone*; *whither going the Wind?* *Go!* *Thou Traitor!* But there is a Mode or Form, under which Verbs sometimes appear, where they have no reference at all to Persons or Substances. For example—

“ greater than the Existence of any one of them, as there may be assumed a number
 “ greater than the greatest multitude, that is capable of being numbered. And hence
 “ it is that *things temporary* have their Existence, as it were *limited* by Time; that they
 “ are confined within it, as within some bound; and that in some degree or other they
 “ all submit to its power, according to those common Phrases, that *Time is a destroyer*;
 “ that *things decay through Time*; that *men forget in Time*, and lose their abilities, and
 “ seldom that they improve, or grow young, or beautiful. The truth indeed is, *Time*
 “ always attends Motion. Now the natural effect of Motion is to put something, which
 “ now is, out of that state, in which it now is, and so far therefore to destroy that state.

“ The reverse of all this holds with THINGS THAT EXIST ETERNALLY. These exist
 “ not in Time, because Time is so far from being able to measure their Existence, that
 “ no Time can be assumed, which their Existence doth not surpass. To which we may add,
 “ that they feel none of its effects, being no way obnoxious either to damage or dissolu-
 “ tion.

“ To instance in examples of either kind of Being. There are such things at this
 “ instant, as *Stonehenge* and the *Pyramids*. It is likewise true at this instant, that the
 “ Diameter of the square is incommensurable with its side. What then shall we say? Was
 “ there ever a Time, when it was not incommensurable, as it is certain there was a Time,
 “ when there was no Stonehenge, or Pyramids? or is it daily growing less incommen-
 “ surable, as we are assured of Decays in both those massy Structures?” From these
 unchangeable Truths, we may pass to their Place, or Region; to the unceasing Intellec-
 tion of the universal Mind, ever perfect, ever full, knowing no remissions, languors, &c.
 See *Nat. Aufc.* L. IV. c. 19. *Metaph.* L. XIV. c. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Edit. Du Val. and Vol.
 I. p. 148. Note VII. The following Passage may deserve Attention.

Τοῦ γὰρ Νοῦ ὁ μὲν νοεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ μὴ νοῶν· ὁ δὲ καὶ πέφυκε, καὶ νοεῖ. ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος οὕτω τέλος, ἂν μὴ προσθῇς αὐτῷ τὸ καὶ νοεῖν αἰεὶ, καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα. ὥστε εἴη ἂν ἐντελέστατος ὁ νοῶν οὐ καὶ πάντα, καὶ ἅμα. Max. Tyr. Diff. XVII. p. 201. Ed. Lond.

example—*To eat is pleasant; but to fast is wholesome.* Here the Verbs, *To eat*, and, *To fast*, stand alone by themselves, nor is it requisite or even practicable to prefix a Person or Substance. Hence the *Latin* and modern Grammarians have called Verbs under this Mode, from this their indefinite nature, *INFINITIVES*. *Sanctius* has given them the name of *Impersonals*; and the *Greeks* that of Ἀπαρέμματα, from the same reason of their *not discovering* either Person or Number.

Ch.VIII.

THESE *INFINITIVES* go farther. They not only lay aside the character of *Attributives*, but they also assume that of *Substantives*, and as such themselves become distinguished with their several *Attributes*. Thus in the instance above, *Pleasant* is the Attribute, attending the Infinitive, *To Eat*; *Wholesome* the Attribute attending the Infinitive, *To Fast*. Examples in *Greek* and *Latin* of like kind are innumerable.

Dulce & decorum est pro patria MORI.

SCIRE tuum nihil est—

Οὐ κατθανεῖν γὰρ δεινόν, ἀλλ' αἰσχυρῶς θανεῖν (i).

THE

(i) It is from the *INFINITIVE* thus participating the nature of a Noun or Substantive, that the best Grammarians have called it sometimes Ὄνομα ῥηματικόν, A *VERBAL NOUN*; sometimes Ὄνομα ῥήματος, THE *VERB'S NOUN*. The Reason of this Appellation is in *Greek* more evident, from its taking the prepositive Article before it in all cases; τὸ γράφειν, τῷ γράφειν, τῇ γράφειν. The same construction is not unknown in *English*.

Thus *Spencer*,

*For not to have been dipt in Lethe lake,
Could save the Son of Thetis FROM TO DIE—*

ἀπὸ τῆς θανεῖν. In like manner we say, *He did it, to be rich*, where we must supply by an

VOL. I.

R r

Ellipsis

Ch. VIII.

THE *Stoics* in their grammatical inquiries had this Infinitive in such esteem, that they held this alone to be the genuine PHMA or VERB, a name, which they denied to all the other Modes. Their reasoning was; they considered the true verbal character to be contained *simple* and *unmixed* in the *Infinitive only*. Thus the Infinitives, Περὶπατεῖν, *Ambulare*, *To walk*, mean *simply* that energy, and *nothing more*. The other Modes, besides expressing this energy, *superadd certain Affections*, which respect persons and circumstances. Thus *Ambulo* and *Ambula* mean not simply *To walk*, but mean, *I walk*, and *Walk Thou*. And hence they are all of them resolvable into the *Infinitive*, as their *Prototype*, together with *some sentence or word*, expressive of their proper Character. *Ambulo*, *I walk*; this is, *Indico me ambulare*, *I declare myself to walk*. *Ambula*, *Walk Thou*; that is, *Impero te ambulare*, *I command thee to walk*; and so with the Modes of every other species. Take away therefore the *Affertion*, the *Command*, or whatever else gives a Character to any one of these Modes, and there remains nothing

Ellipsis the Preposition, *For*. *He did it, for to be rich*, the same as if we had said, *He did it for gain*—ἐνεκα τῆ πλεστεῖν, ἐνεκα τῆ κέρδους—in *French*, *pour s'enrichir*. Even when we speak such Sentences, as the following, *I choose to PHILOSOPHIZE, rather than TO BE RICH*, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν βέλομαι, ἢ περ τὸ πλεστεῖν, the Infinitives are in nature as much Accusatives, as if we were to say, *I choose PHILOSOPHY rather than RICHES*, τὴν φιλοσοφίαν βέλομαι, ἢ περ τὸν πλεστον. Thus too *Priscian*, speaking of *Infinitives*—CURRERE enim est CURSUS; & SCRIBERE, SCRIPTURA; & LEGERE, LECTIO. Itaque frequenter & Nominibus adjunguntur, & aliis casualibus, more Nominum; ut *Persius*,

Sed pulcrum est digito monstrari, & dici, hic est.

And soon after—Cum enim dico, BONUM EST LEGERE, nihil aliud significo, nisi, BONA EST LECTIO. L. XVIII. p. 1130. See also *Apoll.* L. I. c. 8. *Gaza Gram.* L. IV. Τὸ δὲ ἀπαρέμφατον, ὀνομά ἐστι ρήματος, κ. τ. λ.

nothing more than THE MERE INFINITIVE, which (as *Priscian* says) Ch.VIII.
significat ipsam rem, quam continet Verbum (k). ~

THE application of this Infinitive is somewhat singular. It naturally coalesces with all those Verbs, that denote any *Tendence, Desire, or Volition of the Soul*, but not readily with others. Thus it is sense as well as syntax, to say βέλομαι ζῆν, *Cupio vivere, I desire to live*; but not to say ἔσθιω ζῆν, *Edo vivere*, or even in *English, I eat to live*, unless by an Ellipsis, instead of *I eat for to live*; as we say ἐνεκα τῆς ζῆς, or *pour vivre*. The reason is, that though different *Actions* may unite in the same *Subject*, and therefore be coupled together (as when we say, *He walked and discoursed*) yet the *Actions* notwithstanding remain separate and distinct. But it is not so with respect to *Volitions, and Actions*. Here the coalescence is often so intimate, that the *Volition* is unintelligible, till the *Action* be exprest. *Cupio, Volo, Desidero—I desire, I am willing, I want—What?—The sentences, we see, are defective and imperfect. We must help them then by Infinitives, which express the proper Actions to which they tend. Cupio legere, Volo discere, Desidero videre, I desire to read, I am willing to live, I want to see. Thus is the whole rendered complete, as well in sentiment, as in syntax* (l).

AND

(k) See *Apollon. L. III. 13.* Καθότι πάντων παρεγγόμενον ἀπὸ τινος, κ.τ.λ. See also *Gaza*, in the note before. *Igitur a Constructione quoque Vim rei Verborum (id est, Nominis, quod significat ipsam rem) habere INFINITIVUM possumus dignoscere; res autem in Personas distributa facit alios verbi motus.—Itaque omnes modi in hunc, id est, Infinitivum, transmutantur sive resolvuntur. Prisc. L. XVIII. p. 1131.* From these Principles *Apollonius* calls the Infinitive Πῆμα γενικώτατον, and *Priscian, Verbum generale*.

(l) *Priscian* calls these Verbs, which naturally precede Infinitives, *Verba Voluntativa*; they are called in *Greek Προαιρετικά*. See *L. XVIII. 1129.* but more particularly see

Ch. VIII.

AND so much for MODES, and their several SPECIES. We are to attempt to denominate them according to their most eminent characters; it may be done in the following manner. As every necessary truth, and every demonstrative syllogism (which last is no more than a combination of such truths) must always be express'd under positive assertions, and as positive assertions only belong to the *Indicative*, we may denominate it for that reason the MODE OF SCIENCE (*m*). Again, as the *Potential* is only conversant about *Contingents*, of which we cannot say with certainty that they will happen or not, we may call this Mode, THE MODE OF CONJECTURE. Again, as those that are ignorant and would be informed, must ask of those that already know, this being the natural way of becoming *Proficients*; hence we may call the *Interrogative*, THE MODE OF PROFICIENCY.

*Inter cuncta leges, & PERCONTABERE doctos,
Quâ ratione queas traducere leniter ævum,
Quid purè tranquillet, &c.* HOR.

Farther still, as the highest and most excellent use of the *Requisitive* Mode is legislative command, we may stile it for this reason THE MODE OF LEGISLATURE. *Ad Divos adeunto castè*, says Cicero in the character of a Roman lawgiver; *Be it therefore enacted*, say the laws

Apollonius, L. III. c. 13. where this whole doctrine is explained with great Accuracy. See also *Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Gr. & Lat.* p. 685. Ed. Var.

—*Nec omne ἀπαρέμφατον cuicunque Verbo, &c.*

(*m*) *Ob nobilitatem præivit INDICATIVUS, solus Modus aptus Scientiis, solus Pater Veritatis.* Scal. de Caus. L. Lat. c. 116.

laws of *England*; and in the same *Mode* speak the *laws* of every other nation. It is also in this *Mode* that the geometrician, with the authority of a legislator, orders lines to be bisected, and circles described, as preparatives to that science, which he is about to establish. Ch.VIII.

THERE are other *supposed* affections of Verbs, such as *Number* and *Person*. But these surely cannot be called a part of their essence, nor indeed are they the essence of any other Attribute, being in fact the properties, not of Attributes, but of Substances. The most that can be said, is, that Verbs in the more elegant languages are provided with certain terminations, which respect the *Number* and *Person* of every *Substantive*, that we may know with more precision, in a complex sentence, each particular substance, with its attendant verbal Attributes. The same may be said of *Sex*, with respect to Adjectives. They have terminations which vary, as they respect Beings male or female, tho' *Substances* past dispute are alone susceptible of sex (*n*). We therefore pass over these matters, and all of like

(*n*) It is somewhat extraordinary, that so acute and rational a Grammarian as *Sanctius*, should justly deny *Genders*, or the distinction of Sex to *Adjectives*, and yet make *Persons* appertain, not to *Substantives*, but to *Verbs*. His commentator *Perizonius* is much more consistent, who says—*At vero si rem rectè consideres, ipsis Nominibus & Pronominibus vel maximè, imò unicè inest ipse Persona; & Verba se habent in Personarum ratione ad Nomina planè sicuti Adjectiva in ratione Generum ad Substantiva, quibus solis autor* (*Sanctius* scil. L. I. c. 7.) *& rectè Genus adscribit, exclusis Adjectivis.* *Sanct. Minerv. L. I. c. 12.* There is indeed an exact Analogy between the Accidents of *Sex* and *Person*. There are but two *Sexes*, that is to say, the Male, and the Female; and but two *Persons* (or Characters essential to discourse) that is to say, the Speaker, and the Party addressed. The third Sex and third Person are improperly so called, being in fact but Negations of the other two.

Ch.VIII. like kind, as being rather among the elegancies, than the essentials (*o*) of language, which essentials are the subject of our present inquiry. The principal of these now remaining is **THE DIFFERENCE OF VERBS, AS TO THEIR SEVERAL SPECIES**, which we endeavour to explain in the following manner.

(*o*) Whoever would see more upon a subject of importance, referred to in many parts of this treatise, and particularly in note (*h*) of this chapter, may consult *Letters concerning Mind*, an Octavo Volume published 1750, the Author Mr. John Petvin, Vicar of Ilfington in Devon; a person who, though from his retired situation little known, was deeply skilled in the Philosophy both of the Antients and Moderns, and, more than this, was valued by all that knew him for his virtue and worth.

CHAP. IX.

Concerning the Species of VERBS, and their other remaining Properties.

ALL VERBS, that are strictly so called, denote (a) Energies. Ch. IX.
 Now as all *Energies* are *Attributes*, they have reference of course to certain *energizing Substances*. Thus it is impossible there should be such Energies, as *To love, to fly, to wound, &c.* if there were not such beings as *Men, Birds, Swords, &c.* Farther, every Energy doth not only require an Energizer, but is necessarily conversant about some *Subject*. For example, if we say, *Brutus loves*—we must needs supply—*loves Cato, Cassius, Portia, or some one. The Sword wounds*—i. e. wounds *Hector, Sarpedon, Priam, or some one.* And thus is it, that every Energy is necessarily situate between two Substantives, an Energizer which is *active*, and a Subject which is *passive*. Hence then, if the Energizer lead the sentence, the Energy follows its character, and becomes what we call A VERB ACTIVE.—Thus we say *Brutus amat, Brutus loves.* On the contrary, if the passive Subject be principal, it follows the character of this too, and then becomes what we call A VERB PASSIVE.—Thus we say, *Portia amatur, Portia is loved.* It is in like manner that the same Road between the summit and foot of the same mountain, with respect to the summit is *Ascent*, with respect to the foot is *Descent*. Since then every

(a) We use this word ENERGY, rather than *Motion*, from its more comprehensive meaning; it being a sort of Genus, which includes within it both *Motion* and its *Privation*. See before, p. 266, 267.

Ch. IX. every Energy respects an Energizer or a passive Subject; hence the Reason why every Verb, whether active or passive, has in language a necessary reference to some Noun for its *Nominative Case* (b).

BUT to proceed still farther from what has been already observed. *Brutus loved Portia*.—Here *Brutus* is the Energizer; *loved*, the Energy; and *Portia*, the Subject. But it might have been, *Brutus loved Cato*, or *Cassius*, or the *Roman Republic*; for the Energy is referable to Subjects infinite. Now among these infinite Subjects, when that happens to occur, which is the Energizer also, as when we say *Brutus loved himself*, *flew himself*, &c. in such Case the Energy hath to the same being a double Relation, both active and passive. And this it is which gave rise among the *Greeks* to that species of Verbs, called VERBS MIDDLE (c), and such was their true and original use, however in many instances they may have since happened to deviate. In other languages the Verb still retains its active Form, and the passive Subject (*se* or *himself*) is expressed like other accusatives.

AGAIN, in some Verbs it happens that the Energy *always keeps within* the Energizer, and *never passes out* to any foreign extraneous Subject.

(b) The doctrine of Impersonal Verbs has been justly rejected by the best Grammarians, both antient and modern. See *Sanct. Min.* L. I. c. 12. L. III. c. 1. L. IV. c. 3. *Priscian.* L. XVIII. p. 1134. *Apoll.* L. III. sub. fin. In which places the reader will see a proper Nominative supplied to all Verbs of this supposed Character.

(c) Τὰ γὰρ κατέμικτα μεσότητος χήματα συνέμικτωσιν ἀνεδέξατο ἐνεργητικῆς καὶ παθητικῆς διαθέσεως. The Verbs, called Verbs middle, admit a Co-incidence of the active and passive Character. *Apollon.* L. III. c. 7. He that would see this whole Doctrine concerning the power of THE MIDDLE VERB explained and confirmed with great Ingenuity and Learning, may consult a small Treatise of that able Critic *Kuster*, entitled, *De vero Ufu Verborum Mediorum*. A neat edition of this scarce piece has been lately published.

Subject. Thus when we say, *Cæsar walketh, Cæsar sitteth*, it is impossible *the Energy should pass out* (as in the case of those Verbs called by the Grammarians VERBS TRANSITIVE;) because both the *Energizer* and the *Passive Subject* are united in *the same Person*. For what is the cause of this walking or sitting?—It is the *Will* and *Vital Powers* belonging to *Cæsar*. And what is the Subject, made so to move or to sit?—It is the *Body* and *Limbs* belonging also to the same *Cæsar*. It is this then forms that species of Verbs, which Grammarians have thought fit to call VERBS NEUTER, as if indeed they were void both of *Action* and *Passion*, when perhaps (like Verbs middle) they may be rather said *to imply both*. Not however to dispute about names, as these Neuters in *their Energizer* always discover *their passive Subject* (c), which other Verbs cannot, their passive Subjects

(c) This Character of Neuters the Greeks very happily express by the Terms, 'Αυτοπάθεια and 'Ιδιοπάθεια, which *Priscian* renders *quæ ex se in seipsâ fit intrinsecus Passio*, L. VIII. 790. *Consentii Ars apud Putsch.* p. 2051.

It may be here observed, that even those Verbs, called *Actives*, can upon occasion lay aside their transitive character; that is to say, can drop their subsequent Accusative, and assume the form of Neuters, so as to stand by themselves. This happens, when the Discourse respects the mere *Energy* or *Affection* only, and has no regard to the Subject, be it this thing or that. Thus we say, *ἐκ οὐδεν ἀναγινώσκειν ἔτος*, *This Man knows not how to read*, speaking only of the Energy, in which we suppose him deficient. Had the Discourse been upon the Subjects of reading, we must have added them, *ἐκ οὐδεν ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ Ὅμηρον*, *He knows not how to read Homer, or Virgil, or Cicero, &c.*

Thus *Horace*,

*Qui CUPIT aut METUIT, juvat illum sic domus aut res,
Ut lippum pictæ tabulæ——*

He that DESIRES or FEARS (not this thing in particular nor that, but in general he within whose breast these affections prevail) *has the same joy in a House or Estate, as the Man with bad Eyes has in fine Pictures.* So *Cæsar* in his celebrated *Laconic Epistle* of,

VOL. I.

S S

VENI,

Ch. IX. Subjects being infinite; hence the reason why it is as superfluous in these Neuters to have the Subject expressed, as in other Verbs it is necessary, and cannot be omitted. And thus it is that we are taught in common grammars that *Verbs Active require an Accusative*, while *Neuters require none*.

OF the above species of Verbs, the *Middle* cannot be called necessary, because most languages have done without it. THE SPECIES OF VERBS therefore remaining are the ACTIVE, the PASSIVE and the NEUTER, and those seem essential to all languages whatever (*d*).

THERE

VENI, VIDI, VICI, where two Actives we see follow one Neuter in the same detached Form, as that Neuter itself. The Glory it seems was *in the rapid Sequel of the Events*. Conquest came as quick, as he could come himself, and look about him. *Whom* he saw, and *whom* he conquered, was not the thing, of which he boasted. See *Apoll. L. III. c. 31. p. 279.*

(*d*) The STOICS, in their logical view of Verbs, as making part in Propositions, considered them under the four following Sorts:

When a *Verb*, co-inciding with the *Nominative of some Noun*, made without further help a perfect assertive Sentence, as *Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ*, *Socrates walketh*; then as the Verb in such case implied the Power of a perfect Predicate, they called it for that reason *Κατηγορημα*, a *Predicable*; or else, from its readiness *συμβάλλειν*, to co-incide with its Noun in completing the Sentence, they called it *Σύμμετρον*, a *Co-incider*.

When a *Verb* was able with a *Noun* to form a perfect assertive Sentence, yet could not associate with such Noun, but under some *oblique Case*, as *Σωκράτει μεταμέλει*, *Socratem pœnitet*: Such a Verb, from its near approach to just Co-incidence, and Predication, they called *Παρασύμμετρον* or *Παρακατηγορημα*.

When a Verb, though regularly co-inciding with a Noun in its Nominative, still required, to complete the Sentiment, some other Noun under an *oblique Case*, as *Πλάτων φιλεῖ Δίωνα*, *Plato loveth Dio* (where without *Dio* or some other, the Verb *loveth* would rest indefinite:) Such Verb, from this Defect, they called *ἥττον ἢ σύμμετρον*, or *ἢ κατηγορημα*, *something less than a Co-incider, or less than a Predicable*.

Lastly,

THERE remains a remark or two farther, and then we quit the Subject of Verbs. It is true in general that the greater part of them denote Attributes of *Energy* and *Motion*. But there are some which appear to denote nothing more, than a *mere simple Adjective*, joined to an Affertion. Thus ἰσάζει in *Greek*, and *Equalleth* in *English*, mean nothing more than ἰσός ἐστίν, *is equal*. So *Albo* in *Latin* is no more than *albus sum*.

—Campique ingentes ossibus alcent. Virg.

THE same may be said of *Tumeo*. Mons tumet, i. e. *tumidus est*, is *tumid*. To express the *Energy* in these instances, we must have recourse to the *Inceptives*.

Fluctus uti primo cepit cum ALBESCERE Vento. Virg.

————— Freta ponti

Incipiunt agitata TUMESCERE. Virg.

THERE are Verbs also to be found, which are formed out of Nouns. So that as in *Abstract Nouns* (such as *Whiteness* from *White*,
Goodness,

Lastly, when a Verb required *two Nouns in oblique Cases*, to render the Sentiment complete; as when we say Σωκράτει Ἀλκιβιάδης μέλει, *Tædet me Vitæ*, or the like: Such Verb they called ἥτλον, or ἑλατλον ἢ παρασύμβαμα, or ἡ παρακατηγόρημα, *something less than an imperfect Co-incider, or an imperfect Predicable*.

These were the *Appellations* which they gave to Verbs, when employed along with Nouns to the forming of Propositions. As to the Name of ῥΗΜΑ, or VERB, they denied it to them all, giving it only to the *Infinitive*, as we have shewn already. See page 305. See also *Ammon. in Lib. de Interpret.* p. 37. *Apollon. de Syntaxi*, L. I. c. 8. L. III. c. 31. p. 279. c. 32. p. 295. *Theod. Gaz. Gram.* L. IV.

From the above Doctrine it appears, that all Verbs Neuter are Συμβάματα; Verbs Active, ἥτλονα ἢ συμβάματα.

Ch. IX. *Goodness from Good*) as also in the *Infinitive Modes* of Verbs, the *Attributive* is converted into a *Substantive*; here the *Substantive* on the contrary is converted into an *Attributive*. Such are ΚΥΝΙΖΕΙΝ from κύων, to act the part of a Dog, or be a Cynic; ΦΙΛΙΠΠΙΖΕΙΝ from Φίλιππος, to Philippize, or favour Philip; Syllaturire from Sylla, to meditate acting the same part as Sylla did. Thus too the wise and virtuous Emperor, by way of counsel to himself—ὄρα μὴ ἀποκαίσαρωθῇς, beware thou beest not BECÆSAR'D; as though he said, Beware, that by being Emperor, thou dost not dwindle into A MERE CÆSAR (e). In like manner one of our own witty Poets,

STERNHOLD himself he OUT-STERNHOLDLED.

And long before him the facetious Fuller, speaking of one Morgan, a sanguinary Bishop in the Reign of Queen Mary, says of him, that he OUT-BONNER'D even BONNER himself*.

AND so much for that Species of ATTRIBUTES, called VERBS IN THE STRICTEST SENSE.

(e) Marc. Antonin. L. VI. § 30.

* Church Hist. B. VIII. p. 21.

C H A P. X.

Concerning those other Attributives, PARTICIPLES and ADJECTIVES.

THE nature of Verbs being understood, that of PARTICIPLES is Ch. X.
no way difficult. Every complete Verb is expressive of an *Attribute*; of *Time*; and of an *Affertion*. Now if we take away the *Affertion*, and thus destroy the *Verb*, there will remain the *Attribute* and the *Time*, which make the essence of a PARTICIPLE. Thus take away the *Affertion* from the Verb, Γράφει, *Writeth*, and there remains the Participle, Γράφων, *Writing*, which (without the *Affertion*) denotes the same *Attribute*, and the same *Time*. After the same manner, by withdrawing the *Affertion*, we discover Γράψας in Ἐγράψε, Γράψων in Γράψει, for we chuse to refer to the *Greek*, as being of all languages the most complete, as well in this respect, as in others.

AND so much for PARTICIPLES (a).

THE

(a) The *Latins* are defective in this Article of Participles. Their Active Verbs, ending in *or*, (commonly called Deponents) have Active Participles of all Times (such as *Loquens, Locutus, Locuturus*) but none of the Passive. Their Actives ending in *O*, have Participles of the Present and Future (such as *Scribens* and *Scripturus*) but none of the Past. On the contrary, their Passives have Participles of the Past (such as *Scriptus*) but none of the Present or Future, unless we admit such as *Scribendus* and *Docendus* for Futures, which Grammarians controvert. The want of these Participles they supply by a Periphrasis—for γράψας they say, *cum scripssisset*—for γραφόμενος, *dum scribitur*, &c. In *English* we have sometimes recourse to the same Periphrasis; and sometimes we avail ourselves of the same Auxiliars, which form our Modes and Tenses.

The

Ch. X.

THE nature of *Verbs* and *Participles* being understood, that of *ADJECTIVES* becomes easy. A *Verb* implies (as we have said) both an *Attribute*, and *Time*, and an *Affertion*; a *Participle* only implies an *Attribute*, and *Time*; and an *ADJECTIVE* only implies an *Attribute*; that is to say, in other Words, an *ADJECTIVE* has no *Affertion*, and only denotes such an *Attribute*, as has not its essence either in *Motion* or its *Privation*. Thus in general the Attributes of quantity, quality, and relation (such as *many* and *few*, *great* and *little*, *black* and *white*, *good* and *bad*, *double*, *treble*, *quadruple*, &c.) are all denoted by *ADJECTIVES*.

It must indeed be confessed, that sometimes even those Attributes, which are wholly foreign to the idea of *Motion*, assume an *affertion*, and appear as *Verbs*. Of such we gave instances before, in *albeo*, *tumeo*, *ισάζω*, and others. These however, compared to the rest of *Verbs*, are but few in number, and may be called, if thought proper, *Verbal Adjectives*. It is in like manner, that *Participles* insensibly pass too into *Adjectives*. Thus *doctus* in *Latin*, and *learned* in *English*, lose their power, as *Participles*, and mean a Person possessed of an habitual Quality. Thus *Vir eloquens* means not a man now speaking, but

The *English* Grammar lays down a good rule with respect to its *Participles* of the Past, that they all terminate in D, T, or N. This Analogy is perhaps liable to as few Exceptions, as any. Considering therefore how little Analogy of any kind we have in our Language, it seems wrong to annihilate the few Traces, that may be found. It would be well therefore, if all writers, who endeavour to be accurate, would be careful to avoid a corruption, at present so prevalent, of saying, *it was wrote*, for, *it was written*; *he was drove*, for, *he was driven*; *I have went*, for, *I have gone*, &c. in all which instances a Verb is absurdly used to supply the proper Participle, without any necessity from the want of such Word.

but a man, *who possesses the habit of speaking*, whether he speak or no. So when we say in *English*, he is a *thinking Man*, an *understanding Man*, we mean not a person, whose mind is in *actual Energy*, but whose *mind is enriched with a larger portion of those powers*. It is indeed no wonder, as all *Attributives* are homogeneous, that at times the several species should appear to interfere, and the difference between them be scarcely perceptible. Even in *natural species*, which are congenial and of kin, the specific difference is not always to be discerned, and in appearance at least they seem to run into each other.

WE have shewn already (*b*) in the Instances of *Φιλιππίζειν*, *Syllaturire*, *Ἀποκαισαρωθῆναι*, and others, how *Substantives* may be transformed into *Verbal Attributives*. We shall now shew, how they may be converted into *Adjectives*. When we say the *Party of Pompey*, the *stile of Cicero*, the *philosophy of Socrates*, in these cases the party, the stile, and the philosophy spoken of, receive a stamp and character from the persons, whom they respect. Those persons therefore perform the part of *Attributes*, that is, stamp and characterize their respective Subjects. Hence then *they actually pass into Attributes*, and assume, as such, the form of *Adjectives*. And thus it is we say, the *Pompeian party*, the *Ciceronian stile*, and the *Socratic philosophy*. It is in like manner for a trumpet of *Brass*, we say, a *brazen Trumpet*; for a *Crown of Gold*, a *golden Crown*, &c. Even *Pronominal Substantives* admit the like mutation. Thus instead of saying, the *Book of Me*, *of Thee*, and *of Him*, we say, *My Book*,
Thy

(*b*) Sup. p. 316.

Ch. X. *Thy* Book, and *His* Book; instead of saying the Country of *Us*, of *You*, and of *Them*, we say, *Our* Country, *Your* Country, and *Their* Country; which Words may be called so many *Pronominal Adjectives*.

It has been observed already, and must needs be obvious to all, that Adjectives, as marking Attributes, can have no sex (*c*). And yet their having terminations conformable to the sex, number, and case of their Substantive, seems to have led grammarians into that strange absurdity of ranging them with Nouns, and separating them from Verbs, tho' with respect to these they are perfectly homogeneous; with respect to the others, quite contrary. They are homogeneous with respect to Verbs, as both sorts denote *Attributes*; they are heterogeneous with respect to Nouns, as *never properly denoting Substances*. But of this we have spoken before (*d*).

THE Attributives hitherto treated, that is to say, VERBS, PARTICIPLES, and ADJECTIVES, may be called ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. The reason of this name will be better understood, when we have more fully discussed ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER, to which we now proceed in the following Chapter.

(*c*) Sup. p. 309.

(*d*) Sup. C. VI. Note (*a*). See also C. III. p. 231, &c.

C H A P. XI.

Concerning ATTRIBUTIVES of the second Order.

AS the ATTRIBUTIVES hitherto mentioned denote *the Attributes of Substances*, so there is an inferior class of them, which denote *the Attributes only of Attributes*.

Ch. XI.

To explain by examples in either kind — When we say, *Cicero and Pliny were both of them eloquent; Statius and Virgil both of them wrote*; — in these instances the *Attributives*, *eloquent*, and *wrote*, are immediately referable to the substantives, *Cicero*, *Virgil*, &c. As therefore denoting THE ATTRIBUTES OF SUBSTANCES, we call them ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. But when we say, *Pliny was moderately eloquent, but Cicero exceedingly eloquent; Statius wrote indifferently, but Virgil wrote admirably*; — in these instances, the *Attributives*, *Moderately*, *Exceedingly*, *Indifferently*, *Admirably*, are not referable to *Substantives*, but to *other Attributives*, that is, to the words, *Eloquent*, and *Wrote*. As therefore denoting *Attributes of Attributes*, we call them ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER.

GRAMMARIANS have given them the Name of *Ἐπιρρήματα*, AD-
VERBIA, ADVERBS. And indeed if we take the word *ῥῆμα*, or,
Verb, in its most *comprehensive Signification*, as including not only
Verbs properly so called, but also *Participles* and *Adjectives* [an usage,

VOL. I.

T t

which

Ch. XI. which may be justified by the best authorities (a);] we shall find the name, *Επίρρημα*, or ADVERB, to be a very just appellation, as denoting a PART OF SPEECH, THE NATURAL APPENDAGE OF VERBS. So great is this dependence in Grammatical Syntax, that an *Adverb* can no more subsist without its *Verb*, than a *Verb* can subsist without its *Substantive*. It is the same here, as in certain natural Subjects. Every Colour for its existence as much requires a Superficies, as the Superficies for its existence requires a solid Body (b).

AMONG the Attributes of Substance are reckoned Quantities, and Qualities. Thus we say, *a white Garment, a high Mountain*. Now
some

(a) Thus *Aristotle* in his *Treatise de Interpretatione*, instances *ἄνθρωπος* as a Noun, and *λευκός* as a Verb. So *Ammonius*—κατὰ τὸ τοῦ σημαίνοντος, τὸ μὲν ΚΑΛΟΣ καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα—ΡΗΜΑΤΑ λέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκ ὀΝΟΜΑΤΑ. According to this Signification (that is of denoting the Attributes of Substance and the Predicate in Propositions) the words, FAIR, JUST, and the like, are called VERBS, and not NOUNS. *Am. in libr. de Interp.* p. 37. b. *Arist. de Interp.* L. I. c. 1. See also of this *Treatise*, c. vi. Note (a) p. 263.

In the same manner the *Stoics* talked of the Participle. Nam PARTICIPIUM connumerantes Verbis, PARTICIPIALE VERBUM vocabant vel CASUALE. *Priscian*, L. I. p. 574.

(b) This notion of ranging the *Adverb* under the same Genus with the *Verb* (by calling them both *Attributives*) and of explaining it to be the *Verb's Epithet* or *Adjective* (by calling it the *Attributive* of an *Attributive*) is conformable to the best authorities. *Theodore Gaza* defines an ADVERB, as follows—μέρος λόγου ἀπλῶτον, κατὰ ῥήματος λεγόμενον, ἢ ἐπιλεγόμενον ῥήματι, καὶ οἷον ἐπίθετον ῥήματος. A Part of Speech devoid of Cases, predicated of a Verb, or subjoined to it, and being as it were the Verb's Adjective. L. IV. (where by the way we may observe, how properly the Adverb is made an *Aptote*, since its principal sometimes has cases, as in *Valdè Sapiens*; sometimes has none, as in *Valdè amat*.) *Priscian's* definition of an Adverb is as follows—ADVERBIUM est pars orationis indeclinabilis, cujus significatio Verbis adjicitur. Hoc enim perficit Adverbium Verbis additum, quod adjectiva nomina appellativis nominibus adjuncta; ut prudens homo; prudenter egit; felix Vir; feliciter vivit. L. XV. p. 1003. And before, speaking of the *Stoics*, he says—Etiam ADVERBIA Nominibus vel VERBIS CONNUMERABANT, & quasi ADJECTIVA VERBORUM nominabant. L. I. p. 574. See also *Apoll. de Synt.* L. I. c. 3. sub. fin.

some of these Quantities and Qualities are capable of Intension, and Remission. Thus we say, *a Garment* EXCEEDINGLY *white*; *a Mountain* TOLERABLY *high*, or MODERATELY *high*. It is plain therefore that Intension and Remission are among the Attributes of such Attributes. Hence then one copious Source of secondary Attributives, or Adverbs, to denote these two, that is, *Intension*, and *Remission*. The *Greeks* have their θαυμασῶς, μάλιστα, πάνυ, ἥκιστα; the *Latins* their *valdè*, *vehementer*, *maximè*, *satis*, *mediocriter*; the *English* their *greatly*, *vastly*, *extremely*, *sufficiently*, *moderately*, *tolerably*, *indifferently*, &c.

FARTHER than this, where there are different Intensions of the same Attribute, they may be compared together. Thus if the Garment A be EXCEEDINGLY *White*, and the Garment B be MODERATELY *White*, we may say, *the Garment A is MORE white than the Garment B*.

IN these instances the Adverb MORE not only denotes Intension, but *relative Intension*. Nay we stop not here. We not only denote Intension *merely relative but relative Intension, than which there is none greater*. Thus we not only say *the Mountain A is MORE high than the Mountain B*, but that *it is the most high of all Mountains*. Even Verbs, properly so called, as they admit *simple* Intensions, so they admit also these *comparative* ones. Thus in the following Example — *Fame he LOVETH MORE than Riches, but Virtue of all things he LOVETH MOST* — the Words MORE and MOST denote the different *comparative Intensions* of the Verbal Attributive, *Loveth*.

AND hence the rise of COMPARISON, and of its different *Degrees*; which cannot well be more, than the two Species above mentioned,

Ch. XI. one to denote *Simple Excess*, and one to denote *Superlative*. Were we indeed to introduce *more* degrees than these, we ought perhaps to introduce *infinite*, which is absurd. For why stop at a limited Number, when in all subjects, susceptible of Intension, the intermediate Excesses are in a manner infinite? There are infinite Degrees of *more* White, between the *first Simple White*, and the *Superlative, Whitest*; the same may be said of *more* Great, *more* Strong, *more* Minute, &c. The Doctrine of Grammarians about *three* such Degrees, which they call the Positive, the Comparative, and the Superlative, must needs be absurd; both because in their Positive there is † no Comparison at all, and because their *Superlative* is a Comparative, as much as their *Comparative* itself. Examples to evince this may be found every where. *Socrates was the MOST WISE of all the Athenians—Homer was the MOST SUBLIME of all Poets.—*

—*Cadit et Ripheus, JUSTISSIMUS UNUS*

Qui fuit in Teucris—

Virg.

It must be confessed these Comparatives, as well the *simple*, as the *superlative*, seem sometimes to part with their *relative* Nature, and only retain their *intensive*. Thus in the Degree, denoting *simple* Excess,

Tristior, et lacrymis oculos suffusa nitentes.

Virg.

Rusticior paulo est—

Hor.

IN the *Superlative* this is more usual. *Vir doctissimus, Vir fortissimus, a most learned Man, a most brave Man*,—that is to say, not the *bravest*

† Qui (scil. Gradus Positivus) quoniam perfectus est, a quibusdam in numero Graduum non computatur. Consentii Ars apud Putsch. p. 2022.

bravest and *most learned* Man, that ever existed, but a Man possessing those Qualities in an *eminent Degree*. Ch. XI.

THE Authors of Language have contrived a method to retrench these Comparative Adverbs, by expressing their force in the Primary Attributive. Thus instead of *More fair*, they say FAIRER; instead of *Most fair*, FAIREST, and the same holds true both in the *Greek* and *Latin*. This Practice however has reached no farther than to *Adjectives*, or at least to *Participles*, sharing the nature of *Adjectives*. Verbs perhaps were thought too much diversified already, to admit more Variations without perplexity.

As there are some Attributives, which admit of Comparison, so there are others, which admit of none. Such for example are those, which denote *that Quality of Bodies arising from their Figure*; as when we say, a *Circular Table*, a *Quadrangular Court*, a *Conical Piece of Metal*, &c. The reason is, that a million of things, participating the same Figure, participate it *equally*, if they participate it at all. To say therefore that while A and B are both quadrangular, A is *more* or *less* quadrangular than B, is absurd. The same holds true in all Attributives, denoting *definite Quantities*, whether *continuous* or *discrete*, whether *absolute* or *relative*. Thus the *two-foot Rule* A cannot be *more a two-foot Rule*, than any other of the same length. *Twenty Lions* cannot be *more twenty* than *twenty Flies*. If A and B be both *triple*, or *quadruple* to C, they cannot be *more triple*, or *more quadruple*, one than the other. The reason of all this is, there can be no Comparison without *Intension and Remission*; there can

Ch. XI. can be no Intension and Remission in things *always definite*; and such are the Attributives, which we have last mentioned.

IN the same reasoning we see the cause, why *no Substantive is susceptible of these Comparative Degrees*. A *Mountain* cannot be said MORE TO BE, or TO EXIST, than a *Mole-hill*, but the *More* and *Less* must be sought for in their Quantities. In like manner when we refer many Individuals to one Species, the Lion A cannot be called *more a Lion*, than the Lion B, but if more any thing, he is *more fierce, more speedy*, or exceeding in some such Attribute. So again, in referring many Species to one Genus, a Crocodile is not more an Animal, than a Lizard; nor a Tiger, more than a Cat; but if any thing, they are *more bulky, more strong*, &c. the Excess, as before, being derived from their Attributes. So true is that saying of the acute *Stagirite*—that SUBSTANCE is not susceptible of MORE and LESS (c). But this by way of digression; to return to the subject of Adverbs.

OF the Adverbs, or secondary Attributives already mentioned, these denoting Intension or Remission may be called Adverbs of Quantity continuous; *Once, Twice, Thrice*, are Adverbs of Quantity discrete; *More* and *Most*, *Less* and *Least*, to which may be added *Equally, Proportionally*, &c. are Adverbs of Relation. There are others

(c) ἐκ αὐτῶν ἐπιδέχονται ἢ ἐστὶν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥτιον, *Categor.* c. 5. See also *Sanctius*, L. I. c. 11. L. II. c. 10, 11. where the subject of Comparatives is treated in a very masterly and philosophical manner. See also *Priscian*, p. 598. *Derivantur igitur Comparativa a Nominibus Adjectivis*, &c.

others of *Quality*, as when we say, *HONESTLY industrious, PRUDENTLY brave, they fought BRAVELY, he painted FINELY, a Portico formed CIRCULARLY, a Plain cut TRIANGULARLY; &c.*

AND here it is worth while to observe, how the same thing, participating the same *Essence*, assumes different grammatical Forms from its different relations. For example, suppose it should be asked, how differ *Honest, Honestly, and Honesty*. The Answer is, they are in *Essence* the same, but they differ, in as much as *Honest* is the *Attributive of a Substantive*; *Honestly, of a Verb*; and *Honesty*, being divested of these its attributive Relations, assumes *the Power of a Substantive*, so as to stand by itself.

THE Adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are common to *Verbs of every Species*; but there are some which are peculiar to *Verbs properly so called*, that is to say, to such as denote *Motion* or *Energy*, with their *Privations*. All *MOTION* and *REST* imply *TIME* and *PLACE*, as a kind of necessary *Coincidents*. Hence then, if we would express the *Place* or *Time* of either, we must needs have recourse to the proper Adverbs; of *Place*, as when we say, *he stood THERE; he went HENCE; he travelled FAR, &c.*; of *Time*, as when we say, *he stood THEN; he went AFTERWARD; he travelled FORMERLY, &c.* Should it be asked — why *Adverbs of Time*, when Verbs have *Tenses*? The Answer is, tho' *Tenses* may be sufficient to denote the greater Distinctions of *Time*, yet to denote them all by *Tenses* would be a perplexity without end. What a variety of Forms, to denote *Yesterday, To-day, To-morrow, Formerly, Lately, Just now, Now, Immediately, Presently, Soon,*

Ch. XI. *Soon, Hereafter, &c.?* It was this then that made the *Temporal* Adverbs necessary, over and above the *Tenses*.

To the Adverbs just mentioned may be added those, which denote the *Intensions and Remissions peculiar to Motion*, such as *speedily, hastily, swiftly, slowly, &c.* as also *Adverbs of Place, made out of Prepositions*, such as *ἀνω* and *κάτω* from *ἀνὰ* and *κατὰ*, in *English upward and downward*, from *up* and *down*. In some instances the Preposition suffers no change, but becomes an Adverb by nothing more than its Application, as when we say, *CIRCA equitat, he rides ABOUT; PROPE cecidit, he was NEAR falling; Verum ne POST conferas culpam in me, But do not AFTER lay the blame on me (d).*

THERE are likewise *Adverbs of Interrogation*, such as *Where, Whence, Whither, How*; of which there is this remarkable, that when they lose their *Interrogative* power, they assume that of a *Relative*, so as even to represent the *Relative or Subjunctive Pronoun*. Thus *Ovid*,

Et Seges est, UBI Troja fuit—

translated in our old *English Ballad*,

And Corn doth grow, WHERE Troy town stood.

That

(d) *Sofip. Charisii Inst. Gram. p. 170. Terent. Eun. Act. II. Sc. 3.*

That is to say, *Seges est in eo loco, IN QUO, &c. Corn groweth in that place, IN WHICH, &c.* the power of the *Relative*, being implied in the *Adverb*. Thus Terence,

Ch. XI.

Hujusmodi mihi res semper comminiscere,

UBI me excarnufices—

Heaut. IV. 6.

where *UBI* relates to *res*, and stands for *quibus rebus*.

It is in like manner that the *Relative Pronoun* upon occasion becomes an *Interrogative*, at least in *Latin* and *English*. Thus Horace,

QUEM Virum aut Heroa lyrá, vel acrí

Tibiá fumes celebrare, Clio?

So Milton,

WHO first seduc'd them to that foul revolt?

THE reason of all this is as follows. The *Pronoun* and *Adverbs* here mentioned are all alike, in their original character, *RELATIVES*. Even when they become *Interrogatives*, they lose not this character, but are still *Relatives*, as much as ever. The difference is, that *without* an *Interrogation*, they have reference to a *Subject*, which is *antecedent, definite, and known*; *with* an *Interrogation*, to a *Subject* which is *subsequent, indefinite, and unknown*, and which it is expected that the *Answer* should express and ascertain.

WHO first seduc'd them?—

Ch. XI. The very Question itself supposes a Seducer, to which, tho' *unknown*, the Pronoun, *Who*, has a *reference*.

Th' infernal Serpent—

Here in the *Answer* we have *the Subject*, which was *indefinite*, ascertained; so that the *Who* in the *Interrogation* is (we see) as much a *Relative*, as if it had been said originally, without any *Interrogation* at all, *It was the infernal SERPENT, who first seduced them*.

AND thus is it that *Interrogatives* and *Relatives* mutually pass into each other.

AND so much for ADVERBS, peculiar to Verbs properly so called. We have already spoken of those, which are common to all *Attributives*. We have likewise attempted to explain *their general Nature*, which we have found to consist in being *the Attributes of Attributives*. There remains only to add, that ADVERBS may be derived from almost every *Part of Speech*: from PREPOSITIONS, as when from *After* we derive *Afterwards*—from PARTICIPLES, and through these from *Verbs*, as when from *Know* we derive *Knowing*, and thence *Knowingly*; from *Scio*, *Sciens*, and thence *Scienter*—from ADJECTIVES, as when from *Virtuous* and *Vicious*, we derive *Virtuously* and *Viciously*—from SUBSTANTIVES, as when from Πιθήκος, an *Ape*, we derive Πιθήκειον βλέπειν, to look *Apishly*; from Λέων, a *Lion*, Λεοντωδῶς, *Leoninely*—nay even from PROPER NAMES, as when from *Socrates* and *Demosthenes*, we derive *Socratically* and *Demosthenically*. *It was*
Socratically

Socratically reasoned, we say; it was *Demosthenically* spoken*. Of Ch. XI.
 the same sort are many others, cited by the old Grammarians, such
 as *Catiliniter* from *Catilina*, *Sisenniter* from *Sisenna*, *Tullianè* from
Tullius, &c. (e).

NOR are they thus extensive only in *Derivation*, but in *Significa-
 tion* also. *Theodore Gaza* in his Grammar informs us (f), that AD-
 VERBS may be found in every one of the Predicaments, and that
 the readiest way to reduce their Infinitude, was to refer them by
 classes to those ten universal Genera. The *Stoics* too called the
 ADVERB by the name of Πανδέκτης, and that from a view to the same
multiform Nature. *Omnia in se capit quasi collata per satiram, concessâ
 sibi rerum variâ potestate*. It is thus that *Sofipater* explains the
 Word (g), from whose authority we know it to be *Stoical*. But of
 this enough.

AND now having finished these PRINCIPAL PARTS of Speech, the
 SUBSTANTIVE and the ATTRIBUTIVE, which are SIGNIFICANT
 WHEN ALONE, we proceed to those AUXILIARY PARTS, which are
 ONLY SIGNIFICANT, WHEN ASSOCIATED. But as these make the
 Subject of a Book by themselves, we here conclude the first Book
 of this Treatise.

* *Aristotle* has Κυκλοπικῶς *Cyclopically*, from Κύκλωψ a *Cyclops*. *Eth. Nic. X. 9.*

(e) See *Prisc. L. XV. p. 1022. Sof. Charif. 161. Edit. Putschii.*

(f) —διὸ δὴ καὶ ἄμεινον ἴσως δεκά καὶ τῶν ἐπιρρήμάτων γένη θέσθαι ἐκεῖνα, ἑσίαν, ποιὸν, ποσὸν, πρὸς
 τι, κ. τ. λ. *Gram. Introd. L. II.*

(g) *Sofip. Char. p. 175. Edit. Putschii.*

HERMES OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Concerning Definitives.

Ch. I.

WHAT remains of our Work, is a matter of less difficulty, it being the same here, as in some Historical Picture; when the principal Figures are once formed, it is an easy labour to design the rest.

DEFINITIVES, the Subject of the present Chapter, are commonly called by Grammarians, ARTICLES, ARTICULI, ἄρθρα. They are of two kinds, either those *properly and strictly so called*, or else the *Pro-nominal Articles*, such as *This, That, Any, &c.*

WE shall first treat of those *Articles more strictly so denominated*, the reason and use of which may be explained, as follows.

THE

THE visible and individual Substances of Nature are infinitely more numerous, than for each to admit of a particular Name. To supply this defect, when any Individual occurs, which either wants a proper Name, or whose proper Name is not known, we ascertain it, as well as we can, by referring it to its Species; or, if the Species be unknown, then at least to some Genus. For example—a certain Object occurs, with a head and limbs, and appearing to possess the powers of Self-motion and Sensation. If we know it not as an Individual, we refer it to its proper Species, and call it *Dog*, or *Horse*, or *Lion*, or the like. If none of these Names fit, we go to the Genus, and call it, *Animal*.

BUT this is not enough. The Thing, at which we are looking, is neither a Species, nor a Genus. What is it then? An Individual.—Of what kind? *Known*, or *unknown*? Seen now *for the first time*, or *seen before*, and now remembered?—It is here we shall discover the use of the two Articles (A) and (THE). (A) respects our *primary* Perception, and denotes Individuals as *unknown*; (THE) respects our *secondary* Perception, and denotes Individuals as *known*. To explain by an example—I see an object pass by, which I never saw till now. What do I say?—*There goes A Beggar with A long Beard*. The Man departs, and returns a Week after. What do I say then?—*There goes THE Beggar with THE long Beard*. The Article only is changed, the rest remains unaltered.

YET mark the force of this apparently minute Change. The Individual, *once vague*, is now recognized as *something known*, and that merely by the efficacy of this latter Article, which tacitly insinuates a kind

Ch. I. a kind of *previous* acquaintance, by referring the present Perception to a like Perception already past (a).

THE Truth is, the Articles (A) and (THE) are both of them *definitives*, as they circumscribe the latitude of Genera and Species, by reducing them for the most part to denote Individuals. The difference however between them is this; the Article (A) leaves the Individual itself *unascertained*, whereas the Article (THE) *ascertains the Individual also*, and is for that reason the more accurate Definitive of the two.

It is perhaps owing to the imperfect manner, in which the Article (A) defines, that the *Greeks* have no Article correspondent to it, but supply its place, by a negation of their Article 'Ο. 'Ο ἄνθρωπος ἔπεσεν, THE *man* fell—ἄνθρωπος ἔπεσεν, A *Man* fell, without any thing prefixed, but only the Article withdrawn (b). Even in *English*, where the Article (A) cannot be used as in plurals, its force is exprest by the same Negation. *Those are THE Men*, means those are Individuals,

(a) See B. I. c. 5. p. 251.

(b) Τὰ γὰρ ἀοριστῶς ποτε νοούμενα, ἢ τὰ ἄρθρα παρὰθεσις ὑπὸ ὀρισμὸν τὰ προσώπων ἄγει. *Those things, which are at times understood indefinitely, the addition of the Article makes to be definite as to their Person.* Apoll. L. IV. c. 1. See of the same author, L. I. c. 6, 36. ποιεῖ (τὸ "Ἀρθρον sc.) δ' ἀναπόλησιν προεγνωσμένον τὸ ἐν τῇ συντάξει· οἷον· εἰ μὲν λέγοι τις, ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ ΗΚΕ, ἄδηλον τίνα ἄνθρωπον λέγει. εἰ δὲ Ο ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ, δῆλον, προεγνωσμένον γὰρ τίνα ἄνθρωπον λέγει. Τῆτο δὲ αὐτὸ βέλονται καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες τ' ἄρθρον σημαντικὸν πρώτης γνώσεως καὶ δευτέρας. *The Article causes a Review within the Mind of something known before the texture of the Discourse. Thus if any one says "Ἀνθρωπος ἦκε, MAN CAME (which is the same, as when we say in English A man came) it is not evident, of whom he speaks. But if he says ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦκε, THE MAN CAME, then it is evident; for he speaks of some Person known before. And this is what those mean, who say that the Article is expressive of the First and Second Knowledge together.* Theod. Gazæ, L. IV.

duals, of which we possess some *previous* Knowledge. *Those are Men*, the Article apart, means no more than that they are so many *vague* and *uncertain* Individuals, just as the Phrase, *A Man*, in the singular, implies one of the same number.

BUT tho' the *Greeks* have no Article correspondent to the Article (A,) yet nothing can be more nearly related, than their 'Ο, to the Article, THE. 'Ο βασιλεῦς, THE King; ΤΟ δῶρον, THE Gift, &c. Nor is this only to be proved by parallel examples, but by the Attributes of the *Greek* Article, as they are described by *Apollonius*, one of the earliest and most acute of the old *Grammarians* now remaining.

Ἔστιν ἓν καθὼς καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἀπεφηνάμεθα, ἴδιον ἀρθρῶν ἢ ἀναφορὰ ἢ ἐς προκατελεγμένον πρόσωπον παραστατική. — Now the peculiar Attribute of the Article, as we have shown elsewhere, is that Reference, which implies some certain Person already mentioned. Again,—Οὐ γὰρ δήγε τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφορὰν παρίσθην, εἰ μὴ συμπαραλάβοιεν τὸ ἄρθρον, ἔξ ἑξαιρέτος ἐστὶν ἢ ἀναφορά. For Nouns of themselves imply not Reference, unless they take to them the Article, whose peculiar Character is Reference. Again—Τὸ ἄρθρον προῦφραζῶσαν γνῶσιν δηλοῖ.—The Article indicates a pre-established acquaintance (c).

HIS reasoning upon *Proper Names* is worth remarking. *Proper Names* (he tells us) often fall into *Homonymie*, that is, different Persons

(c) *Apoll. de Synt. L. I. c. 6, 7.* His account of REFERENCE is as follows—Ἰδίωμα ἀναφορᾶς προκατελεγμένον πρόσωπον δευτέρα γνῶσις. The peculiar character of Reference is the second or repeated Knowledge of some Person already mentioned. L. II. c. 3.

Ch. I.

sons often go by the same Name. To solve this ambiguity, we have recourse to *Adjectives* or *Epithets*. For example—there were two *Grecian* chiefs, who bore the name of *Ajax*. It was not therefore without reason, that *Menestheus* uses *Epithets*, when this intent was to distinguish the one of them from the other.

Ἀλλὰ περ οἷοι' ἴτω Τελαμώνιοι ἀλκιμοὶ Αἴας. Hom. (A nothing)

If both *Ajaxes* (says he) cannot be spared,

—at least alone

Let mighty *Telamonian Ajax* come.

Apollonius proceeds—Even *Epithets* themselves are diffused thro' various Subjects, in as much as the same *Adjective* may be referred to many *Substantives*.

IN order therefore to render both *Parts of Speech* equally definite, that is to say the *Adjective* as well as the *Substantive*, the *Adjective* itself assumes an *Article* before it, that it may indicate a *Reference* to some single *Person* only, μοναδικὴ ἀναφορά, according to the Author's own Phrase. And thus it is we say, Τρύφων ὁ Γραμματικός, *Trypho* THE *Grammarians*; Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος, *Apollodorus* THE *Cyrenean*, &c. The Author's Conclusion of this Section is worth remarking. Δεόντως ἄρα καὶ κατὰ τὸ τοῦτον ἢ πρόσθεσις ἐστὶ τῷ ἄρθρῳ, συνιδιάζουσα τὸ ἐπιθετικὸν τῷ κυρίῳ ὀνόματι.—It is with reason therefore that the *Article* is here also added, as it brings the *Adjective* to an *Individuality*, as precise, as the proper Name (d).

WE

(d) See *Apoll. L. I. c. 12.* where by mistake *Menelaus* is put for *Menestheus*.

WE may carry this reasoning farther, and shew, how by help of the *Article* even *common Appellatives* come to have the force of *proper Names*, and that unassisted by epithets of any kinds. Among the *Athenians* Πλοῖον meant *Ship*; Ἐνδεκα, *Eleven*; and Ἄνθρωπος, *Man*. Yet add but the *Article*, τὸ Πλοῖον, THE SHIP, meant *that particular Ship, which they sent annually to Delos*; οἱ Ἐνδεκα, THE ELEVEN, meant *certain Officers of Justice*; and ὁ Ἄνθρωπος, THE MAN, meant *their public Executioner*. So in *English*, *City*, is a Name common to many places; and *Speaker*, a Name common to many Men. Yet if we prefix the *Article*, THE CITY means our *Metropolis*; and THE SPEAKER, a *high Officer* in the *British Parliament*.

AND thus it is by an easy transition, that the *Article*, from denoting *Reference*, comes to denote *Eminence* also; that is to say, from implying an *ordinary* pre-acquaintance, to presume a kind of *general and universal Notoriety*. Thus among the *Greeks* ὁ Ποιητής, THE POET, meant *Homer (e)*; and ὁ Σταγείριτης, THE STAGIRITE, meant *Aristotle*; not that there were not many Poets, beside *Homer*; and many Stagirites, beside *Aristotle*; but none equally illustrious for their Poetry and Philosophy.

IT is on a like principle that *Aristotle* tells us, it is by no means the same thing to assert — εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν, or, τὸ ἀγαθόν — that, *Pleasure*

(e) There are so few exceptions to this Observation, that we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet *Aristotle* twice denotes *Euripides* by the Phrase ὁ ποιητής, once at the end of the seventh Book of his *Nicomachian Ethics*, and again in his *Physics*, L. II. 2. *Plato* also in his tenth Book of *Laws* (p. 901. *Edit. Serr.*) denotes *Hesiod* after the same manner.

Ch. I. *Pleasure is A GOOD, or, THE GOOD.* The first only makes it a *common Object of Desire*, upon a level with many others, which daily raise our wishes; the last supposes it *that supreme and sovereign Good*, the ultimate Scope of all our Actions and Endeavours (f).

BUT to pursue our Subject. It has been said already that the Article has no meaning, but when associated to some other word.—To what words then may it be associated?—To such as require *defining*, for it it is by nature a *Definitive*.—And *what Words* are these?—Not those which already are *as definite, as may be*. Nor yet those, which, *being indefinite, cannot properly be made otherwise*. It remains then they must be *those, which though indefinite, are yet capable, through the Article, of becoming definite*.

UPON these Principles we see the reason, why it is absurd to say, Ο ΕΓΩ, THE I, or Ο ΣΥ, THE THOU, because nothing can make those Pronouns more *definite*, than they are (g). The same may be asserted of Proper Names, and though the Greeks say ὁ Σωκράτης, ἡ Εὐδοκία and the like, yet the Article is a mere Pleonasm, unless perhaps

(f) Analyt. Prior. L. I. c. 40.

(g) Apollonius makes it part of the Pronoun's Definition, to refuse co-alefcence with the Article. Ἐκεῖνο ἐν Ἀντωνυμίᾳ, τὸ μετὰδείξεως ἢ ἀναφορᾶς ἀντονομαζόμενον, ὃ ἔσυνεσι τὸ ἄρθρον. *That therefore is a Pronoun, which with Indication or Reference is put for a Noun, and WITH WHICH THE ARTICLE DOETH NOT ASSOCIATE.* L. II. c. 5. So Gaza, speaking of Pronouns—Πάντη δὲ—ἐκ ἐπιδέχονται ἄρθρον. L. IV. Priscian says the same. *Jure igitur apud Græcos prima et secunda persona pronominum, quæ sine dubio demonstrativæ sunt, articulis adjungi non possunt; nec tertia, quando demonstrativa est.* L. XII. p. 938.—In the beginning of the same Book, he gives the true reason of this. *Supra omnes alias partes orationis FINIT PERSONAS PRONOMEN.*

perhaps it serve to distinguish Sexes. By the same rule we cannot say in *Greek* ΟΙ ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ, or in *English*, THE BOTH, because these Words in their own nature are each of them perfectly defined, so that to define them farther would be quite superfluous. Thus, if it be said, *I have read BOTH Poets*, this plainly indicates a definite pair, of whom some mention has been made already; Δυὸς ἐγνωσμένη, a known Duad, as Apollonius expresses himself, (h) when he speaks of this Subject. On the contrary, if it be said, *I have read Two Poets*, this may mean any Pair out of all that ever existed. And hence this Numeral, being in this Sense indefinite (as indeed are all others, as well as itself) is forced to assume the Article, whenever it would become definite*. And thus it is, THE Two in *English*, and ΟΙ ΔΥΟ in *Greek*, mean nearly the same thing, as BOTH or ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ. Hence also it is, that as Two, when taken alone, has reference to some primary and indefinite Perception, while the Article, THE, has reference to some secondary and definite†; hence I say the Reason, why it is bad *Greek* to say ΔΥΟ ΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, and bad *English*, to say Two THE MEN. Such Syntax is in fact a Blending of Incompatibles, that is to say of a defined Substantive with an undefined Attributive. On the contrary to say in *Greek* ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ ΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, or in *English*, BOTH THE MEN, is good and allowable, because the Substantive cannot possibly be less apt, by being defined, to coalesce with an

(h) Apollon. L. I. c. 16.

* This explains Servius on the XIIth Æneid. v. 511. where he tells us that *Duorum* is put for *Amborum*. In *English* or *Greek* the Article would have done the business, for the Two, or τοῖν δυοῖν are equivalent to Both or ἀμφότερων, but not so *Duorum*, because the *Latins* have no Articles to prefix.

† Sup. p. 334.

Ch. I.

an Attributive, which is defined as well as itself. So likewise, it is correct to say, ΟΙ ΔΥΟ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, THE TWO MEN, because here the Article, being placed in the beginning, *extends its Power* as well through Substantive as Attributive, and equally contributes to *define* them both.

As some of the words above admit of no Article, *because they are by Nature as definite as may be*, so there are others, which admit it not, *because they are not to be defined at all*. Of this sort are all INTERROGATIVES. If we question about *Substances*, we cannot say Ο ΤΙΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ, THE WHO IS THIS; but ΤΙΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ, WHO IS THIS? (*i*). The same as to *Qualities* and both kinds of *Quantity*. We say without an Article ΠΟΙΟΣ, ΠΟΣΟΙ, ΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ, in *English*, WHAT SORT OF, HOW MANY, HOW GREAT. The Reason is, that the Articles 'Ο, and THE, respect Beings, *already known*; Interrogatives respect Beings, *about which we are ignorant*; for as to what we know, Interrogation is superfluous.

IN a word the natural *Associators with Articles*, are all those common *Appellatives*, which denote the several Genera and Species of Beings. It is these, which, by assuming a different *Article*, serve either to explain an Individual upon its first being perceived, or else to indicate upon its return, a Recognition, or repeated Knowledge (*k*).

WE

(*i*) Apollonius calls ΤΙΣ, ἐναντιώτατον τῶν ἄρθρων, a Part of Speech, *most contrary, most averse to Articles*, L. IV. c. 1.

(*k*) What is here said respects the two Articles which we have in *English*. In *Greek*, the Article does no more, than imply a *Recognition*. See before p. 334, 335.

WE shall here subjoin a few Instances of the Peculiar Power of ARTICLES. Ch. I.

EVERY Proposition consists of a *Subject*, and a *Predicate*. In *English*, these are distinguished by their Position, the Subject standing *first*, the Predicate *last*. *Happiness is Pleasure*—Here, *Happiness* is the *Subject*; *Pleasure*, the *Predicate*. If we change their order, and say, *Pleasure is Happiness*; then *Pleasure* becomes the *Subject*, and *Happiness* the *Predicate*. In *Greek* these are distinguished not by any Order or Position, but by help of the *Article*, which the Subject always assumes, and the Predicate in most instances (some few excepted) rejects. *Happiness is Pleasure*—ἡδονὴ ἡ εὐδαιμονία—*Pleasure is Happiness*—ἡ ἡδονὴ εὐδαιμονία—*Fine things are difficult*—χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ—*Difficult things are fine*—τὰ χαλεπὰ καλὰ.

IN *Greek* it is worth attending, how in the same Sentence, the same *Article*, by being prefixed to a different Word, quite changes the whole meaning. For example—Ὁ Πτολεμαῖος γυμνασιαρχήσας ἐτιμήθη—*Ptolemy, having presided over the Games, was publickly honoured*. The Participle γυμνασιαρχήσας has here no other force, than to denote to us *the Time, when* Ptolemy was honoured, *viz.* after having presided over the Games. But if, instead of the Substantive, we join the Participle to the *Article*, and say, Ὁ γυμνασιαρχήσας Πτολεμαῖος ἐτιμήθη, our meaning is then—*The Ptolemy, who presided over the Games, was honoured*. The Participle in this case, being joined to the *Article*, tends tacitly to indicate not one *Ptolemy* but many, of which number a particular one participated of honour (1).

IN

(1) *Apollon*. L. I. c. 33, 34.

Ch. I.

IN *English* likewise it deserves remarking, how the Sense is changed by changing of the *Articles*, tho' we leave every other Word of the Sentence untouched.—*And Nathan said unto David, THOU ART THE MAN**. In that single *THE*, that diminutive Particle, all the force and efficacy of the Reason is contained. By that alone are the Premises applied, and so firmly fixed, as never to be shaken. It is possible this Assertion may appear at first somewhat strange; but let him, who doubts it, only change the *Article*, and then see what will become of the Prophet and his reasoning.—*And Nathan said unto David, THOU ART A MAN*. Might not the King well have demanded upon so impertinent a position,

Non dices hodie, quorsum hæc tam putida tendant?

BUT enough of such Speculations. The only remark, which we shall make on them, is this; that “minute Change in PRINCIPLES
“ leads to mighty Change in EFFECTS; so that well are PRINCI-
“ PLES intitled to our regard, however *in appearance* they may be
“ trivial and low.”

THE ARTICLES already mentioned are those *strictly* so called; but besides these there are the PRONOMINAL ARTICLES, such as, *This, That, Any, Other, Some, All, No, or None, &c.* Of these we have spoken already in our Chapter of Pronouns (*m*), where we have shewn,

* ΣΤ ΕΙ 'Ο ΑΝΗΡ. Βασιλ. Β'. κεφ. ιβ'.

(*m*) See B. I. c. 5. p. 256, 7. It seems to have been some view of words, like that here given, which induced *Quintilian* to say of the *Latin Tongue*—*Noster sermo Articulos*

shewn, when they may be taken as Pronouns, and when as Articles. Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the Essence of an Article be to *define* and *ascertain*, they are much more properly Articles, than any thing else, and as such should be considered in Universal Grammar. Thus when we say, *THIS Picture I approve, but THAT I dislike*, what do we perform by the help of these Definitives, but bring down the common Appellative to denote two Individuals, the one as *the more near*, the other as *the more distant*? So when we say, *SOME men are virtuous, but ALL men are mortal*, what is the natural Effect of this ALL and SOME, but to define that *Universality*, and *Particularity*, which would remain indefinite, were we to take them away? The same is evident in such Sentences, as—*SOME substances have sensation; OTHERS want it—Chuse ANY way of acting, and SOME men will find fault, &c.* For here SOME, OTHER, and ANY, serve all of them to *define* different Parts of a given Whole; SOME, to denote a *definite Part*; ANY, to denote an *indefinite*; and OTHER, to denote the *remaining* Part, when a Part has been assumed already. Sometimes this last Word denotes a *large indefinite Portion*, set in opposition to some *single, definite, and remaining Part*, which receives from such Opposition no small degree of heightening. Thus *Virgil*,

Excudent

culos non desiderat; ideoque in alias partes orationis sparguntur. Inst. Orat. L. I. c. 4. So Scaliger. His declaratis, satis constat. Græcorum Articulos non neglectos a nobis, sed eorum usum superfluum. Nam ubi aliquid præscribendum est, quod Græci per articulum efficiunt (ἐλεξεν ὁ δᾶλος) expletur a Latinis per Is aut ILLE; Is, aut, Ille servus dixit, de quo servo antea facta mentio sit, aut qui alio quo pacto notus sit. Additur enim Articulus ad rei memoriam renovandam, cujus antea non nescii sumus, aut ad præscribendam intellectionem, quæ latius patere queat; veluti cum dicimus, C. Cæsar, is qui postea dictator fuit. Nam alii fuere C. Cæsares. Sic. Græcè Καῖσαρ ὁ ἀντοκράτωρ. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 131.

Ch. I.

*Excudent ALII spirantia mollius æra;
 (Credo equidem) vivos ducent de marmore vultus;
 Orabunt causas meliùs, cælique meatus
 Describent radio, et surgentia sidera dicent:
 Tu regere imperio populos, ROMANE, memento. &c. Æn. VI.*

NOTHING can be stronger or more sublime, than this Antithesis; one *Act* set as equal to many other *Acts* taken together, and the Roman singly (for it is *Tu Romane*, not *Vos Romani*) to all other Men; and yet this performed by so trivial a cause, as the just opposition of *ALII* to *TU*.

BUT here we conclude, and proceed to treat of CONNECTIVES.

C H A P. II.

Concerning CONNECTIVES, and first those called CONJUNCTIONS.

CONNECTIVES are the subject of what follows; which, according as they connect either *Sentences* or *Words*, are called by the different Names of CONJUNCTIONS, or PREPOSITIONS. Of these Names, that of the *Preposition* is taken from a *mere accident*, as it commonly stands in connection before the Part, which it connects. The name of the *Conjunction*, as is evident, has reference to its *essential character*.

Ch. II.

OF these two we shall consider the CONJUNCTION first, because it connects, not Words, but *Sentences*. This is conformable to the Analysis, with which we began this inquiry*, and which led us, by parity of reason, to consider *Sentences themselves* before *Words*. Now the Definition of a CONJUNCTION is as follows—a *Part of Speech*, void of Signification itself, but so formed as to help Signification, by making TWO or more significant Sentences to be ONE significant Sentence (a).

THIS

* Sup. p. 235.

(a) Grammarians have usually considered the Conjunction as connecting rather *single Parts of Speech*, than *whole Sentences*, and that too with the addition of like with like, Tense with Tense, Number with Number, Case with Case, &c. This *Sanctius* justly explodes. *Conjunctio neque casus, neque alias partes orationis (ut imperiti docent) conjungit, ipsæ enim partes inter se conjunguntur—sed conjunctio Orationes inter se conjungit.*

Ch. II.

THIS therefore being the general Idea of CONJUNCTIONS, we deduce their Species in the following manner. CONJUNCTIONS, while

Miner. L. III. c. 14. He then establishes his doctrine by a variety of examples. He had already said as much, L. I. c. 18. and in this he appears to have followed *Scaliger*, who had asserted the same before him. *Conjunctionis autem notionem veteres paullo inconsultius prodidere; neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias conjungit (ipsæ enim partes per se inter se conjunguntur)—sed Conjunctio est, quæ conjungit Orationes plures.* De Cauf. Ling. Lat. c. 165.

This Doctrine of theirs is confirmed by *Apollonius*, who in the several places, where he mentions the Conjunction, always considers it in Syntax as connecting *Sentences*, and not Words, though in his works now extant he has not given us its Definition. See L. I. c. 2. p. 14. L. II. c. 12. p. 124. L. III. c. 15. p. 234.

But we have stronger authority than this to support *Scaliger* and *Sanctius*, and that is *Aristotle's* Definition, as the Passage has been corrected by the best Critics and Manuscripts. A Conjunction, according to him, is *φωνὴ ἀσημος, ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾷ, σημαντικῇ δὲ, ποιεῖν πεφυκυῖα μίαν φωνὴν σημαντικὴν.* An articulate Sound, devoid of Signification, which is so formed as to make ONE significant articulate Sound out of several articulate Sounds, which are each of them significant. Poet. c. 20. In this view of things, the one significant articulate Sound, formed by the Conjunction, is not the Union of two or more Syllables in one simple Word, nor even of two or more Words in one simple Sentence, but of two or more simple Sentences in one complex Sentence, which is considered as ONE, from that Concatenation of Meaning effected by the Conjunctions. For example, let us take the Sentence, which follows. *If Men are by nature social, it is their Interest to be just, though it were not so ordained by the Laws of their Country.* Here are three Sentences. (1.) *Men are by nature social.* (2.) *It is Man's Interest to be just.* (3.) *It is not ordained by the Laws of every Country that Man should be just.* The first two of these Sentences are made ONE by the Conjunction, *IF*; these, ONE with the third Sentence, by the Conjunction, *THO'*; and the three, thus united, make that *φωνὴ μία σημαντικὴ*, that one significant articulate Sound, of which *Aristotle* speaks, and which is the result of the conjunctive Power.

This explains a passage in his Rhetoric, where he mentions the same Subject. *Ὁ γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἐν ποιεῖ τὰ πολλά ὥστε ἐὰν ἐξαίρεθῇ, δῆλον ὅτι τεναντίον ἔσται τὸ ἐν πολλά.* The Conjunction makes many, ONE; so that if it be taken away, it is then evident on the contrary that one will be MANY. Rhet. III. c. 12. His instance of a Sentence, divested of its Conjunctions, and thus made many out of one, is, *ἦλθον, ἀπήντησα, εἰδέμεν, veni, occurri, rogavi*, where by the way the three Sentences, resulting from this Dissolution, (for *ἦλθον, ἀπήντησα*, and *εἰδέμεν*, are each of them, when unconnected, so many perfect Sentences) prove that these are the proper Subjects of the Conjunction's connective faculty.

Ammonius's

while they connect sentences, either connect also their meanings, or not. Ch. II.
 For example: let us take these two Sentences — *Rome was enslaved* — *Cæsar was ambitious* — and connect them together by the Conjunction, BECAUSE. *Rome was enslaved, BECAUSE Cæsar was ambitious.* Here the Meanings, as well as the Sentences, appear to be connected. But if I say, — *Manners must be reformed, OR Liberty will be lost* — here the Conjunction, OR, though it join the Sentences, yet as to their respective Meanings, is a perfect Disjunctive. And thus it appears, that though all Conjunctions conjoin Sentences, yet with respect to the Sense, some are CONJUNCTIVE, and some DISJUNCTIVE; and hence (b) it is that we derive their different Species.

THE Conjunctions, which conjoin both Sentences and their Meanings, are either COPULATIVES, or CONTINUATIVES. The principal Copulative in English is, AND. The Continuatives are, IF, BECAUSE, THEREFORE, THAT, &c. The Difference between these is this — The Copulative does no more than barely couple Sentences, and is therefore applicable to all Subjects, whose Natures are not incompatible. Continuatives, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate

Ammonius's account of the use of this Part of Speech is elegant Διὸ καὶ τῶν λόγων ὁ μὲν ὑπαρξίν μίαν σημαίνων, ὁ κυρίως εἷς, ἀνάλογος ἂν εἴη τῷ μηδέπω τετμημένῳ ξύλῳ, καὶ διὰ τῆτο ἐνὶ λεγομένῳ· ὁ δὲ πλείονας ὑπάρξεις δηλῶν, ἓνα (lege διὰ) τινὰ δὲ σύνδεσμον ἡνωσθῆναι πῶς δοκῶν, ἀναλογεῖ τῇ γῆ τῇ ἐκ πολλῶν συγχειμένῃ ξύλῳ, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν γόμφων φαινομένην ἐχέσθαι τὴν ἑνωσιν. *Of Sentences that, which denotes one Existence simply, and which is strictly ONE, may be considered as analogous to a piece of Timber not yet severed, and called on this account One. That, which denotes several Existences, and which appears to be made ONE by some Conjunctive Particle, is analogous to a Ship made up of many pieces of Timber, and which by means of the nails has an apparent Unity.* Am. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 54. 6.

(b) Thus Scaliger. *Aut ergo Sensum conjungunt, ac Verba; aut Verba tantum conjungunt, Sensum vero disjungunt.* De C. L. Lat. c. 167.

Ch. II. consolidate Sentences into *one continuous Whole*, and are therefore applicable only to Subjects, which have an *essential Co-incidence*.

To explain by examples—It is no way improper to say, *Lyfippus was a Statuary, AND Priscian was a Grammarian—The Sun shineth, AND the Sky is clear*—because these are things that may co-exist, and yet imply no absurdity. But it would be absurd to say, *Lyfippus was a Statuary, BECAUSE Priscian was a Grammarian*; tho' not to say, *the Sun shineth, BECAUSE the Sky is clear*. The Reason is, with respect to the first, the *Co-incidence* is merely *accidental*; with respect to the last, it is *essential*, and founded in nature. And so much for the Distinction between *Copulatives* and *Continuatives* (c).

As to *Continuatives*, they are either *SUPPOSITIVE*, such as, *IF*; or *POSITIVE*, such as, *BECAUSE, THEREFORE, As, &c.* Take Examples of each—you *will live happily, IF you live honestly—you live happily, BECAUSE you live honestly*. The Difference between these *Continuatives* is this—The *Suppositives* denote *Connection*, but assert not actual *Existence*; the *Positives* imply *both the one and the other* (d).

FARTHER

(c) *Copulativa est, quæ copulat tam Verba, quam Sensum*. Thus *Priscian*, p. 1026. But *Scaliger* is more explicit—*si Sensum conjungunt (conjunctiones sc.) aut necessariò, aut non necessariò: & si non necessariò, tum fiunt Copulativæ, &c.* De C. Ling. Lat. c. 167. *Priscian's* own account of *Continuatives* is as follows. *Continuativæ sunt, quæ continuationem & consequentiam rerum significant*—ibid. *Scaliger's* account is—*causam aut præstiluunt, aut subdunt*. Ibid. c. 168. The Greek name for the Copulative was Σύνδεσμος συμπλεκτικός; for the Continuative, συναπτικός; the Etymologies of which words justly distinguish their respective characters.

(d) The old Greek Grammarians confined the name Συναπτικοί, and the Latins that of *Continuativæ*, to those Conjunctions, which we have called *Suppositive* or *Conditional*, while

FARTHER than this, the Positives above mentioned are either CAUSAL, such as, BECAUSE, SINCE, AS, &c. or COLLECTIVE, such as, THEREFORE, WHEREFORE, THEN, &c. The Difference between these is this—The *Causals* subjoin *Causes to Effects*—*The Sun is in Eclipse, BECAUSE the Moon intervenes*—The *Collectives* subjoin *Effects to Causes*—*The Moon intervenes, THEREFORE the Sun is in Eclipse*. Now we use *Causals* in those instances, where, the Effect being conspicuous, we seek its Cause; and *Collectives*, in *Demonstrations*, and *Science properly so called*, where the Cause being known first, by its help we discern consequences (e).

ALL

while the Positive they called *παρασυναπτικοί*, or *Subcontinuativæ*. They agree however in describing their proper Characters. The first according to *Gaza* are, *οἱ ὑπαρξίν μὲν ἔ, ἀπολεθίαν δὲ τινα καὶ τάξιν δηλῶντες*—L. IV. *Priscian* says, they signify to us, *qualis est ordinatio & natura rerum, cum dubitatione aliquâ essentia rerum*—p. 1027. And *Scaliger* says, they conjoin *sine subsistentiâ necessariâ; potest enim subsistere & non subsistere; utrumque enim admittunt*. Ibid. c. 168. On the contrary of the Positive, or *παρασυναπτικοί* (to use his own name) *Gaza* tells us, *ὅτι καὶ ὑπαρξίν μετὰ τάξεως σημάνουσιν ἕτοιγε*—And *Priscian* says, *causam continuationis ostendunt consequentem cum essentia rerum*—And *Scaliger*, *non ex hypothesi, sed ex eo, quod subsistit, conjungunt*. Ibid.

It may seem at first somewhat strange, why the *Positive* Conjunctions should have been considered as Subordinate to the *Suppositive*, which by their ancient Names appears to have been the fact. Is it, that the Positive are confined to what *actually is*; the Suppositive extend to *Possibles*, nay even as far as to *Impossibles*? Thus it is false to affirm, *As it is Day, it is Light*, unless it actually be Day. But we may at midnight affirm, *If it be Day, it is Light*, because the, *If*, extends to Possibles also. Nay we may affirm, by its help (if we please) even Impossibles. We may say, *If the Sun be cubical, then is the Sun angular; If the Sky fall, then shall we catch Larks*. Thus too *Scaliger* upon the same occasion—*amplitudinem Continuativæ percipi ex eo, quod etiam impossibile aliquando præsupponit*. De C. L. Lat. C. 168. In this sense then the Continuative, Suppositive or Conditional Conjunction is (as it were) superior to the Positive, as being of greater latitude in its application.

(e) The *Latins* called the *Causals*, *Causales* or *Causativæ*; the *Collectives*, *Collectivæ* or *Illativæ*: The *Greeks* called the former *Αἰτιολογικοί*, and the latter *Συλλογιστικοί*.

Ch. II.

ALL these *Continuatives* are resolvable into *Copulatives*. Instead of, *BECAUSE it is Day, it is light*, we may say, *It is Day, AND it is Light*. Instead of, *IF it be Day, it is Light*, we may say, *It is at the same time necessary to be Day, AND to be Light*; and so in other Instances. The Reason is, that the Power of the *Copulative* extends to all Connections, as well to the *essential*, as to the *casual* or *fortuitous*. Hence therefore the *Continuative* may be resolved into a *Copulative* and something more, that is to say, into a *Copulative* implying an *essential* Co-incidence (f) in the Subjects conjoined.

As to *Causal* Conjunctions (of which we have spoken already) there is no one of the four Species of Causes, which they are not capable of denoting: for example, THE MATERIAL CAUSE—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE it is made of Metal*—THE FORMAL—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE it is long and hollow*—THE EFFICIENT—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE an Artist blows it*—THE FINAL—*The Trumpet sounds, THAT it may raise our courage*. Where it is worth observing, that the three first Causes are express'd by the strong affirmation of the *Indicative Mode*, because if the Effect actually be, these must of necessity be also. But the last Cause has a different Mode, namely, the *Contingent* or *Potential*. The Reason is, that the Final Cause, tho' it may be *first in Speculation*, is always *last in Event*. That is to say, however it may be the End, which set the Artist first to work, it may still be an End beyond his Power to obtain, and which,

(f) *Resoluntur autem in Copulativas omnes hæ, propterea quod Causa cum Effectu Suapte naturâ conjuncta est.* Scal. de C. L. Lat. c. 169.

which, like other Contingents, may either happen, or not (g). Ch. II.
Hence also it is connected by Conjunctions of a peculiar kind, such
as, THAT, ἵνα, UT, &c.

THE Sum is, that ALL CONJUNCTIONS, *which connect both Sentences and their Meanings*, are either COPULATIVE, or CONTINUATIVE; the Continuatives are either *Conditional*, or *Positive*; and the Positives are either *Causal* or *Collective*.

AND now we come to the DISJUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS, a Species of Words which bear this contradictory Name, because, while they *disjoin the Sense*, they *conjoin the Sentences* (h).

WITH respect to these we may observe, that as there is a Principle of UNION diffused throughout all things, by which THIS WHOLE is kept together, and preserved from Dissipation; so there is a Principle of DIVERSITY diffused in like manner, the Source of Distinction, of Number, and of Order (i).

Now

(g) See B. I. c. 8. p. 52. See also Vol. I. Note VIII. p. 152. For the four Causes, see Vol. I. Note XVII. p. 156.

(h) Ὅτι δὲ διαζευκτικοὶ τὰ διαζευγμένα συντιθέασιν, καὶ ἡ πρᾶγμα ἀπὸ πρᾶγματ', ἢ πρόσωπον ἀπὸ προσώπου διαζευγνύοντες, τὴν φρασιν ἐπισυνδῶσιν. *Gazæ Gram. L. IV. Disjunctivæ sunt, quæ, quamvis dictiones conjungant, sensum tamen disjunctum habent.* *Prisc. L. XVI. p. 1029.* And hence it is, that a Sentence, connected by Disjunctives, has a near resemblance to a *simple negative Truth*. For though this as to its Intellection be *disjunctive* (its end being to disjoin the Subject from the Predicate) yet as it combines Terms together into one Proposition, it is as truly *synthetical*, as any Truth, that is *affirmative*. See Chap. I. Note (b) p. 216.

(i) The DIVERSITY, which adorns Nature, may be said to heighten by degrees, and as it passes to different Subjects, to become more and more intense. Some things only differ,

Ch. II.

Now it is to express in some degree the Modifications of this Diversity, that DISJUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS seem first to have been invented.

OF these DISJUNCTIVES, some are SIMPLE, some ADVERSATIVE — Simple, as when we say, EITHER *it is Day*, OR *it is Night* — Adversative, as when we say, *It is not Day*, BUT *it is Night*. The Difference between these is, that the simple do no more, than merely disjoin; the Adversative disjoin, with an Opposition concomitant. Add to this, that the Adversative are definite; the Simple, indefinite, Thus when

differ, when considered as *Individuals*, but if we recur to their *Species*, immediately lose all Distinction: such for instance are *Socrates* and *Plato*. Others differ as to *Species*, but as to *Genus* are the same: such are *Man* and *Lion*. There are others again, which differ as to *Genus*, and co-incide only in those transcendental Comprehensions of *Ens*, *Being*, *Existence*, and the like: such are *Quantities* and *Qualities*, as for example an *Ounce*, and the Colour, *White*. Lastly ALL BEING whatever differs, as *Being*, from *Non-being*.

Farther, in all things different, however moderate their Diversity, there is an appearance of OPPOSITION with respect to each other, in as much as each thing is *it self*, and not any of the rest. But yet in all Subjects this Opposition is not the same. In RELATIVES, such as Greater and Less, Double and Half, Father and Son, Cause and Effect, in these it is more striking, than in ordinary Subjects, because these always shew it, by necessarily inferring each other. In CONTRARIES, such as Black and White, Even and Odd, Good and Bad, Virtuous and Vicious, in these the Opposition goes still farther, because these not only differ, but are even destructive of each other. But the most potent Opposition is that of *Ἀντίφασις*, or CONTRADICTION, when we oppose Proposition to Proposition, Truth to Falshood, asserting of any Subject, either it is, or it is not. This indeed is an Opposition, which extends itself to all things, for every thing conceivable must needs have its Negative, though multitudes by nature have neither Relatives, nor Contraries.

Besides these Modes of DIVERSITY, there are others that deserve notice: such for instance, as the Diversity between the Name of a thing, and its Definition; between the various Names, which belong to the same thing, and the various things, which are denoted by the same Name; all which Diversities upon occasion become a Part of our Discourse. And so much, in short, for the Subject of DIVERSITY.

when we say, *The Number of Three is not an even Number, BUT an odd*, we not only disjoin two opposite Attributes, but we definitely affirm one, and deny the other. But when we say, *The Number of the Stars is EITHER even OR odd*, though we assert one Attribute *to be*, and the other *not to be*, yet the Alternative notwithstanding is left indefinite. And so much for *simple Disjunctives* (k).

As to *Adversative Disjunctives*, it has been said already that they imply OPPOSITION. Now there can be no Opposition of the *same Attribute*, in the *same Subject*, as when we say, *Nireus was beautiful*; but the Opposition must be either of the *same Attribute* in *different Subjects*, as when we say, *Brutus was a Patriot, BUT Cæsar was not* — or of *different Attributes* in the *same Subject*, as when we say, *Gorgias was a Sophist, BUT not a Philosopher* — or of *different Attributes* in *different Subjects*, as when we say, *Plato was a Philosopher, BUT Hippias was a Sophist*.

THE *Conjunctions* used for all these purposes may be called ABSOLUTE ADVERSATIVES.

BUT

(k) The simple Disjunctive *ἢ*, or *Vel*, is mostly used *indefinitely*, so as to leave an Alternative. But when it is used *definitely*, so as to leave no Alternative, it is then a perfect Disjunctive of the Subsequent from the Previous, and has the same force with *καὶ ἐ*, or, *Et non*. It is thus Gaza explains that Verse of Homer.

Βάλομ' ἐγὼ λαὸν σόον ἔμμεναι, ἢ ἀπολέσθαι.

Il. A.

That is to say, *I desire the people should be saved, AND NOT be destroyed*, the Conjunction *ἢ* being *ἀναιρετικὸς*, or *sublative*. It must however be confessed, that this Verse is otherwise explained by an Ellipsis, either of *μᾶλλον*, or *ἀντίς*, concerning which see the Commentators.

Ch. II.

BUT there are *other Adversatives*, besides these; as when we say, *Nireus was more beautiful, THAN Achilles—Virgil was AS great a Poet, AS Cicero was an Orator.* The Character of these latter is, that they go farther than the former, by marking not only *Opposition*, but that *Equality* or *Excess*, which arises among Subjects from their being compared. And hence it is they may be called ADVERSATIVES OF COMPARISON.

BESIDES the Adversatives here mentioned, there are two other Species, of which the most eminent are UNLESS and ALTHO'. For example—*Troy will be taken, UNLESS the Palladium be preserved—Troy will be taken, ALTHO' Hector defend it.* The Nature of these Adversatives may be thus explained. As every Event is naturally allied to its Cause, so by parity of reason it is opposed to its Preventive. And as every Cause is either *adequate* (l) or *in-adequate* (in-adequate, when it endeavours, without being effectual) so in like manner is every Preventive. Now adequate Preventives are expressed by such Adversatives, as UNLESS—*Troy will be taken, UNLESS the Palladium be preserved*; that is, *This alone is sufficient to prevent it.* The In-adequate are expressed by such Adversatives, as ALTHO'—*Troy will be taken, ALTHO' Hector defend it*; that is, *Hector's Defence will prove in-effectual.*

THE Names given by the old Grammarians to denote these last Adversatives, appear not sufficiently to express their Natures (m.) They

(l) This Distinction has reference to common Opinion, and the form of Language, consonant thereto. In strict metaphysical truth, No Cause, that is not adequate, is any Cause at all.

(m) They called them for the most part, without sufficient Distinction of their Species, Adversativæ, or Ἐναντιωματικαί.

They may be better perhaps called ADVERSATIVES ADEQUATE, and IN-ADEQUATE. Ch. II.

AND thus it is that all DISJUNCTIVES, that is CONJUNCTIONS, which conjoin Sentences, but not their Meanings, are either SIMPLE or ADVERSATIVE; and that all ADVERSATIVES are either *Absolute* or *Comparative*; or else *adequate* or *In-adequate*.

WE shall finish this Chapter with a few miscellany Observations.

IN the first place it may be observed, through all the Species of Disjunctives, that the *same* Disjunctive appears to have *greater* or *less* force, according as the Subjects, which it disjoins, are more or less disjoined by Nature. For example, if we say, *Every Number is even, OR odd*—*Every Proposition is true, OR false*—nothing seems to disjoin *more strongly* than the *Disjunctive*, because no things are in Nature more *incompatible* than the Subjects. But if we say, *That Object is a Triangle, OR Figure contained under three right lines*—the (OR) in this case hardly seems to disjoin, or indeed to do more, than *distinctly* to express the Thing, first by its *Name*, and then by its *Definition*. So if we say, *That Figure is a Sphere, OR a Globe, OR a Ball*—the Disjunctive in this case, tends no farther to disjoin, than as it distinguishes the *several Names*, which belong to the *same Thing* (n).

AGAIN

(n) The *Latins* had a peculiar Particle for this occasion, which they called *Subdisjunctiva*, a *Subdisjunctive*; and that was *SIVE*. *Alexander sive Paris*; *Mars sive Marors*. The *Greek* *ἢ* seems to answer the same end. Of these Particles, *Scaliger* thus speaks—*Et sane nomen Subdisjunctivarum recte acceptum est, neque enim tam planè disjungit, quam Disjunctivæ. Nam Disjunctivæ sunt in Contrariis—Subdisjunctivæ autem etiam in non Contrariis, sed Diversis tantum; ut, Alexander sive Paris.* De C. L. Lat. c. 170.

Ch. II.

AGAIN—the Words, *When* and *Where*, and all others of the same nature, such as, *Whence*, *Whither*, *Whenever*, *Wherever*, &c. may be properly called ADVERBIAL CONJUNCTIONS, because they participate the nature both of Adverbs and Conjunctions—of *Conjunctions*, as they conjoin Sentences; of *Adverbs*, as they denote the Attributes either of *Time*, or of *Place*.

AGAIN—these *Adverbial Conjunctions*, and perhaps most of the *Prepositions* (contrary to the Character of *accessory* Words, which have strictly no Signification, but when associated with other words) have a kind of *obscure* Signification, when taken alone, by denoting those Attributes of *Time* and *Place*. And hence it is, that they appear in Grammar, like *Zoophytes* in Nature; a kind of (o) middle Beings, of amphibious character, which, by sharing the Attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link the Whole together (p).

AND so much for CONJUNCTIONS, their Genus, and their Species.

(o) Πολλαχού γὰρ ἡ φύσις δῆλη γίνεται κατὰ μικρὸν μεταβαίνουσα, ὥστε ἀμφισχητεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τίνων, πότερον ζῶον ἢ φυτὸν. *Themist.* p. 74. Ed. Ald. See also *Arist.* de Animal. Part p. 93. l. 10. Ed. Syll.

(p) It is somewhat surprizing that the politeſt and moſt elegant of the *Attic* Writers, and *Plato* above all the reſt, ſhould have their works filled with Particles of all kinds, and with Conjunctions in particular; while in the modern polite works, as well of ourſelves as of our neighbours, ſcarce ſuch a Word as a Particle, or Conjunction is to be found. Is it, that where there is *Connection in the Meaning*, there muſt be *Words had to connect*; but that where the Connection is little or none, ſuch Connectives are of little uſe? That Houſes of Cards, without cement, may well answer their end, but not thoſe Houſes, where one would chuſe to dwell? Is this the Cause? or have we attained an Elegance, to the Antients unknown?

Venimus ad ſummam fortunæ, &c.

C H A P. III.

Concerning those Connectives, called Prepositions.

PREPOSITIONS by their name express their *Place*, but not their *Character*. Their Definition will distinguish them from the former Connectives. A PREPOSITION is a Part of Speech, devoid itself of Signification, but so formed as to unite two Words that are significant, and that refuse to co-alesce or unite of themselves (a). This connective Power, (which relates to Words only, and not Sentences) will be better understood from the following Speculations.

Ch. III.

SOME things co-alesce and unite of themselves; others refuse to do so without help, and as it were compulsion. Thus in Works of Art, the Morter and the Stone co-alesce of themselves; but the Wainscot and the Wall not without Nails and Pins. In nature this is more conspicuous. For example; all Quantities, and Qualities co-alesce immediately with their Substances. Thus it is we say, *a fierce Lion, a vast Mountain*; and from this Natural Concord of Subject and Accident,

(a) The Stoic Name for a Preposition was Προθετικὸς Σύνδεσμος, *Præpositiva Conjunctio*, a *Prepositive Conjunction*. Ὡς μὲν ἔν καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας παραθέσεις αἱ προθέσεις συνδεσμικῆς συνιάξεως γίνονται παρεμφατικάι, λέλεκται ἡμῖν ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἀφορμὴ εὔρηται παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς τὴ καλεῖσθαι αὐτὰς Προθετικὸς Σύνδεσμος. Now in what manner even in other applications (besides the present) Prepositions give proof of their Conjunctive Syntax, we have mentioned already; whence too the Stoics took occasion to call them PREPOSITIVE CONJUNCTIONS. *Apollon. L. IV. c. 5. p. 313.* Yet is this in fact rather a descriptive *Sketch*, than a complete *Definition*, since there are other Conjunctions, which are Prepositive as well as these. See *Gaz. L. IV. de Præposit. Prisc. L. XIV. p. 983.*

Ch. III. *cident, arises the Grammatical Concord of Substantive and Adjective.*
 In like manner Actions co-alesce with their Agents, and Passions with their Patients. Thus it is we say, *Alexander conquers; Darius is conquered.* Nay, as every Energy is a kind of Medium between its Agent and Patient, the whole three, *Agent, Energy, and Patient*, co-alesce with the same facility; as when we say, *Alexander conquers Darius.* And hence, that is from *these Modes of natural Co-alescence*, arises the *Grammatical Regimen of the Verb by its Nominative, and of the Accusative by its Verb.* Farther than this, Attributives themselves may be most of them characterized; as when we say of such Attributives as *ran, beautiful, learned, he ran swiftly, she was very beautiful, he was moderately learned, &c.* And hence the *Co-alescence of the Adverb with Verbs, Participles, and Adjectives.*

THE general Conclusion appears to be this. "THOSE PARTS
 " OF SPEECH UNITE OF THEMSELVES IN GRAMMAR, WHOSE ORI-
 " GINAL ARCHETYPES UNITE OF THEMSELVES IN NATURE." To
 which we may add, as following from what has been said, that *the great Objects of Natural Union are SUBSTANCE and ATTRIBUTE.* Now tho' *Substances* naturally co-incide with their *Attributes*, yet they absolutely refuse doing so, *one with another (b).* And hence those known Maxims in Physics, that *Body is impenetrable; that two Bodies cannot possess the same place; that the same Attribute cannot belong to different Substances, &c.*

FROM

(b) *Causa, propter quam duo Substantiva non ponuntur sine copulâ, e Philosophiâ petenda est: neque enim duo substantialiter unum esse potest, sicut Substantia et Accidens; itaque non dicas, CÆSAR, CATO PUGNAT. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 177.*

From these Principles it follows, that when we form a Sentence, the *Substantive* without difficulty co-incides with the *Verb*, from the natural Co-incidence of *Substantive* and *Energy*—THE SUN WARMETH. So likewise the *Energy* with the *Subject*, on which it operates—WARMETH THE EARTH. So likewise both *Substance* and *Energy* with their proper *Attributes*.—THE SPLENDID SUN,—GENIALLY WARMETH—THE FERTILE EARTH. But suppose we were desirous to add other Substantives, as for instance, AIR, or BEAMS. How would these co-incide, or under what Character could they be introduced? Not as *Nominatives* or *Accusatives*, for both those places are already filled; the Nominative by the Substance, SUN; the Accusative by the Substance, EARTH. Not as *Attributes* to these last, or to any other thing; for *Attributes* by nature they neither are, nor can be made. Here then we perceive the Rise and Use of PREPOSITIONS. By these we connect those Substantives to Sentences, which at the time are unable to co-alesce of themselves. Let us assume for instance a pair of these Connectives, THRO', and WITH, and mark their Effect upon the Substances here mentioned. *The splendid Sun WITH his Beams genially warmeth THRO' the Air the fertile Earth.* The Sentence, as before, remains *intire and one*; the Substantives required are both *introduced*; and not a Word, which was there before, is detruded from its proper place.

It must be here observed that most, if not all Prepositions seem originally formed to denote the *Relations of PLACE* (c). The reason is,

(c) Omne corpus aut movetur aut quiescit: quare opus fuit aliquâ notâ, quæ TO ΠΟΤ significaret, sive esset inter duo extrema, inter quæ motus fit, sive esset in altero extremorum, in quibus fit quies. Hinc eliciemus Præpositionis essentialem definitionem. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 152.

Ch. III. is, this is that grand *Relation*, which *Bodies* or *natural Substances* maintain at all times one to another, whether they are contiguous or remote, whether in motion or at rest.

It may be said indeed that *in the Continuity of Place* they form this UNIVERSE or VISIBLE WHOLE, and are made as much ONE by that general Comprehension, as is consistent with their several Natures, and specific Distinctions. Thus it is we have Prepositions to denote the *contiguous Relation* of Body, as when we say, *Caius walketh WITH a Staff; the Statue stood UPON a Pedestal; the River ran OVER a Sand*; others for the *detached Relation*, as when we say, *He is going TO Italy; the Sun is risen ABOVE the Hills; these Figs came FROM Turkey*. So as to *Motion* and *Rest*, only with this difference, that *here* the Preposition varies its character with the Verb. Thus if we say, *that Lamp hangs FROM the ceiling*, the Preposition, FROM, assumes a Character of *Quiescence*. But if we say, *that Lamp is falling FROM the Ceiling*, the Preposition in such case assumes a Character of *Motion*. So in Milton,

— *To support uneasy Steps*
OVER the burning Marle — Par. L. I.

Here OVER denotes *Motion*.

Again —

— *He — with looks of cordial Love*
Hung OVER her enamour'd — Par. L. IV.

Here OVER denotes *Rest*.

BUT

BUT though the original use of Prepositions was to denote *the Relations of Place*, they could not be confined to this Office only. They by degrees extended themselves to Subjects *incorporeal*, and came to denote Relations, as well *intellectual* as *local*. Thus, because in Place he, who is *above*, has commonly the advantage over him, who is *below*, hence we transfer OVER and UNDER to *Dominion* and *Obedience*; of a King we say, *he ruled over his People*; of a common Soldier, *he served under such a General*. So too we say, *with Thought*; *without Attention*; *thinking over a Subject*; *under Anxiety*; *from Fear*; *out of Love*; *through Jealousy*, &c. All which instances, with many others of like kind, shew that the *first Words* of Men, like their *first Ideas*, had an immediate reference to *sensible Objects*, and that in afterdays, when they began to discern with their *Intellect*, they took those Words, which they found *already* made, and transferred them by metaphor to *intellectual* Conceptions. There is indeed no Method to express new Ideas, but either this of *Metaphor*, or that of *Coining new Words*, both which have been practised by Philosophers and wise Men, according to the nature, and exigence of the occasion (*d*).

IN

(*d*) Among the Words new coined we may ascribe to *Anaxagoras*, ὁμοιομέρεια; to *Plato*, Ποιότης; to *Cicero*, Qualitas; to *Aristotle*, Ἐντελέχεια; to the *Stoics*, Ὅντις, κεράτις, and many others.—Among the Words transferred by Metaphor from *common* to *special* Meanings, to the *Platonics* we may ascribe Ἰδέα; to the *Pythagoreans* and *Peripatetics*, Κατηγορία, and Κατηγορεῖν; to the *Stoics*, Κατάληψις, ὑπόληψις, καθήκον; to the *Pyrrhonists*, Ἐξεσι, ἐνδέχεται, ἐπέχω, &c.

And here I cannot but observe, that he who pretends to discuss the Sentiments of any one of these Philosophers, or even to cite and translate him (except in trite and obvious Sentences) without accurately knowing the *Greek* Tongue in general; the nice differences of many Words apparently synonymous; the peculiar Stile of the Author whom he presumes to handle; the new coined Words, and new Significations given to old

Words,

Ch. III.

IN the foregoing use of Prepositions, we have seen how they are applied *κατὰ παράθεσιν*, by way of *Juxta-position*, that is to say, where they are prefixt to a Word, without becoming a Part of it. But they may be used also *κατὰ σύνθεσιν*, by way of *Composition*, that is, they may be prefixt to a Word, so as to become a real Part of it (*e*). Thus in *Greek* we have *Ἐπίσθαι*, in *Latin*, *Intelligere*, in *English*, to *Understand*. So also, to *foretel*, to *overact*, to *undervalue*, to *out-go*, &c. and in *Greek* and *Latin*, other instances innumerable. In this case the Prepositions commonly transfuse something of their own Meaning into the Word, with which they are compounded; and this imparted Meaning in most instances will be found ultimately resolvable into some of the Relations of *PLACE*, (*f*) as used either in its *proper* or *metaphorical* acceptance.

LASTLY,

Words, used by such Author, and his Sect; the whole Philosophy of such Sect, together with the Connections and Dependencies of its several Parts, whether Logical, Ethical, or Physical;—He I say, that, without this previous preparation, attempts what I have said, will shoot in the dark; will be liable to perpetual blunders; will explain, and praise, and censure merely by chance; and though he may possibly to Fools appear as a wise Man, will certainly among the wise ever pass for a Fool. Such a Man's Intellect comprehends antient Philosophy, as his Eye comprehends a distant Prospect. He may see perhaps enough, to know Mountains from Plains, and Seas from Woods; but for an accurate discernment of particulars, and their character, this without farther helps, it is impossible he should attain.

(*e*) See *Gaz. Gram. L. IV. Cap. de Præpositione*.

(*f*) For example, let us suppose some given Space. *E* and *Ex* signify *out of* that Space; *PER*, *through it*, from beginning to end; *IN*, *within it*; *SUB*, *under it*. Hence then *E* and *PER* in composition *augment*; *Enormis*, something not simply big, but big in excess; something got *out of the rule*, and *beyond the measure*: *Dico*, to *speak*, *Edico*, to *speak out*; whence *Edictum*, an *Edict*, something so effectually spoken, as all are supposed to hear, and all to obey. So *Terence*,

Dico, Edico vobis—*Eun. V. 5. 20.*

which (as *Donatus* tells us in his Comment) is an *Ἀνέησις*. *Fari*, to *speak*; *Effari*, to *speak*

LASTLY, there are times, when Prepositions totally lose their connective Nature, being converted into Adverbs, and used in Syntax accordingly. Thus *Homer*,

—Γέλασσε δὲ πᾶσα περὶ χθών.

—*And Earth smil'd all around.* IL. T. 362.

But of this we have spoken in a preceding Chapter (g). One thing we must however observe, before we finish this Chapter, which is, that whatever we may be told of CASES in modern Languages, there are in fact no such things; but their force and power is express'd by two Methods, either by *Situation*, or by *Prepositions*; the *Nominative and Accusative Cases* by *Situation*; the *rest*, by *Prepositions*. But this we shall make the Subject of a Chapter by itself, concluding here our Inquiry concerning Prepositions.

speak out—hence *Effatum*, an *Axiom*, or self-evident Proposition, something addressed as it were to all men, and calling for universal Assent. *Cic. Acad. II. 29. Per magnus, Perutilis*, great throughout, useful through every part.

On the contrary, *IN* and *SUB* diminish and lessen. *Injustus, Iniquus, unjust, inequitable*, that lies within Justice and Equity, that reaches not so far, that falls short of them; *Subniger, blackish; Subrubicundus, reddish*; tending to black, and tending to red, but yet under the standard, and below perfection.

Emo originally signified to take away; hence it came to signify to buy, because he, who buys, takes away his purchase. *INTER, Between*, implies *Discontinuance*, for in things continuous there can nothing lie between. From these two comes, *Interimo, to kill*, that is to say, *To take a Man away in the midst of Life, by making a Discontinuance of his vital Energy*. So also *Perimo, to kill a Man*, that is to say, *to take him away thoroughly*; for indeed what more thorough taking away can well be supposed? The *Greek Verb, Ἀναρρεῖν*, and the *English Verb, To take off*, seem both to carry the same allusion. And thus it is that Prepositions become Parts of other Words.

(g) See before, p. 328.

C H A P. IV.

Concerning CASES.

Ch. IV.

AS CASES, or at least their various Powers, depend on the knowledge partly of *Nouns*, partly of *Verbs*, and partly of *Prepositions*; they have been reserved, till those Parts of Speech had been examined and discussed, and are for that reason made the Subject of so late a Chapter, as the present.

THERE are no CASES in the modern Languages, except a few among the *primitive Pronouns*, such as I, and ME; JE, and MOY; and the *English Genitive*, formed by the addition of s, as when from *Lion*, we form *Lion's*; from *Ship*, *Ship's*. From this defect however we may be enabled to discover in some instances *what a Case is*, the *Periphrasis*, which supplies its place, being *the Case* (as it were) *unfolded*. Thus *Equi* is analyzed into *Du Cheval*, *Of the Horse*, *Equo* into *Au Cheval*, *To the Horse*. And hence we see that the GENITIVE and DATIVE CASES imply the joint Power of a *Noun* and a *Preposition*, the Genitive's Preposition being *A*, *De*, or *Ex*, the Dative's Preposition being *Ad*, or *Versus*.


WE have not this assistance as to the ACCUSATIVE, which in modern Languages (a few instances excepted) is only known from its position, that is to say, by being subsequent to its Verb, in the collocation of the words.

THE

THE VOCATIVE we pass over from its little use, being not only unknown to the modern Languages, but often in the antient being supplied by the *Nominative*.

THE ABLATIVE likewise was used by the *Romans* only; a Case they seem to have adopted to *associate with their Prepositions*, as they had deprived their *Genitive* and *Dative* of that privilege; a Case certainly not necessary, because the *Greeks* do as well without it, and because with the *Romans* themselves it is frequently undistinguished.

THERE remains the NOMINATIVE, which whether it were a Case or no, was much disputed by the Antients. The *Peripatetics* held it to be no Case, and likened the Noun, in this its *primary and original Form*, to a perpendicular Line, such for example, as the line AB.



The Variations from the Nominative, they considered as if AB were to fall from its perpendicular, as for example, to AC, or AD. Hence then they only called these Variations, ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ, CASUS, CASES, or FALLINGS. The *Stoics* on the contrary, and the *Grammarians* with them, made the *Nominative* a CASE also. Words they considered (as it were) to *fall from the Mind*, or *discursive Faculty*. Now when a Noun fell thence in its *primary Form*, they then called it

Ch. IV. it ΠΤΩΣΙΣ ΟΡΘΗ, CASUS RECTUS, AN ERECT, OR UPRIGHT CASE OR FALLING, such as AB, and by this name they distinguished the *Nominative*. When it fell from the Mind under any of its variations, as for example in the form of a *Genitive*, a *Dative*, or the like, such variations they called ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΠΛΑΓΙΑΙ, CASUS OBLIQUI, OBLIQUE CASES, OR SIDE-LONG FALLINGS (such as AC, or AD) in opposition to the other (that is AB) which was erect and perpendicular (*a*). Hence too Grammarians called the Method of enumerating the various Cases of a Noun, ΚΑΙΣΙΣ, DECLINATIO, a DECLENSION, it being a sort of *progressive Descent from the Noun's upright Form thro' its various declining Forms*, that is, a Descent from AB, to AC, AD, &c.

OF these CASES we shall treat but of four, that is to say, the NOMINATIVE, the ACCUSATIVE, the GENITIVE, and the DATIVE.

IT has been said already in the preceding Chapter, that the great Objects of natural Union are SUBSTANCE and ATTRIBUTE. Now from this *Natural Concordance* arises the *Logical Concord* of SUBJECT and PREDICATE, and the *Grammatical Concord* of SUBSTANTIVE and ATTRIBUTIVE (*b*) These CONCORDS in SPEECH produce PROPOSITIONS and SENTENCES, as that previous CONCORD in NATURE produces NATURAL BEINGS. This being admitted, we proceed by observing, that when a Sentence is regular and orderly, *Nature's Substance*, the *Logician's Subject*, and the *Grammarians's Substantive* are

(a) See *Ammon.* in *Libr. de Interpr.* p. 35.

(b) See before, p. 358.

are all denoted by that Case, which we call the NOMINATIVE. For example, CÆSAR pugnat, Æs fingitur, DOMUS ædificatur. We may remark too by the way, that *the Character of this Nominative* may be learnt from its *Attributive*. The Action implied in pugnat, shews its Nominative CÆSAR to be an Active efficient Cause; the Passion implied in fingitur, shews its Nominative Æs to be a Passive Subject, as does the Passion in ædificatur prove DOMUS to be an Effect.

As therefore every Attributive would as far as possible conform itself to its Substantive, so for this reason, when it has Cases, it imitates its Substantive, and appears as a *Nominative* also. So we find it in such instances as—CICERO est ELOQUENS; VITIUM est TURPE; HOMO est ANIMAL, &c. When it has no Cases, (as happens with Verbs) it is forced to content itself with such assimilations as it has, those of Number and Person*; as when we say, CICERO LOQUITUR; NOS LOQUIMUR; HOMINES LOQUUNTUR.

From what has been said, we may make the following observations—that as there can be *no Sentence without a Substantive*, so that Substantive, if the Sentence be *regular*, is always denoted by a *Nominative*—that on this occasion, *all the Attributives, that have Cases*, appear as *Nominatives* also—that there may be a regular and perfect Sentence *without any of the other Cases*, but that *without one Nominative at least*, this is utterly impossible. Hence therefore we form its Character and Description—THE NOMINATIVE is that Case,
without

* What sort of Number and Person Verbs have, see before, p. 308, 309.

Ch. IV. *without which there can be no regular (c) and perfect Sentence. We are now to search after another Case.*

WHEN the *Attributive* in any Sentence is some *Verb denoting Action*, we may be assured the *principal Substantive* is some *active efficient Cause*. So we may call *Achilles* and *Lyfippus* in such Sentences as *Achilles vulneravit*, *Lyfippus fecit*. But though this be evident and clearly understood, the Mind is still in *suspence*, and finds its conception *incomplete*. ACTION, it well knows, not only requires some *Agent*, but it must have a *Subject* also to work on, and it must produce some *Effect*. It is then to denote one of these (that is, the *Subject* or the *Effect*) that the Authors of Language have destined THE ACCUSATIVE. *Achilles vulneravit* HECTOREM—here the Accusative denotes the Subject. *Lyfippus fecit* STATUAS—here the Accusative denotes the Effect. By these additional Explanations the Mind becomes satisfied, and the Sentences acquire a Perfection, which before they wanted. In whatever other manner, whether figuratively, or with Prepositions, this Case may have been used, its first destination seems to have been that here mentioned, and hence therefore we shall form its Character and Description—THE ACCUSATIVE is that Case, which to an efficient Nominative and a Verb of Action subjoins either the Effect or the passive Subject. We have still left the Genitive and the Dative, which we investigate, as follows.

IT

(c) We have added *regular* as well as *perfect*, because there may be *irregular* Sentences, which may be *perfect* without a Nominative. Of this kind are all Sentences, made out of those Verbs, called by the Stoics Παρασυμβάματα or Παρακατηγορήματα, such as Σωκράτει μετάνειμι, Socratem pœnitet, &c. See before, p. 315.

IT has been said in the preceding Chapter (*d*), that when the Places of the *Nominative* and the *Accusative* are filled by proper Substantives, other Substantives are annexed by the help of *Prepositions*. Now, though this be so far true in the modern Languages, that (a very few instances excepted) they know no other method; yet is not the rule of equal latitude with respect to the *Latin* or *Greek*, and that from reasons which we are about to offer.

AMONG the various Relations of Substantives denoted by Prepositions, there appear to be two principal ones; and these are, the *Term* or *Point*, which something commences FROM, and the *Term* or *Point*, which something tends TO. These Relations the *Greeks* and *Latins* thought of so great importance, as to distinguish them, when they occurred, by peculiar Terminations of their own, which express their force, without the help of a Preposition. Now it is here we behold the Rise of the antient Genitive and Dative, the GENITIVE being formed to express all Relations commencing FROM itself; THE DATIVE, all Relations tending TO itself. Of this there can be no stronger proof, than the Analysis of these Cases in the modern Languages, which we have mentioned already (*e*).

IT is on these Principles that they say in *Greek* — Δεομαί ΣΟΥ, δίδωμι ΣΟΙ, OF thee I ask, To thee I give. The reason is, in requests the person requested is one whom something is expected from; in donations, the person presented, is one whom something passes to.
So

(*d*) See before, p. 359.

(*e*) See before, p. 264.

Ch. IV. So again — (f) Πεποιήται λίθος, *it is made of Stone*. Stone was the passive Subject, and thus it appears in the *Genitive*, as being the *Term from, or out of which*. Even in *Latin*, where the Syntax is more formal and strict, we read —

Implentur veteris Bacchi, pinguisque ferinae. Virg.

The old Wine and Venison were the funds or stores, *of or from which* they were filled. Upon the same principles, Πίνω τῆ ὕδατος, is a Phrase in *Greek*; and *Je bois de l'eau*, a Phrase in *French*, as much as to say, *I take some or a certain part, FROM or OUT OF a certain whole*.

WHEN we meet in Language such Genitives as *the Son of a Father*; *the Father of a Son*; *the Picture of a Painter*; *the Painter of a Picture*, &c. these are all RELATIVES, and therefore each of them reciprocally a *Term or Point* to the other, FROM or OUT OF which it derives its *Essence*, or at least its *Intellection* (g).

The *Dative*, as it implies *Tendency to*, is employed among its other uses to denote the FINAL CAUSE, that being the Cause *to which* all

(f) Χρυσοῦ πεποιημένος, καὶ ἐλέφαντος, *made of Gold and Ivory*. So says *Pausanias* of the *Olympian Jupiter*, L. V. p. 400. See also *Hom. Iliad*. Σ. 574.

(g) All Relatives are said to reciprocate, or mutually infer each other, and therefore they are often expressed by this Case, that is to say, the Genitive. Thus *Aristotle*, Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δὲ ἄλλος δεσπότης δὲ ἄλλος, καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δὲ ἄλλος δεσπότης λέγεται εἶναι, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον, καὶ τὸ ἡμισυ διπλάσιος ἡμισυ. *Omnia vero, quæ sunt ad aliquid, referuntur ad ea, quæ reciprocantur. Ut servus dicitur domini servus; et dominus, servi dominus; necnon duplum, dimidii duplum; et dimidium, dupli dimidium.* *Categor.* C. VII.

all Events, not fortuitous, may be said to tend. It is thus ~~used~~ in Ch. IV.
the following instances, among innumerable others.

—TIBI *suaveis dædala tellus*

Submittit flores— Lucret.

—TIBI *brachia contrahit ardens*

Scorpius— Virg. G. I.

— —TIBI *serviat ultima Thule.* Ibid.

AND so much for CASES, their Origin and Use; a Sort of Forms, or Terminations, which we could not well pass over, from their great importance (*h*) both in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues; but which however, not being among the Essentials of Language, and therefore not to be found in many particular Languages, can be hardly said to fall within the limits of our Inquiry.

(*h*) *Annon et illud observatione dignum (licet nobis modernis spiritus nonnihil redundat) antiquas Linguas plenas declinationum, casuum, conjugationum, et similium fuisse; modernas, his ferè destitutas, plurima per præpositiones et verba auxiliaria segnitèr expedire? Sanè facile quis conjiciat (utcunque nobis ipsi placeamus) ingenia priorum seculorum nostris fuisse multo acutiora et subtiliora. Bacon. de Augm. Scient. VI. 1.*

C H A P. V.

Concerning INTERJECTIONS—Recapitulation—Conclusion.

Ch. V. **B**ESIDES the Parts of Speech before mentioned, there remains
 THE INTERJECTION. Of this Kind among the *Greeks* are ὦ , Φεῦ , ἦ , &c. among the *Latins*, *Ah! Heu! Hei!* &c. among the *English*, *Ah! Alas! Fie!* &c. These the *Greeks* have ranged among their *Adverbs*; improperly, if we consider the Adverbial Nature, which always co-incides with some Verb, as its Principal, and to which it always serves in the character of an Attributive. Now INTERJECTIONS *co-incide with no Part of Speech, but are either uttered alone, or else thrown into a Sentence, without altering its Form, either in Syntax or Signification.* The *Latins* seem therefore to have done better in † separating them by themselves, and giving them a name by way of distinction from the rest.

SHOULD it be ask'd, if not *Adverbs*, what then are they? It may be answered, not so properly *Parts of Speech*, as adventitious Sounds; certain VOICES OF NATURE, rather than Voices of *Art*, expressing those Passions and natural Emotions, which spontaneously arise in the human Soul, upon the View or Narrative of interesting Events (a).

“ AND

† *Vid. Servium in Æneid XII. v. 486.*

(a) INTERJECTIONES a Græcis ad Adverbia referuntur, atque eos sequitur etiam Boethius. Et recte quidem de iis, quando casum regunt. Sed quando orationi solum inseruntur,

“ AND thus we have found that ALL WORDS ARE EITHER SIG-
 “ NIFICANT BY THEMSELVES, OR ONLY SIGNIFICANT, WHEN AS-
 “ SOCIATED—*that those significant by themselves, denote either SUB-*
 “ STANCES or ATTRIBUTES, and are called for that reason SUBSTAN-
 “ TIVES and ATTRIBUTIVES—*that the Substantives are either NOUNS*
 “ or PRONOUNS—*that the ATTRIBUTIVES are either PRIMARY or*
 “ SECONDARY—*that the Primary Attributives are either VERBS,*
 “ PARTICIPLES, or ADJECTIVES; the Secondary, ADVERBS—*Again,*
 “ *that the Parts of Speech, only significant when associated, are either*
 “ DEFINITIVES or CONNECTIVES—*that the Definitives are either*
 “ ARTICULAR or PRONOMINAL—and that the Connectives are either

“ PREPOSITIONS or CONJUNCTIONS.”

AND

*inferuntur, ut nota affectus, velut suspirii aut metus, vix videntur ad classem aliquam perti-
 nere, ut quæ NATURALES sint NOTÆ; non, aliarum vocum instar, ex instituto significant.*
 Voss. de Anal. L. I. c. 1. INTERJECTIO est Vox affectum mentis significans, ac citra
 verbi opem sententiam complens. Ibid. c. 3. Restat classium extrema, INTERJECTIO.
 Hujus appellatio non similiter se habet ac Conjunctionis. Nam cum hæc dicatur Con-
 junctio, quia conjungat; Interjectio tamen, non quia interjacet, sed quia interjicitur, nomen
 accepit. Nec tamen de ætate ejus est, ut interjiciatur; cum per se compleat sententiam, nec
 raro ab eâ incipiat oratio. Ibid. L. IV. c. 28. INTERJECTIONEM non esse partem Ora-
 tionis sic ostendo: Quod naturale est, idem est apud omnes: Sed gemitus & signa lætitiæ
 idem sunt apud omnes: Sunt igitur naturales. Si vero naturales, non sunt partes Ora-
 tionis. Nam eæ partes, secundum Aristotelem, ex instituto, non naturæ, debent constare.
 Interjectionem Græci Adverbiis adnumerant; sed falso. Nam neque, &c. Sanct. Miner.
 L. I. c. 2. INTERJECTIONEM Græci inter Adverbia ponunt, quoniam hæc quoque vel
 adjungitur verbis, vel verba ei subaudiuntur. Ut si dicam—Papæ! quid video?—vel per
 se—Papæ!—etiamsi non addatur, Miror; habet in se ipsius verbi significationem. Quæ
 res maxime fecit Romanarum artium Scriptores separatim hanc partem ab Adverbiis
 accipere; quia videtur affectum habere in sese Verbi, et plenam motus animi significationem,
 etiamsi non addatur Verbum, demonstrare. Interjectio tamen non solum illa, quæ dicunt
 Græci σχετλιασµόν, significat; sed etiam voces, quæ cujuscunque passionis animi pulsu per
 exclamationem interjiciuntur. Prisc. L. XV.

Ch. V.

AND thus have we resolved LANGUAGE AS A WHOLE INTO ITS CONSTITUENT PARTS; which was the first thing, that we proposed, in the course of this Inquiry (b).

BUT now as we conclude, methinks I hear some Objector, demanding with an air of pleasantry, and ridicule — “ *Is there no speaking then without all this trouble? Do we not talk every one of us, as well unlearned, as learned; as well poor Peasants, as profound Philosophers?* ” We may answer by interrogating on our part — Do not those same poor Peasants use the Lever and the Wedge, and many other Instruments, with much habitual readiness? And yet have they any conception of those Geometrical Principles, from which those Machines derive their Efficacy and Force? And is the Ignorance of these Peasants, a reason for others to remain ignorant; or to render the Subject a less becoming Inquiry? Think of Animals, and Vegetables, that occur every day — of Time, of Place, and of Motion — of Light, of Colours, and of Gravitation — of our very Senses and Intellect, by which we perceive every thing else — THAT they are, we all know, and are perfectly satisfied — WHAT they are, is a Subject of much obscurity and doubt. Were we to reject this last Question, because we are certain of the first, we should banish all Philosophy at once out of the world (c).

BUT

(b) See before, p. 220.

(c) Ἀλλ' ἔστι πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων, ἃ τὴν μὲν ὑπαρξίν ἔχει γνωριμωτάτην, ἀγνωστοτάτην δὲ τὴν ἐστίαν· ὥσπερ ἢ τε κίνησις, καὶ ὁ τόπος, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ χρόνος. Ἐκάστω γὰρ τῶν τούτων τὸ μὲν εἶναι γνώριμον καὶ ἀναμφίλεκτον· τίς δὲ ποτέ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ ἐστία, τῶν χαλεπωτάτων ὁραθῆναι. Ἔστι δὲ δὴ τί τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τι τὴν ψυχὴν, γνωριμωτάτον καὶ φανερώτατον· τί δὲ ποτέ ἐστιν, ἢ ῥᾶδιον καταμαθεῖν. Ἀλεξάνδ. Ἀφροδ. Περὶ ψυχῆς, Β'. p. 142.

BUT a graver Objecter now accosts us, "*What (says he) is the UTILITY? Whence the Profit, where the Gain?*" Every Science whatever (we may answer) has its Use. Arithmetic is excellent for the gauging of Liquors; Geometry, for the measuring of Estates; Astronomy, for the making of Almanacks; and Grammar perhaps, for the drawing of Bonds and Conveyances.

THUS much to the *Sordid*—If the *Liberal* ask for something better than this, we may answer and assure them from the best authorities, that every Exercise of the Mind upon Theorems of Science, like generous and manly Exercise of the Body, tends to call forth and strengthen Nature's original Vigour. Be the Subject itself immediately lucrative or not, the Nerves of Reason are braced by the mere Employ, and we become abler Actors in the Drama of Life, whether our Part be of the busier, or of the sedater kind.

PERHAPS too *there is a Pleasure even in Science itself*, distinct from any End, to which it may be farther conducive. Are not Health and Strength of *Body* desirable for their own sakes, tho' we happen not to be fated either for Porters or Draymen? And have not Health and Strength of *Mind* their intrinsic Worth also, tho' not condemned to the low drudgery of sordid Emolument? Why should there not be a *Good* (could we have the Grace to recognize it) *in the mere Energy of our Intellect*, as much as in Energies of lower degree? The Sportsman believes there is Good in his Chace; the Man of Gaiety, in his Intrigue; even the Glutton, in his Meal. We may justly ask of these, *why they pursue such things*; but if they answer, *they pursue them, because they are Good*, it would be folly to ask them farther,

WHY

Ch. V. *WHY they PURSUE what is GOOD.* It might well in such case be replied on their behalf (how strange soever it may at first appear) *that if there was not something GOOD, which was in no respect USEFUL, even things useful themselves could not possibly have existence.* For this is in fact no more than to assert, that some things are ENDS, some things are MEANS, and that if there were NO ENDS, there could be of course NO MEANS.

IT should seem then the Grand Question was, WHAT IS GOOD—that is to say, *what is that which is desirable, not for something else, but for itself;* for whether it be the Chace, or the Intrigue, or the Meal, may be fairly questioned, since Men in each instance are far from being agreed.

IN the mean time, it is plainly from daily experience, there are infinite Pleasures, Amusements, and Diversions, some for Summer, others for Winter; some for Country, others for Town; some, easy, indolent, and soft; others, boisterous, active, and rough; a multitude diversified to every taste, and which for the time are enjoyed as PERFECT GOOD, *without a thought of any End, that may be farther obtained.* Some Objects of this kind are at times sought by all men, excepting alone that contemptible Tribe, who, from a love to the Means of life wholly forgetting its End, are truly for that reason called *Misers*, or Miserable.

IF there be supposed then a Pleasure, a Satisfaction, a Good, a Something valuable for its self without view to any thing farther, in so many Objects of the *subordinate* kind; shall we not allow the
same

same praise to the *sublimest* of all Objects? Shall THE INTELLECT alone feel no pleasures *in its Energy*, when we allow them to the grossest Energies of Appetite, and Sense? Or if the Reality of all Pleasures and Goods were to be controverted, may not the *Intellectual* Sort be defended, as rationally as any of them? Whatever may be urged in behalf of the rest (for we are not now arraigning them) we may safely affirm of INTELLECTUAL GOOD, that it is “the Good
“ of that Part, which is most excellent within us; that it is a Good
“ accommodated to all Places and Times; which neither depends
“ on the will of others, nor on the affluence of external Fortune;
“ that it is a Good, which decays not with decaying Appetites, but
“ often rises in vigour, when those are no more (d).”

THERE is a Difference, we must own, between this *Intellectual* Virtue, and *Moral* Virtue. MORAL VIRTUE, from its Employment, may be called more HUMAN, as it tempers our Appetites to the purposes of human Life. But INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE may be surely called more DIVINE, if we consider the Nature and Sublimity of its End.

INDEED for *Moral* Virtue, as it is almost wholly conversant about Appetites, and Affections, either to reduce the natural ones to a proper Mean, or totally to expel the unnatural and vitious, it would be impious to suppose THE DEITY to have occasion for such an Habit, or that any work of this kind should call for his attention. Yet GOD IS, and LIVES. So we are assured from Scripture it self.

What

(d) See Vol. I. p. 69, 70, &c.

Ch. V.

What then may we suppose the **DIVINE LIFE** to be? Not a Life of Sleep, as Fables tell us of *Endymion*. If we may be allowed then to conjecture with a becoming reverence, what more likely, than **A PERPETUAL ENERGY OF THE PUREST INTELLECT ABOUT THE FIRST, ALL-COMPREHENSIVE OBJECTS OF INTELLECTION; WHICH OBJECTS ARE NO OTHER THAN THAT INTELLECT ITSELF?** For in pure INTELLECTION it holds the reverse of all Sensation, that **THE PERCEIVER AND THING PERCEIVED ARE ALWAYS ONE AND THE SAME (e).**

It was Speculation of this kind concerning **THE DIVINE NATURE**, which induced one of the wisest among the Antients to believe—" That the Man, who could live in the pure enjoyment of
 " his *Mind*, and who properly cultivated that *divine* Principle, was
 " *happiest in himself*, and *most beloved by the Gods*. For if the Gods
 " had any regard to what past among Men (as it appeared they had)
 " it was probable they should rejoice in *that which was most excellent*,
 " and by nature *the most nearly allied to themselves*; and, as this was
 " **MIND,**

(e) 'Εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτὲ, ὁ Θεὸς αἰεὶ θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον ἔχει δὲ ὧδε, καὶ ζωὴ δὲ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ Νῆ ἐνέργεια, ζωὴ· Ἐκεῖνος δὲ, ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὐτήν, ἐκείνη ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδίου. Φαμέν δὲ τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι ζῶν αἰδίου, ἄριστον ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ αἰδίου ὑπάρχει τῷ Θεῷ ΤΟΤΤΟ γὰρ Ο ΘΕΟΣ. Τῶν μετὰ τὰ φουσ· Α'.ζ'. It is remarkable in Scripture that God is peculiarly characterized as A LIVING GOD, in opposition to all false and imaginary Deities, of whom some had no pretensions to Life at all; others to none higher than that of Vegetables or Brutes; and the best were nothing better than illustrious Men, whose existence was circumscribed by the short period of Humanity.

To the passage above quoted, may be added another, which immediately precedes it. Ἄυτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νῆς κατὰ μετάληψιν τῆ νοητῆ νοητὸς γὰρ γίνεται, διγλάνων καὶ νοῶν· ὥστε ΤΑΤΤΟΝ ΝΟΤΣ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΗΤΟΝ.

“ MIND, that they should requite the Man, who most loved and
 “ honoured *This*, both from his regard to that which was *dear* to
 “ themselves, and from his acting a Part, which was laudable and
 “ right (f).”

Ch. V.

AND thus in all SCIENCE there is something *valuable for itself*,
 because it contains within it something which is *divine*.

(f) Ἠθικὴ Νικομάχου τὸ Κ'. κεφ. η'.

END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

H E R M E S

OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

CONCERNING

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

B O O K I I I .

C H A P. I .

Introduction—Division of the Subject into its principal Parts.

Ch. I. **S**OME things the MIND performs thro' the BODY; as for example, the various Works and Energies of Art. Others it performs *without such Medium*; as for example, when it thinks, and reasons, and concludes. Now tho' the Mind, in either case, may be called the Principle or Source, yet are these last more properly *its own* peculiar Acts, as being immediately referable to its own innate Powers. And thus is MIND *ultimately the Cause of all*; of every thing at least that is *Fair and Good*.

AMONG those Acts of Mind more immediately its own, that of *mental Separation* may be well reckoned one. *Corporeal Separations*,
however

however accurate otherwise, are in one respect incomplete, as they may be repeated without end. The smallest Limb, severed from the smallest Animalcule (if we could suppose any instrument equal to such dissection) has still a triple Extension of length, breadth, and thickness; has a figure, a colour, with perhaps many other qualities; and so will continue to have, tho' thus divided to infinity. But (a) the *Mind* surmounts all power of *Concretion*, and can place in the simplest manner every Attribute by itself; convex without concave; colour without superficies; superficies without Body; and Body without its Accidents; as distinctly each one, as tho' they had never been united.

AND thus it is that it penetrates into the recesses of all things, not only dividing them, as *Wholes*, into their *more conspicuous Parts*, but persisting, till it even separate those *Elementary Principles*, which, being blended together after a more mysterious manner, are united in the *minuteest Part*, as much as in the *mightiest Whole* (b).

NOW if MATTER and FORM are among these Elements, and deserve perhaps to be esteemed as *the principal* among them, it may not be foreign to the Design of this Treatise, to seek whether *these*, or *any things analogous to them*, may be found in SPEECH OR LANGUAGE

(a) *Itaque Naturæ faciendæ est prorsus Solutio & Separatio; non per Ignem certe, sed per Mentem, tanquam ignem divinum.* Bacon. Organ. Lib. II. 16.

(b) See below, p. 384.

Ch. I.

GUAGE (c). This therefore we shall attempt after the following method.

EVERY

(c) See before, p. 215. 220. MATTER and FORM (in *Greeh* ΤΑΗ and ΕΙΔΟΣ) were Terms of great import in the days of antient Philosophy, when things were scrutinized rather at their beginning than at their End. They have been but little regarded by modern Philosophy, which almost wholly employs itself about the last order of Substance, that is to say, the *tangible, corporeal* or *concrete*, and which acknowledges no separations even in this, but those made by mathematical Instruments or Chemical Procefs.

The original meaning of the Word ΤΑΗ, was SYLVA, a WOOD. Thus *Homer*,

—Τρέμε δ' ἔρεα μακρὰ καὶ ΤΑΗ,
Ποσσὶν ὑπ' ἀθανάτοισι Ποσειδάωνος ἰόντος.

*As Neptune past, the Mountains and the WOOD
Trembled beneath the God's immortal Feet.*

Hence as WOOD was perhaps the first and most useful kind of Materials, the Word ΤΑΗ, which denoted it, came to be by degrees extended, and at length to denote MATTER or MATERIALS in general. In this sense Brass was called the ΤΑΗ or *Matter* of a Statue; Stone, the ΤΑΗ or *Matter* of a Pillar; and so in other instances. The *Platonic Chalcidius*, and other Authors of the latter Latinity use SYLVA under the same extended and comprehensive Signification.

Now as the Species of *Matter* here mentioned, (Stone, Metal, Wood, &c.) occur most frequently in common life, and are all nothing more than natural Substances or Bodies, hence by the Vulgar, MATTER and BODY have been taken to denote the same thing; *Material* to mean *Corporeal*; *Immaterial*, *Incorporeal*, &c. But this was not the Sentiment of Philosophers of old, by whom the Term *Matter* was seldom used under so narrow an acceptance. By these, every thing was called ΤΑΗ, or MATTER, whether corporeal or incorporeal, which was *capable of becoming something else, or of being moulded into something else*, whether from the operation of Art, of Nature, or a higher Cause.

In this sense they not only called *Brass* the ΤΑΗ of a Statue, and Timber of a Boat, but Letters and Syllables they called the ΤΑΗ of Words; Words or simple Terms, the ΤΑΗ of Propositions; and Propositions themselves the ΤΑΗ of Syllogisms. The *Stoics* held all things out of our own power (τὰ ἐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν) such as Wealth and Poverty, Honour and Dishonour, Health and Sicknefs, Life and Death, to be the ΤΑΗ, or *Materials* of *Virtue* or *Moral Goodnefs*, which had its essence in a proper conduct with respect to all these, (Vid. *Arr. Epiet. L. 1. c. 29.* Also Vol. the first of these Miscellaneous Treatises,

p. 107,

EVERY thing in a manner, whether natural or artificial, is in its constitution compounded of something COMMON, and something PECULIAR;

Ch. I.

p. 107, 170. M. Ant. XII. 29. VII. 29. X. 18, 19. where the Ὑλικὸν and Αἰτιώδεις are opposed to each other). The *Peripatetics*, tho' they expressly held the Soul to be ἀσώματος, or *Incorporeal*, yet still talked of a Νῆς Ὑλικὸς, a *material Mind or Intellect*. This to modern Ears may possibly sound somewhat harshly. Yet if we translate the Words, *Natural Capacity*, and consider them as only denoting that *original and native Power* of Intellection, which being previous to all *human Knowledge*, is yet necessary to its *reception*; there seems nothing then to remain, that can give us offence. And so much for the Idea of ΤΑΗ, or MATTER. See *Alex. Aphrod. de Anim.* p. 144. b. 145. *Arist. Metaph.* p. 121, 122, 141. *Edit. Sylb. Procl. in Euclid.* p. 22, 23.

As to ΕΙΔΟΣ, its original meaning was that of FORM or FIGURE, considered as denoting *visible Symmetry*, and Proportion; and hence it had its name from Εἶδω to see, Beauty of person being one of the noblest, and most excellent Objects of Sight. Thus *Euripides*,

Πρῶτον μὲν Εἶδος ἄξιον τυραννίδος.

Fair FORM to Empire gave the first pretence.

Now as the *Form* or *Figure* of visible Beings tended principally to *distinguish* them, and to give to each its Name and Essence; hence in a more general sense, *whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal)* was peculiar, essential, and distinctive, so as by its accession to any Beings, as to its Ὑλη or *Matter*, to mark them with a Character, which they had not before, was called by the Antients ΕΙΔΟΣ or FORM. Thus not only the *Shape* given to the Brass was called the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Statue; but the *Proportion* assigned to the Drugs was the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Medicine; the *orderly Motion* of the human Body was the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Dance; the *just Arrangement* of the Propositions, the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Syllogism. In like manner the *rational and accurate Conduct* of a wise and good man, in all the various Relations and Occurrences of life, made that Εἶδος or *Form*, described by Cicero to his Son,—FORMAM quidam ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem HONESTI vides: quæ, si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret sapientiæ, &c. *De Offic. I.*

We may go farther still—THE SUPREME INTELLIGENCE, which passes thro' all things, and which is the same to our Capacities, as Light is to our Eyes, this supreme Intelligence has been called ΕΙΔΟΣ ΕΙΔΩΝ, THE FORM OF FORMS, as being the Fountain of all Symmetry, of all Good, and of all Truth; and as imparting to every Being those *essential and distinctive* Attributes, which make it to be *itself*, and *not any thing else*.

And so much concerning FORM, as before concerning MATTER. We shall only add, that it is in the *uniting* of these, that every thing generable begins to exist; in their *separating*,

Ch. I. PECULIAR; of something *Common*, and belonging to many other things; and of something *Peculiar*, by which it is distinguished, and made to be its true and proper self.

HENCE LANGUAGE, if compared according to this notion to the murmurs of a Fountain, or the dashings of a Cataract, has *in common* this,

separating, to perish, and be at an end—that while the two co-exist, they co-exist not by *juxta-position*, like the stones in a wall, but by a more *intimate Co-incidence*, complete in the minutest part—that hence, if we were to persist in dividing any substance (for example Marble) to infinity, there would still remain after every section both *Matter* and *Form*, and these as perfectly united, as before the Division began—lastly, that they are both *pre-existent* to the Beings, which they constitute; the *Matter* being to be found in the world at large; the *Form*, if artificial, pre-existing within the *Artificer*, or if natural, within the *supreme Cause*, the Sovereign Artist of the Universe,

—*Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse*

Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.

Even without speculating so high as this, we may see among all animal and vegetable Substances, the Form pre-existing in their *immediate generating Cause*; Oak being the parent of Oak, Lion of Lion, Man of Man, &c.

Cicero's account of these Principles is as follows.

MATTER:

Sed subjectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie, atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatus hoc verbum et tritius) MATERIAM quantam, ex qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint: (quæ tota omnia accipere possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte) eoque etiam interire, non in nihilum, &c. Acad. I. 8.

FORM:

Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id sit, unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quasi imago, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, neque ullo sensu percipi potest: cogitatione tantum et mente complectimur.—HAS RERUM FORMAS appellat Ideas ille non intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister, Plato: easque gigni negat, et ait semper esse, ac ratione et intelligentiâ contineri: cætera nasci, occidere, fluere, labi; nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu. Quidquid est igitur, de quo ratione et viâ disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis Formam speciemque ridigendum. Cic. ad M. Brut. Orat.

this, that like them, *it is a SOUND*. But then on the contrary it has *in peculiar* this, that whereas those Sounds have *no Meaning or Signification*, to Language a MEANING or SIGNIFICATION is *essential*. Again, *Language*, if compared to the Voice of irrational Animals, has *in common* this, that like them, *it has a Meaning*. But then it has this *in peculiar* to distinguish it from them, that whereas the *Meaning* of those Animal Sounds is derived *from NATURE*, that of Language is derived, not from Nature, but *from COMPACT (d)*.

FROM hence it becomes evident, that LANGUAGE, taken in the most comprehensive view, *implies certain Sounds, having certain Meanings*; and that of these two Principles, the SOUND is as the MATTER, common (like other Matter) to many different things; the MEANING as that peculiar and characteristic FORM, by which the Nature or Essence of Language becomes complete.

(d) The *Peripatetics* (and with just reason) in all their definitions as well of Words as of Sentences, made it a part of their character to be significant *κατὰ συνθήκην*, *by Compact*. See *Aristot. de Interp. c. 2. 4.* Boethius translates the Words *κατὰ συνθήκην*, *ad placitum*, or *secundum placitum*, and thus explains them in his comment—*SECUNDUM PLACITUM vero est, quod secundum quandam positionem, placitumque ponentis aptatur; nullum enim nomen naturaliter constitutum est, neque unquam, sicut subjecta res à naturâ est, ita quoque à naturâ veniente vocabulo nuncupatur. Sed hominum genus, quod et ratione, et oratione vigeret, nomina posuit, eaque quibus libuit literis syllabisque conjungens, singulis subjectarum rerum substantiis dedit.* Boeth. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 308.

C H A P. II.

Upon the Matter, or common Subject of LANGUAGE.

Ch. II.

THE *TAH* OR MATTER OF LANGUAGE comes first to be considered, a Subject, which Order will not suffer us to omit, but in which we shall endeavour to be as concise as we can. Now this *TAH* or Matter is SOUND, and SOUND is *that Sensation peculiar to the Sense of Hearing, when the Air hath felt a Percussion, adequate to the producing such Effect (a).*

As the Causes of this Percussion are various, so from hence Sound derives the Variety of its Species.

FARTHER, as all these Causes are either Animal or Inanimate, so the two grand Species of Sounds are likewise *Animal* or *Inanimate*.

THERE

(a) This appears to be *Priscian's* Meaning when he says of a VOICE, what is more properly true of SOUND in general, that it is—*suum sensibile aurium, id est, quod propriè auribus accidit.* Lib. I. p. 537.

The following account of the *Stoics*, which refers the cause of SOUND to an *Undulation in the Air propagated circularly*, as when we drop a stone into a Cistern of water, seems to accord with the modern Hypothesis, and to be as plausible as any—*Ἀκούειν δὲ, τῆ μεταξύ τῆ τε φωνοῦντος καὶ τῆ ἀκούοντος ἀέρος πληττομένην σφαιροειδῶς, εἴτα κυματούμενην, καὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσπίπλοντος, ὥς κυματῆται τὸ ἐν τῇ δεξαμενῇ ὕδωρ κατὰ κύκλους ὑπὸ τῆ ἐμβληθέντος λίθου—Porro audire, cum is, qui medius inter loquentem, et audientem est, aër verberatur orbiculariter, deinde agitated auribus influit, quemadmodum et cisternæ aqua per orbes injecto agitur lapide.* Diog. Laert. VII.

THERE is no peculiar Name for *Sound Inanimate*; nor even for that of Animals, when made by the trampling of their Feet, the fluttering of their Wings, or any other Cause, which is merely *accidental*. But that, *which they make by proper Organs, in consequence of some Sensation or inward Impulse, such Animal Sound is called a VOICE.*

As Language therefore implies that Sound called HUMAN VOICE; we may perceive that *to know the Nature and Powers of the Human Voice, is in fact to know THE MATTER or common Subject of Language.*

Now the Voice of Man, and it should seem of all other Animals, is formed by certain Organs between the Mouth and the Lungs, and which Organs maintain the intercourse between these two. The Lungs furnish Air, out of which the Voice is formed; and the Mouth, when the Voice is formed, serves to publish it abroad.

WHAT these Vocal Organs precisely are, is not in all respects agreed by Philosophers and Anatomists. Be this as it will, it is certain that the *mere primary and simple Voice is completely formed, before ever it reach the Mouth*, and can therefore (as well as Breathing) find a Passage thro' the Nose, when the Mouth is so far stopt, as to prevent the least utterance.

Now *pure and simple VOICE*, being thus produced, is (as before was observed) *transmitted to the Mouth*. HERE then, by means of certain *different Organs*, which do not change its primary Qualities,

Ch. II.

but only superadd others, it receives *the Form or Character of ARTICULATION*. For ARTICULATION is in fact nothing else, than *that Form or Character, acquired to simple Voice, by means of the Mouth and its several Organs, the Teeth, the Tongue, the Lips, &c.* The Voice is not by Articulation made more grave or acute, more loud or soft (which are its *primary Qualities*) but it acquires to these Characters certain *others additional*, which are perfectly adapted to exist along with them (b).

THE

(b) The several Organs above mentioned not only serve the purposes of *Speech*, but those very different ones likewise of *Mastication* and *Respiration*; so frugal is Nature in thus assigning them double duty, and so careful to maintain her character of *doing nothing in vain*.

He, that would be informed, how much better the Parts here mentioned are framed for *Discourse* in *Man, who is a Discursive Animal*, than they are in other Animals, who are not so, may consult *Aristotle* in his *Treatise de Animal. Part. Lib. II. c. 17. Lib. III. c. 1. 3. De Animâ, L. II. c. 8. § 23, &c.*

And here by the way, if such Inquirer be of a Genius truly modern, he may possibly wonder how the Philosopher, considering (as it is modestly phrased) the Age in which he lived, should know so much, and reason so well. But if he have any taste or value for ancient literature, he may with much juster cause wonder at the Vanity of his Contemporaries, who dream all Philosophy to be the Invention of their own Age, knowing nothing of those Ancients still remaining for their perusal, tho' they are so ready on every occasion to give the preference to *themselves*.

The following account from *Ammonius* will shew whence the Notions in this chapter are taken, and what authority we have to distinguish VOICE from mere SOUND; and ARTICULATE VOICE from SIMPLE VOICE.

Καὶ ΨΟΦΟΣ μὲν ἐστὶ πλεονὴς ἀέρος αἰσθητὴ ἀκοή· ΦΩΝΗ δὲ, ψόφος ἐξ ἐμφυχῆς γινόμενος, ὅταν διὰ τῆς συστολῆς τῆ θώρακος ἐκθλιβόμενος ἀπὸ τῆ πνεύμονος ὁ εἰσπνευθεὶς ἀὴρ προσπίπτῃ ἀθρόως τῇ καλεσμένῃ τραχείᾳ ἀρτηρίᾳ, καὶ τῇ ὑπερώᾳ, ἥτοι τῷ γαργαρεῶνι, καὶ διὰ τῆς πλεονῆς ἀποτελῇ τινα ἦχον αἰσθητὸν, κατὰ τινα ὁρμὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμπνευστῶν παρὰ τοῖς μουσικοῖς καλεσμένων ὀργάνων συμβαίνει, οἷον αὐλῶν καὶ συρίγγων· τῆς γλώττης, καὶ τῶν ὀδόντων, καὶ χειλέων πρὸς μὲν ΤΗΝ ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΝ ἀναγκαίων ὄντων, πρὸς δὲ ΤΗΝ ἈΠΛΩΣ ΦΩΝΗΝ ἢ πάντως συμβαλλομένων.—*Estque SONUS, ictus aeris qui auditu sentitur: Vox autem est sonus, quem animans edit, cum per thoracis compressionem aer attractus a pulmone, elisus simul totus in arteriam, quam asperam vocant, et palatum,*
aut

THE *simplest* of these new Characters are those acquired thro' the mere Openings of the Mouth, as these Openings differ in giving the Voice a Passage. It is the Variety of Configurations in these Openings only, which gives birth and origin to the several VOWELS; and hence it is they derive their Name, by being thus *eminently Vocal* (c), and *easy to be founded of themselves alone*.

THERE are other articulate Forms, which the Mouth makes not by mere Openings, but by *different Contacts of its different parts*; such for instance, as it makes by the Junction of the two Lips, of the Tongue with the Teeth, of the Tongue with the Palate, and the like.

Now as all these several Contacts, unless some Opening of the Mouth either immediately precede, or immediately follow, would rather occasion Silence, than to produce a Voice; hence it is, that with some such Opening, either previous or subsequent, they are always connected. Hence also it is, that the *Articulations so produced*

aut gurgulionem impingit, et ex ictu sonum quendam sensibilem pro animi quodam impetu perficit. Id quod in instrumentis quæ quia instant, ideo ἐμπνευστὰ a musicis dicuntur, usu venit, ut in tibiis, ac fistulis contingit, cum lingua, dentes, labiaque ad loquelam necessaria sint, ad vocem vero simplicem non omnino conferant. Ammon. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 25. b. Vid. etiam Boerhaave Institut. Medic. Sect. 626. 630.

It appears that the *Stoics* (contrary to the notion of the *Peripatetics*) used the word ΦΩΝΗ to denote SOUND in general. They defined it therefore to be—Τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἀκοῆς, which justifies the definition given by *Priscian*, in the Note preceding. ANIMAL SOUND they defined to be—Ἀήρ, ὑπὸ ὁρμῆς πεπληγμένος, *Air struck* (and so made audible) *by some animal impulse*; and HUMAN OR RATIONAL SOUND they defined—Ἐναρθεὶς καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη, *Sound articulate and derived from the discursive faculty*. *Diog. Laert. VII. 55.*

(c) ΦΩΝΗΝΤΑ.

Ch. II. *duced* are called CONSONANT, because they found not of themselves, and from their own powers, but *at all times in company with some auxiliary Vowel (d).*

THERE are other subordinate Distinctions of these primary Articulations, which to enumerate would be foreign to the design of this Treatise.

It is enough to observe, that they are all denoted by the common Name of ELEMENT (*e*), in as much as every Articulation of every other kind is from them derived, and into them resolved. Under their *smallest* Combination they produce a *Syllable*; Syllables properly combined produce a *Word*; Words properly combined produce a *Sentence*; and Sentences properly combined produce an *Oration* or *Discourse*.

AND thus it is that to Principles *apparently* so trivial (*f*), as about twenty plain elementary Sounds, we owe that variety of articulate
Voices,

(*d*) ΣΥΜΦΩΝΑ.

(*e*) The Stoic Definition of an ELEMENT is as follows—Ἐστὶ δὲ στοιχεῖον, ἐξ οὗ πρῶτον γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον ἀναλύεται. An ELEMENT is that, out of which, as their first Principle, things generated are made, and into which, as their last remains, they are resolved. Diog. Laert. VII. 176. What Aristotle says upon ELEMENTS with respect to the Subject here treated, is worth attending to—Φωνῆς στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ἡ φωνή, καὶ εἰς ἃ διαφεύται ἔσχατὰ· ἐκεῖνα δὲ μηκέτ' εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἑτέρας τῷ εἶδει αὐτῶν. The ELEMENTS OF ARTICULATE VOICE are those things, out of which the VOICE is compounded, and into which, as its last remains, it is divided: the Elements themselves being no farther divisible into other articulate Voices, differing in Species from them. Metaph. V. c. 3.

(*f*) The Egyptians paid divine Honours to the Inventor of Letters, and Regulator of Language, whom they called THEUTH. By the GREEKS he was worshipped under the
Name

Voices, which have been sufficient to explain the Sentiments of so innumerable a Multitude, as all the present and past Generations of Men.

Ch. II.

IT

Name of HERMES, and represented commonly by a *Head alone without other Limbs*, standing upon a *quadrilateral Basis*. The Head itself was *that of a beautiful Youth*, having on it a *Petafus*, or *Bonnet*, adorned with two Wings.

There was a peculiar reference in this Figure to the ἙΡΜΗΣ ΛΟΓΙΟΣ, THE HERMES OF LANGUAGE OR DISCOURSE. He possessed no other part of the human figure but the HEAD, because *no other* was deemed *requisite to rational Communication*. Words at the same time, the medium of this Communication, being (as *Homer* well describes them) *Ἑπεα πτερόεντα*, *Winged Words*, were represented in their *Velocity* by the WINGS of his Bonnet.

Let us suppose such a HERMES, having the *Front of his Basis* (the usual place for Inscriptions) *adorned with some old Alphabet*, and having a *Veil flung across*, by which that Alphabet is *partly covered*. Let a YOUTH be seen *drawing off this Veil*; and a NYMPH, near the Youth, *transcribing what She there discovers*.

Such a Design would easily indicate its Meaning. THE YOUTH we might imagine to be THE GENIUS OF MAN (*Naturæ Deus humanæ*, as *Horace* styles him;) THE NYMPH to be MNΗΜΟΣΥΝΗ, or MEMORY; as much as to insinuate that "MAN, for the Preservation of his *Deeds and Inventions*, was *necessarily obliged to have recourse to* " LETTERS; and that MEMORY, *being conscious of her own Insufficiency*, was glad to " avail herself of so valuable an Acquisition."

MR. STUART, well known for his accurate and elegant Edition of the *Antiquities of Athens*, has adorned this Work [*Hermes*] with a Frontispiece agreeable to the above Ideas, and that in a taste truly *Attic and Simple*, which no one possesses more eminently than himself.

As to HERMES, his History, Genealogy, Mythology, Figure, &c. Vid. *Platon. Phileb.* T. II. p. 18. *Edit. Serran. Diod. Sic. L. I. Horat. Od. X. L. 1. Hesiod. Theog. V. 937. cum Comment. Joan. Diaconi. Thucid. VI. 27. et Scholiast. in loc. Pighium apud Gronov. Thesaur. T. IX. p. 1164.*

For the *value and importance of Principles*, and the *difficulty* in attaining them, see *Aristot. de Sophist. Elench. c. 34.*

The following Passage, taken from that able Mathematician *Tacquet*, will be found peculiarly pertinent to what has been said above concerning *Elementary Sounds*.

Mille milliones scriptorum mille annorum millionibus non scribent omnes 24 literarum alphabeti permutationes, licet singuli quotidie absolverent 40 paginas, quarum unaquæque contineret diversos ordines literarum 24. Tacquet. Arithmetica Theor. p. 381. Edit. Antverp. 1663.

Ch. II.

It appears from what has been said, that THE MATTER or COMMON SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE is *that Species of Sounds called VOICES ARTICULATE.*

WHAT remains to be examined in the following Chapter, is Language under its characteristic and peculiar FORM, that is to say, Language considered, not with respect to *Sound*, but to *Meaning*.

C H A P. III.

Upon the Form, or peculiar Character of LANGUAGE.

WHEN to any articulate Voice there accedes *by compact* a Meaning or Signification, such Voice by such accession is then called a WORD; and many Words, possessing their Significations (as it were) *under the same Compact (a)*, unite in constituting a PARTICULAR LANGUAGE.

Ch. III.

It

(a) See before Note (c) p. 382. See also Treatise II. c. 1. Notes (a) and (c).

The following Quotation from *Ammonius* is remarkable—Καθάπερ ἐν τῷ μὲν κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι, φύσει, τὸ δὲ ὀρχεῖσθαι, θέσει καὶ κατὰ συνθήκην, καὶ τὸ μὲν ξύλον, φύσει, ἢ δὲ θύρα, θέσει· ἔτω καὶ τὸ μὲν φωνεῖν, φύσει, τὸ δὲ δι' ὀνομάτων ἢ ῥημάτων σημαίνειν, θέσει—καὶ ἔοικε τὴν μὲν φωνητικὴν δύναμιν, ὄργανον ἔσσαν τῶν ψυχικῶν ἐν ἡμῖν δυνάμεων γνωστικῶν, ἢ ὀρεκτικῶν, κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν ὁ ἄνθρωπος· παραπλησίως τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις· τὸ δὲ ὀνόμασιν, ἢ ῥήμασιν, ἢ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν συγκειμένοις λόγοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν σημασίαν (ἔκτετι φύσει ἔσιν, ἀλλὰ θέσει) ἐξαιρετόν ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ ἀλογα ζῶα, διότι καὶ μόνος τῶν θνητῶν αυτοκινήτως μετέχει ψυχῆς, καὶ τέχνικώς ἐνεργεῖν δυνάμενης, ἵνα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ φωνεῖν ἡ τεχνικὴ αὐτῆς διακρίνηται δύναμις· δηλῶσι δὲ ταῦτα οἱ εἰς κάλλος συντιθέμενοι λόγοι μετὰ μέτρων, ἢ ἀνευ μέτρων. *In the same manner therefore, as local Motion is from Nature, but Dancing is something positive; and as Timber exists in Nature, but a Door is something positive; so is the power of producing a vocal Sound founded in Nature, but that of explaining ourselves by Nouns, or Verbs, something positive. And hence it is, that as to the simple power of producing vocal Sound (which is as it were the Organ or Instrument to the Soul's faculties of Knowledge or Volition) as to this vocal power I say, Man seems to possess it from Nature, in like manner as irrational animals: but as to the employing of Nouns, or Verbs, or Sentences composed out of them, in the explanation of our Sentiments (the thing thus employed being founded not in Nature, but in Position) this he seems to possess by way of peculiar eminence, because he alone of all mortal Beings partakes of a Soul, which can move itself, and operate artificially; so that even in the Subject of Sound his artificial Power shews itself; as the various elegant Compositions both in Metre, and without Metre, abundantly prove. Ammon. de Interpr. p. 51. a.*

Ch. III.

It appears from hence, that A WORD may be defined a *Voice articulate, and significant by Compact*—and that LANGUAGE may be defined a *System of such Voices, so significant*.

It is from notions like these concerning Language and Words, that one may be tempted to call LANGUAGE a kind of PICTURE OF THE UNIVERSE, where the Words are as the Figures or Images of all particulars.

AND yet it may be doubted, how far this is true. For if *Pictures* and *Images* are all of them *Imitations*, it will follow, that whoever has natural faculties to know the Original, will by help of the same faculties know also its Imitations. But it by no means follows, that he who knows any Being, should know for that reason its *Greek* or *Latin* Name.

THE Truth is, that every Medium through which we exhibit any thing to another's Contemplation, is either derived from *Natural Attributes*, and then it is an IMITATION; or else from *Accidents quite arbitrary*, and then it is a SYMBOL (*b*).

Now,

It must be observed, that *the operating artificially*, (ἐνεργεῖν τεχνικῶς) of which *Ammonius* here speaks, and which he considers as a distinctive Mark peculiar to the *Human Soul*, means something very different from the *mere producing works of elegance and design*; else it could never be a mark of Distinction between Man, and many other Species of Animals, such as the Bee, the Beaver, the Swallow, &c. See p. 9, 10. 91, 92, &c.

(b) Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ΟΜΟΙΩΜΑ τῷ ΣΥΜΒΟΛΟΥ, καθόσον τὸ μὲν ὁμοίωμα τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν τῷ πράγματι κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἀπεικονίζεσθαι βέλεται, καὶ ἐκ ἑστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτὸ μεταπλάσαι· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι γεγραμμένον τῷ Σωκράτι ὁμοίωμα, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ φαλακρὸν, καὶ τὸ σιμὸν, καὶ τὸ ἐξώφθαλμον ἔχει τῷ Σωκράτι, ἔκείτ' ἂν αὐτῷ λέγοιτο εἶναι ὁμοίωμα· τὸ δὲ γε σύμβολον, ἥτοι σημεῖον, (ἀμφότερα γὰρ ὁ φιλόσοφος αὐτὸ

Now, if it be allowed that in far the greater part of things, not any of their *natural* Attributes are to be found in articulate Voices, and that yet through such Voices things of every kind are exhibited, it will follow that *WORDS must of necessity be SYMBOLS*, because it appears that they cannot be *Imitations*.

BUT here occurs a Question, which deserves attention—"Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, have Imitations been neglected, and Symbols preferred, although Symbols are only known by Habit or Institution, while Imitations are recognized by a kind of natural Intuition?"—To this it may be answered, that if the Sentiments of the Mind, like the Features of the Face, were immediately

αὐτὸ ὀνομάζει) τὸ ὅλον ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔχει, ἅτε καὶ ἐκ μόνης ὑφιστάμενον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπινοίας· οἷον, τὰ πότε δεῖ συμβάλλειν ἀλλήλοις τῆς πολεμῆντας, δύναται σύμβολον εἶναι καὶ σάλπιγξ ἀπήχησις, καὶ λαμπάδος ῥίψις, καθάπερ φησὶν Εὐριπίδης,

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀφείθη πυρσὸς, ὡς τυρσηνικῆς
Σάλπιγξ ἦχος, σῆμα φοινίου μάχης.

Δύναται δέ τις ὑποθέσθαι καὶ δόρατ' ἀνάτασιν, καὶ βέλος ἄφυσιν, καὶ ἀλλὰ μυρία.—A REPRESENTATION OR RESEMBLANCE differs from a SYMBOL, in as much as the Resemblance aims as far as possible to represent the very nature of the thing, nor is it in our power to shift or vary it. Thus a REPRESENTATION intended for Socrates in a Picture, if it have not those circumstances peculiar to Socrates, the bald, the flat-nosed, and the Eyes projecting, cannot properly be called a Representation of him. But a SYMBOL or SIGN (for the Philosopher Aristotle uses both names) is wholly in our own power, as depending singly for its existence on our imagination. Thus for example, as to the time when two armies should engage, the Symbol or Sign may be the sounding of a Trumpet, the throwing of a Torch, (according to what Euripides says,

But when the flaming Torch was hurl'd, the sign
Of purple fight, as when the Trumpet sounds, &c.)

or else one may suppose the elevating of a Spear, the darting of a Weapon, and a thousand ways besides. Ammon. in Lib. de Interp. p. 17. b.

Ch. III.

immediately visible to every beholder, the Art of Speech or Discourse would have been perfectly superfluous. But now, while our Minds lie enveloped and hid, and the Body (like a Veil) conceals every thing but itself, we are necessarily compelled, when we communicate our Thoughts, to convey them to each other *through a Medium which is corporeal (c)*. And hence it is that all Signs, Marks, Imitations, and Symbols must needs be *sensible*, and addressed *as such* to the *Senses (d)*. Now THE SENSES, we know, never exceed their natural Limits; the Eye perceives no Sounds; the Ear perceives no Figures nor Colours. If therefore we were to converse, not by *Symbols* but by *Imitations*, as far as things are characterized by Figure and Colour, our Imitation would be necessarily thro' Figure and Colour also. Again, as far as they are characterized by Sounds, it would for the same reason be thro' the Medium of Sounds. The like may be said of all the other Senses, the Imitation still shifting along with the Objects imitated. We see then how *complicated* such Imitation would prove.

IF we set LANGUAGE therefore, as a *Symbol*, in opposition to *such Imitation*; if we reflect on the Simplicity of the one, and the Multiplicity

(c) Αἱ ψυχὰς αἱ ἡμέτεραι, γυμναὶ μὲν εἶναι τῶν σωμάτων, ἡδύνατο δὲ αὐτῶν τῶν νοημάτων σημαίνειν ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ σώμασι συνδέονται, δίκην νέφους περικαλύπτουσιν αὐτῶν τὸ νοερόν, ἐδέθησαν τῶν ὀνομάτων, δι' ὧν σημαίνουσιν ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα. *Animi nostri a corporis compage secreti res vicissim animi conceptionibus significare possent: cum autem corporibus involuti sint, perinde ac nebulâ, ipsorum intelligendi vis obtegatur: quocirca opus eis fuit nominibus, quibus res inter se significarent.* Ammon. in Prædicam. p. 18. a.

(d) Quicquid scindi possit in differentias satis numerosas, ad notionum varietatem explicandam (modo differentie illæ sensui perceptibiles sint) fieri potest vehiculum cogitationum de homine in hominem. Bacon. de Augm. Scient. VI. 1.

tiplicity of the other; if we consider the Ease and Speed, with which Words are formed (an Ease which knows no trouble or fatigue; and a * Speed, which equals the Progress of our very Thoughts) if we oppose to this the difficulty and length of Imitations; if we remember that some Objects are capable of no Imitations at all, but that all Objects universally may be typified by Symbols; we may plainly perceive an Answer to the Question here proposed, “Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, Imitations have been rejected, and Symbols preferred.”

HENCE too we may perceive a Reason, *why there never was a Language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to express the Properties and real Essences of things*, as a Mirrour exhibits their Figures and their Colours. For if Language of itself imply nothing more, than *certain Species of Sounds with certain Motions concomitant*; if to some Beings Sound and Motion are no Attributes at all; if to many others, where Attributes, they are no way essential (such as the Murmurs and Wavings of a Tree during a storm) if this be true—it is impossible the Nature of such Beings should be expressed, or the least essential Property be any way imitated, while between *the Medium and themselves* there is nothing CONNATURAL (e).

It is true indeed, when *Primitives* were once established, it was easy to follow the Connection and Subordination of Nature, in the just deduction of *Derivatives* and *Compounds*. Thus the Sounds,
Water,

* *Ἐπεα πλερόντα*—See before, p. 391.

(e) See Treatise II. c. 3. p. 42.

Ch. III. *Water*, and, *Fire*, being once annexed to those two Elements, it was certainly more natural to call Beings participating of the first, *Watry*, of the last, *Fiery*, than to commute the Terms, and call them by the reverse. But why, and from what *natural Connections* the Primitives themselves might not be commuted, it will be found, I believe, difficult to assign a Reason, as well in the instances before us, as in most others. We may here also see the Reason, why ALL LANGUAGE IS FOUNDED IN COMPACT, and not in Nature; for so are all Symbols, of which Words are a certain Species.

The Question remains if Words are Symbols, then SYMBOLS OF WHAT?—If it be answered, OF THINGS, the Question returns, OF WHAT THINGS?—If it be answered, *of the several Individuals of Sense, the various particular Beings, which exist around us*—to this, it is replied, may be raised certain Doubts. In the first place every Word will be in fact a *proper Name*. Now if all Words are proper Names, how came Lexicographers, whose express business is to explain Words, either wholly to omit proper Names, or at least to explain them, not from their own Art, but from History?

AGAIN, if all Words are *proper Names*, then in strictness no Word can belong to more than one Individual. But if so, then, as *Individuals* are *infinite*, to make a perfect Language, Words must be *infinite also*. But if infinite, then *incomprehensible*, and never to be attained by the wisest Men; whose labours in Language upon this Hypothesis would be as idle as that study of infinite written Symbols, which Missionaries (if they may be credited) attribute to the *Chinese*.

AGAIN,


AGAIN, *if all Words are proper Names*, or (which is the same) the Symbols of *Individuals*; it will follow, as *Individuals* are not only *infinite*, but ever *passing*, that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, will be as unknown *now*, as the very Voices of the Speakers. Nay the Language of every Province, of every Town, of every Cottage, must be every where different, and every where changing, since such is the Nature of *Individuals*, which it follows.

AGAIN, *if all Words are proper Names*, the Symbols of *Individuals*, it will follow that in Language there can be no *general Proposition*, because upon the Hypothesis *all Terms are particular*; nor any *Affirmative Proposition*, because *no one Individual in nature is another*. It remains, there can be no Propositions, but *Particular Negatives*. But if so, then is Language incapable of communicating *General Affirmative Truths*—If so, then of communicating *Demonstration*—If so, then of communicating *Sciences*, which are so many Systems of Demonstrations—If so, then of communicating *Arts*, which are the Theorems of Science applied practically—If so, we shall be little better for it either in Speculation or in Practice (*e*). And so much for this Hypothesis; let us now try another.

IF WORDS are not the Symbols of *external Particulars*, it follows of course, they must be THE SYMBOLS OF OUR IDEAS: For this is evident,

(*e*) The whole of *Euclid* (whose Elements may be called the basis of Mathematical Science) is founded upon *general Terms*, and *general Propositions*, most of which are *affirmative*. So true are those Verses, however barbarous as to their stile,

*Syllogizari non est ex Particulari,
Neve Negativis, rectè concludere si vis.*

Ch. III.  evident, if they are not Symbols of things *without*, they can only be Symbols of something *within*.

HERE then the Question recurs, if SYMBOLS OF IDEAS, then of WHAT IDEAS?—OF SENSIBLE IDEAS.—Be it so, and what follows?—Every thing in fact, which has followed already from the supposition of their being the Symbols of *external Particulars*; and that from this plain and obvious reason, because the several *Ideas*, which *Particulars* imprint, must needs be as *infinite* and *mutable*, as they are themselves.

IF then Words are neither the Symbols of *external Particulars*, nor yet of *particular Ideas*, they can be SYMBOLS of nothing else, except of GENERAL IDEAS, because nothing else, except these, remains.—And what do we mean by GENERAL IDEAS?—We mean SUCH AS ARE COMMON TO MANY INDIVIDUALS; not only to Individuals which exist now, but which existed in ages past, and will exist in ages future; such for example, as the Ideas belonging to the Words, *Man*, *Lion*, *Cedar*.—Admit it, and what follows?—It follows, that *if Words are the Symbols of such general Ideas*, Lexicographers may find employ, though they meddle not with *proper Names*.

IT follows that *one Word* may be, not *homonymously*, but *truly and essentially common to many Particulars*, past present and future; so that however these *Particulars* may be *infinite*, and *ever fleeting*, yet Language notwithstanding may be *definite* and *steady*. But if so,
then

then attainable even by ordinary Capacities, without danger of incurring the *Chinefe* Abfurdity*.

Ch. III.

AGAIN, it follows that the Language of thofe, who lived ages ago, as far as it ftands *for the fame general Ideas*, may be as intelligible *now*, as it was *then*. The like may be faid of the fame Language being accommodated to diftant Regions, and even to diftant Nations amidft all the variety of *ever new* and *ever changing* Objects.

AGAIN, it follows that Language may be expreffive of *general Truths*; and if fo, then of Demonftration, and Sciences, and Arts; and if fo, become fubfervient to purpofes of every kind (*f*).

Now if it be true “that none of thefe things could be afferted
“ of Language, were not Words the Symbols of *general Ideas*—and
“ it be further true, that thefe things may be all undeniably afferted
“ of Language”—it will follow (and that neceffarily) that WORDS
ARE THE SYMBOLS OF GENERAL IDEAS.

AND yet perhaps even here may be an Objection. It may be urged, if Words are the Symbols of *general Ideas*, Language may anfwer well enough the purpofe of Philofophers, who reafon about *general*, and *abstract* Subjects—but what becomes of the bufinefs of ordinary Life? Life we know is merged in a multitude of *Particulars*,

* See p. 398, 399.

(*f*) See before Note (*e*)

Ch. III. *culars*, where an Explanation by Language is as requisite, as in the highest Theorems. The Vulgar indeed want it to *no other* End. How then can this End in any respect be answered, if Language be expressive of nothing farther than *general Ideas*?

To this it may be answered, that *Arts* surely respect the business of ordinary Life; yet so far are *general Terms* from being an Obstacle here, that without them no Art can be *rationaly* explained. How for instance should the measuring Artist ascertain to the Reapers the price of their labours, had not he first through *general Terms* learnt those *general Theorems*, that respect the doctrine and practice of Mensuration?

BUT suppose this not to satisfy a persevering Objector—suppose him to insist, that, admitting this to be true, *there were still a multitude of occasions for minute particularizing, of which it was not possible for mere Generals to be susceptible*—suppose, I say, such an Objection, what should we answer?—*That the Objection was just*; that it was necessary to the Perfection and Completion of LANGUAGE, that it should be expressive of PARTICULARS, as well as of GENERALS. We must however add, that its *general Terms* are by far its most excellent and essential Part, since from these it derives “that comprehensive
“ *Universality*, that just proportion of *Precision* and *Permanence*,
“ without which it could not possibly be either learnt, or understood,
“ or applied to the purposes of Reasoning and Science;”—that *particular Terms* have their Utility and End, and that therefore care too has been taken for a supply of these.

ONE Method of expressing Particulars, is that of PROPER NAMES. Ch. III.
 This is the least artificial, because *proper Names* being in every district arbitrarily applied, may be unknown to those, who know the Language perfectly well, and can hardly therefore with propriety be considered as parts of it. The other and more artificial Method is that of DEFINITIVES or ARTICLES (*g*), whether we assume the *pronominal*, or those *more strictly* so called. And here we cannot enough admire the exquisite *Art* of Language, which, *without wandering into infinitude*, contrives how to denote things infinite; that is to say in other words, which, by the small Tribe of *Definitives properly applied to general Terms*, knows how to employ these last, tho' in number *finite*, to the accurate expression of *infinite* Particulars.

To explain what has been said by a single example. Let the general Term be MAN. I have occasion to apply this Term to the denoting of some Particular. Let it be required to express this Particular, *as unknown*; I say, A *Man*—*known*; I say, THE *Man*—*indefinite*; ANY *Man*—*definite*; A CERTAIN *Man*—*present and near*; THIS *Man*—*present and distant*; THAT *Man*—*like to some other*; SUCH A *Man*—*an indefinite Multitude*; MANY *Men*—*a definite Multitude*; A THOUSAND *Men*—*the ones of a Multitude, taken throughout*; EVERY *Man*—*the same ones, taken with distinction*; EACH *Man*—*taken in order*; FIRST *Man*, SECOND *Man*, &c.—*the whole Multitude of Particulars taken collectively*; ALL *Men*—*the Negation of this Multitude*; NO *Man*. But of this we have spoken already, when we inquired concerning Definitives.

THE

(g) See before, p. 255, &c. 342, &c.

Ch. III.

THE Sum of all is, that WORDS ARE THE SYMBOLS OF IDEAS BOTH GENERAL AND PARTICULAR; YET OF THE GENERAL, PRIMARILY, ESSENTIALLY, AND IMMEDIATELY; OF THE PARTICULAR, ONLY SECONDARILY, ACCIDENTALLY, AND MEDIATELY.

SHOULD it be asked, “why has Language this *double Capacity*?” —May we not ask, by way of return, Is it not a kind of reciprocal Commerce, or *Intercourse of our Ideas*? Should it not therefore be framed, so as to express *the whole* of our Perception? Now can we call that Perception intire and whole, which implies either INTELLECTION without *Sensation*, or SENSATION without *Intellection*? If not, how should Language explain *the whole* of our Perception, had it not Words to express the Objects, proper to each of the two Faculties?

To conclude—As in the preceding Chapter we considered Language with a view to its MATTER, so here we have considered it with a view to its FORM. Its MATTER is recognized, when it is considered *as a Voice*; its FORM, as it is *significant of our several Ideas*; so that upon the whole it may be defined—A SYSTEM OF ARTICULATE VOICES, THE SYMBOLS OF OUR IDEAS, BUT OF THOSE PRINCIPALLY, WHICH ARE GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL.

C H A P. IV.

Concerning general or universal IDEAS.

MUCH having been said in the preceding Chapter about GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL IDEAS, it may not perhaps be amiss to inquire, *by what process we come to perceive them, and what kind of Beings they are*; since the generality of men think so meanly of their existence, that they are commonly considered, as little better than Shadows. These Sentiments are not unusual even with the Philosopher now a days, and that from causes much the same with those, which influence the Vulgar,

Ch. IV.

THE VULGAR merged in *Sense* from their earliest Infancy, and never once dreaming any thing to be worthy of pursuit, but what either pampers their Appetite, or fills their Purse, imagine nothing to be *real*, but what may be *tasted*, or *touched*. THE PHILOSOPHER as to these matters being of much the same Opinion, in Philosophy looks no higher, than to *experimental Amusements*, deeming nothing *Demonstration*, if it be not made *ocular*. Thus instead of ascending from *Sense* to *Intellect* (the natural progress of all true Learning) he hurries on the contrary into the midst of *Sense*, where he wanders at random without any end, and is lost in a Labyrinth of infinite Particulars. Hence then the reason why the sublimer parts of *Science*, the Studies of MIND, INTELECTION, and INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLES, are in a manner neglected; and, as if the Criterion

of

Ch. IV. of all Truth were an Alembic or an Air-pump, what cannot be proved by *Experiment*, is deemed no better than *mere Hypothesis*.

AND yet it is somewhat remarkable, amid the prevalence of such Notions, that there should still remain two Sciences in fashion, and these having their Certainty of all the least controverted, *which are not in the minutest article depending upon Experiment*. By these I mean ARITHMETIC and GEOMETRY (*a*). But to come to our Subject concerning GENERAL IDEAS.

MAN'S FIRST PERCEPTIONS are those of the SENSES, in as much as they commence from his earliest Infancy. These Perceptions, if
not

(*a*) The many noble Theorems (so useful in life, and so admirable in themselves) with which these two SCIENCES so eminently abound, arise originally from PRINCIPLES, THE MOST OBVIOUS IMAGINABLE; Principles, so little wanting the pomp and apparatus of EXPERIMENT, that they are *self-evident* to every one, possessed of common sense. I would not be understood, in what I have here said, or may have said elsewhere, to undervalue EXPERIMENT; whose importance and utility I freely acknowledge, in the many curious Nostrums and choice Receipts, with which it has enriched the necessary Arts of Life. Nay, I go farther—I hold *all justifiable Practice in every kind of Subject* to be founded in EXPERIENCE, which is no more than *the result of many repeated EXPERIMENTS*. But I must add withal, that the man who acts *from Experience alone*, tho' he act ever so well, is but an *Empiric* or *Quack*, and that not only in Medicine, but in every other Subject. It is then only that we recognize ART, and that the EMPIRIC quits his name for the more honourable one of ARTIST, when to his EXPERIENCE he adds SCIENCE, and is thence enabled to tell us, not only, *WHAT is to be done*, but *WHY it is to be done*; for ART is a composite of Experience and Science, Experience providing it *Materials*, and Science giving them a FORM.

In the mean time, while EXPERIMENT is thus necessary to all PRACTICAL WISDOM, with respect to PURE and SPECULATIVE SCIENCE, as we have hinted already, it has not the least to do. For who ever heard of *Logic*, or *Geometry*, or *Arithmetic* being proved *experimentally*? It is indeed by the application of *these* that *Experiments* are rendered useful; that they are assumed into Philosophy, and in some degree made a part of it, being otherwise nothing better than puerile amusements. But that these Sciences themselves should depend upon the Subjects, on which they work, is, as if the Marble were to fashion the Chizzele, and not the Chizzele the Marble.

not infinite, are at least *indefinite*, and more *fleeting* and *transient*, Ch. IV. than the very Objects, which they exhibit, because they not only depend upon the *existence* of those Objects, but because they cannot subsist, without their *immediate Presence*. Hence therefore it is, that there can be *no Sensation of either Past or Future*, and consequently had the Soul no other Faculties, than the *Senses*, it never could acquire the least Idea of TIME (*b*).

BUT happily for us we are not deserted here. We have in the first place a Faculty, called IMAGINATION or FANCY, which however as to its *energies* it may be subsequent to Sense, yet is truly prior to it both in *dignity* and *use*. THIS it is which *retains the fleeting Forms of things*, when Things themselves are gone, and *all Sensation* at an end.

THAT this Faculty, however connected with Sense, is still perfectly different, may be seen from hence. We have an *Imagination* of things, that are gone and extinct; but no such things can be made objects of *Sensation*. We have an easy command over the Objects of our *Imagination*, and can call them forth in almost what manner we please; but our *Sensations* are necessary, when their Objects are present, nor can we controul them, but by removing either the Objects, or ourselves (*c*).

As

(*b*) See before, p. 272. See also, p. 276. Note (*f*).

(*c*) Besides the distinguishing of SENSATION from IMAGINATION, there are two other Faculties of the Soul, which from their nearer alliance ought carefully to be distinguished from it, and these are ΜΝΗΜΗ, and ΑΝΑΜΝΗΣΙΣ, MEMORY, and RECOLLECTION.

When

Ch. IV.

As the Wax would not be adequate to its business of Signature, had it not a Power to *retain*, as well as to *receive*; the same holds of the SOUL, with respect to *Sense* and *Imagination*. SENSE is its *receptive* Power; IMAGINATION, its *retentive*. Had it Sense without Imagination, it would not be as Wax, but as Water, where tho' all Impressions may be instantly made, yet as soon as made they are as instantly lost.

Thus then, from a view of the two Powers taken together, we may call SENSE (if we please) *a kind of transient Imagination*; and IMAGINATION on the contrary *a kind of permanent Sense* (d).

Now

When we view some *relict* of sensation reposed within us, *without thinking of its rise, or referring it to any sensible Object*, this is PHANSY or IMAGINATION.

When we view some such *relict*, and *refer it withal to that sensible Object, which in time past was its cause and original*, this is MEMORY.

Lastly the Road, which leads to Memory through a series of Ideas, however connected, whether rationally or casually, this is RECOLLECTION. I have added *casually*, as well as *rationally*, because a casual connection is often sufficient. Thus from seeing a Garment, I think of its Owner; thence of his Habitation; thence of Woods; thence of Timber; thence of Ships, Sea-fights, Admirals, &c.

If the Distinction between Memory and Phansy be not sufficiently understood, it may be illustrated by being compared to the view of a Portrait. When we contemplate a Portrait, *without thinking of whom it is the Portrait*, such Contemplation is analogous to PHANSY. When we view it *with reference to the Original, whom it represents*, such Contemplation is analogous to MEMORY.

We may go farther. IMAGINATION or PHANSY may exhibit (after a manner) even *things that are to come*. It is here that Hope and Fear paint all their pleasant, and all their painful Pictures of *Futurity*. But MEMORY is confined in the strictest manner *to the past*.

What we have said, may suffice for our present purpose. He that would learn more, may consult *Aristot. de Animâ*, L. III. c. 3, 4. and his *Treatise de Mem. et Reminisc.*

(d) Τί τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία ὥδε ἂν γνωρίσαιμεν· δεῖ νοεῖν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, οἷον τύπον (lege τύπον) τινὰ καὶ ἀναζωγράφημα ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ αἰσθητηρίῳ, ἐγκατάλειμμά τι τῆς ὑπὸ

Now as our Feet in vain venture to walk upon the River, till the Frost bind the Current, and harden the yielding Surface; so does the SOUL in vain seek to exert its higher Powers, the Powers I mean of REASON and INTELLECT, till IMAGINATION first fix the *fluency* of SENSE, and thus provide a proper Basis for the support of its higher Energies.

AFTER this manner, in the admirable Oeconomy of the Whole, are Natures subordinate made subservient to the higher. Were there *no Things external*, the *Senses* could not operate; were there *no Sensations*, the *Imagination* could not operate; and were there *no Imagination*, there could be *neither Reasoning* nor *Intellection*, such at least as they are found in *Man*, where they have their Intensions and Remissions in alternate succession, and are at first nothing better, than a mere CAPACITY or POWER. Whether every Intellect begins thus, may be perhaps a question; especially if there be any one of a nature *more divine*, to which “Intension and Remission and mere “Capacity are unknown (*e*).” But not to digress.

IT

ὑπὸ τῆ αἰσθητῆς γινομένης κινήσεως, ὃ καὶ μηκέτι τῆ αἰσθητῆς παρόντος, ὑπομένει τὸ καὶ σώζεται, ὅν ὥσπερ εἰκὼν τις αὐτῆς, ὃ καὶ τῆς μνήμης ἡμῶν σωζόμενον αἴτιον γίνεται· τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐγκατάλειμμα, καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ὥσπερ τύπον, ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΝ καλεῖσιν. Now what PHANSY or IMAGINATION is, we may explain as follows. We may conceive to be formed within us, from the operations of our Senses about sensible Subjects, some Impression (as it were) or Picture in our original Sensorium, being a relict of that motion caused within us by the external object; a relict, which when the external object is no longer present, remains and is still preserved, being as it were its Image, and which, by being thus preserved, becomes the cause of our having Memory. Now such a sort of relict and (as it were) Impression they call PHANSY or IMAGINATION. *Alex. Aphrod. de Animâ, p. 135. b. Edit. Ald.*

(*e*) See p. 304. The *Life, Energy*, or Manner of MAN's Existence is not a little different from that of the DEITY. THE LIFE OF MAN has its Essence in MOTION.

Ch. IV.

It is then on these *permanent* Phantasms that THE HUMAN MIND first works, and by an Energy as spontaneous and familiar to its Nature, as the seeing of Colour is familiar to the Eye, it discerns at once what in MANY is ONE; what in things DISSIMILAR and DIFFERENT

This is not only true with respect to that lower and subordinate Life, which he shares in common with Vegetables, and which can no longer subsist than while the Fluids circulate, but it is likewise true in that *Life*, which is peculiar to him as *Man*. Objects from without *first move* our faculties, and thence we move *of ourselves* either to *Practice* or *Contemplation*. But the LIFE or EXISTENCE of GOD (as far as we can conjecture upon so transcendent a Subject) is not only complete throughout Eternity, but complete in every Instant, and is for that reason IMMUTABLE and SUPERIOR TO ALL MOTION.

It is to this distinction that *Aristotle* alludes, when he tells us—Οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεως ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσεως· καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν, ἢ ἐν κινήσει· μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκὴ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρὸς, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· ἡ γὰρ ἀπλή, οὐδ' ἐπιεικής. *For there is not only an Energy of MOTION, but of IMMOBILITY; and PLEASURE or FELICITY exists rather in REST than in MOTION; Change of all things being sweet (according to the Poet) from a principle of Pravity in those who believe so. For in the same manner as the bad man is one fickle and changeable, so is that Nature bad that requireth Variety, in as much as such Nature is neither simple nor even.* Eth. Nicom. VII. 14. & Ethic. Eudem. VI. sub. fin.

It is to this UNALTERABLE NATURE OF THE DEITY that *Boethius* refers, when he says in those elegant verses,

—Tempus ab Aeo

Ire jubes STABILISQUE MANENS das cuncta moveri.

From this single principle of IMMOBILITY, may be derived some of the noblest of the *Divine Attributes*; such as that of IMPASSIVE, INCORRUPTIBLE, INCORPOREAL, &c. Vide *Aristot.* Physic. VIII. Metaphys. XIV. c. 6, 7, 9, 10. Edit. *Du Val*. See before, p. 148 to 150—also p. 164, where the Verses of *Boethius* are quoted at length.

It must be remembered however, that tho' we are not *Gods*, yet as *rational Beings* we have within us something *Divine*, and that the more we can become superior to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and place our welfare in that Good, which is immutable, permanent, and rational, the higher we shall advance in real Happiness and Wisdom. This is (as an antient writer says)—Ὁμοίωσις τῷ Θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, *the becoming like to God, as far as in our power.* Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς πᾶς ὁ βίος μακάριος· τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοιωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει. *For to THE GODS (as says another antient) the whole of life is one continued happiness; but to MEN, it is so far happy, as it rises to the resemblance of so divine an Energy.* See *Plat.* in Theætet. *Arist.* Eth. X. 8.

FERENT is SIMILAR and the SAME (*f*). By this it comes to behold
a kind of *superior* Objects; a new Race of Perceptions, more com-
prehensive

Ch. IV.

(*f*) This CONNECTIVE ACT of the Soul, by which it views ONE IN MANY, is perhaps one of the principal Acts of its most excellent Part. It is this removes that impenetrable mist, which renders *Objects of Intelligence* invifible to lower faculties. Were it not for this, even the *fenfible* World (with the help of all our Sensations) would appear as unconnected, as the words of an Index. It is certainly not the Figure alone, nor the Touch alone, nor the Odour alone, that makes the Rose, but it is made up of all thefe, and other attributes UNITED; not an *unknown* Conftitution of *infenfible* Parts, but a *known* Conftitution of *fenfible* Parts; unlefs we chufe to extirpate the poffibility of natural Knowledge.

WHAT then perceives this CONSTITUTION or UNION?—Can it be any of the Senses?—No one of thefe, we know, can pafs the limits of its own province. Were the Smell to perceive the union of the Odour and the Figure, it would not only be Smell, but it would be Sight alfo. It is the fame in other instances. We muft neceffarily therefore recur to fome HIGHER COLLECTIVE POWER, to give us a profpect of Nature, even in thefe her *fubordinate Wholes*, much more in that *comprehensive Whole*, whose Sympathy is univerfal, and of which thefe fmaller Wholes are all no more than Parts.

But no where is this *collecting*, and (if I may be allowed the expreffion) this *unifying* Power more conspicuous, than in the fubjects of PURE TRUTH. By virtue of this power the Mind views *One general Idea*, in *many Individuals*; *One Propofition* in *many general Ideas*; *One Syllogifm* in *many Propofitions*; till at length, by properly repeating and connecting Syllogifm with Syllogifm, it afcend into thofe bright and *fteady regions* of SCIENCE,

*Quas neque concutiunt venti, neque nubila nimbis
Adfpergunt, &c.*

Lucr.

Even *negative* Truths and *negative* Conclufions cannot fubfift, but by bringing Terms and Propofitions together, fo *neceffary* is this UNITING Power to every Species of KNOWLEDGE. See p. 216, 351.

He that would better comprehend the diftinction between SENSITIVE PERCEPTION, and INTELLECTIVE, may obferve that, when a Truth is fpoken, it is *heard* by our Ears, and *underftood* by our Minds. That thefe two Acts are different, is plain, from the example of fuch, as *hear* the founds, without *knowing* the language. But to fhew their difference ftill ftronger, let us fuppofe them to concur in the fame Man, who fhall both *hear* and *underftand* the Truth propofed. Let the Truth be for example, *The Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles*. That this is ONE Truth, and not *two* or *many* Truths, I believe none will deny. Let me afk then, in what manner does this Truth become perceptible (if at all) to SENSATION?—The Answer is obvious; it is by fucceffive

Ch. IV. *prehenſive than thoſe of Senſe; a Race of Perceptions, each one of which may be found intire and whole in the ſeparate individuals of an infinite*

Portions of little and little at a Time. When the firſt Word is *preſent*, all the ſubſequent are *abſent*; when the laſt Word is *preſent*, all the previous are *abſent*; when any of the middle Words are *preſent*, then are there ſome *abſent*, as well of one ſort as the other. No more exiſts at once than a ſingle Syllable, and the Remainder as much *is not*, (to Senſation at leaſt) as tho' it never had been, or never was to be. And ſo much for the perception of SENSE, than which we ſee nothing can be more *diſſipated, fleeting, and detached*.—And is that of the MIND ſimilar?—Admit it, and what follows?—It follows, that *one* Mind would no more recognize *one* Truth, by recognizing its Terms *ſucceſſively* and *apart*, than *many* diſtant Minds would recognize it, were it diſtributed among them, a different part to each. The caſe is, every TRUTH is ONE, tho' its TERMS are MANY. It is in no reſpect true *by parts at a time*, but it is true of neceſſity at *once* and *in an inſtant*.—What Powers therefore recognize this ONENESS or UNITY?—Where even does it reſide, or what makes it?—Shall we answer with the *Stagirite*, Τὸ δὲ ΕΝ ΠΟΙΟΥΝ ΤΑΥΤΟ ἡ ΝΟΥΣ ἑκάστων—If this be allowed, it ſhould ſeem, where SENSATION and INTELLECTION appear to concur, that Senſation was of MANY, Intellection was of ONE; that Senſation was *temporary, diviſible* and *ſucceſſive*; Intellection, *instantaneous, indiviſible, and at once*.

If we conſider the Radii of a Circle, we ſhall find at the Circumference that they are MANY; at the Center that they are ONE. Let us then ſuppoſe SENSE and MIND to view the ſame Radii, only let Senſe view them at the *Circumference*, Mind at the *Center*; and hence we may conceive, how theſe Powers differ, even where they jointly appear to operate in perception of the ſame object.

There is ANOTHER ACT OF THE MIND, the very reverse of that here mentioned; an Act, by which it perceives not *one in many*, but MANY IN ONE. This is that *mental Separation*, of which we have given ſome account in the firſt Chapter of this Book; that Reſolution or Analyſis which enables us *to inveſtigate the Cauſes, and Principles, and Elements of things*. It is by Virtue of this, that we are enabled to abſtract any particular Attribute, and make it *by itſelf* the Subject of philoſophical Contemplation. Were it not for this, it would be difficult for *particular Sciences* to exiſt; becauſe otherwiſe they would be as much blended, as the ſeveral Attributes of ſenſible Subſtances. How, for example, could there be ſuch a Science as *Optics*, were we neceſſitated to contemplate *Colour concentered with Figure*, two Attributes, which the Eye can never view, but affiliated? I mentioned not a multitude of other ſenſible qualities, ſome of which ſtill preſent themſelves, whenever we look on any *coloured Body*.

Thoſe two noble Sciences, ARITHMETIC and GEOMETRY, would have no Baſis to ſtand on, were it not for this *ſeparative Power*. They are both converſant about QUANTITY;

infinite and fleeting Multitude, without departing from the unity and permanence of its own nature. Ch. IV.

AND thus we see the *Process by which we arrive at* GENERAL IDEAS; for the Perceptions here mentioned are in fact no other. In these too we perceive the objects of SCIENCE and REAL KNOWLEDGE, which can by no means be, but of *that which is general, and definite, and fixt* (g). Here too even *Individuals*, however of themselves

TITY; *Geometry* about CONTINUOUS Quantity, *Arithmetic* about DISCRETE. EXTENSION is essential to *continuous* Quantity; MONADS, or UNITS, to *Discrete*. By separating from the infinite Individuals, with which we are surrounded, those infinite Accidents, by which they are all *diversified*, we leave nothing but those SIMPLE and PERFECTLY SIMILAR UNITS, which being combined make NUMBER, and are the Subject of ARITHMETIC. Again, by separating from *Body* every possible subordinate Accident, and leaving it nothing but its *triple Extension of Length, Breadth, and Thickness*, (of which were it to be deprived, it would be *Body* no longer) we arrive at that pure and unmixed MAGNITUDE, the contemplation of whose properties makes the Science of *Geometry*.

By the same *analytical* or *separate* Power, we investigate DEFINITIONS of all kinds, each one of which is a *developed Word*, as the same Word is an *enveloped Definition*.

To conclude—IN COMPOSITION AND DIVISION CONSISTS THE WHOLE OF SCIENCE, COMPOSITION MAKING AFFIRMATIVE TRUTH, AND SHEWING US THINGS UNDER THEIR SIMILARITIES AND IDENTITIES; DIVISION MAKING NEGATIVE TRUTH, AND PRESENTING THEM TO US UNDER THEIR DISSIMILARITIES AND DIVERSITIES.

And here, by the way, there occurs a Question.—If all Wisdom be Science, and it be the business of Science as well to *compound* as to *separate*, may we not say that those Philosophers took *Half* of Wisdom for the *Whole*, who distinguished it from Wit, as if WISDOM only *separated*, and WIT only *brought together*?—Yet so held the Philosopher of *Malmesbury*, and the Author of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*.

(g) The very Etymologies of the Words ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ, SCIENTIA, and UNDERSTANDING, may serve in some degree to shew the nature of these Faculties, as well as of those Beings, their true and proper Objects. ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ ὀνόμασαι, διὰ τὸ ΕΠΙ ΣΤΑΣΙΝ καὶ ὄρον τῶν πραγμάτων ἀγειν ἡμᾶς, τῆς ἀορισίας καὶ μεταβολῆς τῶν ἐπὶ μέρος ἀπάγασα· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τὰ καθόλου καὶ ἀμετάπλωτα καταγίνεται. SCIENCE (ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ) has its name from bringing us (ΕΠΙ

Ch. IV. selves unknowable, become objects of Knowledge, as far as their nature will permit. For then only may *any Particular* be said to be known,

(ΕΠΙ ΣΤΑΣΙΝ) TO SOME STOP and BOUNDARY of things, taking us away from the unbounded nature and mutability of Particulars; for it is conversant about Subjects, that are general, and invariable. Niceph. Blem. Epit. Logic. p. 21.

This Etymology given by *Blemmides*, and long before him adopted by the *Peripatetics*, came originally from *Plato*, as may be seen in the following account of it from his *Cratylus*. In this Dialogue *Socrates*, having first (according to the *Heraclitean* Philosophy, which *Cratylus* favoured) etymologized a multitude of Words with a view to that *Flow* and *unceasing Mutation*, supposed by *Heraclitus* to run thro' all things, at length changes his System, and begins to etymologize from another, which supposed something in nature to be *permanent* and *fixed*. On this principle he thus proceeds Σκοπῶμεν δὴ, ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναλαβόντες, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος τὴν ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΝ, ὡς ἀμφιβόλον ἐστὶ, καὶ μάλλον ἔοικε σημαίνον τι ὅτι ΙΣΤΗΣΙΝ ἡμῶν ΕΠΙ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἢ ὅτι συμπεριφέρεται. Let us consider then (says he) some of the very Words already examined; and in the first place, the Word SCIENCE; how disputable is this (as to its former Etymology) how much more naturally does it appear to signify, that IT STOPS THE SOUL AT THINGS, than that it is carried about with them. Plat. Cratyl. p. 437. Edit. Serr.

The disputable Etymology, to which he here alludes, was a strange one of his own making in the former part of the Dialogue, adapted to the *flowing* System of *Heraclitus* there mentioned. According to this notion, he had derived ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ from ἐπεσθαι and μένειν, as if it kept along with things, by perpetually following them in their motions. See *Plato* as before, p. 412.

As to SCIENTIA, we are indebted to *Scaliger* for the following ingenious Etymology. RATIOCINATIO, motus quidam est: SCIENTIA, quies: unde et nomen, tum apud Græcos, tum etiam nostrum. Παρὰ τὸ ΕΠΙ ΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ, ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ. Siftitur enim mentis agitatio, et fit species in animo. Sic Latinum SCIENTIA, ὅτι γίνεται ΣΧΕΣΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ. Nam Latini, quod nomen entis simplex ab usu abjecerunt atque repudiarunt, omnibus activis participiis idem adjunxerunt. Audiens, ἀκούων ὢν. Sciens, σχῶν ὢν. Scal. in Theophr. de Causis Plant. Lib. I. p. 17.

The *English* Word, UNDERSTANDING, means not so properly Knowledge, as that Faculty of the Soul, where Knowledge resides. Why may we not then imagine, that the framers of this Word intended to represent it as a kind of firm Basis, on which the fair Structure of Sciences was to rest, and which was supposed to STAND UNDER them, as their immoveable Support?

Whatever may be said of these Etymologies, whether they are true or false, they at least prove their Authors to have considered SCIENCE and UNDERSTANDING, not as *fleeting*

known, when by asserting it to be *a Man*, or *an Animal*, or the like, Ch. IV.
we refer it to some such *comprehensive*, or *general Idea*.

Now it is of these COMPREHENSIVE and PERMANENT IDEAS, THE GENUINE PERCEPTIONS OF PURE MIND, that WORDS of all Languages, however different, are the SYMBOLS. And hence it is, that *as the PERCEPTIONS include, so do these their SYMBOLS express, not this or that set of Particulars only, but all indifferently, as they happen to occur.* Were therefore the Inhabitants of *Salisbury* to be transferred to *York*, tho' new particular objects would appear on every side, they would still no more want a new Language to explain themselves, than they would want new Minds to comprehend what they beheld. All indeed, that they would want, would be the *local proper Names*; which Names, as we have said already*, are hardly a
part

fleeting powers of Perception, like *Sense*, but rather as *steady, permanent, and durable* COMPREHENSIONS. But if so, we must somewhere or other find for them certain *steady, permanent, and durable* OBJECTS; since if PERCEPTION OF ANY KIND BE DIFFERENT FROM THE THING PERCEIVED, (whether it perceive straight as crooked, or crooked as straight; the moving as fixed, or the fixed as moving) SUCH PERCEPTION MUST OF NECESSITY BE ERRONEOUS AND FALSE. The following passage from a *Greek Platonic* (whom we shall quote again hereafter) seems on the present occasion not without its weight—*Εἰ ἐστὶ γνῶσις ἀκριβεστέρα τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἔτι αὖ καὶ γινώσκει ἀληθεστέρα τῶν αἰσθητῶν.* If there be A KNOWLEDGE more accurate than SENSATION; there must be certain OBJECTS of such knowledge MORE TRUE THAN OBJECTS OF SENSE.

The following then are Questions worth considering,—*What* these Objects are?—*Where* they reside?—And *how* they are to be discovered?—Not by *experimental Philosophy* it is plain; for that meddles with nothing, but what is tangible, corporeal, and mutable—nor even by the more refined and rational speculation of *Mathematics*; for this, at its very commencement, takes such Objects for granted. We can only add, that *if they reside in our own MINDS*, (and who, that has never looked there, can affirm they do not?) then will the advice of the Satirist be no ways improper,

—NEC TE QUÆSIVERIS EXTRA. *Perf.*

* Sup. p. 402, 403.

Ch. IV. part of Language, but must equally be learnt both by learned and unlearned, as often as they change the place of their abode.

It is upon the same principles we may perceive the reason, why the dead Languages (as we call them) are *now* intelligible; and why the Language of *modern England* is able to describe *antient Rome*; and that of *antient Rome* to describe *modern England* (*h*). But of these matters we have spoken before.

§ 2. AND now having viewed *the Process, by which we acquire general Ideas*, let us begin anew from other Principles, and try to discover (if we can prove so fortunate) *whence it is that these Ideas originally come*. If we can succeed here, we may discern perhaps, *what kind of Beings they are*, for this at present appears somewhat obscure.

LET us suppose any man to look for the first time upon *some Work of Art*, as for example upon a Clock, and having sufficiently viewed it, at length to depart. Would he not retain, when absent, an Idea of what he had seen? — And what is it, *to retain such Idea*? — *It is to have A FORM INTERNAL correspondent to THE EXTERNAL*; only with this difference, that the *Internal Form is devoid of the Matter*;
the

(*h*) As far as *Human Nature*, and the *primary Genera* both of *Substance* and *Accident* are *the same* in all places, and have been so thro' all ages: so far *all Languages* share one common *IDENTITY*. As far as *peculiar species of Substance* occur in different regions; and much more, as far as *the positive Institutions of religious and civil Politics* are *every where different*; so far each *Language* has its peculiar *DIVERSITY*. To the *Causes of Diversity* here mentioned, may be added *the distinguishing Character and Genius of every Nation*, concerning which we shall speak hereafter.

the External is united with it, being seen in the metal, the wood, and the like. Ch. IV.

Now if we suppose this Spectator to view *many such Machines*, and not simply to view, but to consider every part of them, so as to comprehend how these parts all operate to one End, he might be then said to possess a kind of INTELLIGIBLE FORM, by which he would not only understand, and know the Clocks, which he had seen *already*, but every Work also of like Sort, which he might see *hereafter*.—Should it be asked, “*which of these Forms is prior, the External and Sensible, or the Internal and Intelligible;*” the Answer is obvious, that *the prior is the Sensible*.

Thus then we see, THERE ARE INTELLIGIBLE FORMS, WHICH TO THE SENSIBLE ARE SUBSEQUENT.

BUT father still—If these Machines be allowed the Work *not of Chance*, but of an *Artist*, they must be the Work of one, who *knew what he was about*. And what is it, to work, and know what one is about?—It is to have an *Idea of what one is doing*; to possess A FORM INTERNAL, corresponding to the EXTERNAL, to which external it serves for an EXEMPLAR or ARCHETYPE.

HERE then we have AN INTELLIGIBLE FORM, WHICH IS PRIOR TO THE SENSIBLE FORM; *which, being truly prior as well in dignity as in time, can no more become subsequent, than Cause can to Effect*.

Ch. IV.

THUS then, with respect to Works of ART, we may perceive, if we attend, A TRIPLE ORDER OF FORMS; *one* Order, *intelligible* and *previous* to these Works; a *second* Order, *sensible* and *concomitant*; and a *third* again, *intelligible* and *subsequent*. After the first of these Orders the Maker may be said to *work*; thro' the second, the Works themselves *exist*, and are what they are; and in the third they become *recognized*, as mere *Objects of Contemplation*. To make these Forms by different Names more easy to be understood; *the first* may be called THE MAKER'S FORM; *the second*, that of THE SUBJECT; and the *third*, that of THE CONTEMPLATOR.

LET us pass from hence to Works of NATURE. Let us imagine ourselves viewing some diversified Prospect; "a Plain, for example, "spacious and fertile; a river winding thro' it; by the banks of that "river, men walking and cattle grazing; the view terminated with "distant hills, some craggy, and some covered with wood." Here it is plain we have plenty of FORMS NATURAL. And could any one quit so fair a Sight, and retain no traces of what he had beheld?—And what is it, *to retain traces of what one has beheld*?—It is to have certain FORMS INTERNAL correspondent to the EXTERNAL, and resembling them in every thing, *except the being merged in Matter*. And thus, thro' the same *retentive* and *collective* Powers, the Mind becomes fraught with *Forms natural*, as before with *Forms artificial*.—Should it be asked, "*which of these natural Forms are prior, the "External ones viewed by the Senses, or the Internal existing in the "Mind?*" the Answer is obvious, that *the prior are the External*.

THUS

THUS therefore in NATURE, as well as in ART, THERE ARE INTELLIGIBLE FORMS, WHICH TO THE SENSIBLE ARE SUBSEQUENT. Hence then we see the meaning of that noted School Axiom, *Nil est in INTELLECTU quod non prius fuit in SENSU*; an Axiom, which we must own to be so far allowable, as it respects the Ideas of a mere Contemplator.

BUT to proceed somewhat farther—Are *natural* Productions made BY CHANCE, or BY DESIGN?—Let us admit *by Design*, not to lengthen our inquiry. They are certainly * more exquisite than *any* Works of ART, and yet *these* we cannot bring ourselves to suppose made by *Chance*.—Admit it, and what follows?—*We must of necessity admit a MIND also, because DESIGN implies MIND, wherever it is to be found*.—Allowing therefore this, what do we mean by the Term, MIND?—We mean *something, which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with Ideas of its intended Works, agreeably to which Ideas those Works are fashioned*.

THAT such EXEMPLARS, PATTERNS, FORMS, IDEAS (call them as you please) must *of necessity* be, requires no proving, but follows of course, if we admit the Cause of Nature to be A MIND, as above-mentioned. For take away these, and *what a Mind* do we leave without them? CHANCE surely is as knowing, as MIND WITHOUT IDEAS; or rather MIND WITHOUT IDEAS is no less blind than CHANCE.

THE

* *Arist. de Part. Animal. L. I. c. 1.*

Ch. IV.

THE Nature of these IDEAS is not difficult to explain, if we once come to allow a possibility of their Existence. That they are exquisitely *beautiful*, *various*, and *orderly*, is evident from the exquisite Beauty, Variety, and Order, seen in natural Substances, which are but their *Copies* or *Pictures*. That they are *mental* is plain, as *they are of the Essence of MIND*, and consequently no Objects to any of the *Senses*, nor therefore circumscribed either by *Time* or *Place*.

HERE then, on this System, we have plenty of FORMS INTELLIGIBLE, WHICH ARE TRULY PREVIOUS TO ALL FORMS SENSIBLE. Here too we see that NATURE is not defective in her TRIPLE ORDER, having (like Art) her FORMS PREVIOUS, HER CONCOMITANT, and HER SUBSEQUENT (*i*).

THAT

(*i*) *Simplicius*, in his commentary upon the Predicaments, calls the *first* Order of these intelligible Forms, τὰ πρὸ τῆς μεθέξεως, *those previous to Participation*, and at other times, ἡ ἐξηρημένη κοινότης, *the transcendent Universality* or *Sameness*; the *second* Order he calls τὰ ἐν μεθέξει, *those which exist in Participation*, that is, those merged in Matter; and at other times, he calls them ἡ κατατεταγμένη κοινότης, *the subordinate Universality* or *Sameness*; lastly, of the *third* Order he says, that they have no independent existence of their own, but that—ἡμεῖς ἀφελόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἐννοίαις, καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑπεστήσαμεν, *we ourselves abstracting them in our own Imaginations, have given them by such abstraction an existence as of themselves*. *Simp.* in *Prædic.* p. 17. In another place he says, in a language somewhat mysterious, yet still conformable to the same doctrine—Μήποτε ἐν τριτλὸν λεγέον τὸ κοινόν, τὸ μὲν ἐξηρημένον τῶν καθ' ἑκάστα, καὶ ἄντιον τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς κοινότητος, κατὰ τὴν μίαν ἑαυτῷ φύσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς διαφορότητος κατὰ τὴν πολυειδῆ πρόληψιν—δεύτερον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κοινόν, τὸ ἀπὸ κοινῆς αὐτῶν τοῖς διαφοροῖς εἰδεσιν ἐνδιδόμενον, καὶ ἐνυπάρχον αὐτοῖς—τρίτον δὲ, τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις διανοίαις ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ὑφιστάμενον, ὑπερογενὲς ὄν—*Perhaps therefore we must admit a TRIPLE ORDER OF WHAT IS UNIVERSAL AND THE SAME; that of the first Order, transcendent and superior to Particulars, which thro' its uniform nature is the cause of that Sameness existing in them, as thro' its multiform pre-conception it is the cause of their Diversity—that of the second Order, what is infused from the first universal Cause into the various Species of Beings, and which has its existence in those several Species—that of the third Order, what subsists*
by

THAT the Previous may be *justly* so called is plain, because they are *essentially* prior to all things else. The WHOLE VISIBLE WORLD exhibits

Ch. IV

by abstraction in our own Understandings, being of subsequent origin to the other two. Ibid. p. 21.

To *Simplicius* we shall add the two following Quotations from *Ammonius* and *Nicophorus Blemmides*, which we have ventured to transcribe, without regard to their uncommon length, as they so fully establish the Doctrine here advanced, and the works of these Authors are not easy to be procured.

Ἐννοείσθω τοίνυν δακτύλιός τις ἐκλύπωμα ἔχων, εἰ τύχοι, Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ κηρία πολλὰ παρακείμενα· ὁ δὲ δακτύλιος σφραγιζέτω τὰς κηρὰς πάντας ὑπερὶν δὲ τις εἰσελθὼν καὶ θεασάμενος τὰ κηρία, ἐπιτήσας ὅτι πάντα ἐξ ἐνός εἰσιν ἐκλυπώματα, ἔχέτω παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ ἐκλύπωμα τῇ διανοίᾳ. Ἡ τοίνυν σφραγὶς ἢ ἐν τῷ δακτυλίῳ λέγεται ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ εἶναι· ἢ δὲ ἐν τοῖς κηρίοις, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· ἢ δὲ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῷ ἀπομαξαμένῳ, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, καὶ ὑπερογενής. Τῆτο ἔν ἐννοείσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν· ὁ γὰρ Δημιουργός, ποιῶν πάντα, ἔχει παρ' ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντων παραδείγματα· οἷον, ποιῶν ἄνθρωπον, ἔχει τὸ εἶδος παρ' ἑαυτῷ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, πρὸς ὃ ἀφορῶν, πάντας ποιεῖ. Ἐἰ δὲ τις ἐνταῖη λέγων, ὡς ἐκ εἰσὶ παρὰ τῷ Δημιουργῷ τὰ εἶδη, ἀκτέτω ταῦτα, ὡς ὁ Δημιουργός δημιουργεῖ, ἢ εἰδὼς τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῷ δημιουργήματα, ἢ ἐκ εἰδῶς. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς, ἐκ ἂν δημιουργήσει. Τίς γὰρ, μέλλων ποιήσῃν τί, ἀγνοεῖ ὃ μέλλει ποιεῖν; ἢ γὰρ, ὡς ἡ φύσις, ἀλόγῳ δυνάμει ποιεῖ (ὅθεν καὶ ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις, ἐκ ἐφιδάσκου γνωστικῶς τῷ γιγνόμενῳ)· Ἐἰ δὲ τι καθ' ἑξὶν λογικῇ ποιεῖ, οἶδε πᾶς πάντως τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῷ. Ἐἰ τοίνυν μὴ χεῖρον, ἢ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, ὁ Θεὸς ποιεῖ, οἶδε τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῷ γιγνόμενον· εἰ δὲ οἶδεν ὁ ποιεῖ, αὐτόθι δῆλον, ὡς ἔστιν ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ τὰ εἶδη. Ἐἰ δὲ τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ, ὡς ὁ ἐν τῷ δακτυλίῳ τύπος· καὶ λέγεται τῆτο τὸ εἶδος ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ, καὶ χωριστὸν τῆς ὕλης. Ἐἰ δὲ τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕνατον ἀνθρώποις, ὡς τὰ ἐν τοῖς κηρίοις ἐκλυπώματα· καὶ λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ εἶναι, καὶ ἀχώριστα τῆς ὕλης. Θεασάμενοι δὲ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι πάντες τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἔχουσιν, (ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπερὶν ἐλθόντος, καὶ θεασάμενος τὰ κηρία) ἀνεμαξαμένθα αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ· καὶ λέγεται τῆτο ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ἥγουν μετὰ τὰ πολλὰ, καὶ ὑπερογενές. *Intelligatur annulus, qui alicujus, utpote Achillis, imaginem insculptam habeat: multæ insuper ceræ sint, et ab annulo imprimentur: vaniat deinde quispiam, videatque ceras omnes unius annuli impressione formatas, annulique impressionem in mente contineat: sigillum annulo insculptum, ANTE MULTA dicetur: in cerulis impressum, in MULTIS: quod vero in illius, qui illo venerat intelligentiâ remanserit, POST MULTA, et posterius genitum dicetur. Idem in generibus et formis intelligendum censeo: etenim ille optimus procreator mundi Deus, omnium rerum formas, atque exempla habet apud se: ut si hominem efficere velit, in hominis formam, quam habet, intueatur, et ad illius exemplum ceteros faciat omnes. At si quis restiterit, dicatque rerum formas apud Creatorem non esse: quæso ut diligenter attendat: Opifex, quæ facit, vel cognoscit, vel ignorat: sed is, qui nesciet, nunquam quicquam faciet: quis enim id facere aggreditur, quod facere ignorat? Neque enim facultate quâdam rationis experte aliquid aget, prout agit natura (ex quo conficitur, ut natura etiam agat, etsi quæ faciat, non advertat:).*

Ch. IV. exhibits nothing more, than so many *passing* Pictures of these *immutable* Archetypes. Nay thro' these it attains even a Semblance of Immortality,

advertat: Si vero ratione quadam aliquid facit, quodcunque ab eo factum est omnino cognovit. Si igitur Deus non pejore ratione, quam homo, facit quid, quæ fecit cognovit: si cognovit quæ fecit, in ipso rerum formas esse perspicuum est. Formæ autem in opifice sunt perinde ac in annulo sigillum, hæcque forma ANTE MULTA, et avulsa a materiâ dicitur. Atqui hominis species in unoquoque homine est, quemadmodum etiam sigilla in ceris; et IN MULTIS, nec avulsa a materiâ dicitur. At cum singulos homines animo conspiciamus, et eandem in unoquoque formam atque effigiem videmus, illa effigies in mente nostrâ insidens POST MULTA, et posterius genita dicitur: veluti in illo quoque dicebamus, qui multa sigilla in cerâ uno et eodem annulo impressa conspexerat. Ammon. in Porphy. Introduct. p. 29. b.

Λέγονται δὲ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· οἷον ἐννοεῖσθω τι σφραγιτήριον, ἔχον καὶ ἐκλύπωμα τὸ τυχόν, ἐξ ἧς κηρία πολλὰ μεταλαβέτω τῷ ἐκλύπωματι, καὶ τις ὑπ' ὅψιν ἀγαγέτω ταῦτα, μὴ προκατιδὼν μηδ' ὅλως τὸ σφραγιτήριον· ἑωρακὼς δὲ τὰ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐκλύπωμα, καὶ ἐπισήσας ὅτι πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ μετέχουσιν ἐκλύπωματι, καὶ τὰ δοκῶντα πολλὰ τῷ λόγῳ συναθροίσας εἰς ἓν, ἐχέτω τῆτο κατὰ διάνοιαν. Τὸ μὲν ἓν σφραγιτήριον τύπωμα λέγεται ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ· τό δ' ἐν τοῖς κηρίοις, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· τὸ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν καταληφθὲν, καὶ κατὰ διάνοιαν αὐλῶς ὑποστάν, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ. Οὕτως ἓν καὶ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ μὲν εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ, κατὰ τὰς ποιητικὰς λόγους· ἐν τῷ Θεῷ γὰρ οἱ ἐσιοποιοὶ λόγοι τῶν ὄντων ἐνιαίως προῦφετήμασι, καθ' ἧς λόγους ὁ ὑπερῷος τὰ ὄντα πάντα καὶ προώρισε καὶ παρήγαγεν· ὑφετηκέναι δὲ λέγονται τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, διότι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώποις τὸ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶδος ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἵπποις τὸ τῷ ἵππῳ εἶδος· ἐν ἀνθρώποις, δὲ, καὶ ἵπποις, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τὸ γένος εὐρίσκεται τῶν τοιούτων εἰδῶν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ζῶον· καὶ τοῖς ζώοις ὅμῃ καὶ τοῖς ζωοφύτοις τὸ καθολικώτερον γένος, τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ἐξετάζεται· συναχθέντων δὲ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν, θεωρεῖται τὸ ἐμφυχον· εἰ δὲ σὺν τοῖς ἐμφύχοις ἐθέλει τις ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ τὰ ἀψυχὰ, τὸ σῶμα σύμπαν κατόψεται· συνδραμυστῶν δὲ τοῖς ἐξηρημένοις τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἐσιῶν, τὸ πρῶτον γένος φανεῖται καὶ γενικώτατον· καὶ ἔτω μὲν ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ ὑφέτηκε τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ γένη. Καταλαβὼν δὲ τις ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν, τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἵππων αὐτὴν τὴν ἵππότητα, καὶ ἔτω τὸν καθόλου ἀνθρώπον, καὶ τὸν καθόλου ἵππον ἐπινοήσας· καὶ τὸ καθόλου ζῶον ἐκ τῶν κατέκατα τῷ λόγῳ συναγαγὼν· καὶ τὸ καθόλου αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐμφυχον, καὶ τὸ καθόλου σῶμα, καὶ τὴν καθολικωτάτην ἐσίαν ἐξ ἀπάντων συλλογισάμενος, ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ διανοίᾳ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη αὐλῶς ὑπέστησεν ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, τῷ τῷ, μετὰ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὑπερογενῶς. Genera verò et Species dicuntur esse ANTE MULTA, IN MULTIS, POST MULTA. Ut puta, intelligatur sigillum, quamlibet figuram habens, ex quo multæ ceræ ejusdem figuræ sint participes, et in medium aliquis has proferat, nequaquam præviso sigillo. Cum autem vidisset eas ceras in quibus figura exprimitur, et animadvertisset omnes eandem figuram participare, et quæ uidebantur multæ, ratione in unum coegisset, hoc in mente teneat. Nempe sigillum dicitur esse species ANTE MULTA; illa vero in ceris, IN MULTIS; quæ vero ab iis desumitur, et in mente immaterialiter subsistit, POST MULTA. Sic igitur

Immortality, and continues throughout ages to be SPECIFICALLY ONE, amid those infinite particular changes, that befall it every moment (*k*). Ch. IV.

MAY

et Genera et Species ANTE MULTA in Creatore sunt, secundum rationes efficientes. In Deo enim rerum effectrices rationes una et simpliciter præ-existunt; secundum quas rationes ille supra-substantialis omnes res et prædestinavit et produxit. Existere autem dicuntur Genera et Species IN MULTIS, quoniam in singulis hominibus hominis Species, et in singulis equis equi Species est. In hominibus æque ac in equis et aliis animalibus Genus invenitur harum specierum, quod est animal. In animalibus etiam una cum Zoophytis magis universale Genus, nempe sensitivum exquiritur. Additis vero plantis, spectatur Genus animatum. Si verò una cum animatis quisquam velit perscrutari etiam inanimata, totum Corpus perspiciet. Cum autem entia incorporea conjuncta fuerint iis modo tractatis, apparebit primum et generalissimum Genus. Atque ita quidem IN MULTIS subsistunt Genera et Species. Comprehendens vero quisquam ex singulis hominibus naturam ipsam humanam, et ex singulis equis ipsam equinam, atque ita universalem hominem et universalem equum considerans, et universale animal ex singulis ratione colligens, et universale sensitivum, et universale animatum, et universale corpus, et maxime universale ens ex omnibus colligens, hic, inquam, in suâ mente Genera et Species immaterialiter constituit ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, hoc est, POST MULTA, et posterius genita. Niceph. Blem. Log. Epit. p. 62. Vid. etiam Alcibiades in Platonic. Philosoph. Introduct. C. IX. X.

(*k*) The following elegant Lines of *Virgil* are worth attending to, tho' applied to no higher a subject than Bees.

*Ergo ipsas quamvis angusti terminus ævi
Excipiat: (neque enim plus septima ducitur ætas)
AT GENUS IMMORTALE MANET—G. IV.*

The same *Immortality*, that is, the *Immortality of the Kind*, may be seen in all *perishable* substances, whether animal or inanimate; for tho' *Individuals perish*, the *several Kinds still remain*. And hence, if we take *TIME*, as denoting the *system of things temporary*, we may collect the meaning of that passage in the *Timæus*, where the Philosopher describes *TIME* to be—*μένοντες αἰῶντες ἐν ἐνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἴσσαν αἰῶνιον εἰκόνα. Æternitatis in uno permanentis Imaginem quandam, certis numerorum articulis progredientem. Plat. V. III. p. 37. Edit. Serran.*

We have subjoined the following extract from *Boethius*, to serve as a commentary on this description of *TIME*.—*ÆTERNITAS igitur est, interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio. Quod ex collatione temporalium clarius liquet. Nam quidquid vivit in TEMPORE, id præsens à præteritis in futura procedit: nihilque est in tempore ita constitutum, quod totum vitæ suæ spatium pariter possit amplecti; sed crastinum quidem nondum apprehendit,*

Ch. IV.

MAY we be allowed then to credit those speculative Men, who tell
 “ us, it is in these permanent and comprehensive FORMS that THE DEITY
 “ views at once, without looking abroad, all possible productions both
 “ present, past, and future—that this great and stupendous View is but
 “ a View of himself, where all things lie enveloped in their Principles and
 “ Exemplars, as being essential to the fulness of his universal Intellection?”
 —If so, it will be proper that we invert the Axiom before mention-
 ed. We must now say — *Nil est in SENSU, quod non prius fuit in*
INTELLECTU. For tho’ the contrary may be true with respect to
 Knowledge merely human, yet never can it be true with respect to
 Knowledge

apprehendit, hesternum vero jam perdidit. In hodiernâ quoque vita non amplius vivitis, quam in illo mobili transitorioque momento. Quod igitur Temporis patitur conditionem, licet illud, sicut de mundo censuit Aristoteles, nec ceperit unquam esse, nec desinat, vitæque ejus cum temporis infinitate tendatur, nondum tamen tale est, ut æternum esse jure credatur. Non enim totum simul infinitæ licet vitæ spatium comprehendit, atque complectitur, sed futura nondum transacta jam non habet. Quod igitur interminabilis vitæ plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit, ac possidet, cui neque futuri quidquam absit, nec præteriti fluxerit, id ÆTERNUM esse jure perhibetur: idque necesse est, et sui compos præsens sibi semper assistere, et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere præsentem. Unde quidam non rectè, qui cum audiunt visum Platoni, mundum hunc nec habuisse initium, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri coæternum putant. Aliud est enim PER INTERMINABILEM DUCI VITAM, (quod Mundo Plato tribuit) aliud INTERMINABILIS VITÆ TOTAM PARITER COMPLEXAM ESSE PRÆSENTIAM, quod Divinæ Mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque enim Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet temporis quantitate, sed simplicis potius proprietate naturæ. HUNC ENIM VITÆ IMMOBILIS PRÆSENTARIUM STATUM, INFINITUS ILLE TEMPORALIUM RERUM MOTUS IMITATUR; cumque eum effingere, atque æquare non possit, ex immobilitate deficit in motum; ex simplicitate præsentiae decrescit in infinitam futuri ac præteriti quantitatem; et, cum totam pariter vitæ suæ plenitudinem nequeat possidere, hoc ipso, quod aliquo modo nunquam esse desinit, illud, quod implere atque exprimere non potest, aliquatenus videtur æmulari, alligans se ad qualemcunque præsentiam hujus exigui volucrisque momenti: quæ, quoniam MANENTIS ILLIUS PRÆSENTIÆ QUANDAM GESTAT IMAGINEM, quibuscumque contigerit, id præstat, ut ESSE videantur. Quoniam vero manere non potuit, infinitum Temporis iter arripuit: eoque modo factum est, ut CONTINUARET VITAM EUNDO, cujus plenitudinem complecti non valuit PERMANENDO. Itaque, &c. De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.

Knowledge universally, *unless we give Precedence to ATOMS and LIFE-LESS BODY, making MIND, among other things, to be struck out by a lucky Concourse.* Ch. IV.

§ 3. It is far from the design of this Treatise, to insinuate that Atheism is the Hypothesis of our latter Metaphysicians. But yet it is somewhat remarkable, in their several Systems, how readily they admit of the above *Precedence*.

FOR mark the Order of things, according to *their* account of them. First comes that huge Body *the sensible World*. Then this and its Attributes beget *sensible Ideas*. Then out of sensible Ideas, by a kind of lopping and pruning, are made *Ideas intelligible, whether specific or general*. Thus should they admit that MIND was coeval with BODY, yet *till BODY gave it Ideas*, and awakened its dormant Powers, it could at best have been nothing more, than *a sort of dead Capacity; for INNATE IDEAS it could not possibly have any*.

AT another time we hear of *Bodies so exceedingly fine*, that their very *Exility* makes them susceptible of *sensation and knowledge*; as if they shrunk into *Intellect* by their exquisite subtlety, which rendered them too delicate to be Bodies any longer. It is to this notion we owe many curious inventions, such as *subtle Æther, animal Spirits, nervous Ducts, Vibrations*, and the like; Terms, which MODERN PHILOSOPHY, upon parting with *occult Qualities*, has found expedient to provide itself, to supply their place.

Ch. IV.

BUT the *intellectual* Scheme, which never forgets Deity, postpones every thing corporeal to the *primary mental Cause*. It is here it looks for the origin of *intelligible* Ideas, even of those, which exist in *human Capacities*. For tho' *sensible* Objects may be the destined medium, to awaken the dormant Energies of Man's Understanding, yet are those Energies themselves no more contained in *Sense*, than the Explosion of a Cannon, in the Spark which gave it fire (1).

IN

(1) The following Note is taken from a Manuscript Commentary of the *Platonic Olympiodorus*, (quoted before, p. 414.) upon the *Phædo* of *Plato*; which tho' perhaps some may object to from inclining to the Doctrine of *Platonic Reminiscence*, yet it certainly gives a better account how far the *Senses* assist in the acquisition of *Science*, than we can find given by vulgar Philosophers.

Οὐδέποτε γὰρ τὰ χεῖρω καὶ δεύτερα ἀρχαὶ ἢ αὐτῶν εἰσὶ τῶν κρείττονων· εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς ἐγκυκλίσις ἐξηγήσασθαι, καὶ ἀρχὴν εἰπεῖν τὴν αἰσθησιν τῆς ἐπιστήμης, λέξομεν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχ' ὡς ποιητικὴν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐρεθίζουσαν τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν τῶν καθόλου—κατὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἐννοίαν εἰρηται καὶ τὸ ἐν *Τιμαίῳ*, ὅτι δι' ὅψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπορίσασθαι γένεσθαι, διότι ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν ἀφικνέμεθα. Those things, which are inferior and secondary, are by no means the Principles or Causes of the more excellent; and tho' we admit the common interpretations, and allow SENSE to be a Principle of SCIENCE, we must however call it a Principle, not as if it was the efficient Cause, but as it rouses our Soul to the Recollection of general Ideas—According to the same way of thinking is it said in the *Timæus*, that through the Sight and Hearing we acquire to ourselves Philosophy, because we pass from Objects of SENSE to REMINISCENCE or RECOLLECTION.

And in another passage he observes—Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάμμορφον ἀγαλμὰ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ, πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἔχουσα λόγους, ἐρεθιζομένη ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀναμιμνήσκειται ὧν ἐνδον ἔχει λόγων, καὶ τὰς προσάλλεται. For in as much as the SOUL, by containing the Principles of all Beings, is a sort of OMNIFORM REPRESENTATION or EXEMPLAR; when it is roused by objects of Sense, it recollects those Principles, which it contains within, and brings them forth.

Georgius Gemistus, otherwise called *Pletho*, writes upon the same subject in the following manner. Τὴν ψυχὴν φασὶν οἱ τὰ εἶδη τιθέμενοι ἀναλαμβάνουσιν ἔσθ' ἐπιστήμην τὰς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λόγους, ἀκριβέστερον αὐτὰς ἔχοντας καὶ τελεώτερον ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἴσχειν, ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἔχουσι. Τὸ ἐν τελεώτερον τῆτο καὶ ἀκριβέστερον ἐκ αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἴσχει τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅγε μὴ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς. Οὐ δ' αὖ μὴδαμὲν ἀλλόθι ὅν αὐτὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς διανοεῖσθαι· ἐ δὲ γὰρ πεφυκέναι τὴν ψυχὴν μὴδαμὲν ὅν, τι διανοεῖσθαι· τὰς γὰρ ψευδεῖς τῶν δοξῶν ἔχει μὴ ὄντων ἀλλ' ὄντων μὲν, ἄλλων δὲ κατ' ἄλλων εἶναι σφινθέσεις τινὰς, ἐ κατὰ τὸ ὁρῶν

IN short ALL MINDS, that are, are SIMILAR and CONGENIAL; Ch. IV.
and so too are *their Ideas*, or *intelligible Forms*. Were it otherwise,
there

ὁρθὸν γινομένης. Λείπεσθαι δὲ ἀφ' ἑτέρας τινὸς φύσεως πολλῶν ἔτι κρείττονός τε καὶ τελεωτέρας ἀφήκειν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ τελεώτερον τῆτο τῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λόγων. *Those who suppose IDEAL FORMS, say that the Soul, when she assumes, for the purposes of Science, those Proportions, which exist in sensible objects, possesses them with a superior accuracy and perfection, than that to which they attain in those sensible objects. Now this superior Perfection or Accuracy the Soul cannot have from sensible objects, as it is in fact not in them; nor yet can she conceive it herself as from herself, without its having existence any where else. For the Soul is not formed so as to conceive that, which has existence no where, since even such opinions, as are false, are all of them compositions irregularly formed, not of mere Non-Beings, but of various real Beings, one with another. It remains therefore that this Perfection, which is superior to the Proportions existing in sensible objects, must descend to the Soul from SOME OTHER NATURE, WHICH IS BY MANY DEGREES MORE EXCELLENT AND PERFECT. Pleth. de Aristotel. et Platonic. Philosoph. Diff. Edit. Paris 1541.*

The ΛΟΓΟΙ or PROPORTIONS, of which *Gemistius* here speaks, mean not only those relative Proportions of *Equality* and *Inequality*, which exist in Quantity, (such as double, sesquialter, &c.) but in a larger sense, they may be extended to mathematical *Lines*, *Angles*, *Figures*, &c. of all which Λόγοι or *Proportions*, tho' we possess in the *Mind* the most clear and precise Ideas, yet it may be justly questioned, whether any one of them ever existed in the *sensible World*.

To these two Authors we may add *Boethius*, who, after having enumerated many acts of the MIND or INTELLECT, wholly distinct from *Sensation*, and independent of it, at length concludes,

*Hac est efficiens magis
Longè caussa potentior,
Quam quæ materiæ modo
Impressas patitur notas.
Præcedit tamen excitans,
Ac vires animi movens,
Vivo in corpore passio.
Cum vel lux oculos ferit,
Vel vox auribus instrepat;
Tum MENTIS VIGOR excitus,
QUAS INTUS SPECIES TENET,
Ad motus simileis vocans,
Notis applicat exteris,
INTRORSUMQUE RECONDITIS
FORMIS miscet imagines.* De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.

Ch. IV. there could be no intercourse between Man and Man, or (what is more important) between Man and God.

For what is Conversation between Man and Man?—It is a mutual intercourse of *Speaking* and *Hearing*.—To the Speaker it is *to teach*; to the Hearer, it is *to learn*.—To the Speaker, it is *to descend* from *Ideas* to *Words*; to the Hearer, it is *to ascend* from *Words* to *Ideas*.—If the Hearer, in this ascent, can arrive at *no* Ideas, then is he said *not to understand*; if he ascend to Ideas dissimilar and heterogeneous, then is he said *to misunderstand*.—What then is requisite, that he may be said *to understand*?—That he should ascend to certain Ideas, treasured up *within himself*, correspondent and similar to those *within the Speaker*. The same may be said of a *Writer* and a *Reader*; as when any one reads to-day or to-morrow, or here or in *Italy*, what *Euclid* wrote in *Greece* two thousand years ago.

Now is it not marvellous, there should be *so exact an Identity of our Ideas*, if they were only generated from *sensible* Objects, infinite in number, ever changing, distant in Time, distant in Place, and no one Particular the same with any other?

AGAIN, do we allow it possible for God to signify his *will* to Men; or for MEN to signify their *wants* to God?—In both these cases there must be *an Identity of Ideas*, or else nothing is done either one way or the other. Whence then do these COMMON IDENTIC IDEAS come?—Those of *Men*, it seems, come all from *Sensation*. And whence come *God's Ideas*?—Not surely from *Sensation* too; for this we can hardly venture to affirm, without giving to *Body* that *notable*

Precedence

Precedence of being prior to the Intellection of even God himself.—Let them then be *original*; let them be *connate*, and *essential* to the *divine Mind*.—If this be true, is it not a fortunate Event, that *Ideas* of *corporeal* rise, and *others* of *mental*, (*things* derived from *subjects* so *totally distinct*) should so *happily* co-incide in the *same wonderful Identity*?

HAD we not better reason thus upon so *abstruse* a *Subject*?—Either all *MINDS* have their *Ideas* *derived*; or all have them *original*; or *some* have them *original*, and *some* *derived*. If all *Minds* have them *derived*, they must be derived from something, *which is itself not Mind*, and thus we fall insensibly into a kind of *Atheism*. If all have them *original*, *then are all Minds divine*, an *Hypothesis* by far more *plausible* than the former. But if this be not admitted, then must *one Mind* (at least) have *original* *Ideas*, and the rest have them *derived*. Now supposing this last, whence are those *Minds*, whose *Ideas* are *derived*, most likely to derive them?—From *MIND*, or from *BODY*?—From *MIND*, a thing *homogeneous*; or from *BODY*, a thing *heterogeneous*? From *MIND*, such as (from the *Hypothesis*) has *original* *Ideas*; or from *BODY*, which we cannot discover to have any *Ideas* at all? (*m*)—An *Examination* of this kind, pursued with *accuracy* and *temper*, is the most *probable* method of solving these doubts. It is thus we shall be enabled with more *assurance* to decide, whether we are to admit the *Doctrine* of the *Epicurean Poet*,

CORPOREA NATURA *animum constare, animamque*;

OR

(*m*) NOTN δὲ ἐδὲν ΣΩΜΑ γεννᾷ· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὰ ΑΝΟΗΤΑ ΝΟΥΝ ΓΕΝΗΣΟΙ; No BODY produces MIND: for how should THINGS DEVOID OF MIND produce MIND? Sallust de Diis et Mundo, c. 8.

Ch. IV. or trust *the Mantuan Bard*, when he sings in divine numbers,

Ignæus est ollis vigor, et CÆLESTIS ORIGO

Seminibus. —

BUT it is now time, to quit these Speculations. Those, who would trace them farther, and have leisure for such studies, may perhaps find themselves led into regions of Contemplation, affording them prospects both interesting and pleasant. We have at present said as much as was requisite to our Subject, and shall therefore pass from hence to our concluding chapter.

CHAP. V.

Subordination of Intelligence—Difference of Ideas, both in particular Men, and in whole Nations—Different Genius of different Languages—Character of the English, the Oriental, the Latin, and the Greek Languages—Superlative Excellence of the Last—Conclusion.

ORIGINAL TRUTH (*a*), having the most intimate connection with the *supreme Intelligence*, may be said (as it were) to shine with unchangeable splendor, enlightening throughout the Universe every

Ch. V.

(*a*) Those Philosophers, whose Ideas of *Being* and *Knowledge* are derived from *Body* and *Sensation*, have a short method to explain the nature of TRUTH. It is a *factitious* thing, made by every man for himself; which comes and goes, just as it is remembered and forgot; which in the order of things makes its appearance *the last* of any, being not only subsequent to *sensible Objects*, but even to our *Sensations* of them. According to this Hypothesis, there are many Truths, which have been, and are no longer; others, that will be, and have not been yet; and multitudes, that possibly may never exist at all.

But there are other Reasoners, who must surely have had very different notions; those I mean, who represent TRUTH not as the *last*, but the *first* of Beings; who call it *immutable, eternal, omnipresent*; Attributes, that all indicate something more than human. To these it must appear somewhat strange, how men should imagine, that a crude account of the method *how they perceive* Truth, was to pass for an account of *Truth itself*; as if to describe the road to *London*, could be called a Description of that Metropolis.

For my own part, when I read the detail about Sensation and Reflection, and am taught the process at large how my Ideas are all generated, I seem to view the human Soul in the light of a Crucible, where Truths are produced by a kind of logical Chemistry. They may consist (for aught we know) of *natural materials*, but are as much *creatures of our own*, as a Bolus or Elixir.

If

Ch. V.

every possible Subject, by nature susceptible of its benign influence. Passions and other obstacles may prevent indeed its efficacy, as clouds and vapours may obscure the Sun; but it self neither admits *Diminution* nor *Change*, because the Darkeness respects only particular Percipients. Among *these* therefore we must look for ignorance and error, and for that *Subordination of Intelligence*, which is their natural consequence.

WE have daily experience in the Works of ART, that a *partial Knowledge* will suffice for *Contemplation*, tho' we know not enough, to profess ourselves Artists. Much more is this true, with respect to NATURE; and well for mankind is it found to be true, else never could we attain any *natural Knowledge* at all. For if the *constitutive Proportions of a Clock* are so subtle, that few conceive them truly, but the Artist himself; what shall we say to *those seminal Proportions*, which make the essence and character of every *natural Subject*? — Partial views, the Imperfections of Sense; Inattention, Idleness, the turbulence of Passions; Education, local Sentiments, Opinions, and Belief, conspire in many instances to furnish us with Ideas, some *too general*, some *too partial*, and (what is worse than all this) with many that

If *Milton* by his URANIA intended to represent TRUTH, he certainly referred her to a much more antient, as well as a far more noble origin.

———Heav'nly born!
 Before the hills appear'd, or fountains flow'd,
 Thou with eternal Wisdom didst converse,
 Wisdom thy Sister; and with her didst play
 In presence of th' almighty Father, pleas'd
 With thy celestial Song.—— P. L. VII.

See *Proverbs*, VIII. 22, &c. *Jeremiah*, X. 10. *Marc. Antonin.* IX. 1.

that are *erroneous*, and contrary to Truth. These it behoves us to correct as far as possible, by cool suspense and candid examination.

Νῆφε, καὶ μέμνησ' ἀπιστεῖν, ἄρθρα ταῦτα τῶν φρενῶν.

AND thus by a connection perhaps little expected, the Cause of LETTERS, and that of VIRTUE appear to co-incide, it being the business of both *to examine our Ideas, and to amend them by the Standard of Nature and of Truth (b)*.

IN this important Work, we shall be led to observe, how Nations, like single Men, have their *peculiar* Ideas; how these *peculiar* Ideas become THE GENIUS OF THEIR LANGUAGE, since the *Symbol* must of course correspond to its *Archetype (c)*; how the *wisest* Nations, having the *most* and *best* Ideas, will consequently have the *best* and *most copious* Languages; how others, whose Languages are motley and compounded, and who have borrowed from different countries different Arts and Practices, discover by WORDS, to whom they are indebted for THINGS.

To

(b) How useful to ETHIC SCIENCE, and indeed to KNOWLEDGE in general, a GRAMMATICAL DISQUISITION into the *Etymology* and *Meaning* of WORDS was esteemed by the chief and ablest Philosophers, may be seen by consulting *Plato* in his *Cratylus*; *Xenoph. Mem.* IV. 5, 6. *Arrian. Epict.* I. 17. II. 10. *Marc. Anton.* III. 11. V. 8. X. 8.

(c) ΗΘΟΥΣ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ ἔστι τ' ἀνθρώπων ΛΟΓΟΣ. *Stob. Capiuntur Signa haud levia, sed observatu digna (quod fortasse quispiam non putarit) de ingeniis et moribus populorum et nationum ex linguis ipsorum.* *Bacon. de Augm. Scient.* VI. 1. *Vid. etiam. Quintil. L. XI. p. 675. Edit. Capperon. Diog. L. I. p. 58. et Menag. Com. Tusc. Disp. V. 16.*

Ch. V.

To illustrate what has been said, by a few examples. WE BRITONS in our time have been remarkable borrowers, as our *multiform* Language may sufficiently shew. Our Terms in *polite Literature* prove, that this came from *Greece*; our Terms in *Music* and *Painting*, that these came from *Italy*; our Phrases in *Cookery* and *War*, that we learnt these from the *French*; and our Phrases in *Navigation*, that we were taught by the *Flemings* and *Low Dutch*. These many and very different Sources of our Language may be the cause, why it is so deficient in *Regularity* and *Analogy*. Yet we have this advantage to compensate the defect, that what we want in *Elegance*, we gain in *Copiousness*, in which last respect few Languages will be found superior to our own.

LET us pass from ourselves to the NATIONS OF THE EAST. The (d) Eastern World, from the earliest days, has been at all times the Seat of enormous Monarchy. On its natives fair Liberty never shed its genial influence. If at any time civil Discords arose among them (and arise there did innumerable) the contest was never about *the Form of their Government*; for this was an object, of which the Combatants had no conception; it was all from the poor motive of, *who should be their MASTER*, whether a *Cyrus* or an *Artaxerxes*, a *Mahomet* or a *Mustapha*.

SUCH was their Condition, and what was the consequence?— Their Ideas became consonant to their servile State, and their Words became

(d) Διὰ γὰρ τὸ δαλιώτεροι εἶναι τὰ ἥθη οἱ μὲν Βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν, ἔδην δυσχεραίνοντες. For the Barbarians by being more slavish in their Manners than the Greeks, and those of Asia than those of Europe, submit to despotic Government without murmuring or discontent. Arist. Polit. III. 4.

became consonant to their servile Ideas. The great Distinction, for ever in their sight, was that of *Tyrant* and *Slave*; the most unnatural one conceivable, and the most susceptible of pomp, and empty exaggeration. Hence they talked of Kings as Gods, and of themselves, as the meanest and most abject Reptiles. Nothing was either great or little in moderation, but every Sentiment was heightened by incredible Hyperbole. Thus tho' they sometimes ascended into the *Great* and *Magnificent* (*e*), they as frequently degenerated into the *Tumid* and *Bombast*. The *Greeks too of Asia* became infected by their neighbours, who were often at times not only their neighbours, but their masters; and hence that *Luxuriance* of the *Asiatic Stile*, unknown to the chaste eloquence and purity of *Athens*. But of the *Greeks* we forbear to speak now, as we shall speak of them more fully, when we have first considered the Nature or Genius of the *Romans*.

AND what sort of People may we pronounce the ROMANS?—A Nation engaged in wars and commotions, some foreign, some domestic, which for seven hundred years wholly engrossed their thoughts. Hence therefore their LANGUAGE became, like their Ideas, copious in all Terms expressive of things *political*, and well adapted to the purposes both of *History* and *popular Eloquence*.—But what was their *Philosophy*?—As a Nation, it was none, if we may credit their ablest Writers. And hence the Unfitness of their Language to this Subject; a defect, which even *Cicero* is compelled to confess, and more

(*e*) The truest Sublime of the East may be found in the Scriptures, of which perhaps the principal cause is the intrinsic Greatness of the Subjects there treated; the Creation of the Universe, the Dispensations of divine Providence, &c.

Ch. V.

more fully makes appear, when he writes Philosophy himself, from the number of terms, which he is obliged to invent (*f*). *Virgil* seems

(*f*) See *Cic. de Fin.* I. C. 1, 2, 3. III. C. 1, 2, 4. &c. but in particular *Tusc. Disp.* I. 3. where he says, *PHILOSOPHIA jacuit usque ad hanc ætatem, nec ullum habuit lumen LITERARUM LATINARUM; quæ illustranda et excitanda nobis est; ut si, &c.* See also *Tusc. Disp.* IV. 3. and *Acad.* I. 2. where it appears, that 'till *CICERO* applied himself to the writing of *Philosophy*, the *Romans* had nothing of the kind in their language, except some mean performances of *Amasanius* the *Epicurean*, and others of the same sect. How far the *Romans* were indebted to *Cicero* for *Philosophy*, and with what industry, as well as eloquence, he cultivated the Subject, may be seen not only from the titles of those Works that are now lost, but much more from the many noble ones still fortunately preserved.

The *Epicurean* Poet *LUCRETIVS*, who flourished nearly at the same time, seems by his silence to have over-looked the *Latin* writers of his own sect; deriving all his *Philosophy*, as well as *Cicero*, from *Grecian* Sources; and, like him, acknowledging the difficulty of writing in *Philosophy* in *Latin*, both from the *Poverty* of the Tongue, and from the *Novelty* of the Subject.

*Nec me animi fallit, GRAIORUM obscura reperta
Difficile inlustrare LATINIS versibus esse,
(Multa novis rebus præsertim quom sit agendum,)
Propter EGESTATEM LINGUÆ et RERUM NOVITATEM:
Sed tua me virtus tamen, et sperata voluptas
Suavis amicitia quemvis perferre laborem
Suadet—*

Lucr. I. 137.

In the same age, *Varro*, among his numerous works, wrote some in the way of *Philosophy*; as did the Patriot *BRUTUS*, a Treatise concerning *Virtue*; much applauded by *Cicero*; but these Works are now lost.

Soon after the writers above mentioned came *HORACE*, some of whose *Satires* and *Epistles* may be justly ranked amongst the most valuable pieces of *Latin Philosophy*, whether we consider the purity of their *Stile*, or the great *Addres*s, with which they treat the Subject.

After *Horace*, tho' with as long an interval as from the days of *Augustus* to those of *Nero*, came the Satirist *PERSIUS*, the friend and disciple of the Stoic *Cornutus*; to whose precepts as he did honour by his virtuous Life, so his works, tho' small, shew an early proficiency in the Science of *Morals*. Of him it may be said, that he is almost the single difficult writer among the *Latin Classics*, whose meaning has sufficient merit, to make it worth while to labour thro' his obscurities.

In

seems to have judged the most truly of his Countrymen, when admitting their inferiority in the more elegant Arts, he concludes at last with his usual majesty,

*Tu REGERE IMPERIO POPULOS, Romane, memento,
(Hæ tibi erunt artes) pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.*

FROM

In the same degenerate and tyrannic period, lived also SENECA; whose character, both as a Man and a Writer, is discussed with great accuracy by the noble Author of the *Characteristics*, to whom we refer.

Under a milder Dominion, that of *Hadrian* and the *Antonines*, lived AULUS GELLIUS, or (as some call him) AGELLIUS, an entertaining Writer in the miscellaneous way; well skilled in Criticism and Antiquity; who tho' he can hardly be entitled to the name of a *Philosopher*, yet deserves not to pass unmentioned here, from the curious fragments of Philosophy interspersed in his works.

With *Aulus Gellius* we range MACROBIUS, not because a Contemporary, (for he is supposed to have lived under *Honorius* and *Theodosius*) but from his near resemblance, in the character of a Writer. His Works, like the other's, are miscellaneous; filled with Mythology and antient Literature, some Philosophy being intermixed. His Commentary upon the *Somnium Scipionis* of *Cicero* may be considered as wholly of the philosophical kind.

In the same age with *Aulus Gellius*, flourished APULEIUS of *Madaura* in *Africa*, a Platonic Writer, whose Matter in general far exceeds his perplexed and affected Stile, too conformable to the false Rhetoric of the Age when he lived.

Of the same Country, but of a later Age, and a harsher Stile, was MARTIANUS CAPELLA, if indeed he deserve not the name rather of a *Philologist*, than of a *Philosopher*.

After *Capella*, we may rank CHALCIDIUS the Platonic, tho' both his Age, and Country, and Religion are doubtful. His manner of writing is rather more agreeable than that of the two preceding, nor does he appear to be their inferior in the knowledge of Philosophy, his work being a laudable Commentary upon the *Timæus* of *Plato*.

The last Latin Philosopher was BOETHIUS, who was descended from some of the noblest of the *Roman* Families, and was Consul in the beginning of the sixth Century. He wrote many philosophical Works, the greater part in the Logical way. But his *Ethic* piece, *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, and which is partly prose, and partly verse,

Ch. V.

FROM considering *the Romans*, let us pass TO THE GREEKS. THE GRECIAN COMMONWEALTHS, while they maintained their Liberty, were the most heroic Confederacy, that ever existed. They were the politeſt, the braveſt, and the wiſeſt of men. In the ſhort ſpace of little more than a Century, they became ſuch Stateſmen, Warriors, Orators, Hiſtorians, Phyſicians, Poets, Critics, Painters, Sculptors, Architects, and (laſt of all) Philoſophers, that one can hardly help conſidering THAT GOLDEN PERIOD, as a Providential Event in honour of human Nature, to ſhew to what perfection the Species might aſcend (g).

Now

verſe, deſerves great encomiums both for the Matter, and for the Stile; in which laſt he approaches the Purity of a far better age than his own, and is in all reſpects preferable to thoſe crabbed *Africans* already mentioned. By command of *Theodoric* king of the *Goths*, it was the hard fate of this worthy Man to ſuffer death; with whom the *Latin Tongue*, and the laſt remains of *Roman Dignity*, may be ſaid to have ſunk in the weſtern World.

There were other *Romans*, who left *Philoſophical* Writings; ſuch as *Musonius Rufus*, and the two Emperors, *Marcus Antoninus* and *Julian*; but as theſe preferred the uſe of the *Greek Tongue* to their own, they can hardly be conſidered among the number of *Latin Writers*.

And ſo much (by way of ſketch) for THE LATIN AUTHORS OF PHILOSOPHY; a ſmall number for ſo vaſt an Empire, if we conſider them as all the product of near fix ſucceſſive centuries.

(g) If we except *Homer*, *Hefiod*, and the *Lyric Poets*, we hear of few *Grecian Writers* before the expedition of *Xerxes*. After that Monarch had been defeated, and the dread of the *Persian* power was at an end, the EFFULGENCE OF GRECIAN GENIUS (if I may uſe the expreſſion) broke forth, and ſhone till the time of *Alexander the Macedonian*, after whom it diſappeared, and never roſe again. This is that *Golden Period* ſpoken of above. I do not mean that *Greece* had not many writers of great merit ſubſequent to that period, and eſpecially of the philoſophic kind; but the *Great*, the *Striking*, the *Sublime* (call it as you pleaſe) attained at that time to a height, to which it never could aſcend in any after age.

The

NOW THE LANGUAGE OF THESE GREEKS was truly like themselves, it was conformable to their transcendent and universal Genius. Where Matter so abounded, Words followed of course, and those exquisite in every kind, as the Ideas for which they stood. And hence it followed, there was not a Subject to be found, which could not with propriety be expressed in *Greek*.

HERE

The same kind of fortune befel the people of *Rome*. When the *Punic* wars were ended, and *Carthage* their dreaded Rival was no more, then (as *Horace* informs us) they began to cultivate the politer arts. It was soon after this, their great Orators, and Historians, and Poets arose, and *Rome*, like *Greece*, had her *Golden Period*, which lasted to the death of *Octavius Cæsar*.

I call these two Periods, from the two greatest Geniuses that flourished in each, one THE SOCRATIC PERIOD, the other THE CICERONIAN.

There are still farther analogies subsisting between them. Neither Period commenced, as long as sollicitude for the common welfare engaged men's attentions, and such wars impended, as threatened their destruction by Foreigners and Barbarians. But when once these fears were over, a general security soon ensued, and instead of attending to the arts of defence and self-preservation, they began to cultivate those of Elegance and Pleasure. Now, as these naturally produced a kind of wanton insolence (not unlike the vitious temper of high-fed animals) so by this the bands of union were insensibly dissolved. Hence then among the *Greeks* that fatal *Peloponnesian* War, which together with other wars, its immediate consequence, broke the confederacy of their Commonwealths; wasted their strength; made them jealous of each other; and thus paved a way for the contemptible kingdom of *Macedon* to enslave them all, and ascend in a few years to universal Monarchy.

A like luxuriance of prosperity sowed discord among the *Romans*; raised those unhappy contests between the *Senate* and the *Gracchi*; between *Sylla* and *Marius*; between *Pompey* and *Cæsar*; till at length, after the last struggle for Liberty by those brave Patriots *Brutus* and *Cassius* at *Philippi*, and the subsequent defeat of *Anthony* at *Actium*, the *Romans* became subject to the dominion of a FELLOW-CITIZEN.

It must indeed be confessed, that after *Alexander* and *Octavius* had established their Monarchies, there were many bright Geniuses, who were eminent under their Government. *Aristotle* maintained a friendship and epistolary correspondence with *Alexander*. In the time of the same Monarch lived *Theophrastus*, and the Cynic, *Diogenes*. Then also *Demosthenes* and *Æschines* spoke their two celebrated Orations. So likewise in the time of *Octavius*, *Virgil* wrote his *Æneid*, and with *Horace*, *Varius*, and many other fine Writers, partook of his protection and royal munificence. But then it must be remem-

bered,

Ch. V.

HERE were Words and Numbers for the Humour of an *Aristophanes*; for the native Elegance of a *Philemon* or *Menander*; for the amorous Strains of a *Mimnermus* or *Sappho*; for the rural Lays of a *Theocritus* or *Bion*; and for the sublime Conceptions of a *Sophocles* or *Homer*. The same in Prose. Here *Isocrates* was enabled to display his Art, in all the accuracy of Periods, and the nice counterpoise of Diction. Here *Demosthenes* found materials for that nervous Composition, that manly force of unaffected Eloquence, which rushed, like a torrent, too impetuous to be withstood.

WHO were more different in exhibiting their *Philosophy*, than *Xenophon*, *Plato*, and his disciple, *Aristotle*? Different, I say, in their character of *Composition*; for as to their *Philosophy itself*, it was in reality *the same*. *Aristotle*, strict, methodic, and orderly; subtle in Thought; sparing in Ornament; with little address to the Passions or Imagination; but exhibiting the whole with such a pregnant brevity, that in every sentence we seem to read a page. How exquisitely is this all performed *in Greek*? Let those, who imagine it may be done as well in another Language, satisfy themselves either by attempting to translate him, or by perusing his translations already made by men of learning. On the contrary, when we read either *Xenophon* or *Plato*, nothing of this *method* and strict order appears.

bered, that these men were bred and educated in the principles of a free Government. It was hence they derived that high and manly spirit, which made them the admiration of after-ages. The Successors and Forms of Government left by *Alexander* and *Octavius*, soon stopt the growth of any thing farther in the kind. So true is that noble saying of *Longinus*—Θρέψαι τε γὰρ ἱκανῇ τὰ φρονήματα τῶν μεγαλοφρόνων ἢ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΑ, καὶ ἐπελπίσαι, καὶ ἅμα διωθεῖν τὸ πρόθυμον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐριδος, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα φιλοτιμίας. *It is LIBERTY that is formed to nurse the sentiments of great Geniuses; to inspire them with hope; to push forward the propensity of contest one with another, and the generous emulation of being the first in rank.* De Subl. Sect. 44.

pears. The *Formal* and *Didactic* is wholly dropt. Whatever they may teach, it is without professing to be teachers; a train of Dialogue and truly polite Addrefs, in which, as in a Mirrour, we behold human Life, adorned in all its colours of Sentiment and Manners.

AND yet though these differ in this manner from the *Stagirite*, how different are they likewise in character from each other?—*Plato*, copious, figurative, and majestic; intermixing at times the facetious and satiric; enriching his Works with Tales and Fables, and the mystic Theology of antient times. *Xenophon*, the Pattern of perfect simplicity; every where smooth, harmonious, and pure; declining the figurative, the marvellous, and the mystic; ascending but rarely into the Sublime; nor then so much trusting to the colours of Stile, as to the intrinsic dignity of the Sentiment itself.

THE Language in the mean time, in which *He* and *Plato* wrote, appears to suit so accurately with the Stile of both, that when we read either of the two, we cannot help thinking, that it is he alone, who has hit its character, and that it could not have appeared so elegant in any other manner.

AND thus is THE GREEK TONGUE, from its *Propriety and Universality*, made for all that is great, and all that is beautiful, in every Subject, and under every Form of writing.

GRAIIS ingenium, GRAIIS dedit ore rotundo

Musa loqui.

Ch. V.

It were to be wished, that those amongst us, who either write or read, with a view to employ their liberal leisure (for as to such, as do either from views more fordid, we leave them, like Slaves, to their destined drudgery) it were to be wished, I say, that the liberal (if they have a relish for letters) would inspect the finished Models of *Grecian Literature*; that they would not waste those hours, which they cannot recall, upon the meaner productions of the *French* and *English* Prefs; upon that fungous growth of Novels and of Pamphlets, where, it is to be feared, they rarely find any rational pleasure, and more rarely still, any solid improvement.

To be *competently* skilled in antient learning, is by no means a work of such insuperable pains. The very progress itself is attended with delight, and resembles a Journey through some pleasant Country, where every mile we advance, new charms arise. It is certainly as easy to be a Scholar, as a Gamester, or many other Characters equally illiberal and low. The same application, the same quantity of habit will fit us for one, as completely as for the other. And as to those who tell us, with an air of seeming wisdom, that *it is Men*, and *not Books*, we must study to become knowing; this I have always remarked, from repeated Experience, to be the common consolation and language of Dunces. They shelter their ignorance under a few bright Examples, whose transcendent abilities, without the common helps, have been sufficient *of themselves* to great and important Ends. But alas!

Decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile—

IN truth, each man's Understanding, when ripened and mature, is a composite of *natural Capacity*, and of *super-induced Habit*.

Hence

Hence the greatest Men will be necessarily those, who possess *the best* Capacities, cultivated with *the best* Habits. Hence also moderate Capacities, when adorned with valuable Science, will far transcend others the most acute by nature, when either neglected, or applied to low and base purposes. And thus for the honour of CULTURE and GOOD LEARNING, *they are able to render a man, if he will take the pains, intrinsically more excellent than his natural Superiors.*

AND so much at present as to GENERAL IDEAS; *how we acquire them; whence they are derived; what is their Nature; and what their connection with Language.* So much likewise as to the Subject of this Treatise, UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

END OF THE THIRD BOOK.

A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

THE following Notes are either Translations of former Notes, or Additions to them. The additional are chiefly Extracts from Greek Manuscripts, which (as the Author has said already concerning others of the same kind) are valuable both for their Rarity, and for their intrinsic Merit.

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

PAG. 267.—TO STOP, &c.] The Quotation from *Proclus* in the Note may be thus rendered—THAT THING IS AT REST, *which* FOR A TIME PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT IS IN THE SAME PLACE, *both itself, and its Parts.*

P. 273. In the Note, for *γινόμενον* read *γενόμενον*, and render the passage thus—*For by this faculty (namely the faculty of Sense) we neither know the Future, nor the Past, but the Present only.*

Ibid. NOTE (d).] The passage of *Philoponus* here referred to, but by mistake omitted, has respect to the notion of beings *corporeal* and *sensible*, which were said to be *nearly approaching to Non-Entitys*. The Author explains this, among other reasons, by the following—Πῶς δὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔσι γειτνιάζει; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα τὸ παρελθόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ μέλλον, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ὄντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἠφάνισται καὶ ἔκ ἐτι ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ἔτι ἐστὶ· συμπαραθέει δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τὰ φύσικα πάντα, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῶν παρακολούθημά ἐστι ὁ χρόνος. *How therefore is it that they approach nearly to Non-Entitys? In the first place, because HERE (where they exist) exists THE PAST and THE FUTURE, and these are NON-ENTITYS; for the one is vanished, and is no more, the other is not as yet. Now all natural Substances pass away along with TIME, or rather it is upon their Motion that TIME is an Attendant.*

P. 280—in the Note here subjoined mention is made of the REAL NOW, or INSTANT, and its efficacy. To which we may add, that there is not only a *necessary* Connection between *Existence* and the *Present Instant*, because *no other Point* of Time can properly be said to be, but also between *Existence* and *Life*, because whatever *lives*, by the same reason necessarily *Is*. Hence *Sophocles*, speaking of *Time present*, elegantly says of it—

— χρόνῳ τῷ ζώντι, καὶ παρόντι νῦν·

THE LIVING, and now present TIME. *Trachin.* V. 1185.

P. 339.

P. 339.—The Passage in *Virgil*, of which *Servius* here speaks, is a description of *Turnus's* killing two brothers, *Amycus* and *Diores*; after which the Poet says of him,

— curru abscissa DUORUM
Suspendit capita —

This, literally translated, is—he hung up on his chariot the heads of Two persons, which were cut off, whereas the Sense requires, of THE Two Persons, that is to say, of *Amycus* and *Diores*. Now this by *Amborum* would have been exprest properly, as *Amborum* means THE Two; by *Duorum* is exprest improperly, as it means only Two indefinitely.

P. 356.—The Passage in Note (o) from *Themistius*, may be thus rendered—Nature in many instances appears to make her transition by little and little, so that in some Beings it may be doubted, whether they are Animal, or Vegetable.

P. 374.—Note (c)—There are in the number of things many, which have a most known EXISTENCE, but a most unknown ESSENCE; such for example as Motion, Place, and more than either of them, Time. The EXISTENCE of each of these is known and indisputable, but what their ESSENCE is, or Nature, is among the most difficult things to discern. The Soul also is in the same Class: that it is something, is most evident; but what it is, is a matter not so easy to learn. Alex. Aphrod. p. 142.

P. 399.—LANGUAGE—INCAPABLE OF COMMUNICATING DEMONSTRATION.] See p. 126, and the additional note on the words, *The Source of infinite Truths*, &c.

P. 413.—In the Note—yet so held the Philosopher of Malmesbury, and the Author of the *Essay*, &c.]

Philoponus, from the Philosophy of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, seems to have far excelled these Moderns in his account of WISDOM or PHILOSOPHY, and its Attributes, or essential Characters.—Ἰδιον γὰρ φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχει διαφορὰν δεῖξαι τὴν κοινωσίαν, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχει κοινωσίαν δεῖξαι τὴν διαφέρειν· ἡ γὰρ δυσχερὲς τὸ δεῖξαι φάτης (lege φάτης) καὶ περιγεῖρας κοινωσίαν (παντὶ γὰρ πρᾶπτον), ἀλλ' ἡ (lege ὅπερ) τὸ διάφορον τέτων εἰπεῖν· ἐδὲ κυνὸς καὶ ἵππου διαφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τί κοινὸν ἔχουσιν. IT IS THE PROPER BUSINESS OF PHILOSOPHY TO SHEW IN MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE DIFFERENCE, WHAT IS THEIR COMMON CHARACTER; and IN MANY

MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE A COMMON CHARACTER, THRO' WHAT IT IS THEY DIFFER. *It is indeed no difficult matter to shew the common Character of a Wood-Pigeon and a Dove (for this is evident to every one), but rather to tell where lies the Difference; nor to tell the Difference between a Dog and a Horse, but rather to shew, what they possess in common.* Philop. Com. MS. in Nicomach. Arithm.

P. 419.—THEY ARE MORE EXQUISITE THAN, &c.] The Words of *Aristotle*, here referred to, are these—*μᾶλλον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις, ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τεχνῆς.* THE PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN and BEAUTY are more in the Works of NATURE, than they are in those of ART.

Ibid.—WE MUST OF NECESSITY ADMIT A MIND, &c.] The following quotation, taken from the third Book of a *manuscript Comment of Proclus on the Parmenides of Plato*, is here given for the sake of those, who have curiosity with regard to the doctrine of IDEAS, as held by antient Philosophers.

Εἰ δὲ δεῖ συντόμως εἰπεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν ἰδεῶν ὑποθέσεως, δι' ἣν ἐκείνοις ἤρεσε, ρητέον ὅτι τὰ πάντα ὅσα ὁρατὰ, ἐράνια καὶ ὑπὸ σελήνην, ἢ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτης ἐστίν, ἢ κατ' αἰτίαν· ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ταυτομάτης ἀδύνατον· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑγέροις τὰ κρείττονα, νῆς, καὶ λόγος, καὶ αἰτία, καὶ τὰ αἰτίας, καὶ ἔτω τὰ ἀποτελέσματα κρείττω τῶν ἀρχῶν, πρὸς τῷ καὶ ὁ φησὶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· δεῖ πρὸ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτίων εἶναι τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ, τῶν γὰρ ἑκάστης τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὥστε τὰ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτης πρᾶσσύτερον εἶναι ἢ τὸ κατ' αἰτίαν, εἰ καὶ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτης τὰ θεϊότατα ἢ τῶν φανερῶν. *If therefore we are to relate concisely the Cause, why THE HYPOTHESIS OF IDEAS pleased them (namely Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, &c.) we must begin by observing that all the various visible objects around us, the heavenly as well as the sublunary, are either from CHANCE, or according to a CAUSE. FROM CHANCE IS IMPOSSIBLE; for then the more excellent things (such as Mind, and Reason, and Cause, and the Effects of Cause) will be among those things that come last, and so the ENDINGS of things will be more excellent than their BEGINNINGS. To which too may be added what Aristotle says; that ESSENTIAL CAUSES OUGHT TO BE PRIOR TO ACCIDENTAL, in as much as EVERY ACCIDENTAL CAUSE IS A DEVIATION FROM THEM; so that whatever is the Effect of such essential Cause [as is indeed every work of Art and human Ingenuity] must needs be prior to that which is the Effect of Chance, even tho' we were to refer to Chance the most divine of visible objects [the Heavens themselves].*

The

The Philosopher, having thus proved a *definite Cause* of the World in opposition to *Chance*, proceeds to shew that from the Unity and concurrent Order of things this Cause must be ONE. After which he goes on, as follows.—

—Ἐἰ μὲν ἔν αἰλογον τῆτο, ἄτοπον. ἔσται γάρ τι πάλιν τῶν ὑστέρων τῆς τῆτων αἰτίας κρείττον, τὸ κατὰ λόγον καὶ γινώσιν ποιῶν, ἔισω τῆ Παντός ὄν, καὶ τῆ Ὅλε μέρος, ὃ ἔστιν ἀπ αἰτίας ἀλόγως τοιῆτο. Ἐἰ δὲ λόγον ἔχον, καὶ αὐτὸ γινώσκον, οἶδεν ἑαυτὸ δῆπε τῶν πάντων αἰτιον ὄν, ἢ τῆτο ἀγνοῶν, ἀγνοήσει τὴν ἑαυτῆ φύσιν. Ἐἰ δὲ οἶδεν, ὅτι κατ' ἐσίαν ἐστὶ τῆ παντός αἰτιον, τὸ δὲ ὠρισμένως εἶδος θάτερον, καὶ θάτερον οἶδεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οἶδεν ἄρα καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν αἰτιον ὠρισμένως· οἶδεν ἔν καὶ τὸ Πᾶν, καὶ πάντα ἐξ ὧν τὸ Πᾶν, ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ αἰτιον. Καὶ εἰ τῆτο, ἦτοι εἰς ἑαυτὸ ἄρα βλέπον, καὶ ἑαυτὸ γινώσκον, οἶδε τὰ μετ' αὐτό. Λόγοις ἄρα καὶ εἶδεν αὐτοῖς οἶδε τὰς Κοσμικὰς Λόγους, καὶ τὰ εἶδη, ἐξ ὧν τὸ Πᾶν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ Πᾶν, ὡς ἐν αἰτίῳ, χωρὶς τῆς ὕλης.—

NOW IF THIS CAUSE BE VOID OF REASON, *that indeed would be absurd; for then again there would be something among those things, which came last in order, more excellent than their Principle or Cause. I mean by more excellent, something operating according to Reason and Knowledge, and yet within that Universe, and a Part of that Whole, which is, what it is, from a Cause devoid of Reason.*

But if, on the contrary, THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE BE A CAUSE, HAVING REASON and knowing itself, it of course knows itself to be the Cause of all things; else, being ignorant of this, it would be ignorant of its own nature. But if it know, that from ITS VERY ESSENCE IT IS THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE, and if that, which knows one part of a Relation definitely, knows also of necessity the other, it knows for this reason definitely the thing of which it is the Cause. IT KNOWS THEREFORE THE UNIVERSE, and all things out of which the Universe is composed, of all which also it is the Cause. But if this be true, it is evident that BY LOOKING INTO ITSELF, AND BY KNOWING ITSELF, IT KNOWS WHAT COMES AFTER ITSELF, AND IS SUBSEQUENT. It is, therefore, through certain REASONS and FORMS DEVOID OF MATTER that it knows those mundane Reasons and Forms, out of which the Universe is composed, and that the Universe is in it, as in a Cause, distinct from and without the Matter.

P. 419—AGREEABLE TO WHICH IDEAS THESE WORKS ARE FASHIONED, &c.] It is upon these Principles that Nicomachus in his *Arithmetic*, p. 7. calls the *Supreme Being* an *Artist*—ἐν τῇ τῆ τεχνίτις Θεῷ διανοίᾳ, in *Dei artificis mente*. Where Philoponus, in his *manuscript Comment*, observes as follows—τεχνίτην φησὶ τὸν Θεόν, ὡς πάντων τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας καὶ

τὰς

τὰς λόγους αὐτῶν ἔχοντα. *He calls GOD an ARTIST, as possessing within himself the first Causes of all things, and their Reasons or Proportions.* Soon after speaking of those Sketches, after which Painters work and finish their Pictures, he subjoins—ὥσπερ ἔν ἡμεῖς, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα σκιαγραφήματα βλέποντες, ποιῶμεν τόδε τι, ἔτω καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς, πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἀποβλέπων, τὰ τῆδε πάντα κεκόσμηκεν· ἀλλ' ἴσμεν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν τῆδε σκιαγραφήματα ἀτελῆ εἰσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ οἱ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ λόγοι ἀρχέτυποι καὶ παντέλειοι εἰσιν. *As therefore we, looking upon such Sketches as these, make such and such particular things, so also the Creator, looking at those Sketches of his, hath formed and adorned with beauty all things here below. We must remember, however, that the Sketches here are imperfect; but that the others, those REASONS or Proportions, which exist in GOD, are ARCHETYPAL and ALL-PERFECT.*

It is according to this Philosophy, that *Milton* represents *God*, after he had created this visible World, contemplating

———— how it shew'd

In prospect from his throne, how good, how fair,

ANSWERING HIS GREAT IDEA.—

P. Lost, VII. 556.

Proclus proves the Existence of these GENERAL IDEAS or UNIVERSAL FORMS by the following Arguments.—εἰ τοίνυν ἐν αἰτία τῷ παντὶ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιῶσα, τὸ δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐαυτῆς ποιῆς ἑσίας τῆτό ἐστι πρῶτως, ὅπερ τὸ ποιῶμενον δευτέρως καὶ ὃ ἐστι πρῶτως, δίδωσι τῷ ποιῶμενῳ δευτέρως· οἷον τὸ πῦρ καὶ δίδωσι θερμότητά ἄλλῳ, καὶ ἐστι θερμὸν, ἡ ψυχὴ δίδωσι ζωὴν, καὶ ἔχει ζωὴν, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἰδοῖς ἂν ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον, ὅσα αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιῶν. καὶ τὸ αἷτιον ἐν τῷ παντὶ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιῶν τῆτό ἐστι πρῶτως, ὅπερ ὁ κόσμος δευτέρως. εἰ δὴ ὁ κόσμος πλήρωμα εἰδῶν ἐστὶ παντοίων, εἴη ἂν καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰτίῳ τῷ κόσμῳ ταῦτα πρῶτως· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ αἷτιον καὶ ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ ἄνθρωπον ὑπέστησε, καὶ ἵππον, καὶ ὅλως τὰ εἶδη, τὰ ἐν τῷ παντί. ταῦτα ἄρα πρῶτως ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ αἰτία τῷ παντὶ, ἄλλος ἥλιος παρὰ τὸν ἐμφανῆ, καὶ ἄλλος ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ὁμοίως ἕκαστον. ἐστὶν ἄρα τὰ εἶδη πρὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ αἷτια αὐτῶν τὰ δημιουργικὰ κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον λόγον, ἐν τῇ μιᾷ τῷ κόσμῳ παντὶ αἰτία προϋπάρχοντα. *If therefore THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE be a Cause which operates merely by existing, and if that which operates merely by existing, operate from its own proper Essence, SUCH CAUSE IS PRIMARILY, WHAT ITS EFFECT IS SECONDARILY, and that, which it is primarily, it giveth to its Effect secondarily. It is thus that Fire both giveth Warmth to something else, and is itself warm; that the Soul giveth Life, and possesseth Life; and this reasoning you may perceive to be true in all things whatever, which operate merely by existing. It follows therefore, THAT THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE, operating after this manner, IS THAT PRIMARILY, WHICH THE WORLD IS SECONDARILY. If therefore the WORLD be the*

plenitude of Forms of all Sorts, these Forms must also be primarily in the Cause of the World, for it was the same Cause, which constituted the Sun, and the Moon, and Man, and Horse, and in general all the Forms existing in the Universe. These therefore exist primarily in the Cause of the Universe; another Sun besides the apparent, another Man, and so with respect to every Form else. The Forms therefore, previous to the sensible and external Forms, and which according to this reasoning are their active and efficient Causes, are to be found pre-existing in that One and common Cause of all the Universe. Procli Com. MS. in Plat. Parmenid. L. 3.

We have quoted the above passages for the same reason as the former; for the sake of those, who may have a curiosity to see a sample of this *antient* Philosophy, which (as some have held) may be traced up from *Plato* and *Socrates* to *Parmenides*, *Pythagoras*, and *Orpheus* himself.

If the Phrase, *to operate merely by existing*, should appear questionable, it must be explained upon a supposition, that in the *Supreme Being* no Attributes are *secondary*, *intermittent*, or *adventitious*, but all *original*, *ever perfect* and *essential*. See p. 304, 409.

That we should not therefore think of a *blind unconscious* operation, like that of *Fire* here alluded to, the Author had long before prepared us, by *uniting Knowledge with natural Efficacy*, where he forms the Character of these *Divine* and *Creative* Ideas.

But let us hear him in his own Language.—ἀλλ' ἔπειρ ἐθέλομεν τὴν ιδιότητα αὐτῶν (sc. ἰδεῶν) ἀφορίσασθαι διὰ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν φυσικῶν λόγων λάβωμεν τὸ αὐτῶ τῷ εἶναι ποιητικόν, ὡς δὲ καὶ ποίῃσι· ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνικῶν τὸ γνωστικόν, ὡς ποίῃσιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ αὐτῶ τῷ εἶναι ποίῃσι, καὶ ταῦτα ἐνώσαντες φῶμεν αὐτίας εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας δημιουργικὰς ἅμα καὶ νοερὰς πάντων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀποτελεσμένων. But if we should chuse to define the peculiar character of IDEAS by things more known to us than themselves, let us assume from NATURAL PRINCIPLES THE POWER OF EFFECTING, MERELY BY EXISTING, all the things that they effect; and from ARTIFICIAL PRINCIPLES THE POWER OF COMPREHENDING all that they effect, although they did not effect them merely by existing; and then uniting those two, let us say that IDEAS are at once the EFFICIENT and INTELLIGENT CAUSES of all things produced according to Nature. From book the second of the same Comment.

The Schoolman, *Thomas Aquinas*, a subtle and acute writer, has the following sentence, perfectly corresponding with this Philosophy. *Res omnes comparantur ad Divinum Intellectum, sicut artificiata ad Artem.*

The Verses of *Orpheus* on this subject may be found in the tract *De Mundo*, ascribed to *Aristotle*, p. 23. Edit. *Sylburg*.

Ζεὺς ἄρσιν γένετο, Ζεὺς, κ. τ. λ.

P. 424—WHERE ALL THINGS LIE INVELOPED, &c.]

—ὅσα πέρ ἐστι ΤΑ ΠΟΛΛΑ κατὰ δὴ τινὰ μερισμὸν, τοσαῦτα καὶ ΤΟ ΕΝ ἐκείνο πρὸ τῆ μερισμῶ κατὰ τὸ πάντη ἀμερές· ἔ γάρ ἐν, ὡς ἐλάχιστον, καθάπερ ὁ Σπεύσιππος ἔδοξε λέγειν, ἀλλ' ΕΝ, ΩΣ ΠΑΝΤΑ. *As numerous as is THE MULTITUDE OF INDIVIDUALS by Partition, so numerous also is that PRINCIPLE OF UNITY by universal Impartibility. For it is not ONE, as a MINIMUM is one (according to what Speucippus seemed to say,) but it is ONE, as being ALL THINGS.* Damascius περὶ Ἀρχῶν, MS.

P. 433—THE WISEST NATIONS—THE MOST COPIOUS LANGUAGES.] It is well observed by *Muretus*—*Nulli unquam, qui res ignorarent, nomina, quibus eas exprimerent, quæsierunt.* Var. Lect. VI. 1.

P. 455—BUT WHAT WAS THEIR PHILOSOPHY?] The same *Muretus* has the following passage upon the ROMAN TASTE FOR PHILOSOPHY.—*Beati autem illi, et opulenti, et omnium gentium victores ROMANI, in petendis honoribus, et in prensandis civibus, et in exteris nationibus verbo componendis, re compilandis occupati, philosophandi curam servis aut libertis suis, et Græculis esurientibus relinquebant. Ipsi, quod ab avaritia, quod ab ambitione, quod a voluptatibus reliquum erat temporis, ejus si partem aliquam aut ad audiendum Græcum quempiam philosophum, aut ad aliquem de philosophia libellum vel legendum vel scribendum contulissent, jam se ad eruditionis culmen pervenisse, jam victam a se et profligatam jacere Græciam somniabant.* Var. Lect. VI. 1.

INDEX

TO THE

THREE TREATISES.

A.

ACQUIESCENCE and *Gratitude*, their Force, - - - 132, 193
Affections, reciprocate with our Ideas, 56.
 their Force, when raised by Music, - 57
AGATHO, - - - 152
ALCIDAMAS, noble Sentiment of, - 197
ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, his account of active efficient Causes, 143. of Speech, 163. of the *Stoic* estimate of Externals, 181. of the necessity of *Justice* to the worst Societies, - - - 191
AMMONIUS, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 155, 162, 185, 186
ANDRONICUS RHODIUS, - 143, 179, 180
ANTIPATER, his notion of the *End* of Man, 174
ANTONINUS, unites Social and Rational, 164, 165. describes Law Universal, 168. his notion of *Κατόρθωσις*, or Rectitude of Conduct, 168, 169. quoted, 171, 182, 190. his notion of *Δαίμων*, or Genius, 183. of the Universe, 185. of Reason, or Intellect, 186, 187. of God, the Animating Wisdom, 189. of Evil, *ibid.* of tinging our minds, *ibid.* of Philosophical Exception, or Reserve, *ibid.* joins Justice and Piety, - 192

ARCHIDEMUS, his notion of Happiness, 174
ARCHYTAS, - - - 175
ARISTOCLES, - - - 196
ARISTOTLE, his notion of Art, 143, 144, 146. of active efficient Causes, 145. of the various Modes of *Human* Action, 143. of Compulsion, 144. of Man's *natural* Power, *ibid.* of his acquired Power, or Habits, 145. of Operations, purely natural, *ibid.* of Nature, 146. of a Contingent, 148. of the Subjects of *Philosophy*, 149. of Chance and Fortune, 151. proves from *their* existence that of mind, and Nature, *ibid.* quoted, 38, 153, 185. his notion of human Choice or Determination, 153. of final Causes, 153, 155. of Energies, 155. makes *Life* itself an *Energy*, *ibid.* Final causes two-fold, 156. his Division of Arts, *ibid.* enumeration of Causes, 156, 157. quoted, 160. his Idea of Good, 161. proves Man *social* from *Speech*, 162. quoted, 49, 145. 165. holds the *same* Science of Contraries, 165. his Account of Happiness, 166, 177. gives that of *Xenocrates*, 176. accounts for the Pleasure arising from Imitations, 48. his account of Sentiments, 50. of the end of Tragedy, 51. of Characters or Manners, 54. etymologises the word *Ethics*, 190. makes

INDEX TO THE

- makes *self* and *social* one, 191. makes Happiness the universal object, 193. his Treatise concerning Philosophy, quoted from a Manuscript, - - - 196
- ARRIAN. See EPICTETUS.
- ART, considered as an *efficient* Cause, from 9 to 15. its *Material* Cause, from 15 to 18. its *Final*, from 18 to 21. its *Formal*, from 21 to 25. loves Fortune, why, 152. what, 9, 12, 15, 143. how distinguished from Chance, 9, 144, 150. how from Compulsion, 9, 144. how from Volition, *ibid.* how from natural power and Instinct, 10, 11, 144, 145. how from power divine, 11, 146. its influence on the Elements, 26, 27. on Animals irrational, 27, 28. on Man, 28. the same as *Mind*, *ibid.* inane and false Art, 147. *Peripatetic* description of Art, *ibid.* *Stoic*, *ibid.* that of *Quintilian*, *ibid.* of *Cicero*, *ibid.* of *Cleanthes*, *ibid.* of *Nicephorus Blemmides*, *ibid.* Art considered in *four* views, 29.
- ARTS, their Comparative Priority, 195, &c. either necessary or elegant, 33, 195, 196. the Pretensions of each, 33. *imitative* Arts imitate thro' *sensible* Media, 34. what a number of them wanted to establish *human* Society, - - - 86 to 88
- ARTISTS, moral and inferior, how they differ, 108, 171
- B.
- Beauty, its Effect, - - - 121
- Being, every species of, conciliated to itself, 84, 162
- Being, and *Well-Being*, - - - 33
- BLEMMIDES, - - - 147
- BOSSU, - - - 38, 49, 54
- Brutal, Degradation of *Rational* into it, how, 186, 187
- C.
- Cæsura, in verse, - - - 54
- Capacity, - - - 12, 13
- CAUSE, 9, 10. *Efficient*, 9 to 15. *Material*, 15 to 17. *Final*, 18 to 21, 155. *Formal*, 21 to 25. *Final* often *concurs* with *Formal*, 155. *Final*, two-fold, *ibid.* the *four* species in one view, - - - 156, 157
- Chance, - - - 9, 144, 150, 151
- Character, or *Manners*, - - - 50, 53
- CHRYSIPPUS, his notion of *Law universal*, 182. of *Good*, 170. of the *Rational* Pursuit even of *Externals*, 181. of the *Perfect* Man, 183. of *Futurity*, 188. of *Evil*, 189
- CICERO, his notion of Art, 143. quoted, 147, 148, 160, 161. for an active Life, 162. quoted, 162, 163. his notion of Portents, 163, 164. supposes one Reason, one Truth, and one Law to Gods and men, 165. his argument against Injustice, *ibid.* holds Virtue agreeable to Nature, *ibid.* his Definition of a Moral Office, or Duty, *ibid.* his account of the *Peripatetic* Idea of Happiness, 166. of the *Stoic* objection to it, *ibid.* of *Law universal*, 167. translates *Kalôgêthêsis*, 168. his account of the *Stoic* Happiness, 169, 170, 171. quoted, 172, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 183, 184, 187. his account of the *Stoic* Πάθος, 178. of their regard to the *social* System, 180. to *Externals*, 181, 182. *Good* or *Interest*, his account of it, 183. of the *Perfect* Man, 183, 184. of the Universe, as one City, 185. joins *self* and *social*, 191. his high notion of Justice, *ibid.* whence he derives *human* Reason or Mind, 187. his notion of Habit, as to Morals, 180. quoted, 187, 193
- CLEANTHES, his notion of Happiness, 174. of *Evil*, 189. his verses, - - - 134
- CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS, - - - 184
- Compulsion, - - - 9, 144
- Contingents, what, 148. differ in Character, 150
- Contraries, known thro' the *same* Habit or Faculty, - - - 100, 165
- D.

THREE TREATISES.

D.

Δαίμων or *Genius*, what, 176, 183, 187, 188.
affords an elegant Etymology to *Ευδαιμονία*,
Happiness, - - - - - 183
DEMETRIUS PHALEREUS, - - - - - 38
Desire, how to be treated, - - - 131, 186
Dialectic, what, - - - - - 200
DIO CHRYSOSTOM, - - - - - 143
DIOGENES LAERTIUS, 148, 155, 160, 165.
defines a Moral Office, or Duty, 166. *Law*
universal, 168. quoted, 171, 172, 173, 174,
175, 177, 193. his account of *Passion*, ac-
cording to the *Stoics*, 178. their *Apathy*,
what, 179. their *Eupathies*, or Well-
feelings, 180. quoted, 180, 181, 185.
Virtue and Felicity, one, - - - 188
Duty. See *Moral Offices*.

E.

End of Man, and *human Action*, examined
in the *Life Political*, 73. *Lucrative*, 75.
Pleasurable, 76. *Contemplative*, 79. in
the *Life of Virtue* joined to *Health* and
Competence, 102. of *pure Virtue* alone,
106. *End*, not in the *Success*, but in *Recti-*
tude of Conduct, 106, 170, 173. in the *mere*
doing, *ibid.* and 169. confirmed by Ex-
amples, 55 to 115, 172. *Moral End* dif-
fers from *other Ends*, how, - - - 108, 171
Energies, 13. how they differ from *Works*, 23,
24. in them and *Works* all *Arts* end,
21, 24. easy, when habitual, - - - 146
Enthusiasm, the rational, and the savage, 133.
EPICTETUS, his *Idea of Good*, 159, 160, 161,
169. quoted, 162, 168, 187. makes *Life*
the Subject to the *Moral Artist*, 170. quoted,
172, 173. recommends *Consistence*, 174.
his Account of *Stoic Apathy*, 179. dis-
tinguishes *Passions* from *natural Affections*,
179, 180. maintains the *social System*,
ibid. *Life a Drama*, 182. wise Advice of
his, *ibid.* makes *Good* the *common Object*
of Pursuit, 182, 183. his notion of Pro-
ficiency, 185 of the *World*, as one City,

ibid. of Reason and Intellect, 186. *Reason*
degraded, *how*, 186, 187. *our own*, whence,
131, 187. his advice about *Desire*, 187.
treats *Man* as a *Part* of the *Whole*, 187,
188. his Doctrine as to *Futurity*, 188. his
Notion of *Habit* in *Morals*, 190. quoted,
187, 189, 190. makes *self* and *social one*,
190. rests all in *pious* and *rational Ac-*
quiescence, 192, 193. what Error he would
adopt, - - - - - 193
EPICURUS, his *Epistle*, when dying, 112, 113.
his account of *Happiness* connected with
Virtue, - - - - - 177

Ευδαιμονία, vid. *Δαίμων*.
Ευδαιμον, etymologised morally, - 176, 183
Evil, 133, 164. N. xviii. 189. N. lxxiii. 191.
N. xcv. 201

EUSTATHIUS, - - - - - 37
Externals, not necessarily conducive to *Hap-*
piness, 103. accurate knowledge of them
requisite, why, - - - 107, 116, 117

F.

Final, vid. *Cause*.
Fortitude, natural, why, - - - 100
Fortune, 151. loves *Art*, why, - - - 152
Friendship, real, exists only among the *Vir-*
tuous, - - - - - 181
Frontispiece, explained, - - - 203, &c.
Futurity, its Force, either as unknown, or
known, - - - - - 132, 133, 188

G.

GALE'S *Opuscula*, - - - - - 175
Generals, or *Universals*, their Character, 130,
200, 201

Genius, vid. *Δαίμων*.
GOD, superior to all Art, how, 146. to Phi-
losophizing, why, *ibid.* works uniformly,
according to one *Idea* of Perfection, 97,
163. the same with right Reason, and uni-
versal Law, 167, 168. the Standard of
Perfection, according to *Plato* and *Scrip-*
ture, 184, 185. *the universal Reason*, 131.

or

INDEX TO THE

or *Mind*, 133. pervades and rules the whole, 133, 189, 197. made all men free, 197. himself universal, one, and ever in Energy, - - - - *ibid.*
Good, *absent*, leads to Art, 18, 19. this *absent* Good described, and its Characters given, 19 to 21. *Sovereign*, 67, 159. always complete, 109. various descriptions of it, 150. its original Preconceptions, or Characteristics, 67. agreeable to Nature, 68, 161. conducive to Well-Being, 69. accommodated to all Places and Times, 71, 161. durable, 70, 161. self-derived, *ibid.* its Characteristics applied, to determine *what is Happiness*, 103, 109 to 111, 122. *Good* not in *Externals*, but in their proper Use, 170. pursued by all, 121, 140, 182, 192. See *Happiness*.
Gospel, quoted, - - - - 185
Gratis, nothing to be had, - - - 135, 190
Gratitude and *Acquiescence*, their force, 132, 140

H.

Habit, - - - - 10, 134, 135, 190
HANDEL, - - - - 40, 58
HAPPINESS, in *Virtue* joined to Health and Competence, 102. how far adequate and perfect, 102, 103. in *Virtue alone*, or Rectitude of Conduct, in the mere *doing*, without regard to *Success*, 105, 106. in Consistence, in Experience, in Selection and Rejection, 116 to 118, 172 to 175. in performance of *moral* Offices, 118, 174. *concurring* Sentiments of different Sects of Philosophers on the Subject of Happiness, 175 to 177. *Virtue* and Happiness, One, 188. real Self-Interest and Happiness, One, 190. pursued by all, - 140, 192
ECATO, the *Stoic*, - - - - 181
HERMES, called KOINOΣ, or *COMMON*, why, 199
HOBBS, his account of Happiness, - 177
HOMER, - - - - 162, 196
HORACE, 12, 38, 42, 53, 57, 80, 111, 170, 174, 185, 186

I.

Ideas, in Poetry we form *our own*, in Painting we take them from the Artists, 46, 47. reciprocate with Affections, 56. *Ideas*, *Specific*, their high Rank, 125, 126, 184, 200
JEROM, his Notion of the *Stoics*, - 173
Ill, *vid. Evil*.
IMITATION, Objects of, different from the *Media* of Imitation, how, 34. extend farther than the *Media*, *ibid.* and 37, 38. *Imitation*, *Media* of What to Painting, 35, 37. What to *Music*, 35, 39, 40, 43. What to *Poetry*, 35, 43. Whence *Imitation* by different Arts derive their Pre-eminence, 36. *Imitation*, natural to Man, and pleasing, why, - - - 47, 48
Imitative Arts, - - - - 34, 203
Individuals. See *Particulars*.
Injustice, unnatural, why, - - 165, 191
Instinct, 11. different from Reason, how, 91
Interest, all governed by, 138. and *justly*, *ibid.* a detached one, impossible, *ibid.* a social one, Happiness, 139. Private and Public, *inseparable*, - - - 190
JOANNES GRAMMATICUS. See **PHILOPONUS**.
Justice, natural, why, 98, 139, 191. joined by the *Stoics* to Piety, - - - 192

K.

Κατὰ Νῆς, *Common Sense*, - - 159, 160
 Κατὰ θῶκος, and Κατὰ θῶμα, - - - 168

L.

Language, its Rise, 34. founded in Compact, *ibid.* & 9. See *Speech*.
Law, universal, described, 167, 168. the same as *Right Reason*, 165. and as God himself, - - - - 133, 168
Legislators, their high Character, 28, 196, 197
Liberty, the Gift of God, 196. Philosophic, what, - - - - 134
 LIFE,

THREE TREATISES.

LIFE, 80, 161. Life according to Virtue and to Moral Offices, *the same*, 101, 165. *Life*, and its Events, the Subject-Matter to the *moral* Artist, 170. Life human, a Drama, - - - 120, 131, 182, 187. *Lives*, four sorts of, 72, 73, 161. the Political, 73, 131. the Lucrative, 75, 76. the Pleasurable, 76 to 78. the Contemplative, 78 to 81. all inadequate, 110. Active and Social, - - - - 80, 161. *Love, Philosophic*, its Progress and End, 131, 134, 187. *Logic*, when useful, when not, - - 141

M.

Man, his Nature and Constitution, examined, 85 to 98. by Nature, Social, 85 to 91. Rational, 91 to 98. the *Perfect Man*, 122, 135, 183. Man a *Part only* of the Whole, 132, 140. made by God and Nature, not a Slave, but Free, - - - 197. *Mankind*, their Modes of Action, - 143. *Manners*, or *Characters*, - - 50, 53. *Manuscript*, of PHILOPONUS, 195. of PROCLUS, - - - 199, 200, 201. *Master Knowledge and Science*, 51, 131, 141, 187, 192, 196. *Μαλαιοτεχνία*, what, - - - 147. *Matter*, - - - - 201. MAXIMUS TYRIUS, - - - 183. *Metaphysics*, called so, why, - 197. MILTON, - - 42, 46, 54, 79, 80, 169. *Mimetic*, vid. *Imitative*. *Mind*, recognizes the natural World thro' the Senses, 34. *Particular Minds*, Harmony of, with the Universal, 133, 134, 188. the more respectable, how characterized, 202. *Moral Office*, defined, 101, 166. Happiness, to live performing them, - 118, 174. *Morals* united with Religion, 127. why treated *apart*, - - - 222. *Motion*, its species, with a View to the *Mimetic Arts*, 39. Natural differs from Musical, how, 40. imitated by Painting, how,

VOL. I.

37. more Motions in Music than in Poetry, 43, 44. *Music*, Art of; its Media of *Imitation*, 35. its Subjects, 39. imitates Joy and Grief, how, 40. its Imitation far inferior to that of Painting, why, 40, 41. its Efficacy derived elsewhere, 56. by help of *Natural Media*, imitates nearly as well as Poetry, tho' inferior, 43, 44, 47, 48. an *Ally* to Poetry, how, 54, 55, 56. raises *Affections*, rather than *Ideas*, 57. its force in consequence of this, 57, 58, 59. Objections to singing of Dramas, solved, - - 58, 59. *Musical Discords*, different to different hearers, whence, - - - 201, 202

N.

Nations, comparative Estimate of, how to be formed, - - - 198. *Nature*, Divine, Human, Brutal, Vegetable, 11. defined, 146, 150, 157, 158. her treatment of Man, 63, 159. how distinguished from, and opposed to *Reason*, 94 to 97: governed by one efficient Cause, 97. when and why She Deviates, Note xviii. 164. the *Primaries of Nature*, τὰ πρῶτα τῆς φύσεως, what, - - 166. *Natural Philosophy*, its Order in the Rank of Sciences, - - - 196, 197. *Necessary*, and *Impossible*, - - 150. *Necessity*, natural, how distinguished from natural Desire, - - - 144, 151. NICIAS, the Painter, his judicious remarks on the *Subjects* of his Art, - - 38, 39

O.

Object, of universal Pursuit, what, 140, 141, 192, 193. *Objects* of Perception, to be valued, not by their *Number*, but their *Worth*, - - - 201, 202

P.

Painting, Art of, its Media of *Imitation*, 35. its *Subjects*, 37. imitates Sounds, Motions,

INDEX TO THE

tions, Passions, Affections, Characters, how, 37, 53, 54. its best Subjects, how circumstanced, 38, 45. confined to an *Instant*, as to *Time*, 38. not so, as to *Space*, - 38, 39

Particulars, their Characters, 130, 172, 173

PAUL, quoted, - - - - - 167

Perceptions, Sensitive differ from Intellectual how, - - - - - 164

Perfection, where, and how it exists, 123 to 126. vid. *Standard*.

Peripatetics, unite *Self* and *Social*, - 191

PERSIUS, - - - - - 187

Perspicuity, essential to Arts, - - 39

PHILOPONUS, 155, 156. MS. 195. See JOANNES GRAMMATICUS.

PHILOSOPHERS, the concurring Sentiments of various Sects of, concerning *Happiness*, and *moral Ends*, illustrated from the *Pythagoreans*, 175. the *Socratics*, 176. the *Peripatetics*, 175, 176. the *Epicureans*, 177. *Thomas Hobbs*, 177, 178. the *Stoics*, *passim*.

PHILOSOPHY; its *Progress*, and *End* or *Aim*, according to the *Peripatetics*, 149. according to the *Platonics*, 186. Philosophy, *ancient*, different in its Method from *modern*, how, *ibid.* its three-fold Division according to the *Ancients*, 193. the *First Philosophy*, what, and why so called, 196, 197.

Physics, when useful, when not, 141. prior to *Metaphysics*, why, - - 196, 197, 198

Physical Events, their different Effect on weak, and on generous Minds, - 197

Piety, connected with Virtue, 140. their different employs, - - - 192

PLATO, his Idea of *God* not philosophizing, and why, 146. of the Invention of Art, 152, 153. of the *Sovereign Good*, 159. his Argument for Society, 162, 163. quoted, 113, 114, 146, 147, 153, 154, 163, 164, 165, 171, 172, 182, 183, 187, 188, 191, 192, 193. makes *God* the *Standard*, 184, 185. his philosophical Synthesis, 186. his progress of *Love*, - - - 188

PLUTARCH, describes *Law universal*, 163. quoted, 160, 162, 168, 170, 179, 181, 183, 184, 185, 189, 193

POETRY, *Art of*, its *Media* of Imitation, 35. Media partly *natural*, partly *artificial*, 35, 36, 42. its force by help of *natural* Media, 42. in this view, limited, 43. and inferior to Painting, 43, 46, 47. but *nearly* equal to Music, 43, 44. Poetry, its force by help of an *artificial* Medium, Language, 45. inferior to Painting, where the Subject is *most perfectly* adapted to Painting, 46, 47. the reason, note, 46. superior to Music, 47, 48. Poetry, the objects *most perfectly* adapted to it, described, 49 to 52. its force in *these last* Subjects, 52, 53. compared to Painting, 54. to *Music*, 55. greatly superior to both, and why, 54, 55. associates with *Music*, how, 54. derives power merely from its Numbers, - - - *ibid.*

PORPHYRY, - - - - - 186

Portents, and Monsters, what and whence, 164

Power, 12. natural, prior to Energy, 144. how different from Habit, or Custom, 145

Practice and Theory, - - - 66

Preconceptions, Προλήψεις, 67, 159. defined, 160

PROCLUS, Manuscript of, Quotations from, 199, 200, 201

Proficiency, - - - - 126, 185

Prudence, natural, and our Interest, - 98

Q.

QUINTILIAN, his Account of Ματαιολογία, or inane and false Art, 146, 147. of Energies and Works, 155. of Speech, 163. of the Event, in Rhetoric, 170. of the force of Music, 57. of the perfect Orator, 184, 185

R.

RAPHAEL URBIN, - - - 38, 47

REASON, natural to Man, 94. different from *Instinct*,

THREE TREATISES.

Instinct, how, 92, 93. *rational* implies *social*, 164, 165. Reason and Law, *the same*, *ibid.* its Character, 130, 131, 186, 187. *universal*, see God.
Reason, degraded, how, - - 131, 187
Rectitude of Endeavours, or *Conduct*, 105, 106, 168. proposed as *the Sovereign Good*, 106. examined by our Preconceptions of Good, 109 to 111. explained, 168, 169, 200
Religion, connected with *Morals*, 127, 140. See *Piety*.
Reserve, Philosophical, what, - 134, 189

S.

SALVATOR ROSA, - - - 38
SANCTIUS, - - - 163
SCALIGER, - - - 153, 154, 155
Science, its objects, what, - 186, 200, 201
Self, 200. vid. *Interest*, *Happiness*, *Virtue*.
Self-denial, discuss, - - 136, 137
SENECA, his account of the Causes, 156. quoted, 171, 175. his notion of the *Perfect Man*, 184, 185. of *Futurity*, 188. of Philosophic Reserve, 189. translates *Cleanthes*, *ibid.*
Sense, objects of, their Character, 186, 200. *common*, what, - - 159, 160
Sentiments, their Description and End, - 50
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, - - - 184
SHAFTESBURY, Earl of, quoted, 38, 174, 187
SHAKESPEARE, - - - 65
SIMPLICIUS, explains the *Stoic* Definition of Moral Duty, - - - 165, 166
Social Affections, natural, 90, 91, 179, 180. *social Principle* implied in *rational*, 164, 165. contributes to *Happiness*, - 111
Society, natural to Man, 90, 91, 180. progress of a rising one, from its commencement to its completion, 195, 196. necessary to the production of *Science*, why, 197
SOCRATES, his notion of *Happiness*, 113, 114, 169. his Proficiency, - 126, 185
Soul of Man, has various faculties, - 137
Sounds, imitated by *Painting*, how, 37. Mu-

fic, different from *Natural*, how, 40. inferior to those of Poetry in the view of *Imitation*, why, - - - 44
Speech, its powers natural, 90. our *social* Nature proved from it, 162, 163. its Origin, 34. See HERMES.
SPENSER, - - - 77
Sportsmen, resemble Philosophers, how, 111
Standard, when found among the *many*, when among the *few*, 95, 163. *Natural State*, a Standard of what, 106, 169. of Perfection, natural, and moral, 125. found in no one Individual, 125, 184. general reasoning on the Idea of *Standard*, 184, 185. God, the *moral Standard*, 185. Reason, a *Standard*, 130

STOBEUS, his account of the Virtues, 165. makes Virtue agreeable to Nature, *ibid.* defines a moral Duty, 165, 166. quoted, 154, 173, 174, 175, 178
STOIC PHILOSOPHY, its Idea of the *Sovereign Good*, 66 to 71. objects to the *Peripatetic* Idea, and why, 166. its Notion of *Law universal*, 167, 168. holds its Idea of Good most consonant to our Preconceptions, 170. resembles the *Christian* Religion, 64, 114, 173. takes not away the difference in things, but establishes it, 119, 177, 178. suppresses no natural Affections, 119, 178. its Apathy, what, 178 to 181. what not, 179. its Idea of the *perfect* moral Character, 181. its Attachment to the *social* Scheme, 180, 181. *Stoic* System, what it is not, 119. what it is, 120, 121. did not reject *Externals*, 181, 182. its *perfect* Man, 184, 185. made *real self* and *social* the same, - - - 190
Substances, their species, 28, 129, 130, 196

T.

Temperance, natural, why, - - - 99
TERENCE, places Good not in *Externals*, but in their proper Use, - - - 170
THEMISTIUS, 150, 151. holds the same Science

INDEX TO THE THREE TREATISES.

Science of Contraries, 164. gives the *Stoic* account of the Passions, 179. characterizes the most excellent Mind by its objects, how, - - - 201, 202
Theory, compared to *Practice*, - - 66, 135
Things, not indifferent, 82. their value adjusted by the peculiar nature of each species, 84. Division of them with respect to Beings sensitive, 83. *Philosophy* takes not away their Distinction, - - 119, 178
Tragedy, End of, explained, - - 51

U.

VALERIUS MAXIMUS, - - - 143
 VARRO, his notion of *Genius*, - - 183
Verse, English Heroic, - - 54
Vice, as much *Self-denial* in, as in *Virtue*, 137
 VIRGIL, his account of the Cause, which gave birth to Arts, 154. quoted, 42, 64, 103, 127, 201, 202
 VIRTUE, cardinal Virtues, 100, 101, 165.
Virtue connected with *Religion*, 127. inseparable from *self*, - - 139, 143, 200

UNIVERSE, one City or Commonwealth, 129, 132, 133, 134, 185, 186. how we rise to its Idea, 129. the Mansion of Jove, where all is fair and good, - - - 201

W.

Well-Being, compared to *Mere-Being*, 33
Whole, Man, a part of, - - 132, 187, 188
Wise Men, the Seven, their Character and Employ, - - - 196

X.

XENOCRATES, his notion of *Happiness*, 176.
 of *Δαίμων*, or *Genius*, - *ibid.* and 183
 XENOPHON, - - - 183

Z.

ZENO, 122. his account of the *End of Man*, 173, 174. of a Passion, or Perturbation, *Πάθος*, 178. makes the Passions to be erroneous Judgments, - - - 179

INDEX

TO

HERMES.

A.

ADJECTIVE, how it differs from other Attributives, such as the Verb, and the Participle, 318. verbal, *ibid.* pronominal, 319. strictly speaking can have no Genders, 320
ADVERBS, their character and use, 321, 322. Adverbs of Intension and Remission, 323. of Comparison, 323, 324. of Time, and Place, and Motion, 327, 328. made out of Prepositions, 328. Adverbs of Interrogation, *ibid.* affinity between these last, and the Pronoun relative, 328, 329. Adverbs derived from every Part of Speech, 330. found in every Predicament, 331. called by the Stoics Πανδέκτες, - - *ibid.*
ÆSCHINES, - - - - - 439
ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, 374, 383, 446. his account of Phanfy or Imagination, - - - - - 408
ALEXANDER and THAIS, 255. his influence upon the Greek Genius, - - - 439
AMAFANIUS, - - - - - 436
AMMONIUS, his account of Speech, and its relations, 217. of the Progress of human Knowledge from Complex to Simple, 220. of the Soul's two principal Powers, 225. of the Species of Sentences, *ibid.* his notion

of God, 247. quoted, 249. his notion of a Verb, 263, 321. his notion of Time, 270. illustrates from *Homer* the Species of Modes or Sentences, 296. quoted, 300. his notion of conjunctive Particles, and of the Unity which they produce, 347. quoted, 366. his account of Sound, Voice, Articulation, &c. 389, 393. of the distinction between a Symbol and a Resemblance, 394. what he thought the human Body with respect to the Soul, 396. his triple order of Ideas or Forms, - 421
Analysis and Synthesis, 215, 216, 413. analysis of Cases, - - - - 364, 369
ANAXAGORAS, - - - - 361
ANTHOLOGIA Gr. - - - - 241, 244
ANTONINUS, - 316, 383, 432, 433, 438
APOLLONIUS, the Grammarian, explains the Species of Words by the Species of Letters, 230. his elegant name for the Noun and Verb, 233. quoted, 251. his idea of a Pronoun, 252, 253. quoted, 254. explains the Distinction and Relation between the Article and the Pronoun, 256, 257. his two Species of Δείξις or Indication, 258. holds a wide difference between the Prepositive and Subjunctive Articles, *ibid.* explains the nature of the Subjunctive Article, 260. corrects.

INDEX TO HERMES.

- corrects *Homer* from the doctrine of Enclitics, 262. his notion of that Tense called the *Præteritum perfectum*, 286. holds the Soul's disposition peculiarly explained by Verbs, 293. his notion of the Indicative Mode, 299. of the Future, implied in all Imperatives, 301. explains the power of those past Tenses, found in the *Greek* Imperatives, *ibid.* his Idea of the Infinitive, 306. his name for it, *ibid.* quoted, 308, 312. his notion of middle Verbs, *ibid.* quoted, 314, 315, 322. explains the power and effect of the *Greek Article*, 334 to 336. holds it essential to the Pronoun not to coalesce with it, 338 to 340. shews the different force of the Article when differently placed in the same Sentence, 341. quoted, 345, 346. his idea of the Preposition, - - - - - 357
- APULEIUS, short account of him, - 438
- AQUINAS, THOMAS, quoted, - 451
- Argument, a priori & a posteriori, 220. which of the two more natural to Man, - *ibid.*
- ARISTOPHANES, - - - - - 439
- ARISTOTLE, his notion of Truth, 216. quoted, 219. his notion of the difference between things absolutely prior, and relatively prior, 220. quoted, 223. his Definition of a Sentence, 226. of a Word, *ibid.* of Substance, 231. divides things into Substance and Accident, *ibid.* how many Parts of Speech he admitted, and why, 232, 233, 234, &c. his notion of Genders, 239. his account of the metaphorical use of Sex, 242. quoted, 247, 248, 264. his Definition of a Verb, 267. his notion of a Now or Instant, 271. of Sensation limited to it, 272, 445. of Time, 273. of Time's dependence on the Soul, 277. quoted, 280, 321. his notion of Substance, 326. calls *Euripides* ὁ ποιητής, 337. himself called the *Stagirite*, why, *ibid.* a distinction of his, *ibid.* his definition of a Conjunction, 346. a passage in his Rhetoric explained, *ibid.* his account of Relatives, 370. his notion of the divine Nature, 378. whom he thought it was probable the Gods should love, *ibid.* his notion of Intellect and intelligible Objects, *ibid.* held Words founded in Compact, 384, 385. quoted, 383, 388. his account of the Elements or Letters, 390. his high notion of Principles, 391. quoted, 408, 419, 447. his notion of the difference between moveable and immoveable Existence, 410. between intellectual or divine Pleasure, and that which is subordinate, *ibid.* quoted, *ibid.* his notion of the divine Life or Existence, compared with that of Man, *ibid.* of the difference between the *Greeks* and the *Barbarians*, 434. his character, as a Writer, compared with *Plato* and *Xenophon*, 440. corresponds with *Alexander*, - - 439
- Arithmetic, founded upon what Principles, 406. (See *Geometry*.) its subject, what, 413. owes its Being to the Mind, how, - *ibid.*
- Art, what, and Artist, who, - - 276, 406
- ARTICLES, 232. their near alliance with Pronouns, 256. of two kinds, 332. the first kind, 332 to 342. the second kind, 342 to 344. *English* Articles, their difference and use, 333. *Greek Article*, 335. Articles denote pre-acquaintance, 334, 335. thence eminence and notoriety, 336, 337. with what words they associate, with what not, 337 to 340. *Greek Article* marks the Subject in Propositions, 341. Articles, instances of their effect, 341, 342. Articles pronominal, 255, 256, 342. instances of their effect, 343, 344, 403. Subjunctive Article, see *Pronoun* relative or subjunctive. - - - - -
- Articulation, see *Voice*.
- ASCONIUS, - - - - - 287
- ATTRIBUTIVES, 231, 232. defined, 263. of the first order, 263 to 320. of the second order, 321 to 331. See *VERB*, *PARTICIPLE*, *ADJECTIVE*, *ADVERB*.
- AULUS GELLIUS, short account of him as a Writer, - - - - - 437
- B.

INDEX to HERMES.

B.

- BACON, his notion of *Universal Grammar*, 216. of *ancient Languages and Geniuses*, compared to *modern*, 371. of *mental Separation or Division*, 380. of *Symbols*, to convey our thoughts, 396. of the *Analogy between the Geniuses of Nations and their Languages*, - - - - 433
Being, or Existence, mutable, immutable, 264, 414. temporary, superior to Time, 265. See *Truth, God*.
 BELISARIUS, - - - - 298
 BLEMMIDES, NICEPHORUS, his notion of Time present, 280. his *Etymology of Έπισήμη*, 413. his triple order of *Forms or Ideas*, - - - - 423
Body, Instrument of the Mind, 380. chief Object of modern Philosophy, 382. confounded with Matter, *ibid.* human, the Mind's veil, 395. Body, that, or Mind, which has precedence in different Systems, 425
 BOERHAAVE, - - - - 389
 BOETHIUS, how many Parts of Speech he admitted as necessary to *Logic*, 233. his idea of God's Existence, 265. illustrates from *Virgil* the Species of Modes or Sentences, 296. quoted, 384. held Language founded in Compact, 385. refers to the Deity's unalterable Nature, 410. his notion of original, intelligible Ideas, 428. of the difference between Time (however immense) and Eternity, 423. short account of his Writings and character, - - 438
Both, differs from *Two*, how, - - 339
 BRUTUS, - - - - 436, 439

C.

- CESAR, C. JULIUS, his *Laconic Epistle*, 313
 CESAR, OCTAVIUS, influence of his Government upon the *Roman Genius*, - 439
 CALLIMACHUS, - - - - 245

CASES, scarce any such thing in modern Languages, 363, name of, whence, 365, Nominative, 366 to 368. Accusative, *ibid.* Genitive and Dative, 369 to 371. Vocative, why omitted, 365. Ablative, peculiar to the *Romans*, and how they employed it, 364, 365

Causes, Conjunctions connect the four Species of, with their effects, 350. final Cause, first in Speculation, but last in Event, *ibid.* has its peculiar Mode, 294. peculiar Conjunction, 350. peculiar Case, - - 370

CHALCIDIUS, 378. short account of him, 438

Chance, subsequent to Mind and Reason, 447

CHARISIUS, SOSIPATER, - - 328, 331

CICERO, 287, 308, 361, 363, 383, 384, 433. compelled to allow the unfitness of the *Latin Tongue* for Philosophy, 435. one of the first that introduced it into the *Latin Language*, *ibid.* *Ciceronian* and *Socratic Periods*, - - - - 439

City, Feminine, why, - - - 243

CLARK, Dr. SAM. - - - - 285

COMPARISON, degrees of, 323, 324. why Verbs admit it not, 325. why incompatible with certain Attributives, *ibid.* why with all Substantives, - - - 326

CONJUNCTION, 232. its Definition, 345. its two kinds, 346, 347. Conjunctions Copulative, 347. Continuative, *ibid.* Suppositive, Positive, 348. Causal, Collective, 349. Disjunctive Simple, 352. Adversative, *ibid.* Adversative absolute, 353. of Comparison, 354. Adequate, *ibid.* Inadequate, *ibid.* Subdisjunctive, 355. Some Conjunctions have an obscure Signification, when taken alone, - - - - 356

CONNECTIVE, 231, 232. its two kinds, 345. its first kind, *ibid.* to 356. its second, 357 to 363. See CONJUNCTION, PREPOSITION.

CONSENTIUS, his notion of the Neuter Gender, 239. of middle Verbs, 313. of the positive Degree, - - - 324

Consonant, what, and why so called, - 390

Contraries,

INDEX to HERMES.

Contraries, pass into each other, 287. destructive of each other, - - - 352
Conversation, what, - - - 428
Conversion, of Attributives into Substantives, 236. of Substantives into Attributives, 315, 319. of Attributives into one another, 318. of Interrogatives into Relatives, and *vice versa*, 328, 329. of Connectives into Attributes, - - - 328, 363
 CORN. NEPOS, - - - 331
Country, Feminine, why, - - - 243

D.

DAMASCIUS, his notion of Deity, - 451
Death, Masculine, why, 244. Brother to Sleep, - - - 245
Declension, the name, whence, - - 366
 DEFINITIVE, 232, 332. See ARTICLES.
Definitions, what, - - - 413
 Δείξις, - - - 251, 257
 DEMOSTHENES, - - - 243, 439, 440
Derivatives more rationally formed than Primitives, why, - - - 397
Design, necessarily implies Mind, 419, 447
 DIOGENES, the Cynic, - - - 439
 DIOGENES LAERTIUS, 234, 296, 300, 386, 389, 390, 433
 DIONYSIUS of Halicarnassus, - - 234
Diversity, its importance to Nature, 351. heightens by degrees, and how, *ibid.* to 352
 DONATUS, - - - 255, 363

E.

Earth, Feminine, why, - - - 241
 ECCLESIASTICUS, - - - 248
Element, defined, 390. primary Articulations or Letters so called, why, *ibid.* their extensive application, *ibid.* See *Letters*.
Empiric, who, - - - 406
Enclitics, among the Pronouns, their character, - - - 262
 ENGLISH *Tongue*, its rule as to Genders, 239. a peculiar privilege of, 249. expresses

the power of contra-distinctive and enclitic Pronouns, 262. its poverty as to the expression of Modes and Tenses, 297. its analogy in the formation of Participles, 317, 318. neglected by illiterate Writers, *ibid.* force and power of its Articles, 333 to 342. shews the Predicate of the Proposition by position, as also the Accusative Case of the Sentence, 229, 363, 364. its character, as a Language, - - 433
 EPICTETUS, - - - 382, 433
 Επισήμη, its Etymology, - - - 413
Ether, Masculine, why, - - - 241
 EUCLID, a difference between him and *Virgil*, 254. his Theorems founded upon what, 399
 EURIPIDES, - - - 245, 383
Existence, differs from *Essence*, how, 374, 446
Experience, founded on what, - - 406
Experiment, its utility, 406. conducive to Art, how, *ibid.* beholden to Science, tho' Science not to that, - - - *ibid.*

F.

Form and Matter, 215, 218. elementary Principles, 381. mysteriously blended in their co-existence, *ibid.* and 383. Form, its original meaning, what, 382. transferred from lower things to the highest, 383. pre-existent, where, *ibid.* described by *Cicero*, 383, 384. in Speech, what, 385, 391, 392, &c. Form of Forms, 383. triple order of Forms in Art, 416. in Nature, 418. intelligible or specific Forms, their peculiar character, - 412, 415, 419, 427, 448, 449
Fortune, Feminine, why, - - - 248
 FULLER, - - - 316

G.

GAZA THEODORE, his Definition of a Word, 226. explains the Persons in Pronouns, 253. hardly admits the Subjunctive for an Article, 258. his account of the Tenses, 286. of Modes, 293. quoted, 299. calls the

INDEX TO HERMES.

the Infinitive the Verb's Noun, 306. quoted, 315. his Definition of an Adverb, 322. arranges Adverbs by classes according to the Order of the Predicaments, 331. explains the power of the Article, 334. quoted, 338. explains the different powers of conjunctive Particles, 349. of disjunctive, 351. his singular explanation of a Verse in *Homer*, 353. quoted, - - 357, 362
GEMISTUS, *Georgius*, otherwise *Pletho*, his doctrine of Ideas or intelligible Forms, 427
Genders, their origin, 238. their natural number, *ibid.* (See *Sex*.) why wanting to the first and second Pronoun, - - 254
Genus and *Species*, why they (but not Individuals) admit of Number, - - 237
Geometry, founded on what Principles, 406. that and Arithmetic independent on Experiment, *ibid.* (See *Science*.) its Subject, what, 413. beholden for it to the Mind, how, - - - - *ibid.*
God, expressed by Neuters, such as τὸ θεῖον, *Numen*, &c. why, 247. as Masculine, why, *ibid.* immutable, and superior to Time and its Distinctions, 265. allwise, and always wise, 378. immediate objects of his Wisdom, what, *ibid.* whom among men he may be supposed to love, *ibid.* Form of Forms, sovereign Artist, 383, 384, 448, 449. above all Intensions and Remissions, 304, 409, 450. his Existence different from that of Man, how, 410. his divine Attributes, *ibid.* his Existence necessarily infers that of Ideas or exemplary Forms, 419, 448. exquisite Perfection of these divine Ideas or Forms, 419, 448, 449. his stupendous view of all at once, 424, 451. region of Truth, 304, 424, 431, 432. in Him Knowledge and Power unite, - - - - 450
Good, above all utility, and totally distinct from it, 376. sought by all men, 375, 376. considered by all as valuable for itself, *ibid.* intellectual, its character, 377. See *Science*, *God*.

VOL. I.

GORGAS, - - - - 245
Grammar, philosophical or universal, 215. how essential to other Arts, 217, 218. how distinguished from other Grammars, 221
Grammarians, error of, in naming Verbs Neuter, 313. in degrees of Comparison, 324. in the Syntax of Conjunctions, 345
GREEKS, their character, as a Nation, 438, &c. *Asiatic Greeks*, different from the other *Greeks*, and why, 435. *Grecian Genius*, its maturity and decay, - - 438, &c.
GREEK Tongue, how perfect in the expression of Modes and Tenses, 297. force of its imperatives in the past tenses, 301. wrong in ranging Interjections with Adverbs, 372. its character, as a Language, - 439, 441
GROCINUS, his System of the Tenses, - 285

H.

HERACLITUS, Saying of, 219. his System of things, what, - - - 413, 414
HERMES, his Figure, Attributes, and Character, 390, 391. Authors who have writ of him, - - - - 391
HESIOD, called ὁ ποιητής, the Poet, by *Plato*, 337
HOADLY's Accidence, - - - - 285
HOMER, 244, 245, 260, 261, 296, 298, 336, 337, 343, 353, 363, 370, 382, 438, 440
HORACE, 248, 259, 283, 294, 305, 308, 313, 324, 329, 342, 356, 436, 441, 442

I.

Ideas, of what, Words the Symbols, 400 to 403. if only particular were to exist, the consequence what, 398, 399. general, their importance, 400. undervalued by whom, and why, 405. of what faculty the Objects, 410. their character, 410 to 413, 424. the only objects of Science and real Knowledge, why, 413. acquired, how, 406 to 416. derived, whence, 416, &c. their triple Order in Art, 417. the same in Nature, 420. essential to Mind, why, 419. the

3 O

first

INDEX TO HERMES.

first and highest Ideas, character of, 419,
450. Ideas, their different Sources, stated,
429. their real source, - - - 448
JEREMIAH, - - - - 432
Imagination, what, 407. differs from Sense,
how, *ibid.* from Memory and Recollection,
how, - - - - *ibid.*
Individuals, why so called, 237. quit their
character, how and why, 237, 238. their
infinity, how expressed by a finite number
of Words, 333, 334, 343, 403. become ob-
jects of Knowledge, how, - - 413
INSTANT. See NOW.
Intellect. See *Mind*.
INTERJECTIONS, their application and effect,
372. no distinct Part of Speech with the
Greeks, though with the *Latins*, *ibid.* their
character and description, - - *ibid.*
Interrogation, its species explained and il-
lustrated, 299, 300. Interrogatives refuse
the Article, why, - - - 340
JOANNES GRAMMAT. See PHILOPONUS.
ISOCRATES, - - - - 440
JULIAN, - - - - 438

K.

KUSTER, - - - - 312
Knowledge, if any more excellent than Sen-
sation, the consequence, - - 414, 415

L.

LANGUAGE, how constituted, 392. defined,
394. founded in compact, 384, 392. (See
Speech.) symbolic, not imitative, why, 395
to 407. impossible for it to express the real
Essences of things, 396. its double ca-
pacity, why necessary, 404. its Matter,
what, *ibid.* its Form, what, *ibid.* its Pre-
cision and Permanence derived, whence,
402. particular Languages, their Identity,
whence, 416. their Diversity, whence,
ibid. See *English*, *Greek*, *Latin*, *Oriental*.
LATIN Tongue, deficient in Aorists, and how
it supplies the defect, 283. its peculiar use

of the *Præteritum Perfectum*, 287. has
recourse to Auxiliars for some Modes and
Tenses, 297. to a Periphrasis for some Par-
ticiples, 317. in what sense it has Articles,
342. the Ablative, a Case peculiar to it,
364. right in separating Interjections from
the other Parts of Speech, 372. its cha-
racter, as a Language, 435. not made for
Philosophy, *ibid.* sunk with *Boethius*,
438

Letters, what *Socrates* thought of their In-
ventor, 391. divine honours paid him by
the *Egyptians*, *ibid.* See *Element*.

Liberty, its influence upon Men's Genius,
439

Life, connected with Being, 377, 378, 445

LINNÆUS, - - - - 240

Literature, its cause, and that of Virtue, con-
nected, how, 433. ancient, recommended
to the Study of the liberal, 442. its peculiar
effect with regard to a man's character,
442, 443

Logic, what, - - - - 216

LONGINUS, noble remark of, - - 439

LUCIAN, - - - - 238

LUCILIUS, - - - - *ibid.*

M.

MACROBIUS, short account of him, 437.
quoted, - - - - 285, 302, 307

Man, rational and social, 215. his peculiar
ornament, what, *ibid.* first or prior to Man,
what, 220, 361. his Existence, the manner
of, what, 409. how most likely to advance
in happiness, 410. has within him some-
thing divine, 378. his Ideas, whence de-
rived, 426 to 429. Medium, thro' which he
derives them, what, 409, 426. his errors,
whence, 432, 433. to be corrected, how,
ibid.

Manuscripts quoted, of OLYMPIODORUS,
414, 426, 427. of PHILOPONUS, 445, 446,
448, 449. of PROCLUS, 447, 450. of DA
MASCIUS, - - - - 451
MARCIANUS

INDEX to HERMES.

- MARCIANUS CAPELLA, short account of him, - - - - - 438
- Master Artist, what forms his character, 276
- Matter joined with Form, 215, 218. its original meaning, confounded by the Vulgar, how, 382. its extensive character according to ancient Philosophy, *ibid.* described by Cicero, 384. of Language, what, 385. described at large, - - - - - 386, &c.
- MAXIMUS TYRIUS, his notion of the supreme Intellect, - - - - - 304
- Memory and Recollection, what, 407. distinguished from Imagination or Phanfy, how, - - - - - *ibid.*
- Metaphor, its use, - - - - - 361
- Metaphysicians modern, their Systems, what, 425
- MILTON, 222, 223, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 246, 247, 249, 276, 283, 297, 329, 360, 432, 438
- MIND (not Sense) recognizes time, 274 to 276. universal, 304, 383, 384, 409. differs not (as Sense does) from the objects of its perception, 378. acts in part through the body, in part without it, 380. its high power of separation, 380, 413. penetrates into all things, 381. *Νοῦς ὁ ὅλος*, what, 383. Mind differs from Sense, how, 412. the source of Union by viewing One in Many, 410 to 412. of Distinction by viewing Many in One, 413. without Ideas, resembles what, 419. region of Truth and Science, 414, 415. that or Body, which has precedence, 425, &c. Mind human, how spontaneous and easy in its Energies, 410. all Minds similar and congenial, why, 427
- MODES or MOODS, whence derived, and to what end destined, 293. Declarative or Indicative, *ibid.* Potential, 294. Subjunctive, *ibid.* Interrogative, *ibid.* Inquisitive, *ibid.* Imperative, 295. Precative or Optative, *ibid.* the several Species illustrated from Homer, Virgil, and Milton, 296, 297. Infinitive Mode, its peculiar character, 304, 305. how dignified by the Stoics, 306. other Modes resolvable into it, *ibid.* its application and coalescence, 307. Mode of Science, of Conjecture, of Proficiency, of Legislation, 308. Modes compared and distinguished, 298 to 303. Greek Imperatives of the Past explained, and illustrated, 301, 302
- Moon, Feminine, why, - - - - - 240
- Motion, and even its Privation, necessarily imply Time, - - - - - 267
- MURETUS, quoted, 451. his notion of the Romans, - - - - - *ibid.*
- MUSONIUS RUFUS, - - - - - 438
- N.
- Names, proper, what the consequence if no other words, 398, 399. their use, 402. hardly parts of Language, 403, 415, 416
- NATHAN and DAVID, - - - - - 342
- Nature, first to Nature, first to Man, how they differ, 220. frugality of, 388. Natures subordinate subservient to the higher, 409
- NICEPHORUS. See Blemmides.
- NICOMACHUS, - - - - - 448, 449
- NOUN, or Substantive, its three Sorts, 236. what Nouns susceptible of Number, and why, 237. only Part of Speech susceptible of Gender, - - - - - 238, 309
- A NOW or INSTANT, the bound of Time, but no part of it, 270, 271. analogous to a Point in a geometrical Line, *ibid.* its use with respect to Time, 272. its minute and transient Presence illustrated, 279. by this Presence Time made present, 278, 279, 280. See Time, Place, Space.
- Number, to what words it appertains, and why, 237

INDEX to HERMES.

O.

- Objectors*, ludicrous, 374. grave, - 375
Ocean, Masculine, why, - - - 243
 OLYMPIODORUS, quoted from a Manuscript,
 —his notion of Knowledge, and its de-
 grees, 414, 415. of general Ideas, the Ob-
 jects of Science, - - - 426, 427
 ONE, by natural co-incidence, 304, 311, 321,
 347, 357 to 359. by the help of external
 connectives, - - - 347, 359
Oriental Languages, number of their Parts of
 Speech, 234. their character and Genius,
 434
 ORPHEUS, - - - - 451
 OVID, - - - - 287, 294, 328, 329

P.

- PARTICIPLE, how different from the Verb,
 266, 317. its essence or character, 317. how
 different from the Adjective, 318. See
Attributive, LATIN and ENGLISH *Tongues*.
Particulars, how, though infinite, expressed
 by Words which are finite, 403. conse-
 quence of attaching ourselves wholly to
 them, - - - - 405
 PAUSANIAS, - - - - 370
Perception and Volition, the Soul's leading
 Powers, 224, 225. Perception two-fold,
 404. In Man what first, 220, 406, 409. fen-
 sitive and intellective differ, how, 412. if
 not correspondent to its objects, erroneous,
 414
Period. See *Sentence*.
 PERIPATETIC *Philosophy*, in the latter ages
 commonly united with the *Platonic*, 303.
 what species of Sentences it admitted,
 295. its notion of Cases, 365. held words
 founded in Compact, - - - 385
 PERIZONIUS, his rational account of the Per-
 sons in Nouns and Pronouns, - 309
 PERSIUS, 257, 305, 415. short account of
 his character, - - - - 436
Persons, first, second, third, their Origin and
 Use, - - - - 252, 253

Phansy. See *Imagination*.

- PHILOPONUS, his notion of Time, 445. of
 the business of Wisdom or Philosophy, 446.
 of God, the Sovereign Artist, - 448, 449
Philosophy, what would banish it out of the
 World, 374. its proper business, what, 446.
 ancient differs from modern, how, 382.
 modern, its chief object, what, - *ibid*.
Philosophers, ancient, who not qualified to
 write or talk about them, 362. provided
 words for new Ideas, how, - - - 361
Philosophers, modern, their notion of Ideas,
 405. their employment, *ibid*. their Cri-
 terion of Truth, *ibid*. deduce all from Body,
 425. supply the place of occult Qualities,
 how, - - - - *ibid*.
Place, mediate and immediate, 280. applied
 to illustrate the present Time, and the
 present Instant, *ibid*. its various relations
 denoted, how, 359, 362. its Latitude and
 Universality, - - - - 360
 PLATO, 226. how many Parts of Speech he
 admitted, 233. his account of Genius
 and Species, 237. quoted, 265. his Style
 abounds with Particles, why, 356. new-
 coined Word of, 361. quoted, 391. in
 what he placed real happiness, 410. his
 two different and opposite Etymologies of
 Ἐπιστήμη, 413, 414. his Idea of Time, 423.
 quoted, 433. his character, as a Writer,
 compared with *Zenophon* and *Aristotle*, 440
 PLETHO. See GEMISTUS.
 PLINY, his account how the ancient artists
 inscribed their names upon their Works,
 290
 PLUTARCH, - - - - 233
Poetry, what, - - - - 217
 PORPHYRY, - - - - 237
Position, its force in Syntax, 229, 341, 363,
 364
 PREPOSITIONS, 233. defined, 357. their
 use, 359. their original Signification, *ibid*.
 their subsequent and figurative, 361. their
 different application, 362. force in Com-
 position,

INDEX to HERMES.

- position, 362, 363. change into Adverbs, 328, 363
- Principles*, to be estimated from their consequences, 218, 342, 344, 391. of Union and Diversity, their different ends and equal importance to the Universe, 351. (*See ONE, Union, Diversity.*) elementary Principles mysteriously blended, 381. their invention difficult, why, 391. those of Arithmetic and Geometry how simple, - 406
- PRISCIAN, defines a Word, 226. explains from Philosophy the Noun and Verb, 231, 233. quoted, 234. explains how Indication and Relation differ, 251. the nature of the Pronoun, 252. of pronominal Persons, 253. his reason why the two first Pronouns have no Genders, 255. why but one Pronoun of each sort, *ibid.* ranges Articles with Pronouns according to the *Stoics*, 256, 257. a pertinent observation of his, 263. explains the double Power of the *Latin Præteritum*, 284, 287. his doctrine concerning the Tenses, 286. defines Moods or Modes, 293. his notion of the Imperative, 301. of the Infinitive, 306. of Verbs which naturally precede the Infinitive, 307. of Imperfonals, 312. of Verbs Neuter, 313. of the Participle, 322. of the Adverb, *ibid.* of Comparatives, 326. quoted, 331. his reason why certain Pronouns coalesce not with the Article, 338, 339. explains the different powers of Connectives which conjoin, 348, 349. of Connectives which disjoin, 351. quoted, 357. his notion of the Interjection, 373. of Sound or Voice, - - - 386
- PROCLUS, his Opinion about Rest, 267, 445. quoted, 383. explains the Source of the Doctrine of Ideas, - - 447, 448, 449
- PRONOUNS, why so called, 252. their Species, or Persons, *ibid.* why the first and second have no Sex, 254. resemble Articles, but how distinguished, 256. their coalescence, 257. their importance in Language, 258. relative or subjunctive Pronoun, its nature and use, 258 to 261. those of the first and second person when expressed, when not, 261. *Ἐγκλιμαὶ* and *ὀρθοτονοῦνται*, how distinguished, 262. Primitives, refuse the Article, why, - - - 338
- PROTAGORAS, his notion of Genders, 239. a Sophism of his, - - - 295
- Proverbs of Solomon*, - - - 432
- PUBLIUS SYRUS, - - - 283
- Q.
- QUINTILIAN, - - - 300, 342, 433
- Qualities occult*, what in modern Philosophy supplies their place, - - - 425
- R.
- Relatives*, mutually infer each other, 352, 370. their usual Case, the Genitive, *ibid.*
- Rhetoric*, what, - - - 217
- ROMANS, their character as a Nation, 435.
- Roman Genius*, its maturity and decay, 439, &c.
- S.
- SALLUSTIUS PHILOSOPH. - - - 429
- SANCTIUS, his elegant account of the different Arts respecting Speech, 217. quoted, 234, 305, 309. rejects Imperfonals, 312. quoted, 326. his notion of the Conjunction, after *Scaliger*, 346. of the Interjection, 373
- SCALIGER, his Etymology of *Quis*, 261. his notion of Tenses from *Grocinus*, 285. his elegant observation upon the order of the Tenses, 291. upon the pre-eminence of the Indicative Mode, 308. his account how the *Latins* supply the place of Articles, 342. his notion of the Conjunction, 345. his subtle explication of its various powers, 347 to 349, 355. his reason from Philosophy why Substantives do not coalesce, 358. his origin of Prepositions, 359. his Etymology of *Scientia*, - - 414
- Science*,

INDEX to HERMES.

Science, 217. its Mode the Indicative, and Tense the Present, why, 303. its Conjunction the Collective, why, 349. defended, 375. valuable for its consequences, *ibid.* for itself, 375 to 379. (See GOD.) pure and speculative depends on Principles the most simple, 406. not beholden to Experiment, though Experiment to it, *ibid.* whole of it seen in Composition and Division, 413. its Etymology, 414. residence of itself and its objects, where, 415. See *Mind*.

Scriptures, their Sublimity, whence, - 435

SENECA, - - - - 241, 291, 437

Sensation, of the Present only, 272, 274, 291. none of Time, 272. each confined to its own Objects, 395, 413. its Objects infinite, 398, 406. Man's first Perception, *ibid.* consequence of attaching ourselves wholly to its Objects, 405. how prior to Intellection, 419. how subsequent, - 424

Sentence, definition of, 225, 226. its various Species investigated, 223. illustrated from *Milton*, 297, &c. connection between Sentences and Modes, - - - 295

Separation, corporeal inferior to mental, why, 380

SERVIVS, - - - - 287, 339, 445

Sex, (See *Gender*.) transferred in Language to Beings, that in Nature want it, and why, 240. Substances alone susceptible of it, 309

SHAKESPEARE, 222, 228, 238, 242, 244, 246

Ship, Feminine, why, - - - 243

SIMPLICIUS, his triple Order of Ideas or Forms, - - - - 420, 421

SOPHOCLES, - - - - 445

Soul, its leading Powers, - - - 223, &c.

Sound, species of, 384, 386. the *Υλη*, or Matter of Language, 385. defined, 386. See *Voice*.

Space, how like, how unlike to Time, 270. See *Place*.

Speech, peculiar Ornament of Man, 215. how resolved or analyzed, *ibid.* its four principal Parts, and why these, and not others,

231, 232. its Matter and Form taken together, 381 to 385. its Matter taken separately 386 to 392. its Form taken separately, 392 to 409. necessity of Speech, whence, 395. founded in Compact, 385, 392

SPENCER, - - - - 288, 305

Spirits, animal, subtle Ether, nervous Ducts, Vibrations, &c. their use in modern Philosophy. See *Qualities occult*.

STOICS, how many Parts of Speech they held, 234. ranged Articles along with Pronouns, 256, 257. their Account of the Tenses, 286. multiplied the number of Sentences, 295. allowed the name of Verb to the infinitive only, into which they supposed all other Modes resolvable, 305, 306. their logical view of Verbs, and their Distinctions subsequent, 314, 315. their notion of the Participle, 322. of the Adverb, *ibid.* called the Adverb *πανθενως*, and why, 331. called the Preposition *συνδεσμος προθετικος*, 357. invented new Words, and gave new Significations to old ones, 361. their notion of Cases, 365. of the *Υλη* or Matter of Virtue, 382. of Sound, 386. of the Species of Sound, 389. their Definition of an Element, - - - - 390

Subject and Predicate, how distinguished in *Greek*, 341. how in *English*, *ibid.* analogous to what in nature, - - - 366

Substance and Attribute, 231. the great Objects of natural Union, 358. Substance susceptible of Sex, 309, 238. of Number, 237. coincides not with Substance, 358. incapable of Intension, and therefore of Comparison, - - - - 325, 326

SUBSTANTIVE, 232. described, 236. primary, *ibid.* to 250. secondary, 251 to 253. (See NOUN, PRONOUN.) *Substantive and Attributive*, analogous in Nature to what, 366

Σύλλαβα, Παρασύλλαβα, &c. - - 315

Sun, Masculine, why, - - - 240

Sylva,

INDEX to HERMES.

Sylva, a peculiar Signification of, - 382
Symbol, what, 394. differs from Imitation,
 how, *ibid.* preferred to it in constituting
 Language, why, - - - 395

T.

Tenses, their natural Number, and why, 280.
 Aorists, 282. Tenses either passing or com-
 pletive, what authorities for these Dis-
 tinctions, 285, 286. *Præteritum perfectum*
 of the *Latins*, peculiar uses of, 287, 289.
Imperfectum, peculiar uses of, 289 to 290.
 order of Tenses in common Grammars not
 fortuitous, - - - 291

TERENCE, - - - 328, 363

THE and A. See ARTICLE.

THEMISTIUS, 220. his notion how the Mind
 gains the idea of Time, 274. of the de-
 pendance of Time on the Soul's existence,
 277. of the latent transition of Nature from
 one Genus to another, - - 356, 445

THEODECTES, - - - 234

THEOPHRASTUS, his notion of Speech under
 its various Relations, 217. mentioned, 439

THEUTH, inventor of Letters, 390. See
 HERMES.

TIBULLUS, - - - 257, 287, 288

Time, Masculine, why, 244. why implied in
 every Verb, 267, 268. gave rise to Tenses,
ibid. its most obvious division, 268. how
 like, how unlike to Space, 270 to 271.
 strictly speaking no Time present, 272. in
 what sense it may be called present, 278,
 279, 445. all Time divisible and extended,
 270, 280. no object of Sensation, why, 273.
 how faint and shadowy in existence, 273,
 445. how, and by what power we gain its
 idea, 274. Idea of the past, prior to that of
 the future, 275. that of the future, how
 acquired, *ibid.* how connected with Art
 and Prudence, 276. of what faculty, Time
 the proper Object, 277. how intimately
 connected with the Soul, *ibid.* order and
 value of its several Species, *ibid.* what
 things exist in it, what not, 303, 304. its

natural effect on things existing in it, 244,
 304. described by *Plato*, as the moving
 Picture of permanent Eternity, 423. this
 account explained by *Boethius*, *ibid.* See
 NOW or INSTANT.

Truth, necessary, immutable, superior to all
 distinctions of present, past, and future,
 264, 265, 303, 304, 415. (See *Being*, GOD.)
 its place or region, 431, 432. seen in Com-
 position and Division, 216, 413. even nega-
 tive, in some degree synthetical, 216, 351,
 412. every Truth One, and so recognized,
 how, 412. factitious Truth, - - 431

V.

VARRO, - - - 248, 250, 257, 436

VERB, 232. its more loose, as well as more
 strict acceptations, 263, 321. Verb, strictly
 so called, its character, 266. distinguished
 from Participles, *ibid.* from Adjectives,
ibid. implies Time, why, 267. Tenses, 269,
 280. Modes or Moods, 293, 308. Verbs,
 how susceptible of Number and Person,
 309. Species of Verbs, 311. active, *ibid.*
 passive, *ibid.* middle, 312. transitive, 313.
 neuter, *ibid.* inceptive, 284, 315. deside-
 rative or meditative, 284. formed out of
 Substantives, 315, 316. (See *Time*, *Tenses*,
MODES.) Impersonals rejected, - 312

Verbs Substantives, their pre-eminence, 263.
 essential to every Proposition, *ibid.* implied
 in every other Verb, 264, 266. denote ex-
 istence, 263. vary, as varies the Existence,
 or Being, which they denote, 265. See
Being, *Truth*, GOD.

Verses, logical, - - - 399

Vice, Feminine, why, - - - 248

VIRGIL, 241, 242, 243, 248, 254, 261, 288.

his peculiar method of coupling the passing
 and completive Tenses, 288 to 290. quoted,
 241, 315, 324, 329, 343, 370, 371, 423,
 429, 445. his idea of the *Roman* Genius,
 343, 344, 436

Virtue, Feminine, why, 247. moral and in-
 tellectual

INDEX to HERMES.

Intellectual differ, how, 377. its Matter, what, 382. its Form, what, 383. connected with Literature, how, - - - 433
Understanding, its Etymology, 413, 414. human Understanding, a composite of what, - - - 442
Union, natural, the great objects of, 358, 366. perceived by what power, 411. in every truth, whence derived, - - - 412
Universe. See *World*.
Voice, defined, 387. simple, produced how, *ibid.* differs from articulate, how, *ibid.* articulate, what, 387 to 390. articulate, species of, 389. See *Vowel*, *Consonant*, *Element*.
Volition. See *Perception*.
Vossius, - - - - 234, 257, 372
Vowel, what, and why so called, - 389
Utility, always and only fought by the fordid and illiberal, 374, 375, 376. yet could have no Being, were there not something beyond it, 376. See *Good*.

W.

Whole and Parts, - - - - 218
Wisdom, how some Philosophers thought it distinguished from Wit, - - 413, 446

Words, defined, 226, 393. the several Species of, 228 to 232. significant by themselves, significant by Relation, 230. variable, invariable, 228. significant by themselves and alone, 236 to 331. by Relation and associated, 332 to 363. significant by Compact, 384, 392. Symbols, and not Imitations, 395. Symbols, of what not, 398 to 400. Symbols, of what, 400 to 404, 415. how, though in Number finite, able to express infinite Particulars, - 403, 415
World, visible and external, the passing Picture of what, 421, 448, 449. preserved one and the same, though ever changing, how, 421, 422. its Cause not void of Reason, 448
Writers, ancient polite, differ from modern polite, in what and why, - - 356

X.

Xenophon, 248, 433. his character, as a Writer, compared with *Plato* and *Aristotle*, 440, 441

Y.

Υλη, 382. See *Matter*, *Sylva*.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

